Secretary Rubio Travels to Rome for Talks with Pope and Italian PM amid Iran War

On May 7, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio walked into the Vatican's Apostolic Palace for a thirty-minute audience with Pope Leo XIV — the first known meeting between a senior Trump administration official and the pontiff in almost a year [1]. The meeting, confirmed by the Vatican to begin at 11:30 a.m. and end at noon [2], was followed a day later by talks with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Together, the two meetings constituted an attempt to salvage relationships that the Iran war has systematically destroyed.

What Rubio found in Rome was not a welcoming committee but a diplomatic minefield. President Trump had spent weeks attacking the first American-born pope in the Catholic Church's 2,000-year history, and Meloni — once Trump's closest European ally — had publicly sided with the pontiff [3]. The trip laid bare a central paradox of American foreign policy in 2026: the war meant to project American strength has instead isolated Washington from partners it needs most.

The War That Changed Everything: A Timeline

The current conflict traces back to June 13, 2025, when Israel launched major airstrikes against Iranian nuclear and military facilities. Iran responded within hours with missile and drone attacks on Israeli cities [4]. Eight days later, on June 21, the United States struck three Iranian nuclear sites — Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan [4].

The escalation accelerated through the fall. In September 2025, the UN reimposed sanctions on Iran through the "snapback" mechanism, freezing Iranian assets abroad and imposing penalties on the country's ballistic-missile program [4]. By December, Iran's currency had collapsed, triggering protests that Iranian security forces met with mass violence. In January 2026, authorities killed thousands of civilians in what became the largest crackdown since the 1979 revolution [4].

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a new wave of airstrikes targeting military and government sites, assassinating several Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei [4]. Iran responded with missile and drone strikes against Israel, U.S. bases, and U.S.-allied Arab countries, and closed the Strait of Hormuz — disrupting global trade [4].

A fragile two-week ceasefire was brokered by Pakistan on April 8, 2026 [5]. By the time Rubio arrived in Rome, that ceasefire had been extended but remained precarious, with sporadic violations reported by both sides.

Italy's Refusal: Bases, Treaties, and the Constitution

Italy hosts approximately 12,662 U.S. military personnel across several strategically significant bases [6]. The Navy's 6th Fleet operates from Naples (roughly 8,500 personnel), the Air Force's 31st Fighter Wing is based at Aviano (approximately 8,500 personnel and families), and Naval Air Station Sigonella in eastern Sicily supports about 4,000 Americans [6]. Camp Darby, between Pisa and Livorno, serves as the largest U.S. Army munitions depot outside the continental United States.

These bases operate under the 1954 bilateral Status of Forces Agreement, which permits logistical and non-combat operations. Meloni has drawn a sharp line at that boundary. "We are not at war and we do not want to enter a war," she stated, explaining that existing agreements cover "technical authorizations when we are clearly talking about logistics and so-called non-kinetic operations — simply put, operations that do not involve bombing" [7].

The breaking point came at the end of March 2026, when Defense Minister Guido Crosetto denied Sigonella authorization for certain U.S. military aircraft heading to the Middle East, concluding that proper authorization procedures had not been followed [8]. The Italian government framed the denial as a procedural matter; Washington saw it as betrayal. Trump responded: "Italy wasn't there for us, we won't be there for them" [8].

On May 1, Trump told reporters he would "probably" pull some U.S. troops from Italy, describing the country as having been "not of any help" during the Iran war [9]. The threat extended to Spain as well, signaling a broader rift between the United States and southern European NATO allies.

Italy's position rests on constitutional ground. Article 11 of the Italian Constitution states that Italy "rejects war as an instrument of national policy" and commits to resolving international disputes peacefully [7]. Italian officials have cited this provision repeatedly. Any broader use of Italian bases for combat operations would require parliamentary approval — a vote Meloni could not guarantee winning.

How Italy Compares to Other NATO Allies

Italy's refusal to support combat operations stands out even among skeptical European allies, though the continent's response has been broadly fractured.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

On March 1, 2026, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement condemning "indiscriminate and disproportionate missile attacks launched by Iran against countries in the region" and agreed to "take steps to defend our interests and those of our allies" [10]. But their actual commitments diverged sharply.

The United Kingdom adopted the most permissive posture, reaffirming that U.S. forces could use British bases to defend regional allies and provide for Israel's security, while simultaneously calling for diplomatic de-escalation [10]. Germany broke from its usual alignment with France and the UK by verbally backing U.S. goals, though it stopped short of committing combat forces [10]. France took a legalistic stance, with President Macron warning that military action outside international law "risks undermining global stability" and calling for emergency UN discussions [10].

All four major European allies, however, refused to participate in operations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, insisting the conflict must end first — a position shared by Australia and Japan [11].

Italy went further than any of them. Beyond denying base access, Meloni's government suspended a defense pact with Israel in April [12] and began pulling back Italian troops from the broader region [13]. The government did deploy a naval unit to Cyprus to support European partners after Iranian missile strikes affected the eastern Mediterranean, and offered defensive air support to Gulf states — but drew the line at any offensive role [7].

The Vatican's Moral Campaign

Pope Leo XIV has made opposition to the war a defining feature of his pontificate. On April 11, in his strongest public statement, the Pope denounced the "delusion of omnipotence" fueling the U.S.-Israeli war and demanded political leaders "stop and negotiate peace" [14]. Earlier, on April 8, he had welcomed the ceasefire as "a sign of living hope," stating that "only through a return to negotiation can the war come to an end" [15].

The tension between Trump and the Vatican escalated after a CBS "60 Minutes" segment in which three American cardinals called the war "unjust" [3]. Trump responded on Truth Social by saying the Pope was "soft on crime and terrorism." Leo fired back: "God doesn't listen to the prayers of those who wage war" and said he had "no fear neither of the Trump administration nor speaking out loudly of the message of the Gospel" [3].

The Holy See's diplomatic relationship with Iran dates to 1954 and has been maintained uninterrupted — even through the 1979 revolution [16]. The Apostolic Nunciature in Tehran serves roughly 2,000 Latin-rite Catholics among a total Christian population of 100,000 to 200,000 (predominantly Armenian and Chaldean) [16]. Pope Francis created Dominique Joseph Mathieu, the Belgian missionary and archbishop of Tehran-Isfahan, a cardinal in December 2024, raising the profile of Iran's tiny Catholic community within Church structures [16].

Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin has described the Holy See's approach: "The Holy See speaks with everyone. When necessary we speak also with the Americans, with the Israelis and show them what to us are the solutions" [15]. The nunciature in Tehran — recently vacated by Archbishop Andrzej Józwowicz, who was transferred to Sri Lanka — has served as a back channel for humanitarian concerns [17].

The Vatican's actual leverage in the conflict is limited. Its role has been one of moral advocacy and public pressure rather than formal mediation. The Pope did not broker the April ceasefire — Pakistan did. But the Vatican's statements carry weight in Catholic-majority countries, and Leo's criticism has provided political cover for leaders like Meloni to distance themselves from Washington.

What Rubio Brought to the Table

The State Department described Rubio's Vatican discussions as focused on "the situation in the Middle East and mutual interests in the Western Hemisphere," while meetings with Italian counterparts would address "shared security interests and strategic alignment" [18].

Cuba was reportedly another topic on the agenda. The Trump administration has escalated its economic blockade of the island, and the Vatican — which helped broker a recent prisoner release in Havana — has deep diplomatic ties there [19]. For Rubio, a Cuban-American Catholic, the subject carries personal resonance.

But the Iran war dominated. Rubio, described by multiple outlets as a "devout Catholic," was positioned as a bridge figure — someone who could speak the Vatican's language while delivering Trump's message [1]. The challenge was fundamental: Trump had not retracted his criticism of the Pope, and continued attacking Leo on social media even as Rubio was en route [20].

The Washington Post reported that Rubio sought to "play down the rift" ahead of the meeting [19], but the structural disagreement is not about tone. The Vatican considers the war unjust; the administration considers it necessary. No thirty-minute audience was likely to close that gap.

The Parallel Diplomatic Tracks

Rubio's Rome visit occurred alongside multiple parallel diplomatic efforts. Oman has served as the primary intermediary between Washington and Tehran since February 2026, when indirect talks were held in Muscat. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi communicated exclusively through Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi — no face-to-face contact with U.S. officials occurred [21].

Qatar's Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani separately reaffirmed his country's "readiness to continue playing an active role in mediation and facilitating dialogue" [21]. Switzerland has also served as a communication channel.

The April ceasefire, however, was brokered by Pakistan — a relative newcomer to the mediation landscape. As of early May, Iran's foreign minister was shuttling between Pakistan and regional capitals, and direct U.S.-Iran talks had been announced [5].

The Rome visit fits awkwardly into this framework. Neither the Vatican nor Italy is a direct party to the ceasefire negotiations. Rubio's meetings are better understood as alliance management — an attempt to prevent the diplomatic fallout from the war from compounding the military situation. But critics argue the visit risks sending mixed signals to Tehran about Western unity at a moment when the ceasefire remains fragile.

Italian Domestic Politics: Meloni's Tightrope

The Iran war has reshaped Italian domestic politics. A March 2026 SWG/La7 poll found that 48% of Italians believe their government should maintain neutrality and attempt mediation, while 29% favor condemning the attacks and calling for an immediate ceasefire. Only 12% support alignment with the U.S. and Israel [22].

Source: SWG/La7 Poll via Palestine Chronicle

Data as of Mar 15, 2026CSV

These numbers help explain Meloni's positioning. On March 23, her government lost a constitutional referendum on judiciary reform — a defeat widely interpreted as a proxy vote on her leadership amid the war [23]. Her approval rating dropped to 39%, with 55% disapproving of her performance [24].

Paradoxically, her public break with Trump has helped her recover. After she defended Pope Leo against Trump's attacks, 81% of respondents in a subsequent poll said she had done the right thing [25]. Her distancing from Washington — once politically risky for a leader who built her international brand on proximity to Trump — has become a domestic asset.

Italian business interests add another dimension. Italy was Iran's largest trading partner in the EU in 2017, and Italian entrepreneurs have historically viewed Iran as a large, dynamic market [26]. The war has ended those prospects while simultaneously driving up energy prices. Italy's main business lobby warned that if the conflict persists through the fourth quarter of 2026, knock-on effects on energy prices and trade could push the Italian economy into a 0.7% contraction [27].

The Catholic electorate — roughly 80% of Italians identify as Catholic — adds further pressure. When the Pope speaks, Italian politicians listen. Leo's moral authority on the war question has created a dynamic in which supporting U.S. military operations would mean opposing the Pope, a politically toxic proposition in Italian public life.

The Case That This Is Theater

There is a credible argument that Rubio's Rome trip is primarily symbolic. Italy under Meloni has already made its position clear: no combat operations from Italian bases, no direct military involvement, a preference for EU solidarity and mediation [7]. The government has backed these words with action — denying base access, suspending defense cooperation with Israel, pulling back troops [12][13].

Meloni's incentives all point against meaningful concessions. Her approval ratings improve when she distances herself from Trump. The Italian public overwhelmingly opposes the war. The constitution constrains military involvement. The Pope — an institution with more credibility than any Italian political party — is firmly on the antiwar side.

From Washington's perspective, the trip may serve a different purpose: domestic signaling. Rubio meeting the Pope demonstrates engagement with Catholic voters at home, an important constituency for the Republican Party. The optics of diplomacy — handshakes, communiqués about "shared interests" — can paper over substantive disagreement.

But dismissing the trip entirely would be a mistake. The threat to withdraw 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany, combined with Trump's remarks about Italy and Spain, represents a genuine fracture in NATO's southern flank [9]. If the U.S. follows through, the implications for European security architecture extend well beyond the Iran war. Rubio's presence in Rome, at minimum, signals that someone in the administration recognizes the cost of alienating Italy — even if the president does not.

What Comes Next

The Rubio visit is unlikely to produce a breakthrough. The structural forces — Italian constitutional constraints, Vatican moral opposition, European public opinion, the fragile ceasefire — all militate against a sudden rapprochement. What the visit may accomplish is preventing further deterioration: keeping communication channels open, avoiding additional Trump provocations against the Pope, and buying time for the parallel negotiations in Pakistan and Oman to produce results.

The deeper question is whether the Iran war marks a permanent realignment in transatlantic relations or a temporary stress test. Italy's refusal to support combat operations, France's legalism, and even Britain's cautious balancing act all suggest that European allies are drawing new red lines about the use of force — lines that may outlast the current conflict. For Rubio, the thirty-minute audience in the Apostolic Palace was the easy part. The harder work is convincing an increasingly skeptical world that American leadership still means something beyond military power.