Iran Delivers Response to US Peace Proposals as Drones Strike Ships in the Gulf

On May 10, 2026, Iran delivered its formal response to a US peace proposal through mediator Pakistan — the same day drones struck a commercial cargo ship off Qatar's coast and hostile UAVs entered Kuwaiti and Emirati airspace [1][2]. The juxtaposition was not accidental. Ten weeks into a war that has shuttered the world's most critical oil chokepoint, Tehran is simultaneously talking and shooting, a strategy with deep roots in Iranian statecraft that now carries unprecedented economic stakes for the global economy.

The War So Far: Context and Timeline

The current conflict began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched a joint air campaign against Iran that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his wife, mother, and one sister [3]. Iran responded by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz — blocking roughly 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products that normally transit the waterway [4]. A ceasefire brokered by Pakistan took effect on April 8, but has been repeatedly tested by both sides: the US struck Iranian oil tankers on May 9, and Iran launched drone attacks on Gulf shipping the following day [2].

Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali Khamenei's 56-year-old son, was installed as supreme leader on March 9 after the IRGC pressured the Assembly of Experts into an emergency online vote [3]. He has since operated within a consensus-based security structure rather than wielding his father's singular authority — a dynamic that complicates Western attempts to identify a single Iranian decision-maker [5].

The US Proposal: 14 Points and Nuclear Red Lines

Washington's 14-point proposal, transmitted earlier this week, demands that Iran [6][7]:

• Halt all uranium enrichment for 12 to 15 years (Iran proposed 5 years; the US demanded 20, with negotiators converging on 12-15)
• Surrender approximately 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity
• Commit not to develop nuclear weapons
• Cease operating underground nuclear facilities
• Reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 30 days of signing

In exchange, the US would lift sanctions, release billions in frozen Iranian funds, and withdraw its naval blockade of Iranian ports [7].

Comparison to the 2015 JCPOA

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — which the US unilaterally withdrew from in 2018 under President Trump — limited Iran to 3.67% enrichment with a 300 kg cap on low-enriched uranium stockpiles, for a period of 15 years [8]. The current proposal is significantly more restrictive: it demands zero enrichment rather than capped enrichment, surrender of highly enriched material that did not exist in 2015, and includes conditions around underground facilities that go beyond JCPOA terms. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf mocked the US position, calling it "more of an American wish-list than a reality" and writing on social media that "Operation Trust Me Bro failed" [6].

Iran's Response: War First, Nukes Later

Tehran's official position separates the negotiations into two phases. At this stage, Iranian officials say they are negotiating exclusively about ending the war — not their nuclear program [6]. If a ceasefire holds, Iran says it will discuss nuclear issues in a second phase. The government demands UN Security Council guarantees against future strikes and sanctions relief before any nuclear discussions begin [6].

This sequencing represents a direct challenge to Washington's approach, which bundles security, nuclear, and economic issues into a single package. The US position is that all three tracks must move simultaneously; Iran insists they move sequentially, with its own security guaranteed first.

Khamenei's 'New Guiding Measures': Escalation or Restraint?

On the same day Iran submitted its diplomatic response, the semi-official Fars News Agency reported that Ali Abdollahi, commander of Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters (the unified armed forces command), met with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and received "new guiding measures to pursue military operations and firmly confront adversaries" [9]. Abdollahi reportedly warned: "In case of any error by the enemy, Iran's response will be swift, severe, and decisive" [9].

The ambiguity is likely intentional. The phrase "guiding measures" could signal either escalation authority being delegated downward to operational commanders — enabling faster drone and missile strikes without supreme leader approval — or alternatively, a political framework for calibrated restraint that allows military action below the threshold of ceasefire collapse. Given Mojtaba Khamenei's position as first among equals rather than absolute authority, the directive may represent consensus among the IRGC, regular military, and political leadership rather than a single leader's command [5][10].

The Drone Campaign: Who, What, and Why

The May 10 attacks followed a pattern. A drone struck a commercial cargo vessel 23 nautical miles northeast of Doha, starting a fire that was extinguished without casualties [1]. The UAE reported intercepting two UAVs "launched from Iran," while Kuwait detected multiple hostile drones in its airspace [2]. No group claimed responsibility for the Qatar strike, though the UAE explicitly attributed its intercepts to Iran [2].

Since the ceasefire began on April 8, "several attacks have been reported on ships in the Gulf," according to Al Jazeera reporting, though an exact count remains unclear [2]. The broader Strait of Hormuz crisis since February has involved Iranian fast-boat swarms, mine threats, and tanker seizures alongside drone operations [11]. Iran seized an oil tanker in the Gulf of Oman as recently as May 8, while the US "disabled" two Iranian vessels [12].

The Economic Toll: Oil, Insurance, and Global Exposure

The crisis has produced what the IEA called "the largest oil market supply loss on record" [4]. At the crisis peak in March, only 3.8 million barrels per day were flowing through the Strait — down from 20 million barrels per day in 2025 [4]. Even after the ceasefire, flows have recovered to only an estimated 6.1 million barrels per day as of May 2026 [4].

Source: IEA / EIA estimates

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

The price impact has been severe. WTI crude oil reached $114.58 per barrel in April 2026 — up 87.6% year-over-year from $55.44 in December 2025 [13]. Brent crude surpassed $126 per barrel at its peak in March [14]. Goldman Sachs projected that another month of Hormuz closure would keep Brent above $100 throughout 2026, potentially adding 0.8% to global inflation [14].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 4, 2026CSV

War-risk insurance premiums for Strait of Hormuz transits tripled from 0.125% to 0.4% of hull value — adding approximately $250,000 per transit for very large crude carriers [15]. Shipping giant Hapag-Lloyd imposed a War Risk Surcharge of $3,500 per container as of March 2, 2026 [15]. Iranian drone strikes on alternative ports at Duqm and Salalah in Oman further constricted rerouting options, pushing those facilities into insurer war-risk zones [15].

Source: Lloyd's / Maritime Insurance Reports

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

Who Is Most Exposed?

The countries most dependent on Strait of Hormuz flows include Japan, South Korea, and India — all major US allies that import the bulk of their crude from Gulf producers. China also depends heavily on the strait. Saudi Arabia's alternative pipeline infrastructure offers 3-5 million barrels per day of spare capacity, but cannot compensate for the 13-14 million barrels per day shortfall at the crisis peak [4].

Iran's Domestic Calculus: A New Leader Under Pressure

Mojtaba Khamenei inherited a country in economic freefall. The Iranian rial collapsed from approximately 42,000 to over 1.1 million against the dollar [16]. The World Bank projected GDP contraction in both 2025 and 2026, with inflation approaching 60% and food price inflation above 70% [16]. Protests erupted across all 31 provinces beginning December 28, 2025 [16].

The cumulative cost of sanctions since 2018 — estimated at roughly $500 billion in lost oil revenue and economic output — has hollowed out state capacity while enriching IRGC-connected enterprises that profit from sanctions evasion [16]. This creates a paradox: the sanctions regime simultaneously weakens Iran's civilian economy and strengthens the military-industrial complex that controls the drone and missile programs being used in the Gulf.

Within Iran's power structure, hardliners around the IRGC favor continued military pressure as the only language Washington respects, while pragmatists associated with former president Hassan Rouhani's circle argue that economic collapse poses a greater existential threat than any foreign adversary [17]. Mojtaba Khamenei, lacking his father's decades of accumulated authority, must balance these factions rather than simply overrule one.

Legal Architecture: Treaty, Executive Agreement, or Political Commitment?

The 2015 JCPOA was explicitly not a treaty — the State Department classified it as a "political commitment" that was neither signed nor legally binding under US domestic law [8]. This made it trivially easy for Trump to withdraw in 2018, and Iran has repeatedly cited this experience as grounds for demanding stronger guarantees against reversal.

Under the US Constitution, a formal treaty requires two-thirds Senate approval — a threshold no Iran agreement could plausibly achieve in the current Congress [18]. A congressional-executive agreement requires simple majorities in both chambers but still faces difficult politics. A sole executive agreement requires no congressional approval but offers no legal durability beyond the current administration [18].

Iran is reportedly demanding UN Security Council resolution backing — similar to UNSCR 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA — as a mechanism for international enforceability that does not depend on which party holds the White House [6]. Whether Washington can offer any guarantee against future unilateral withdrawal remains perhaps the most fundamental structural obstacle to a deal.

The Signaling Strategy: Rational or Reckless?

Iran's simultaneous use of force and diplomacy has historical precedent. In 2019, the IRGC seized the British-flagged Stena Impero and Iran launched cruise missiles and drones against Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq — attacks that temporarily knocked out 5% of global oil supply [19]. Rather than triggering war, the incidents preceded a diplomatic opening: the US refusal to respond militarily reportedly convinced Gulf leaders including Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to pursue their own backchannel with Tehran [19].

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping in 2023-24 followed a similar logic: military pressure on global commerce created leverage for political negotiations, though at the cost of international isolation and expanded US military operations [19].

The steelman case for Iran's current approach: drone strikes below the threshold of mass casualties maintain military credibility, remind Gulf states of their vulnerability, and demonstrate that a ceasefire without addressing Iran's core demands (security guarantees, sanctions relief) cannot hold. The risk calculus: each incident creates the possibility of accidental escalation, miscalculation, or a strike that kills enough people to collapse diplomatic space entirely.

Gulf State Diplomacy: Between Washington and Tehran

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE occupy distinct positions. Saudi Arabia has kept its diplomatic channel to Tehran open throughout the war and joined a quadrilateral mediation effort with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan [20]. Its preferred outcome is a comprehensive settlement that curtails Iranian proxy networks and permanently resolves Hormuz [20].

The UAE demands dismantling of Iran's long-range strike capabilities and proxy networks as preconditions for normalization — a maximalist position that aligns with Washington's [20]. Qatar has warned against a "frozen conflict" that leaves its gas infrastructure (the world's largest LNG export facilities) permanently at risk, and prefers maintaining its mediating role over joining an anti-Iran bloc [20].

Iran itself has proposed a Hormuz deal without nuclear talks — offering to reopen the strait in exchange for sanctions relief and security guarantees, while seeking "broader buy-in" from regional states [21]. This represents an attempt to bypass Washington by constructing a regional framework that makes US participation less essential. Whether Gulf states will accept a deal that leaves Iran's nuclear program unaddressed remains unclear, but the economic incentive is substantial: every day the strait remains restricted costs importing nations billions in elevated energy costs.

What Happens Next

The coming days hinge on several variables: whether Iran's formal response contains enough substance for Washington to identify negotiating space; whether the drone campaign intensifies or pauses; and whether Mojtaba Khamenei's "new guiding measures" translate into operational escalation or restrained signaling.

The Trump administration maintains that the ceasefire "remains in effect" despite repeated violations from both sides [2]. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has called for a "clear resolution" from Iran [22]. Iran's foreign ministry says it is "still reviewing" the US proposal while "strongly rejecting" certain terms [7].

At $110 per barrel and climbing, with 70% of normal Hormuz flows still offline and insurance costs tripled, neither side can afford indefinite stalemate. But neither side has yet shown willingness to accept the other's sequencing — Washington demands a comprehensive package; Tehran demands security first, nukes later. The drones flying over the Gulf are Iran's way of arguing that the status quo hurts everyone, and that the price of no deal rises daily.