China Rebuffs Trump on Hormuz as Beijing Summit Collapses

Three weeks into a war he started, President Donald Trump found himself pleading with the world's second superpower for help — and getting nothing but silence. China's refusal to join a naval coalition to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, combined with the indefinite postponement of a once-landmark Beijing summit, has laid bare the degree to which the Iran conflict has isolated the United States diplomatically and handed Beijing an unexpected strategic windfall.

The Ask That Went Unanswered

On March 15, Trump publicly called on China, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and other nations to send warships to secure the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil trade flows [1]. "I'm demanding that these countries come in and protect their own territory," Trump declared, adding an ominous warning: "Whether we get support or not, I can say this, and I said it to them: We will remember" [2].

The response was uniform rejection. The UK's Prime Minister Keir Starmer said Britain "will not be drawn into the wider war" [2]. Germany stated flatly that "as long as this war continues, there will be no involvement" [2]. Italy's Deputy PM Matteo Salvini warned that "sending military ships in a war zone would mean entering the war" [2]. Australia, Japan, Poland, Sweden, and Spain all declined [3]. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas summed up the continental consensus: "This is not Europe's war" [4].

China's response was the most consequential — and the most carefully calibrated. Beijing called for de-escalation and said "all parties have the responsibility to ensure stable and unimpeded energy supply," but made no commitment whatsoever to deploy naval assets [3]. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson noted that China "opposes the U.S. and Israel launching military strikes against Iran in violation of international law" and called for "an immediate stop to military actions" [5].

Trump had asked seven countries for help reopening the strait. Not one answered the call [6].

A Summit Slips Away

The diplomatic freeze extended beyond Hormuz. Trump's state visit to Beijing, originally scheduled for March 31–April 2 and set to be the first by a U.S. president since Trump's own 2017 trip, was postponed indefinitely [7]. Trump told reporters the delay would be "a month or so" to allow him to focus on the Iran war, though he initially floated "five or six weeks" [8].

The summit had been intended to extend a fragile tariff truce negotiated when Trump and Xi Jinping met in South Korea five months ago, where the two sides pulled back from the brink of triple-digit tariffs [8]. Expected deliverables included Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products, energy deals, and cooperation on fentanyl precursor chemicals [8].

But according to Dominic Chiu of the Eurasia Group, preparations "have been going pretty poorly" even before the Iran war intervened [8]. The delay, Chiu noted, may actually benefit both sides by providing "a bit more time to talk." Beijing, which had never officially confirmed the visit, appeared notably unbothered — the Foreign Affairs Ministry said only that the two nations were "maintaining communication regarding the timing" [8].

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent attempted damage control, telling CNBC that any rescheduling had "nothing to do with the Chinese making a commitment" on Hormuz [9]. But the timing told a different story: Trump had publicly linked the summit delay to his request for Chinese naval assistance, creating the impression — accurate or not — that he was leveraging one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in the world for military help that was never coming.

China's Strategic Patience

Behind Beijing's polite stonewalling lies a calculated strategic posture. China is absorbing significant economic pain from the Hormuz closure — before the war, it received 5.35 million barrels of oil per day through the strait, a figure that has plummeted to roughly 1.22 million barrels, coming exclusively from Iran [10]. Vessel transits through the strait have collapsed from over 153 daily before the conflict to just 13 — roughly 9% of normal volume [11]. Fifty-five Chinese-flagged ships remain trapped in the Persian Gulf [11].

Source: Foreign Policy / CSIS

Data as of Mar 17, 2026CSV

Yet China's buffers are formidable. Strategic and commercial reserves total an estimated 1.2–1.4 billion barrels — enough to cover three to four months of imports [10]. Beijing accelerated stockpiling in the months before the war, with crude imports surging 15.8% year-over-year in January and February [12]. Coal still dominates China's energy mix, Russian pipeline oil provides an alternative supply route, and the country's massive renewable energy infrastructure offers insulation that no other major economy can match.

This economic resilience allows Beijing to play a longer game. As CNN reported, China "sees no benefit in heightening tension with the US over Iran" and "still attaches greater importance to maintaining the trade truce and overall stability in the bilateral relationship" [13]. In quick succession, the United States had taken out two of Beijing's closest partners — Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — yet China had done little more than condemn and observe [13].

The restraint is deliberate. Beijing has clearly demonstrated that ties with Iran do not rank anywhere close to the utility it sees in trying to prevent the Trump White House from turning its attention back to China [13].

The Yuan Gambit

Complicating Beijing's careful neutrality is Iran's provocative proposal to allow oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz — but only if the cargo is traded in Chinese yuan rather than U.S. dollars [14]. The proposal, first reported by CNN and confirmed by a senior Iranian official, represents what some analysts have called "the most dangerous shot of this war" — not a missile, but a direct challenge to the petrodollar system that underpins American financial hegemony [15].

If adopted by energy importers, the yuan-for-passage arrangement would redirect a portion of structural dollar demand toward China's currency, weakening one of the foundational pillars of dollar reserve dominance [14]. But observers in China have reacted cautiously, citing operational feasibility limits and security risks [16]. Tehran may be eager to cultivate goodwill in Beijing, but China has no interest in being seen as the beneficiary of Iran's war-time leverage against Washington.

The CSIS analysis was blunt: despite China's diplomatic alignment with Iran, "Iran's leaders are putting the regime's survival above Beijing's desires for global energy stability" [11]. Early speculation that Chinese vessels might receive preferential treatment proved unfounded — Chinese-flagged ship transits fell from 49 in the final week of February to just 2 since March 1 [11].

The Oil Price Shock

The failure to assemble any international coalition has kept the strait effectively closed, sustaining an oil price shock with cascading global consequences.

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 9, 2026CSV

WTI crude surged from approximately $67 per barrel on February 27 — the day before the U.S.-Israeli strikes began — to over $94 by March 9, a gain of more than 40% in less than two weeks [17]. Brent crude has topped $100 [14]. The shock has reverberated through every sector of the global economy, from airlines to agriculture, and has complicated the Federal Reserve's rate-cutting plans by reviving stagflation fears not seen since the 1970s.

For Trump, the economic fallout presents a political crisis layered atop a diplomatic one. With 53% of Americans opposing the military action, crude prices surging, and prominent MAGA figures like Tucker Carlson publicly breaking with the president, the Iran war has fractured the coalition that returned Trump to office [18].

A War Without Allies

The Hormuz debacle has crystallized a broader pattern: the United States launched Operation Epic Fury without building the international coalition that traditionally accompanies major military operations, and is now scrambling to assemble one retroactively.

As PBS noted, Trump "side-stepped diplomacy on his way to war in Iran" and is "now asking China and others for help" [19]. The irony is sharp. The same president who spent years cultivating a relationship with Xi Jinping — meeting him in South Korea, negotiating a tariff truce, planning a historic Beijing visit — torched whatever goodwill that relationship might have yielded by launching a war against one of China's key energy partners and then demanding China help clean up the consequences.

Beijing's calculus is straightforward: why send warships to secure a strait that was only closed because of an American war that China opposed from day one? As one European diplomat told the Washington Post: "He started a fire and now he's asking the neighbors to bring water" [1].

What Comes Next

The postponement of the Trump-Xi summit creates a dangerous vacuum in the world's most consequential bilateral relationship at its most precarious moment. The tariff truce, already under strain from new Section 301 trade investigations that Beijing considers a "manageable irritant," now has no clear venue for extension or renegotiation [8]. The Supreme Court's recent ruling striking down many of Trump's tariffs has given Beijing additional negotiating leverage, making the dynamics even more complex [20].

Meanwhile, the war grinds on. Israel's March 17 strikes killed Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, and Gholamreza Soleimani, commander of Iran's Basij paramilitary forces — the most significant targeted killings since Khamenei's assassination on the war's opening day. Iran has neither confirmed nor denied the deaths, and no ceasefire talks are underway.

China will wait. With 1.2 billion barrels in reserve, a diversified energy supply, and the quiet satisfaction of watching its principal rival burn diplomatic capital across the globe, Beijing has every incentive to let the clock run. The summit will happen when China decides it is ready — not when Washington needs it most.

The question that hangs over all of it is one that Trump himself inadvertently posed last week: "Maybe we shouldn't even be there." China's answer, delivered not in words but in conspicuous inaction, is that the United States shouldn't have been there from the start.