Trump Calls on UK to 'Enthusiastically' Join Hormuz Reopening Effort

Two and a half weeks into Operation Epic Fury, President Trump is learning that starting a war is easier than assembling a coalition to clean up its consequences. On March 16, Trump publicly singled out the United Kingdom for failing to embrace his demand that allied nations send warships to reopen the Strait of Hormuz — the world's most critical energy chokepoint, which Iran has effectively sealed since early March in retaliation for the U.S.-Israeli military campaign [1].

"I was not happy with the U.K.," Trump told reporters. "I think they'll be involved, but they should be involved enthusiastically" [2]. The rebuke came after UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer declined to immediately commit British aircraft carriers to the effort, instead pledging to work with allies on what he called a "viable collective plan" to restore freedom of navigation [3].

The exchange encapsulates a growing transatlantic crisis-within-a-crisis: even as oil prices surge past $100 a barrel and the global economy reels from the worst energy disruption since the 1973 embargo, the very alliance structures Trump needs to resolve the Hormuz blockade are fracturing under the weight of a war none of these nations were consulted about before it began.

The Coalition That Isn't

Trump first floated the idea of an international naval escort mission on March 14, calling on China, France, Japan, South Korea, the UK, and others to send warships alongside the U.S. Navy [4]. Two days later, he acknowledged the effort was stalled.

"Some are very enthusiastic, and some are less than enthusiastic," Trump conceded, before adding ominously: "The level of enthusiasm matters to me" [2].

The tally of refusals is striking. Germany's defense spokesperson stated flatly that "as long as this war continues, there will be no involvement, not even in an option to keep the Strait of Hormuz open by military means" [5]. Italy's Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini declared that "sending military ships in a war zone would mean entering the war" [5]. Spain rejected involvement and called for diplomacy. Australia said it had received no formal request and was not prepared to give support. Greece limited its participation to existing Red Sea operations [6].

Japan cited constitutional constraints on overseas military deployments and said it was conducting a legal review [7]. South Korea requested "adequate time for deliberation" [7]. China, whose oil imports through the strait are among the largest in the world, called for de-escalation but made no commitment to secure the waterway [5].

France offered perhaps the most nuanced position. President Macron said he was working with partners in Europe, India, and Asia on a possible escort mission — but stressed it must come "when the circumstances permit," meaning after fighting subsides [7]. That condition is nowhere close to being met.

Not a single nation has publicly committed warships.

The UK's Balancing Act

The UK finds itself in a particularly delicate position. Britain maintains a permanent naval presence in the Gulf through its base in Bahrain, has historically been America's closest military partner, and depends heavily on Middle Eastern energy flows. But the Starmer government is navigating between Trump's demands and deep domestic opposition to involvement in what polls show is an unpopular war.

Starmer's response has been carefully calibrated. He confirmed he discussed the "importance" of reopening the strait with Trump, and separately with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney [3]. He said the UK is "working with all of our allies, including our European partners, to bring together a viable collective plan that can restore freedom of navigation in the region as quickly as possible" [3].

But he drew firm red lines. "While taking the necessary action to defend ourselves and our allies, we will not be drawn into the wider war," Starmer told reporters [8]. He explicitly ruled out a NATO-led operation: "Let me be clear, that won't be, and it's never envisioned to be, a NATO mission" [6].

Starmer also acknowledged the sheer difficulty of the task. "This is not a simple task," he said, a remark that implicitly highlighted the gap between Trump's breezy demands and the operational reality on the water [8].

The Mine Problem

That operational reality is sobering. Iran is estimated to possess between 5,000 and 6,000 naval mines — a stockpile that dwarfs the few dozen that created havoc during the 1987-88 "Tanker War" [9]. The IRGC has been actively laying mines in the strait since early March, and the U.S. has already sunk at least 16 Iranian minelaying vessels in an effort to stem the flow [10].

Yet the Western world's mine-clearing capacity is woefully inadequate. The U.S. Navy decommissioned its last dedicated minesweepers just months before the war began — a decision that now looks catastrophic in retrospect. According to Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, the best minesweepers in Europe are "months away from showing up at the Strait of Hormuz," while America's more limited assets in the region could clear the strait only "over significant numbers of weeks" [9].

This is where the UK's potential contribution becomes significant. The Royal Navy has been transitioning from crewed minehunters to autonomous platforms under its Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) programme. It already has autonomous mine-hunting systems deployed in the Arabian Gulf — specifically Iver4 underwater drones, two-metre-long torpedo-shaped submarines that scan the seabed to depths of 300 metres [11]. UK military chiefs are reportedly "mulling" the deployment of these systems as part of any coalition effort [3].

But Bloomberg's reporting on March 16 poured cold water on the idea that autonomous drones could quickly solve the problem, calling them an "imperfect way to reopen" the strait and noting that the technology, while promising, has not been fielded at full scale [12].

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 9, 2026CSV

The Economic Pressure

The urgency behind Trump's coalition push is driven by staggering economic numbers. Before the war began on February 28, WTI crude oil traded around $67 per barrel. By mid-March, prices had surged past $100 — with some trading days seeing Brent crude above $119 [13].

The strait normally handles roughly 13 million barrels per day, representing about 31% of all seaborne crude flows [14]. Ship-tracking data shows a 70% reduction in traffic since the crisis began, with IRGC radio warnings telling vessels they will not be permitted to pass [14].

The disruption extends far beyond oil. Roughly one-third of global fertilizer trade transits the Strait of Hormuz, and urea prices at the New Orleans hub have already surged from $475 to $680 per metric ton [14]. Drone strikes on Oman's alternative ports at Duqm and Salalah have closed off potential workarounds, while insurance costs for any vessel transiting the region have skyrocketed [14].

Iran has selectively allowed some vessels through — Turkish, Indian-flagged, and Saudi ships carrying oil purchased in yuan have been granted passage [15]. This selective access threatens to fracture any Western coalition before it forms, by demonstrating that cooperation with Tehran offers a more reliable path to oil supplies than confrontation.

The NATO Dimension

Trump's most consequential threat may be what he said to the Financial Times: "If there's no response or if it's a negative response, I think it will be very bad for the future of NATO" [1].

This is not an idle warning. Trump has spent years questioning the value of NATO, and his administration has already clashed with European allies over defense spending, Ukraine policy, and trade. Using the Hormuz crisis to relitigate NATO's purpose represents a significant escalation — effectively demanding that an alliance designed to defend the North Atlantic transform into a global oil-policing force for a war its members had no part in starting.

EU Foreign Affairs Chief Kaja Kallas pushed back directly: "Europe has no interest in an open-ended war" [6]. The response from European capitals has been strikingly unified in its rejection. Multiple EU leaders have demanded clarity about Trump's war aims before considering any naval commitment — a question the administration has notably failed to answer [16].

The irony is sharp. Trump launched Operation Epic Fury without consulting NATO allies, without congressional authorization, and despite intelligence briefings warning that Iran would blockade the strait. Now, with the consequences of those decisions rippling through the global economy, he is demanding that the very allies he excluded from the decision-making process bail him out.

What Happens Next

The immediate outlook is bleak. Without a functioning coalition, the strait is likely to remain effectively closed for weeks or months. The U.S. Navy is conducting mine-sweeping operations with its limited assets, but progress is slow against the sheer volume of Iranian ordnance.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has publicly downplayed the urgency, telling reporters on March 13 to "not worry about it" [17] — a remarkable statement given that the blockade represents the largest oil supply disruption in recorded history.

Starmer's preferred path — a European-led, non-NATO operation focused on mine clearance and escort duties — may eventually materialize, but it faces enormous logistical and political hurdles. Any participating nation risks Iranian retaliation, and the legal basis for forcibly reopening a waterway while actively bombing the country that closed it remains contested in international law.

For now, the world's most important energy chokepoint remains shut, the coalition to reopen it exists only in Trump's Truth Social posts, and the alliance that might have coordinated such an effort is being actively undermined by the president who needs it most.