Trump Shares Draft Iran Nuclear Agreement with Allies as Vance Says Deal 'Very Close'

The United States and Iran are on the verge of signing a memorandum of understanding that would extend their ceasefire, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and launch formal negotiations over Tehran's nuclear program. Vice President JD Vance said on May 28 that the two sides are "very close" to an agreement but "not there yet," with ongoing disputes over "a couple of language points" [1]. President Trump has circulated the draft text among allies including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates [2] — a diplomatic gambit that has exposed sharp differences among Washington's partners about what an acceptable deal looks like.

The stakes are difficult to overstate. Before the June 2025 strikes by Israel and the United States on Iran's nuclear facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated Iran had amassed 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% — enough, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, to produce material for nine nuclear weapons within three weeks [3]. The question now is whether diplomacy can permanently eliminate that threat, or whether the current MOU amounts to a pause that leaves Iran's nuclear infrastructure fundamentally intact.

What's in the Draft

The proposed MOU, as reported by Axios and confirmed by multiple outlets, contains several core elements [4]:

• Ceasefire extension: A 60-day mutual ceasefire, renewable by consent of both sides.
• Strait of Hormuz: Iran would clear the mines it deployed during the conflict, reopen the strait with no tolls, and allow free passage of commercial shipping.
• Nuclear commitments: Iran would pledge never to pursue nuclear weapons and enter negotiations over suspending its enrichment program and removing its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
• Sanctions relief framework: The U.S. would negotiate lifting sanctions and unfreezing Iranian assets during the 60-day window — but actual relief would be contingent on verified concessions in a final agreement.
• Duration dispute: The Trump administration has proposed a 20-year commitment from Iran; Tehran has countered with five years [5].

Trump has described this as "relief for performance" — Iran wanted frozen funds released immediately and permanent sanctions removal upfront, but Washington insisted those steps would follow tangible, verifiable concessions [4].

The MOU is a framework, not a final deal. Nuclear specifics — enrichment ceilings, centrifuge numbers, stockpile disposal timelines, inspection regimes — are all deferred to subsequent negotiations. This structure mirrors the approach that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which began with an interim agreement before the comprehensive text was finalized.

How the Draft Compares to the JCPOA

The 2015 JCPOA imposed specific, measurable limits on Iran's nuclear program: enrichment capped at 3.67% (sufficient for civilian power but far below weapons grade), a stockpile ceiling of 300 kg of low-enriched uranium, and a reduction from roughly 20,000 centrifuges to 6,104, with only older-generation IR-1 machines permitted at two facilities [6][7].

Under proposals discussed in April 2026, Iran would return to the 3.67% enrichment cap, matching the JCPOA threshold, and allow expanded IAEA access to its facilities [8]. The centrifuge question remains contentious: compromise proposals would permit Iran to retain approximately 5,000 centrifuges — fewer than the JCPOA's 6,104 — but Iran currently operates roughly 15,000, more than double its 2015 level [8].

The gap between where Iran's program stands today and any plausible agreement is far wider than it was in 2015. Iran now enriches to 60%, operates advanced centrifuge models the JCPOA never anticipated, and has accumulated vastly more enriched material.

Source: IAEA Reports / Arms Control Association

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

The Stockpile Problem

The most urgent technical challenge is Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium. IAEA data shows a steep trajectory: from 17.7 kg of 60%-enriched uranium in 2021 to 408.6 kg by May 2025 and 440.9 kg on the eve of the June 2025 strikes [3][9].

Source: IAEA Verification Reports

Data as of Feb 1, 2026CSV

The Institute for Science and International Security assessed that Iran could convert its 60% stock into 233 kg of weapons-grade uranium at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant within three weeks — enough for approximately nine nuclear weapons, assuming 25 kg per device [3].

Under the emerging deal framework, Tehran would agree to remove its highly enriched uranium stockpile, with some material diluted domestically and the remainder transferred to a third country [5]. The mechanism for this removal — which international body would verify it, on what timeline, and with what safeguards against diversion — remains unspecified in the MOU text. The JCPOA relied on IAEA inspectors with access to declared facilities and authority to request access to undeclared sites under a process that took weeks to execute. Whether the new framework would strengthen or weaken those provisions is a central question for the subsequent negotiations.

Allied Reactions: Unity on the Surface, Fractures Beneath

Trump's decision to share the draft with allies before signing has surfaced competing interests that could complicate the final agreement.

Israel has expressed the deepest reservations. In a call with Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that Israel will maintain "freedom of action against threats in all arenas, including Lebanon" [10]. An Israeli political source distributed a statement noting that Trump committed to his "consistent demand for dismantling the Iranian nuclear program and removing all enriched uranium from its territory" — language that goes well beyond what the current MOU commits to [10]. CNN reported that Israel is "worried that Trump will strike a 'bad deal' with Iran, leaving war objectives unmet" [11]. The draft's omission of firm nuclear commitments and its requirement for a permanent ceasefire including Lebanon make the current scope "deeply unpalatable" for the Israeli government [4].

Saudi Arabia has been more publicly supportive. Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan expressed "high appreciation" for Trump's decision to "give diplomacy a chance," specifically citing the restoration of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz [12]. But Saudi concerns about Iran's regional behavior and the precedent of allowing any enrichment on Iranian soil are well documented. Riyadh has consistently said it would pursue its own enrichment capability if Iran retains one — a position that could trigger a regional proliferation cascade [13].

The UAE has offered the most explicit backing. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan told U.S. officials: "We're with you on this deal. And even if this deal fails, we're going to be with you too" [12].

Of the three, Israel's position poses the greatest threat to the agreement. Netanyahu's insistence on complete dismantlement — a maximalist demand that Iran has never accepted — sets a standard the MOU does not meet. If Israel acts unilaterally against Iranian targets during the 60-day negotiating window, the diplomatic framework would almost certainly collapse.

The Binding Problem: Executive Agreements and Their Limits

A structural vulnerability haunts the emerging deal: the same type of legal instrument that made the JCPOA easy to exit would likely govern its successor.

The JCPOA was not a treaty. The State Department explicitly stated it was "not a treaty or an executive agreement, and is not a signed document" — rather, a "nonbinding, unsigned political" agreement [14]. Legal scholar John B. Bellinger III observed at the time that "the next president will have the legal right under both domestic and international law to scrap the JCPOA and reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions on Iran" [14]. That prediction proved accurate in May 2018 when Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement.

The current MOU would be a memorandum of understanding between the executive branches — an even less formal instrument than the JCPOA. Under U.S. domestic law, only treaties ratified by a two-thirds Senate vote carry binding force across administrations. No Iran deal has ever approached that threshold. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 gave Congress a limited review role, but the political math for Senate ratification of any Iran deal remains prohibitive [15].

This means any agreement signed by Trump could be reversed by a future president through executive action alone. The irony — that Trump is now negotiating the type of non-binding deal he criticized Obama for — has not been lost on commentators. CNN's analysis noted that "a possible Iran deal may be almost as divisive as Trump's decision to wage war" [16].

Maximum Pressure: Did Sanctions or Diplomacy Bring Iran to the Table?

The question of what produced the current negotiating opening is politically contested and empirically complex.

The sanctions track record: After Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, the "maximum pressure" campaign reimposed sweeping sanctions. Iran's oil exports fell from 2.5 million barrels per day to roughly 0.5 million by 2019 [17]. But rather than forcing Tehran to accept better terms, the pressure correlated with nuclear escalation: Iran began breaching JCPOA limits in mid-2019, progressively increasing enrichment from 3.67% to 20% (January 2021) and then 60% (April 2021) [6]. The International Crisis Group concluded that maximum pressure "achieved the opposite of its stated goals," accelerating both nuclear development and regional tensions [18].

Source: EIA / Iran International

Data as of Apr 30, 2026CSV

By 2023-2024, however, Iranian oil exports had recovered to roughly 1.4-1.6 million barrels per day despite sanctions, as enforcement weakened and Chinese purchases increased [17]. The exports collapsed again — to 0.4 million barrels per day — only after the 2026 war [17].

The war factor: Proponents of the current diplomatic track argue that the combination of military strikes on Iran's nuclear infrastructure in June 2025 and intensified sanctions during the war created a fundamentally different negotiating dynamic. Iran's formal withdrawal from the JCPOA in October 2025 eliminated the diplomatic fiction that the old deal could be restored and forced both sides toward a new framework [5].

The pressure camp's counterargument: Hawks in Congress and think tanks like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argue that signing a deal now would relieve economic pressure at the moment it is most effective, allowing Iran to rebuild its program on better financial footing. They contend that sustained coercion, not negotiated agreements, is what constrains Iranian behavior — and point to Iran's JCPOA violations as evidence that Tehran does not honor its commitments regardless of the framework.

The empirical record is mixed: sanctions degraded Iran's economy but did not prevent nuclear advances; diplomacy constrained the program for several years but did not survive a change in U.S. administration; military strikes damaged infrastructure but did not eliminate knowledge or intent. Each approach has produced partial, reversible results.

Missiles, Proxies, and the Missing Chapters

The draft MOU's treatment of Iran's ballistic missile program and regional proxy network remains one of its most significant gaps.

The Trump administration's original 15-point plan, presented in March 2026, demanded that Iran end its use of armed proxies — including Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and Iraqi Shia militias — and halt its ballistic missile development [5]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Iran is "trying to achieve intercontinental ballistic missiles," with the Defense Intelligence Agency assessing that Iran could develop an ICBM by 2035 [19].

Iran reportedly proposed steps to deescalate, including a pledge to "disarm and freeze the activities" of its proxy groups [19]. But the current MOU text, as published by Saudi outlet Al-Arabiya, conspicuously omits nuclear red lines and proxy commitments [20]. These issues appear to be deferred to the final agreement negotiations.

This deferral is significant in historical context. Every prior negotiating framework since 2003 — including the EU-3 talks, the P5+1 process, and the JCPOA — kept the nuclear file separate from missiles and proxies. The JCPOA deliberately excluded both. Trump's team initially pledged to address all three in a single comprehensive deal, but the MOU's structure suggests they may be returning to the compartmentalized approach they previously criticized.

Sanctions Relief: The Money on the Table

The economic dimensions of the deal involve substantial sums. Frozen Iranian state assets globally total approximately $70 billion as of April 2026, with some estimates ranging from $100 billion to $200 billion depending on the methodology [21]. Iranian crude exports have collapsed by 75% from their pre-war baseline, from 1.6 million barrels per day in February 2026 to roughly 0.4 million barrels per day by late April [17].

Under the MOU's "relief for performance" principle, sanctions would be lifted in phases: first allowing limited oil sales, then restoring access to SWIFT (from which Iran's banks were disconnected in 2012), and finally unfreezing state assets [21][22]. The sequencing is designed to maintain U.S. leverage throughout the negotiating period.

OFAC enforcement actions have continued even as talks progress. In May 2026, the Treasury Department blocked 19 vessels involved in Iranian petroleum shipments and sanctioned Amin Exchange, identified as a major financial conduit for sanctioned Iranian banks and the National Iranian Oil Company [22].

If Talks Collapse: Three Escalation Scenarios

The 60-day MOU window creates a defined period during which failure could trigger rapid escalation. Three scenarios are most frequently cited by analysts:

Israeli unilateral action: Israel struck Iran's nuclear facilities and military leadership in June 2025 and has repeatedly stated it maintains freedom of action. If Netanyahu concludes the deal inadequately constrains Iran's program, Israeli strikes during or after the negotiating window are a credible scenario — particularly given that Iran's air defenses were significantly degraded during the 2025-2026 conflict [11].

U.S. military escalation: The United States has assembled its largest military force in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq invasion. Three aircraft carrier strike groups — USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Gerald R. Ford, and USS George H.W. Bush — are operating in the region, the first such concentration in decades [23]. Approximately 450-500 combat aircraft, including F-22 Raptors deployed to Israel, are in theater [23]. Thousands of Marines, paratroopers, and sailors have been added to the regional force [24]. This posture blends deterrence with preparation for multiple contingencies, from defensive operations to precision strikes.

Iranian nuclear breakout: Before the June 2025 strikes, Iran's breakout time — the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one device — had shrunk to approximately three weeks [3]. The strikes damaged infrastructure at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan [5], but the extent to which breakout timelines have been extended is classified. If Iran concludes that diplomacy has failed and military strikes are imminent, accelerating toward a nuclear weapon becomes a rational, if dangerous, response.

The Paradox of the Moment

The current diplomatic opening exists because of an extraordinary convergence: a war that neither side expected, strikes that damaged but did not destroy Iran's nuclear program, a ceasefire that both sides want to maintain, and economic pressure that is imposing real costs on Tehran. Each of these conditions is temporary.

The MOU, if signed, buys 60 days. The question is whether that is enough time to bridge the gap between Trump's demand for full dismantlement and Iran's insistence on retaining enrichment — positions that have been irreconcilable for two decades. The JCPOA found a middle ground that held for three years before U.S. withdrawal unraveled it. Whether this administration can build something more durable, using the same legal instruments that proved insufficient last time, is the central test of the negotiations ahead.