Trump Says He Called Off Iran Military Strike at Request of Gulf States

On the evening of May 18, 2026 — day 80 of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran — President Donald Trump posted a statement announcing he had canceled what he called a "very major attack" on Iran that had been "scheduled for tomorrow" [1]. The reason: three Gulf Arab leaders had personally asked him to stand down because they believed a negotiated end to the conflict was within reach.

"I have been asked by the Emir of Qatar, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed to hold off on our planned Military attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was scheduled for tomorrow, in that serious negotiations are now taking place," Trump wrote [2]. He said the Gulf allies had requested "two to three days" and described his decision to postpone the strike as lasting "for a little while, hopefully, maybe forever" [1].

The announcement set off a scramble among diplomats, military planners, and intelligence analysts trying to answer a single question: is this the beginning of the end of the war, or another feint in a conflict defined by brinkmanship?

The Strike That Almost Was

Details about the planned operation remain classified, but its contours are visible in reporting from multiple outlets. The strike was described as retaliatory — a response to Iran's continued resistance to American demands on the nuclear file and its refusal to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping [3]. CNN reported that U.S. military planners had been developing targeting packages focused on Iran's Strait of Hormuz defenses, including anti-ship missile batteries, naval installations at Bandar Abbas, and command-and-control nodes on Qeshm Island [4].

The planned Tuesday strike would not have been the first. On February 28, the U.S. and Israel launched "Operation Epic Fury," a coordinated campaign of airstrikes that hit over 500 military targets in Iran within the first 24 hours [5]. The Israeli Air Force flew the largest combat sortie in its history, deploying more than 1,200 bombs across western and central Iran [6]. That initial assault killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose death was confirmed by Iranian state media on March 1 [5]. A ceasefire took effect on April 8 after 40 days of sustained combat, but it has frayed repeatedly since [7].

That Trump was prepared to launch another major strike — even as a ceasefire nominally held — reveals how fragile the current pause remains. It also raises questions about how far planning had advanced: whether aircraft were airborne, munitions preloaded, or targeting coordinates finalized. The White House has not provided these details. Pentagon spokesperson declined to comment on operational specifics, as is standard practice [3].

Who Asked Trump to Stop — and Why

The three leaders Trump named — Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) — represent the core of the Gulf Cooperation Council's diplomatic weight [1]. Their intervention was not spontaneous. It came through direct phone calls to Trump and, according to diplomatic sources cited by Foreign Policy, through back-channel communications that had been active for weeks [8].

Each leader has distinct motivations for preventing an escalation.

Saudi Arabia has the most to lose from a wider war. The kingdom's oil infrastructure — including the Abqaiq processing facility, attacked by Iran-aligned forces in 2019 — sits within range of Iranian ballistic missiles and Houthi drones [9]. Saudi leadership also assesses that a new round of strikes would draw the Houthis deeper into the conflict, threatening the Red Sea oil export routes that are the backbone of the Saudi economy [8]. MBS's Vision 2030 economic diversification program requires stability, foreign investment, and functioning global trade routes — all of which a regional conflagration would jeopardize [9].

The UAE has taken a more hawkish posture during the war, with some Emirati officials privately arguing that military pressure could produce lasting change in Iran's behavior [10]. But the UAE's exposure is acute: Dubai's role as a global trade and finance hub depends on regional stability, and Iranian retaliatory strikes during the February-April fighting hit Emirati territory [10].

Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East (Al Udeid Air Base) and has long served as an interlocutor with Iran, with which it shares the world's largest natural gas field [8]. Qatar's diplomatic channels with Tehran have been active throughout the conflict.

The Gulf states' intervention carries particular weight because of the damage they absorbed during the war. According to a Soufan Center intelligence brief, 83% of Iranian missile and drone strikes during the February-April conflict targeted GCC states, while only 17% were directed at Israel [10].

Source: Soufan Center Intelligence Brief

Data as of May 14, 2026CSV

This targeting pattern gave the Gulf states both credibility and urgency in their request. They were not bystanders asking for restraint — they were combatants absorbing the bulk of Iranian retaliation while declining to strike back.

The Beijing Agreement's Long Shadow

The Gulf states' ability to serve as intermediaries traces back to the March 2023 Beijing Agreement, in which China brokered a normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran [11]. That agreement ended a seven-year diplomatic rift, led to the reopening of embassies, and established direct communication channels between Riyadh and Tehran [12].

Those channels have proven durable. Despite the war, Saudi Arabia maintained some diplomatic contact with Iranian officials, and MBS's relationship with Iranian interlocutors — established through the Beijing framework — appears to be a factor in the current mediation efforts [11]. China's role as the top oil importer from both Saudi Arabia and Iran gave Beijing unique leverage in 2023; now that leverage has indirectly enabled Gulf-mediated diplomacy with the U.S. as a principal party [13].

What Iran Is Offering — and How It Compares to the JCPOA

The substance of current negotiations centers on a 14-point memorandum of understanding that Axios first reported in early May [14]. The document would declare an end to hostilities and create a 30-day framework for detailed negotiations on the core issues: Iran's nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, and frozen assets.

Key terms under discussion include [14] [15]:

• Enrichment moratorium: Iran has proposed a five-year halt to uranium enrichment; the U.S. demands 20 years. Negotiators expect a landing zone around 12 years.
• Nuclear weapons commitment: Iran would formally commit to never seek a nuclear weapon.
• Strait of Hormuz: Iran would lift restrictions on commercial transit.
• Sanctions relief: The U.S. would lift sanctions and release frozen Iranian funds.
• Inspections: The U.S. demands "enhanced snap inspections" by UN inspectors.

These terms represent a significant departure from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump withdrew from in 2018. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit enrichment to 3.67%, reduce its centrifuge count from approximately 19,000 to 6,104, and submit to the most intrusive verification regime ever negotiated for a nuclear program [16].

Since the JCPOA's collapse, Iran has blown past every limit. Its uranium stockpile is now 30 times the JCPOA-permitted level, enriched to 60% — a short technical step from the 90% required for weapons-grade material [17]. In June 2025, Iran suspended all cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and inspectors have been unable to verify activities at a newly declared underground enrichment facility at Isfahan [17].

Source: Arms Control Association / IAEA

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

The proposed deal's enrichment moratorium — even at 12 years — would be weaker than the JCPOA's permanent enrichment cap but may reflect a pragmatic acknowledgment that Iran's program has advanced beyond what the 2015 agreement addressed. The question of verification is central: without IAEA access, any commitment is unenforceable.

The Verification Problem

The JCPOA's verification architecture was extensive. It included continuous IAEA monitoring of all declared nuclear facilities, Additional Protocol access to suspicious sites, 25-year monitoring of uranium ore concentrate at all mills, and 20-year surveillance of centrifuge rotors [16]. A "snapback" mechanism allowed any P5+1 member to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions within 30 days if Iran was found in significant non-compliance [18].

That architecture collapsed incrementally after the U.S. withdrawal. Iran began exceeding enrichment limits in 2019, accelerated in 2021, and in October 2025 officially declared the JCPOA terminated [17]. France, Germany, and the UK triggered the UN snapback mechanism in August 2025, but Iran, Russia, and China declared the reimposed sanctions legally void [17].

For any new agreement, the verification question is whether the IAEA can rebuild an inspection regime from a weaker starting position. The agency has not inspected the Isfahan underground facility, and Iran has installed advanced centrifuges whose locations and numbers are not fully documented [17]. Arms control experts at the Carnegie Endowment have argued that a new deal would need verification provisions stronger than the JCPOA's to account for the knowledge and infrastructure Iran has accumulated [19]. No international body has publicly committed to participating in a new verification framework.

The View from Israel and Congressional Hawks

Israeli officials have responded to the strike cancellation with measured alarm. CNN reported that Israel is concerned Trump may reach an agreement that leaves Iran's nuclear program partially intact while bypassing Israeli priorities on ballistic missiles and Iranian support for regional proxy groups [20].

A senior Israeli official told CNN that Israel "remains on high alert for a breakdown in talks," and Netanyahu's former national security adviser argued publicly that any agreement must prevent the Iranian regime from reconstituting its military capabilities [20]. The Israeli position draws on Trump's own rhetoric — his statement that "perhaps we are better off with no deal at all" — as evidence that a weak agreement would be worse than continued military pressure [21].

In the U.S. Congress, hawkish critics argue that repeated last-minute reversals erode American deterrence. The Congressional Research Service documented the pattern in a March 2026 report: since 2018, the U.S. has publicly threatened or prepared military action against Iran on multiple occasions — including Trump's 2019 decision to call off strikes 10 minutes before execution — and each reversal has preceded, rather than prevented, Iranian escalation [22]. Critics contend that Iran's nuclear timeline accelerated after each episode in which threatened force was not carried out.

Defenders of diplomatic engagement counter that the February-April war itself demonstrated the limits of military force. Despite destroying significant portions of Iran's nuclear infrastructure, the strikes did not compel Iranian capitulation; instead, Iran retaliated with missile and drone attacks across the region, closed the Strait of Hormuz, and disrupted global energy markets [5] [23]. A Georgetown Journal of International Affairs analysis argued that "the war achieved tactical damage but strategic ambiguity," with Iran's nuclear knowledge base and underground facilities remaining intact [23].

Inside Iran: Who Is Negotiating?

The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28 fundamentally altered Iran's internal power dynamics. His son, Mojtaba Khamenei, assumed the position of Supreme Leader, but real power has shifted to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) [24].

According to Euronews reporting, IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi is now making military and political decisions alongside Mojtaba Khamenei, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi cannot operate independently of IRGC approval [25]. The Soufan Center described the current Iranian negotiating posture as emanating from "a divided committee of hardliners and pragmatists that lacks a cohesive, unified position" [24].

This internal fragmentation complicates diplomacy. The IRGC — which controls significant economic assets, including port operations and construction — has institutional reasons to resist a deal that includes sanctions relief (which could empower civilian competitors) or arms limitations (which would reduce the IRGC's political leverage) [25]. Reformist factions, weakened by years of repression and marginalized further by the war, have remained largely silent [25].

The timing of Iran's apparent willingness to engage may reflect less a change of heart than a change in calculus. The war inflicted significant damage on Iran's conventional military capabilities, and the regime faces economic strain from the U.S. naval blockade and disrupted oil exports [14]. The IRGC's willingness to permit negotiations — even while maintaining a hardline posture publicly — suggests a pragmatic assessment that continued war risks further degradation of their power base.

The Pattern of Brinkmanship

Trump's decision to call off the May 19 strike fits a pattern that dates to his first term. In June 2019, Trump approved and then canceled strikes on Iran — reportedly with planes in the air — after Iran shot down a U.S. surveillance drone [6]. He said at the time that the estimated 150 casualties were "not proportionate" to the downing of an unmanned aircraft.

That episode was followed not by Iranian restraint but by an escalating series of provocations: attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman, the September 2019 strike on Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq, and the January 2020 crisis that followed the U.S. killing of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani [22].

The Congressional Research Service report identified a consistent dynamic: threats of force followed by withdrawal tend to produce short-term de-escalation but do not yield lasting diplomatic concessions [22]. Iran's nuclear program continued to advance through each cycle of threatened and averted conflict.

Whether the current moment is different depends on variables that did not exist before: Iran has fought and lost a conventional war, its supreme leader is dead, and its military infrastructure is significantly degraded. These conditions may make a deal more achievable than at any prior point — or they may make Iran's remaining hardliners more determined to preserve the nuclear program as the regime's ultimate insurance policy.

The Stakes for Gulf States

For Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, the financial and strategic calculus is straightforward. The war has already disrupted oil markets, threatened physical infrastructure, and undermined the business-friendly image all three states have cultivated for foreign investors [9]. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply transits — has rattled energy markets globally [4].

The Gulf states are also navigating a long-term strategic rebalancing. The 2023 Beijing Agreement signaled a willingness to diversify security partnerships beyond Washington, and the current crisis has reinforced that impulse [11]. If the Gulf states succeed in brokering a settlement, it would validate their independent diplomatic capacity and strengthen their position relative to both the U.S. and Iran.

But failure carries risks too. If the two-to-three-day window passes without progress and Trump orders another strike, the Gulf states will face renewed pressure to choose sides — precisely the binary they have spent years trying to avoid [8].

What Comes Next

The 14-point MOU, if signed, would begin a 30-day negotiation period during which detailed terms on enrichment, inspections, sanctions, and military arrangements would need to be finalized [14]. The precedent of the JCPOA — which took two years of negotiations to produce — suggests that timeline is ambitious.

Key unresolved questions include which international bodies would participate in verification, whether the U.S. would accept anything short of complete Iranian nuclear dismantlement, and whether the IRGC-dominated government in Tehran can deliver on commitments made by its negotiators.

Trump framed the postponement in transactional terms, consistent with his approach throughout the crisis. The Gulf allies "feel they are very close to a deal," he said, and he was willing to give them time — but not indefinitely [1]. The clock he started on May 18 is now ticking.

Whether it counts down to a deal or to renewed hostilities depends on negotiations whose participants, on both sides, face intense domestic pressure to reject compromise.