Vance to Lead US Delegation at Iran Peace Talks in Pakistan

Vice President JD Vance will lead a US delegation to Islamabad, Pakistan, on Saturday, April 10, for direct negotiations with Iran — the most senior American engagement with Tehran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution [1]. Vance will be joined by special envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law, as the two sides attempt to convert a fragile two-week ceasefire into a lasting peace agreement after six weeks of open war [2].

The stakes are difficult to overstate. Since the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28 — killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — the conflict has closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupted global energy markets, triggered Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel, US bases, and Gulf states, and produced an estimated $120 billion in damages to Arab countries alone [3][4]. Oil prices, which surged past $100 per barrel during the conflict, dropped sharply after the ceasefire announcement but remain well above pre-war levels [5].

The Delegation: Why a Vice President?

The selection of Vance to head the US team represents a significant escalation in the seniority of American envoys to Iran talks. When the Obama administration negotiated the 2013 interim agreement in Geneva, Secretary of State John Kerry led the effort. Undersecretary Wendy Sherman ran the technical negotiations that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna [6]. Sending a sitting vice president signals a level of commitment — or political ambition — that exceeds any prior US-Iran diplomatic engagement.

The choice was also partly forced by Tehran. Iran rejected further engagement with Witkoff and Kushner, who had led earlier negotiation rounds. Iranian officials indicated they "had zero interest in sitting down with Witkoff or Kushner again," preferring instead to engage with Vance directly [7]. Diplomats familiar with the talks told Bloomberg that Witkoff had "undermined" earlier negotiations, though the White House disputed that characterization [8][2].

The composition of the delegation has drawn scrutiny. Kushner's involvement, given his extensive business interests in the Gulf region, has raised conflict-of-interest concerns among Democratic lawmakers. Responsible Statecraft described Witkoff and Kushner's earlier diplomatic efforts as part of "Trump's march to war in Iran" [9].

Why Pakistan?

Pakistan's emergence as the mediator in this conflict reflects a specific set of geographic, diplomatic, and strategic conditions. Sharing a 959-kilometer border with Iran, Pakistan maintains working relations with Tehran that are "neither openly adversarial nor tightly aligned," allowing it to carry messages without the baggage of other regional players [10].

Several factors converged to make Islamabad the venue. First, Pakistan's leadership had maintained unusually direct lines to Trump, built through public praise and private engagement that gave Islamabad an opening at the critical moment [10]. Second, the Gulf Cooperation Council states — which might ordinarily broker such talks — were divided. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both targets of Iranian missile attacks during the war, had urged Trump not to agree to a ceasefire, arguing there would be "no peace as long as the regime still exists" [11]. That left few credible neutral parties.

Pakistan also has clear self-interest. Any prolonged conflict threatened its energy supplies, trade routes, and internal security [10]. Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif proposed a "two-phased" truce deal and formally offered to host talks on March 23 [12]. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted that the war had "uncovered the weakness in US-Gulf ties," creating space for Pakistan to fill a diplomatic vacuum [13].

What's on the Table

The two sides enter Islamabad with positions that appear far apart.

Iran's 10-Point Plan

Iran's proposal, which Trump described as a "workable basis for talks," includes demands that the US accept Iran's nuclear enrichment program, lift all primary and secondary sanctions, withdraw US combat forces from regional bases, release frozen Iranian assets, and pay war-related damages [14][15]. Multiple Iranian media outlets reported that the 10 points include "acceptance of enrichment" — a direct collision with the Trump administration's stated position that Iran "can never have nuclear weapons," as Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said [15].

The US Position

Vance stated before departing that the US "bottom line" includes verifiable dismantlement of Iran's weapons-capable nuclear infrastructure and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz [16]. The administration has signaled willingness to discuss sanctions relief and tariff adjustments, with Trump posting that "We are, and will be, talking tariff and sanctions relief with Iran" [1]. However, the specific sanctions regimes under discussion — whether JCPOA-era restrictions, Trump's International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) orders, or specific Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designations — have not been publicly disclosed.

The Nuclear Gap

The distance between these positions on the nuclear question is significant. Under the JCPOA, Iran was limited to 3.67% enrichment with 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges. By May 2025, just before the US-Israeli strikes, Iran had accumulated 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity — enough to produce weapons-grade material for multiple warheads within weeks using its advanced IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges [17][18].

Source: IAEA Quarterly Reports

Data as of Sep 1, 2025CSV

The IAEA confirmed in March 2026 that while bombing had damaged the entrance buildings at Natanz, making the main facility inaccessible, Iran had declared a new underground enrichment facility at Isfahan whose status remains unknown because inspectors have not been granted access [17]. The Arms Control Association assessed in March 2026 that "US negotiators were ill-prepared for serious nuclear negotiations with Iran," citing a lack of technical expertise on the American team [19].

The Ceasefire's Fragile Terms

The two-week ceasefire announced on April 7 halted 40 days of US-Israeli strikes on Iran, with Tehran agreeing to reopen the Strait of Hormuz [5][20]. But the agreement showed cracks almost immediately. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that passage through the Strait would "be possible via coordination with Iran's Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations" — language that fell short of the unconditional reopening the US expected [20].

Hours after the announcement, oil tanker traffic through the Strait remained halted as Israel continued attacks on Lebanon, which Iran said violated the ceasefire's spirit [21]. Netanyahu explicitly stated that the ceasefire "does not include Lebanon," a position that threatens to unravel the agreement before talks even begin [22].

Regional Allies: Divided and Anxious

The Islamabad talks proceed without consensus among America's closest regional partners.

Israel has offered conditional support. Netanyahu's office issued a statement backing "Donald Trump's decision to suspend strikes against Iran for two weeks," contingent on Iran immediately opening the straits and stopping all attacks [23]. But Netanyahu faces fierce domestic criticism. Opposition leader Yair Lapid called the ceasefire Israel's worst-ever "diplomatic disaster," arguing that Netanyahu had "failed politically, failed strategically, and didn't meet a single one of the goals that he himself set" [23]. Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett warned that the outcome "will leave Israel facing a vengeful Iran" more determined to acquire nuclear weapons [23].

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken harder lines. Both countries, which sustained Iranian missile and drone strikes during the war, urged the Trump administration to "finish the job" rather than negotiate [11][24]. The UAE, which received the largest number of Iranian attacks after Israel, initially called for all parties to return to the negotiating table but hardened its stance after the attacks [24]. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman urged Trump in multiple calls to "keep hitting the Iranians hard" [11].

No public statements from Riyadh or Abu Dhabi indicate they were formally briefed on the Islamabad talks' agenda before the announcement, though diplomatic sources told Al Jazeera that back-channel communications were ongoing [10].

The Human Cost: Sanctions, Poverty, and Proxy Spending

Any assessment of the negotiations must reckon with who has borne the cost of the US-Iran standoff.

On the Iranian civilian side, the World Bank projects that poverty in Iran will reach 38.8% of the population in 2026, pushing an additional 3 million people into poverty [25]. Approximately 10 million Iranians have fallen into poverty over the past decade. Inflation exceeded 48.6% in October 2025, and the Iranian rial has collapsed from roughly 42,000 to over 1.1 million against the US dollar [26][27]. A peer-reviewed study found that sanctions produced a 28-percentage-point gap between the potential and actual size of Iran's middle class after the maximum pressure campaign began [28].

Source: World Bank Iran MPO

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

On the other side of the ledger, the US State Department has estimated that Iran spent more than $16 billion between 2012 and 2020 to support the Assad regime and its proxy network [29]. Iran sustains an estimated 200,000 fighters across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In 2025, Tehran announced plans to triple its defense spending from approximately $8 billion to more than $24 billion — a 200% increase [30]. Israeli intelligence in December 2025 revealed a network of money exchange houses in Turkey facilitating "hundreds of millions of dollars" in Iranian funding to Hamas [31].

These numbers frame the central moral tension of the standoff: sanctions have devastated ordinary Iranians while the government has continued to fund proxy operations. Critics of maximum pressure argue the policy punishes civilians without changing regime behavior. Defenders counter that without sanctions, even more revenue would flow to proxy forces.

Has Maximum Pressure Worked?

Nonproliferation analysts are divided on whether Iran's negotiating position has weakened or strengthened since 2018.

The case that pressure has worked points to real costs imposed on Tehran: degradation of proxy networks (particularly Hezbollah's infrastructure in Lebanon), economic strain, and the killing of senior military and political leadership including Khamenei himself. These pressures "likely contributed to Tehran's willingness to codify enrichment limits within a structured negotiating framework," according to analysis published by Modern Diplomacy [32].

The case that it has failed is equally compelling. Iran's enriched uranium stockpile grew from zero at 60% purity under the JCPOA to 440.9 kg by May 2025 [17]. Iran's demands entering the Islamabad talks — acceptance of enrichment, reparations, base withdrawals — exceed what Tehran sought in any previous negotiation round [33]. The Arms Control Association warned that further military action "would drive Iranian leaders away from negotiations and strengthen the argument inside Iran that only possessing nuclear weapons can protect the state from external attack" [33].

The Enforcement Problem

Even if negotiators reach an agreement in Islamabad, a fundamental structural problem looms: how to make it stick.

The JCPOA — the last verified multilateral agreement limiting Iran's nuclear program — was not a treaty ratified by the US Senate. It was an executive agreement that one administration made and the next withdrew from in 2018. The "snapback" mechanism that allowed reimposition of UN sanctions expired in October 2025, removing one enforcement tool [6][34].

Iranian negotiators have consistently demanded guarantees that a future US administration could not simply withdraw again — a guarantee the executive branch cannot constitutionally provide [34]. This impasse contributed to the collapse of 2022 restoration negotiations and remains unresolved. Any agreement reached in Islamabad that takes the form of another executive agreement faces the same vulnerability.

Some analysts have proposed creative workarounds: a UN Security Council resolution endorsing the deal (which would bind future administrations under international law, though enforcement remains discretionary), congressional legislation codifying sanctions relief (which would require bipartisan support that does not currently exist), or a phased implementation structure where Iranian concessions unlock incremental and hard-to-reverse economic integration [19][34].

None of these solutions fully resolves the problem. As one former State Department official put it in the original JCPOA debates, "any treaty is only good as long as all parties are willing to abide by it" [34].

What Comes Next

The Islamabad talks represent either the beginning of a serious diplomatic process or a high-profile photo opportunity before hostilities resume. The two-week ceasefire expires on April 21, and the distance between the two sides' opening positions — Iran demanding acceptance of enrichment and reparations, the US insisting on verifiable nuclear dismantlement — is vast.

Pakistan's two-phased proposal envisions an initial agreement to formalize the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, followed by comprehensive negotiations on nuclear issues, sanctions, and regional security [12]. Whether that phased approach can bridge a gap that has defeated diplomats for two decades remains the defining question.

The war has already killed thousands, displaced millions, and reshaped the Middle East's strategic landscape. The selection of a sitting vice president to lead talks signals that the Trump administration recognizes the gravity of the moment. Whether Vance carries sufficient authority to close a deal — or is authorized only to probe Iran's flexibility — will become clear in Islamabad on Saturday.