Trump Fires Navy Secretary Over Shipbuilding Dispute

On April 22, 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired Secretary of the Navy John Phelan — the civilian leader of the largest navy on Earth — in the middle of an active naval blockade of Iran [1][2]. The move capped months of internal conflict over how to rebuild America's aging fleet, who should control the procurement process, and how fast the Navy can realistically expand while China's fleet grows unchecked.

Phelan, a billionaire Trump fundraiser with no prior defense experience, lasted 13 months in the job [3]. He becomes the latest in a string of Navy secretaries removed under Trump, extending a pattern of turnover that defense analysts say has no parallel in the post-World War II era [4].

The firing exposes a fundamental rift inside the Pentagon: whether to bet on large, traditional warships — including a new class of battleships championed by Trump himself — or pivot toward smaller unmanned systems and submarines that Pentagon leadership considers better suited to modern warfare [5][6].

What Happened

The break came during a White House meeting on Wednesday between Trump and Hegseth to discuss shipbuilding progress. According to multiple sources briefed on the meeting, Trump grew frustrated with what he perceived as insufficient speed in expanding the fleet, and he and Hegseth agreed that Phelan needed to go [1][2].

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell announced that evening that Phelan was departing "effective immediately" [7]. Hung Cao, the Under Secretary of the Navy — a retired Navy captain and former Republican congressional candidate from Virginia — stepped into the role on an acting basis, becoming the first Vietnamese American to lead the Navy [8][9].

Trump struck a conciliatory tone on Truth Social, writing: "John Phelan is a long time friend, and very successful businessman, who did an outstanding job serving as my Secretary Of The Navy for the last year" [2]. He later said Phelan left over "conflicts" with others at the Pentagon [10]. The Washington Times reported Trump claimed Phelan quit rather than being fired [11].

The Policy Dispute: Battleships vs. Drones

The substantive disagreement centered on the composition of the future fleet. Phelan had championed Trump's signature "Golden Fleet" initiative, including the Trump-class battleship (BBG(X)), a next-generation large surface combatant whose construction is not expected to begin until fiscal year 2028 [12][6].

Just one day before his ouster, Phelan delivered a keynote at the Sea-Air-Space conference in Washington where he defended the battleship concept. "Battleship strike groups will offer commanders more options than what exists in today's fleet," he said, arguing that "manned platforms combined with unmanned systems, acting interchangeably, is the most powerful winning combination" [6].

But Hegseth and Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg had a different vision. They wanted the Navy leaning harder into submarines, stealth aircraft, unmanned systems, cyber, and electronic warfare — capabilities they considered more relevant to a potential conflict with China [5]. Feinberg had already moved to take control of major shipbuilding and acquisition responsibilities that would typically fall under the Navy secretary's purview [1][2].

The chain-of-command dynamic compounded the policy disagreement. Hegseth was "irked by Phelan's direct communication with Trump," which he viewed as an attempt to bypass the defense secretary's authority [1]. Phelan, a personal friend and fundraiser for Trump, had a direct line to the president that Hegseth could not match — and reportedly used it [3].

The Foreign Shipbuilding Flashpoint

A separate controversy erupted in Phelan's final days when he suggested the Navy might explore building some ships in foreign shipyards. At the Sea-Air-Space conference, Phelan told reporters: "Everything's on the table. We just need to look at it, understand it, understand the implications behind it and decide if we think that makes sense or not" [13].

He pointed to a labor capacity problem at domestic yards and noted that Japan had "three times more productivity per shift" with less bureaucratic paperwork and more automation [13][14]. The suggestion drew immediate criticism from lawmakers who represent shipbuilding districts and from those who view domestic production as a national security requirement.

The Shipbuilding Crisis by the Numbers

The firing takes place against a backdrop of systemic failure in American naval construction. The numbers are stark:

• A 2025 Government Accountability Office analysis of 37 battle force ships under construction found that all 37 were facing delays, with some as much as three years behind schedule [15].
• The Navy has not increased the number of ships in its fleet over the past 20 years despite nearly doubling its shipbuilding budget [15].
• Virginia-class submarine production runs at roughly 60% of its annual target, putting the program years behind schedule [15][16].
• The first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine — critical to the nuclear deterrent — is only about 65% complete, with a 2028 delivery described by the Pentagon's submarine czar as a "wicked heavy lift" [16].

Source: CBO / Navy Budget Office

Data as of Apr 23, 2026CSV

The budget trajectory tells its own story. Shipbuilding funding reached $37 billion in fiscal year 2024 before the administration's FY2026 request slashed it to $20.8 billion — a cut that drew bipartisan criticism on Capitol Hill [17][18]. Congress ultimately appropriated $27.2 billion, a $6.5 billion increase over the White House request, covering 17 ships including Columbia- and Virginia-class submarines [19].

The China Gap

The strategic urgency behind these disputes is the widening numerical gap between the U.S. and Chinese navies. China's People's Liberation Army Navy now operates approximately 370 vessels compared to roughly 290 for the United States [20]. China added 30 ships to its fleet in the past year alone; the U.S. added two [20].

Source: CRS/DoD Reports

Data as of Apr 23, 2026CSV

Congressional Research Service projections estimate China's fleet will reach 435 ships by 2030, while the U.S. Navy plans to reach approximately 300-305 [20][21]. The disparity in industrial capacity is even more pronounced: China has an estimated 232 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, building more than 1,000 commercial ships annually compared to about five for the U.S. [20].

Proponents of the administration's position argue this gap makes Phelan's approach — focused on fewer, larger, more expensive platforms — precisely the wrong answer. The argument for unmanned systems and smaller vessels is that they can be produced faster, distributed more widely, and present a more survivable force in contested waters.

The Steelman Case for Phelan's Removal

There are credible arguments that Phelan's shipbuilding approach had problems. His cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate program — replacing it with a Future Frigate (FF(X)) derived from the Coast Guard's Legend-class cutter — drew criticism within the Navy for restarting a program that had already absorbed years of development [5][22].

Phelan also invested heavily in the Trump-class battleship, a vessel whose utility many naval analysts question. Construction would not begin until the 2030s, meaning it would have no impact on the fleet size gap for at least a decade [12].

Meanwhile, the $900 million initiative Phelan launched in 2026 to automate submarine manufacturing, while ambitious, had yet to produce results [2]. His defenders point out that shipbuilding reforms take years to bear fruit and that firing the person implementing them resets the clock.

The case for the administration boils down to speed: if the Navy cannot produce ships fast enough domestically, then the institutional structures — including the secretary charged with overseeing them — must change. Whether the replacement can actually accelerate production remains an open question.

A Pattern of Instability

Phelan's removal fits a well-established pattern. During Trump's first term, six different people held the Navy secretary position — a record for any single presidential term [4]. Richard Spencer was fired in 2019 over his handling of the SEAL Eddie Gallagher case after going around Defense Secretary Mark Esper to deal directly with the White House [23]. Acting Secretary Thomas Modly resigned in 2020 after public backlash over his removal of the commanding officer of the USS Theodore Roosevelt during a COVID-19 outbreak [24].

Hegseth has fired or sidelined dozens of defense officials since taking office, a pace that critics say has created "an atmosphere of anxiety and mistrust" within the Pentagon [4]. Multiple generals and admirals have been removed during the current term. Former defense secretaries have called for congressional hearings on the pattern of firings [25].

Impact on Active Contracts and the Workforce

The two companies that build virtually all U.S. Navy warships — Huntington Ingalls Industries and General Dynamics — together employ tens of thousands of workers across shipyards in Newport News, Virginia, and Groton, Connecticut. HII's Newport News division alone employs more than 25,000 people, making it the largest industrial employer in Virginia [26][27].

These yards recently won an $18.4 billion contract modification for two Virginia-class submarines [28]. The Pentagon's 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for $1 trillion in investment and 364 new ships [29]. Leadership transitions inject uncertainty into these programs. Contract negotiations, milestone reviews, and design approvals require an engaged and empowered secretary — and acting officials, lacking Senate confirmation and political capital, rarely push bold decisions.

The workforce challenge is acute. HII hired more than 6,000 craft workers in 2024, but more than half of new entry-level hires have been leaving before completing their first year [26]. The company has shifted strategy to recruit experienced workers at higher wages rather than training newcomers who depart quickly [26].

Congress and Constitutional Authority

Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress controls the Navy's shipbuilding budget — and lawmakers from both parties have shown willingness to override executive preferences. Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, publicly rebuked the administration's FY2026 budget request, saying he was "deeply disappointed" and accusing the White House of trying to "game the budget" by relying on reconciliation funds as a substitute for baseline appropriations [17][18].

Congress added $6.5 billion above the president's request for shipbuilding in the FY2026 compromise bill and has consistently appropriated more for naval construction than any recent administration has requested [19]. Whether Phelan's firing prompts legislative action to constrain executive influence over procurement remains to be seen, but the institutional friction is real.

Legal and Structural Guardrails

The president's authority to remove Senate-confirmed civilian appointees like service secretaries is broad and largely unchecked by statute. Unlike active-duty military officers — who by law cannot be dismissed except by court-martial or presidential order during wartime — civilian officials serve at the pleasure of the president [25][30].

Congress has historically relied on its power of the purse and the confirmation process, rather than removal restrictions, to check executive control over defense procurement. The seven-year cooling-off period required before a recently retired military officer can serve as defense secretary reflects one such structural guardrail — but no equivalent restriction governs the firing of service secretaries [30][31].

Some constitutional scholars have argued that the pattern of repeated removals of civilian defense leaders who resist White House procurement preferences poses a structural risk — effectively allowing political considerations to override independent military acquisition judgment. But the legal consensus is that the president's removal power over executive branch appointees is broad, and no court has imposed meaningful limits in the defense context [25].

What Comes Next

Hung Cao inherits a Navy fighting a real-time naval engagement in the Strait of Hormuz — where the U.S. has been enforcing a blockade of Iranian ports since April 13 — while simultaneously managing a shipbuilding enterprise that every independent assessment describes as failing to meet its targets [32][33].

The FY2027 budget request, which Phelan had said could double the FY2026 ship request, is now in the hands of his successor [34]. The Columbia-class program, Virginia-class production rates, the future of the Trump-class battleship, and the fate of foreign shipbuilding partnerships all hang on decisions that an acting secretary may lack the authority or inclination to make.

The deeper question is whether the instability at the top of Navy civilian leadership — now approaching its seventh secretary across two Trump terms — is itself a greater threat to shipbuilding than any particular policy disagreement. Ships take years to design and build. Secretaries, under this administration, last months.