Defense Secretary Hegseth Testifies Under Oath for First Time Since Start of Iran War

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth sat before the House Armed Services Committee on April 29, 2026, raised his right hand, and swore to tell the truth. It was his first time testifying under oath since the United States launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on February 28 — a 60-day gap that coincides almost exactly with the War Powers Resolution's statutory deadline for congressional authorization of ongoing hostilities [1][2].

The hearing, nominally convened to review the Pentagon's $1.5 trillion fiscal year 2027 budget request, became something else entirely: the first sustained public interrogation of the administration's legal rationale, casualty accounting, cost estimates, and strategic endgame for the largest U.S. military operation since the 2003 invasion of Iraq [3].

The 60-Day Gap

Hegseth's 60-day absence from the congressional witness chair has drawn scrutiny. During the Iraq War, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld testified before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18, 2002 — months before the March 2003 invasion — and returned multiple times in the opening weeks of combat, appearing in both chambers within the first 30 days of major operations [4]. Rumsfeld held near-daily Pentagon press briefings during the early phase of the war, fielding questions from reporters as a substitute for, and sometimes supplement to, formal testimony [5].

Hegseth and Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine held televised Pentagon briefings during the Iran conflict but avoided sworn congressional testimony until the 60-day mark — a timeline that critics say was designed to run out the War Powers clock [6]. "He's been hiding behind podium briefings where no one is under oath and there's no subpoena power," said Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee [7].

The administration counters that Hegseth and Caine provided classified briefings to the Gang of Eight congressional leaders and relevant committee chairs throughout the conflict, and that formal testimony was scheduled to coincide with the budget hearing cycle, not to evade oversight [3].

Legal Authority: Article II and Nothing Else

The constitutional debate at the center of the hearing is straightforward: the administration launched a major military campaign against a sovereign nation without an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or a declaration of war. The 2002 Iraq AUMF was repealed, and the 2001 AUMF — stretched by previous administrations to cover operations against terrorist groups — was never designed to authorize state-on-state warfare with Iran [8].

The White House has relied exclusively on Article II of the Constitution, citing the president's inherent authority as Commander in Chief to defend the nation against an imminent threat. The administration's formal notification to Congress under the War Powers Resolution, delivered in early March, described the strikes as necessary to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons capability [9].

Constitutional scholars have been broadly critical. Stanford Law Professor Allen Weiner argued that "the predicate condition for anticipatory self-defense — an instant, overwhelming threat leaving no choice of means — was clearly absent on February 28" [10]. A coalition of legal academics writing in JURIST described the strikes as lacking "authorization, imminence, or a plan" [11]. The New York City Bar Association issued a formal statement questioning the legal basis [12].

On the other side, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) urged Congress to pass a retroactive AUMF, arguing that "the threat posed by Iran's nuclear timeline and regional proxy network justified preemptive action faster than a full congressional authorization process would have allowed" [13]. Some Republican lawmakers have echoed this position, contending that the president acted within his Article II authority to neutralize an existential threat.

Despite these arguments, five separate Senate votes on war powers resolutions — which would have required the president to seek congressional approval — have failed along largely party-line votes, with the most recent defeated 52-47 on April 15 [14][15]. Democrats are now exploring a federal lawsuit against the president, though courts have historically dismissed such challenges as non-justiciable political questions [9].

The Casualty Numbers — and Their Delays

Pentagon data released during Hegseth's testimony confirmed 15 U.S. service members killed in action and 538 wounded since February 28, for a cumulative casualty figure of 553 as of Day 60 [16][17].

Source: Military Times / Pentagon

Data as of Apr 29, 2026CSV

The deadliest single incident occurred on March 1, when six Army Reserve soldiers from the 103rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command were killed in an Iranian drone strike near Camp Arifjan in Kuwait [18]. Six Air Force personnel died on March 12 when their KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft crashed in western Iraq [16]. Marine Corps Lance Corporal Kevin Melendez died in a non-hostile incident in Saudi Arabia on March 4 [16].

The Pentagon has faced accusations of underreporting. The Intercept reported in April that wounded service members were being removed from official casualty lists, with one congressional aide calling it "the definition of a cover-up" [19]. At the ceasefire on April 8, the official tally stood at 385; by Day 60, it had risen to 553, with the Pentagon attributing the increase to injuries sustained during ongoing force protection operations and reclassification of previously unreported wounds [17][20].

Of the 538 wounded, the Pentagon says 330 returned to duty and characterizes the "vast majority" as minor injuries, though five service members were classified as seriously wounded [16].

Intelligence Disputes: Was the Threat Imminent?

A central question in the hearing — and in the broader debate — concerns whether the intelligence assessments available to Hegseth before the first strike order supported the claim of an imminent Iranian nuclear threat.

A 2025 public U.S. intelligence assessment stated that "Iran is not building a nuclear weapon" and that the former Supreme Leader had "not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003" [21]. After the strikes, a preliminary U.S. intelligence report found that Iran's nuclear program had been set back "only a few months," contradicting public statements from President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the program had been "obliterated" [22].

The contradiction surfaced publicly when Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified that Iran's nuclear capabilities had been "obliterated" in the strikes — only for Hegseth to say the following day that Trump could not tolerate Iran moving "closer and closer" to nuclear capability [23]. The Arms Control Association published an analysis concluding that "Iran's nuclear and missile programs did not pose an imminent threat" at the time strikes were authorized [24].

The White House has moved to limit intelligence sharing with Congress after an early Iran report was leaked, further inflaming the oversight debate [22].

$25 Billion and Counting

Pentagon Comptroller Jules "Jay" Hurst told the committee that the war has cost an estimated $25 billion to date, with the bulk spent on munitions, followed by operations, maintenance, and equipment replacements [25][26].

Source: Pentagon / Center for American Progress

Data as of Apr 29, 2026CSV

The administration has not submitted a formal supplemental spending request to Congress to fund the war. Earlier reports indicated the Pentagon asked the White House to approve a request exceeding $200 billion, but it has not been transmitted to Capitol Hill [27]. Budget Director Russell Vought told lawmakers he "could not estimate" the total cost, drawing bipartisan criticism given the Pentagon's record of failed financial audits — it remains the only federal agency that has never passed one [28].

The Center for American Progress estimated the war would reach $25 billion by the end of the current week, a figure that proved accurate when Hurst confirmed it under oath [29]. The funds have been drawn from existing Department of Defense budget authorities without a prior congressional vote, raising questions about whether emergency supplemental appropriations are legally required [25].

Oil Prices and Economic Fallout

The conflict's economic impact has been immediate and measurable. Iran's retaliatory strikes targeted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply transits. WTI crude oil prices, which hovered near $59 per barrel in late February, spiked to $114.58 in early April before settling around $99.89 as of late April — a 57.8% year-over-year increase [30].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

The price shock has rippled through gasoline prices and inflation metrics, adding political pressure to an administration already facing criticism over the war's costs and duration.

Allied Reactions: A Fractured Coalition

The diplomatic fallout from the strikes has been uneven. Gulf Cooperation Council states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain — whose territory and bases were struck by Iranian retaliatory missiles, have broadly supported the campaign. The UAE ambassador to the U.S. publicly stated that "a simple cease-fire isn't enough," and several Gulf states expelled Iranian diplomats after the attacks [31]. Iran struck U.S. installations at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain [31].

NATO's response has been more guarded. NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska expressed "solidarity with Gulf partners" and condemned Iran's retaliatory strikes, citing UN Security Council Resolution 2817 and recognizing Gulf states' right to self-defense [32]. But when Trump requested allied support to secure the Strait of Hormuz, NATO allies, along with China, Japan, and South Korea, declined to participate during active hostilities [31].

Spain explicitly denied the U.S. use of joint military bases at Rota and Morón for operations against Iran, with Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares stating the bases would not be used "for anything that is not in the agreement, nor for anything that isn't covered by the UN charter" [31]. The refusal marked one of the most visible fractures in a bilateral defense relationship that dates to the Cold War.

Oversight Mechanisms: Triggered, Delayed, and Waived

The 60-day War Powers Resolution deadline — which requires the president to either obtain congressional authorization or begin withdrawing forces within 30 days — arrives on or around May 1 [9][33]. The administration has not indicated it will comply. Previous presidents, including Obama during the 2011 Libya intervention, argued the Resolution was unconstitutional, and no court has enforced it [34].

Beyond war powers, multiple oversight mechanisms have been strained. The GAO, which Vought dismissed as "typically wrong" and "very partisan" — a characterization the agency denied — has not been given access to full cost data [28]. The Department of Defense Inspector General published a fiscal year 2026 oversight plan for overseas contingency operations, but the Iran conflict's specific accounting remains opaque [35].

House Democrats have introduced six articles of impeachment against Hegseth, accusing him of abusing power, mishandling classified information, and authorizing military action without proper legal authority [36]. The articles are unlikely to advance in a Republican-controlled House, but they signal the intensity of the oversight conflict.

Senator Elizabeth Warren and a group of Democratic senators sent a letter to Hegseth on April 19 demanding answers on civilian harm in Iran [37]. A separate letter from Rep. Robert Garcia raised concerns about "war profiteering" by defense contractors [38].

The Steelman Case for the Administration

The strongest version of the administration's argument rests on three pillars. First, that Iran's nuclear program — despite the 2025 intelligence assessment — was advancing toward breakout capability on a timeline that would have closed the window for military action, and that the diplomatic track had been exhausted. Second, that Iran's network of regional proxies, including Hezbollah, posed an active and escalating threat to U.S. forces and allies, evidenced by years of attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria. Third, that the speed required to coordinate a joint U.S.-Israeli strike with tactical surprise was incompatible with the public deliberation inherent in a congressional authorization debate [13].

"Two months in, on an existential fight for the safety of the American people — Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb — we are proud of this undertaking," Hegseth said in his opening statement [1]. He described congressional critics as the "biggest adversary" the U.S. faces in the conflict, calling their opposition "reckless, feckless and defeatist" [1].

JINSA's analysis argued that Congress should retroactively authorize the operation rather than force a withdrawal, contending that the legal debate, while legitimate, should not override the strategic reality that Iran's nuclear infrastructure has been substantially degraded [13].

What Happens Next

The May 1 War Powers deadline sets up a constitutional collision. If the administration does not seek authorization and Congress does not force the issue through legislation — a prospect complicated by Republican majorities in both chambers — the precedent will expand executive war-making power for future administrations of either party [34].

The ceasefire that took effect April 8, after 40 days of sustained combat, remains fragile. Casualty figures have continued to climb in the post-ceasefire period, and the Strait of Hormuz remains partially disrupted [31]. Nuclear talks have reportedly begun, though their substance and prospects remain classified [39].

For now, the hearing itself is the accountability mechanism — flawed, partisan, and insufficient by many accounts, but the first moment in 60 days when the civilian leader of the U.S. military answered questions under penalty of perjury about a war that Congress never voted to authorize.