Trump and Netanyahu to Speak Amid Reports of Potential Renewed Military Action Against Iran

On May 17, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with President Donald Trump for more than thirty minutes about the war with Iran, just as Trump returned from a trip to China [1]. The call came amid what two regional intelligence officials described to Fox News as a "prevailing assessment inside Iran" that Trump "may resort to restarting military action," with Tehran pursuing a deliberate strategy of "deception and delay" to complicate any return to war [2].

The conversation marks the latest escalation point in a conflict that has already produced two rounds of military strikes — June 2025's Twelve-Day War and February 2026's Operation Epic Fury — and shows no clear path toward resolution.

What Triggered This Round of Consultations

The proximate cause of the Trump-Netanyahu call is Trump's frustration with the stalled ceasefire process. After Operation Epic Fury ended with a temporary ceasefire on April 7, 2026, Iran agreed in principle to reopen the Strait of Hormuz [3]. But the strait's status has become the central sticking point in turning the temporary truce into a durable agreement.

Iran's parliament codified a "Strait of Hormuz Management Plan" on March 30–31, 2026, imposing a toll of $1 per barrel of oil on all transiting vessels, payable in cryptocurrency — Bitcoin, USDT, or Chinese yuan [4]. At current traffic levels, the system generates an estimated $20 million per day from oil tankers alone, with $600–800 million per month possible if LNG vessels are included [5]. The Trump administration views this as an unacceptable assertion of sovereignty over an international waterway, and Trump rejected Iran's latest truce proposal in the days before the call with Netanyahu [6].

The intelligence picture is also different from earlier decision points. Unlike the May 2025 consultations — when Trump explicitly told Netanyahu a strike would be "inappropriate" because the two sides were "close to a deal" [7] — the diplomatic track has now largely collapsed. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in the opening hours of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026 [8], and Iran's post-Khamenei leadership has rejected direct nuclear negotiations with the United States [9].

A History of Thresholds Reached and Crossed

The question of whether to strike Iran's nuclear facilities has recurred across multiple U.S. and Israeli administrations since at least 2010. Each prior instance was stopped by a combination of factors: insufficient intelligence about underground sites, fear of Iranian retaliation, the availability of diplomatic alternatives, or disagreement between Washington and Jerusalem about timing.

The June 2025 Twelve-Day War marked the first time Israel actually struck. On June 13, 2025, the Israeli Air Force launched five waves of strikes using more than 200 fighter jets, hitting approximately 100 nuclear and military targets across Iran [10]. The United States joined on June 22, deploying bunker-buster munitions against the Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan nuclear facilities [11]. A ceasefire was brokered on June 24, hours after Iran fired missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar [10].

That ceasefire held for eight months. On February 28, 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched coordinated strikes under Operation Epic Fury (U.S.) and Operation Roaring Lion (Israel), hitting Iranian military installations, nuclear enrichment facilities, and leadership targets. B-2 stealth bombers, B-1 Lancers, and B-52 Stratofortresses struck fortified missile sites [8]. Iran retaliated under "Operation True Promise IV," extending the war's geographic footprint to seven countries — Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq — within 48 hours [8].

The inhibiting factors that prevented strikes for over a decade have been substantially eroded. Diplomatic channels have broken down. Israel has demonstrated the operational capability to reach Iranian targets. And the U.S. has already established the legal and political precedent of striking Iranian nuclear infrastructure. The question now is whether the costs of a third round — measured in casualties, economic damage, and regional instability — still outweigh the perceived benefits.

Iran's Nuclear Program: The Numbers

Before the June 2025 strikes, Iran's nuclear program had advanced well beyond any previously stated red line.

As of May 31, 2025, the IAEA confirmed that Iran possessed over 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity — a figure that had grown from 182 kg in October 2024 to 275 kg in February 2025 [12]. At 60% enrichment, the Institute for Science and International Security estimated that Iran could convert its stockpile into 233 kg of weapon-grade uranium (WGU) at the Fordow facility, enough for nine nuclear weapons at 25 kg per device [12]. The estimated breakout time for the first 25 kg of WGU was two to three days [12].

Source: IAEA Verification Reports

Data as of May 31, 2025CSV

For context, Netanyahu's 2012 UN General Assembly speech — in which he drew a red line on a cartoon bomb diagram — placed the threshold at Iran completing "the second stage of nuclear enrichment," which experts interpreted as the gap between 20% and 90% enrichment [13]. Iran's stockpile at 60% had long since crossed that line. The IAEA considered Iran to have enough fissile material for multiple weapons if enriched to 90%, though nuclear experts widely agreed that Iran had not moved toward weaponization — the construction of an actual deliverable device [14].

The strikes of June 2025 and February 2026 damaged key facilities. A post-attack assessment by the Institute for Science and International Security found that 12 days of Israeli and U.S. strikes inflicted significant damage on Iran's enrichment infrastructure [15]. However, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace assessed in May 2026 that "Iran's nuclear question is still on the table" — the strikes set back but did not eliminate Iran's technical knowledge or its ability to reconstitute the program [16].

Allied Consultations and the Gulf States' Fractures

The question of who supports renewed military action reveals deep fissures among U.S. partners.

During Operation Epic Fury, Iran's retaliation hit Gulf states that had not signed up for the fight. The UAE's Jebel Ali port, Abu Dhabi port infrastructure, and multiple civilian targets were struck [17]. Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG facility — the world's largest — was hit in March 2026 [18]. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also absorbed Iranian missile and drone attacks [8].

The UAE attempted to organize a coordinated military response, with President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed calling Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Gulf leaders. But MBZ's neighbors "told him that it was not their war to join," worsening already-strained UAE-Saudi relations [18]. Qatar considered striking Iran but chose de-escalation [18]. On March 26, 2026, six Gulf states plus Jordan issued a joint condemnation of Iran — but stopped short of military coordination [18].

European allies have been notably absent from the military campaign. The UK House of Commons Library published a briefing on "Israel-Iran 2025: Developments in Iran's nuclear programme and military action," reflecting parliamentary concern but no commitment to participate [14]. No European NATO member has offered operational support for U.S. or Israeli strikes on Iran.

The uncomfortable reality: a significant number of U.S. partners have signaled, privately and in some cases publicly, that they view the military campaign as counterproductive — creating more instability than it resolves without a clear theory of how strikes translate into a durable end state.

The Price of Retaliation

The costs of the first two rounds of conflict provide concrete data for assessing what a third would bring.

Casualties from the Twelve-Day War (June 2025): The U.S.-based Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRANA) reported 1,190 Iranians killed and over 4,000 wounded, including 436 confirmed civilians [10]. Israel reported 28 fatalities and 3,491 injuries, the vast majority civilian, from Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks. Iran launched approximately 550 ballistic missiles and 1,000 drones at Israel; the interception rate was about 90% [10].

Operation Epic Fury expanded the damage zone. Iran's retaliation reached seven countries. The Strait of Hormuz was declared "closed" on March 4, 2026 [19], triggering the most significant disruption to global oil flows in decades.

Oil market impact: WTI crude oil prices surged from approximately $65 per barrel in late February 2026 to a peak of $114.58 in April 2026 — a roughly 55% increase [20]. Brent crude hit nearly $120 per barrel at its peak [20]. As of mid-May 2026, WTI remains above $100, up 60.4% year-over-year [20].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 11, 2026CSV

Independent analysts have modeled the scenarios for a third round. A renewed closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of the world's oil passes — would push prices toward or above the April peaks. Global oil stockpiles are already at critically low levels [19]. A sustained closure of weeks or months would trigger cascading economic consequences far beyond the energy sector.

Cyber attacks represent another retaliatory vector. Iran has demonstrated sophisticated cyber capabilities in prior conflicts, and analysts expect any renewed military action to be met with attacks on critical infrastructure in Israel, the Gulf, and potentially the United States.

The Case For and Against Military Action

The hawk argument: Proponents of military action, including voices at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and within the Israeli security establishment, contend that diplomacy has definitively failed. They cite Iran's rapid enrichment progress — from near-zero breakout time to sufficient material for multiple weapons — as evidence that the JCPOA framework was inadequate and its successor negotiations produced nothing [21]. They point to Khamenei's September 2025 rejection of direct negotiations as proof that the regime was never negotiating in good faith [9]. The strikes, hawks argue, have already set back Iran's nuclear timeline by years and eliminated key military and political leaders. A third round could deliver a decisive blow to Iran's reconstitution capacity.

The critics' response: Arms control experts at the Arms Control Association and the Center for International Policy argue that the strikes were premature and counterproductive. They note that prior to June 2025, Iran had increased enrichment but had "not made a conscious effort to create a nuclear weapon" [22]. The February 28 operation "was planned months in advance with the launch date fixed weeks ahead — not the timeline of a war triggered by a suddenly discovered nuclear emergency" [22]. The strikes destroyed IAEA monitoring access, making it harder — not easier — to verify Iran's nuclear status [23]. And the killing of Khamenei eliminated the one decision-maker who had consistently blocked weaponization, potentially empowering hardliners who favor it.

A USC analysis concluded that the "failure of US-Iran talks was all-too predictable — but Trump could still have stuck with diplomacy over strikes" [22]. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi had reported "good progress" and described late February 2025 talks as "one of our best negotiating sessions" before the military track overtook the diplomatic one [22].

The Diplomatic Track: Dead or Dormant?

The 2025–2026 Iran-United States negotiations began with Trump's March 2025 letter to Khamenei expressing interest in a new nuclear deal [24]. Messages were exchanged through intermediaries, with Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi saying Tehran would consider any "fair and balanced" proposal [24].

Those talks collapsed with the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. After the ceasefire, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff stated that the U.S. and Iran were engaging in "both direct and mediated discussions" aimed at a comprehensive agreement [24]. But by September 2025, Khamenei had rejected direct negotiations [9]. The UN Security Council found "no agreement on way forward" regarding Iran's nuclear program despite "intensified diplomatic efforts during the second half of 2025" [25].

Operation Epic Fury further narrowed the diplomatic space. Carnegie's May 2026 assessment noted that while "Iran's nuclear question is still on the table," two wars have made a negotiated solution "much harder" — Iran has less incentive to make concessions after being attacked, and the destruction of monitoring infrastructure means any future deal would require rebuilding verification mechanisms from scratch [16][23].

The back-channel question: It is unclear whether any meaningful intermediary communications are occurring between Washington and Tehran's post-Khamenei leadership. Oman and Qatar, historically the primary conduits, have been drawn into the conflict zone. The February 2026 talks "staggered back on after a day of threats and denials" before collapsing again [26].

The Legal Question

The U.S. military campaign against Iran has operated in a constitutional gray zone.

The strikes of June 2025 and February 2026 were launched without prior congressional authorization. The White House notified the "Gang of Eight" — the bipartisan group of top House and Senate leaders and intelligence committee chairs — through Secretary of State Marco Rubio shortly before the strikes began, but gave Congress no role in the decision [27].

The War Powers Resolution requires the president to withdraw forces within 60 days absent congressional authorization. The 60-day clock from Operation Epic Fury's February 28 start date expired around May 1, 2026. The Trump administration argued that the April ceasefire "pauses or stops" the clock, with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth telling senators: "We are in a ceasefire right now, which our understanding means the 60-day clock pauses or stops" [28].

Legal scholars and members of Congress have challenged this interpretation. PolitiFact examined whether Trump violated the War Powers Act with the June 2025 strikes and found the legal arguments contested [29]. Senator Tim Kaine and Senator Rand Paul introduced bipartisan legislation requiring explicit congressional authorization before further hostilities against Iran. A parallel House resolution was sponsored by Republican Rep. Thomas Massie and Democratic Rep. Ro Khanna [27]. CNN reported that the U.S. was "blowing past" the 60-day limit on unauthorized wars [28].

The State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser published a legal justification for Operation Epic Fury in April 2026 under the title "Operation Epic Fury and International Law," arguing the strikes were lawful under Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defense) and the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief [30]. Constitutional law experts have questioned whether a preemptive strike on nuclear facilities qualifies as self-defense under international law, particularly when no imminent armed attack had been demonstrated.

What Comes Next

The May 17 call between Trump and Netanyahu does not guarantee a third round of strikes. But the conditions that previously restrained military action — active diplomacy, allied unity, congressional pushback, manageable oil prices — have all deteriorated.

Trump's frustration with Iran's "deception and delay" strategy is reportedly driving his consideration of military options [2]. Netanyahu, who discussed "round two" strikes with Trump as early as December 2025 [31], has consistently pushed for more aggressive action. The Israeli position, as conveyed by Netanyahu, is that "the war isn't over" [32].

The counterarguments remain substantial: a third round of strikes would further destabilize oil markets already in crisis, risk drawing in Gulf states that have so far stayed on the sidelines, and destroy whatever remains of the diplomatic track. The legal authority for continued operations faces active legislative challenges. And the fundamental question — whether military strikes can permanently prevent a state with Iran's technical knowledge from eventually acquiring nuclear weapons — remains unanswered by the experience of the last twelve months.

The gap between the two leaders may also matter. In May 2025, Trump told Netanyahu a strike would be "inappropriate" [7]. By February 2026, he authorized one. The trajectory suggests that each round of failed diplomacy moves Trump closer to Netanyahu's position — but each round of military action also raises the costs of the next one.