Shipping Traffic Through Strait of Hormuz Halts as US Considers Iran Peace Proposal

On any given day before February 28, 2026, roughly 100 commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide chokepoint between Iran and Oman through which one-fifth of the world's oil and a similar share of its liquefied natural gas flowed to market. Today, that number is approximately seven [1][2].

The collapse of Hormuz shipping is the most visible consequence of the US-Israeli air war on Iran, which began with strikes on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure and the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran retaliated with missile and drone salvoes against Israel, US military bases, and Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared the strait closed to vessels traveling to or from US, Israeli, and allied ports [3]. Sea mines, drone harassment, and boardings of merchant ships have enforced the closure [4].

Now, nine weeks into the crisis, Iran has submitted a 14-point peace proposal. President Donald Trump says he "can't imagine" accepting it [5]. Oil futures hover near $100, but the price of physically delivered crude has topped $130 [6]. And the diplomats, admirals, and hardliners shaping both sides' strategies are operating under a set of constraints that make resolution difficult and miscalculation easy.

The Scale of the Disruption

The International Energy Agency has called the Hormuz closure "the largest oil supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" — larger than the 1973 Arab oil embargo [7].

Before the war, approximately 20 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude oil and petroleum products transited the strait, along with over 10 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) of LNG — roughly 20% of global supply for each [8]. Gulf states, unable to export, have cut total oil production by at least 10 mb/d [7]. Qatar's Ras Laffan facility, the world's largest LNG export terminal, has no alternative route to global markets [8].

Source: USNI News / CNN Visual Analysis

Data as of May 3, 2026CSV

Vessel transits dropped from roughly 3,000 in January to 1,800 in February (reflecting the late-month onset of hostilities), then collapsed to 154 in March and approximately 210 in April [1][2]. The few ships now crossing are paying war-risk insurance premiums of 1.5% to 5% of hull value per transit — meaning a single passage for a $100 million tanker can cost $5 million in insurance alone [9]. US-, UK-, and Israeli-flagged or -linked vessels face rates at the high end, with some quotes reaching 10% [10].

The economic damage extends beyond energy. Up to 30% of internationally traded fertilizers normally transit the strait; urea prices have risen 50% since the war began [8]. The Kiel Institute and UNCTAD estimate the closure costs the global economy approximately $20 billion per day in GDP losses, with cumulative damage ranging from $3.57 trillion under a shorter closure to $6.95 trillion under a full escalation scenario [6][11]. Gulf states and Iraq alone are losing an estimated $1.1 billion per day in foregone oil revenue [6].

Oil Prices: Futures vs. Physical Reality

The crude oil market is telling two different stories. WTI futures, which reflect traders' expectations of eventual resolution, have settled near $100 per barrel as of late April 2026 — up 57.8% year-over-year from the $63 range of April 2025 [12]. Brent briefly touched $126.41 in late April before pulling back to around $116 [13].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

But the physical market — the price that refiners in Asia and the Middle East actually pay for delivered barrels — paints a starker picture. Dated Brent, the benchmark for physical crude, reached nearly $150 per barrel, far above futures prices [6]. The gap reflects the scramble for actual available crude in a market where supply has physically disappeared rather than merely been repriced.

By comparison, the 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq processing facility briefly spiked Brent by about 15% before rapid repairs brought markets back within days [14]. The 1980s Tanker War, while sustained over years, never fully closed the strait — traffic continued under naval escort. The current disruption is unprecedented in both depth and duration.

Iran's 14-Point Proposal

On May 2, Iran submitted a 14-point response to an earlier US proposal, delivered through Pakistani intermediaries [15]. The plan's core demands, as reported by Iran's semi-official Tasnim news agency and state broadcaster Press TV, include:

• End the war within 30 days across all fronts, including Lebanon, rather than the two-month ceasefire Washington had proposed [15]
• Withdraw US forces from Iran's periphery [16]
• End the naval blockade of Iranian ports [15]
• Release frozen Iranian assets and pay reparations for war damage [16]
• Lift all sanctions [15]
• Establish a new mechanism governing Strait of Hormuz navigation [16]
• Guarantee against future military aggression [15]

Critically, the proposal would reopen the strait and end hostilities first, leaving nuclear negotiations for a later stage [17]. This sequencing is the central point of contention. Trump told Axios that the blockade stays "until the regime agrees to a deal that addresses US concerns about its nuclear program" [18]. A senior administration official framed the issue bluntly: lifting the blockade and ending the war would remove Washington's primary leverage in any future talks to eliminate Iran's enriched uranium stockpile [17].

How the Proposal Differs from the JCPOA

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) capped Iranian enrichment at 3.67% — well below weapons-grade — limited centrifuges to 6,104 older-generation machines at two monitored facilities, and imposed what the IAEA called "one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented" [19][20].

Iran's current position has shifted significantly. By February 2025, Iran possessed 275 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, far exceeding JCPOA limits [20]. The current US negotiating position demands "zero enrichment" on Iranian soil, proposing instead a regional consortium model where civilian enrichment would take place in the UAE or Saudi Arabia under international supervision [20]. Iran has said it must retain enrichment rights but that "the amount and level of enrichment is negotiable" [20].

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has warned that any agreement lacking robust inspection provisions would be "an illusion of an agreement" [20]. The 14-point proposal does not address inspections or enrichment caps, which is precisely why Washington views it as insufficient.

Strategic Reserves: Who Can Wait and Who Cannot

The crisis poses sharply different risks across Asia's major oil importers, which together receive roughly 84% of crude shipments through Hormuz [8].

Source: U.S. EIA / Farmonaut

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

China holds the world's largest strategic petroleum reserve at approximately 1.3 billion barrels — enough for about 120 days of net seaborne crude imports [21]. Beijing has additional commercial stocks and has been diversifying supply routes for years, giving it the most strategic patience among major importers.

South Korea maintains roughly 208 days of supply through combined government and industry reserves [22]. Japan, required by law to hold 70 days of industry stocks in addition to government strategic reserves, has approximately 160 days of coverage [21][22].

India is the most exposed. With only 21.4 million barrels in its strategic reserve — approximately 10 days of supply — India faces the earliest pressure point for price spikes or rationing [22]. India imports roughly a third of its crude through the strait, and its limited reserve buffer means that a prolonged closure could force difficult choices between industrial consumption and consumer supply within weeks rather than months.

The Legal and Military Question

The Strait of Hormuz's legal status is contested. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 38 establishes the right of "transit passage" through international straits — a right that "shall not be impeded" and cannot be suspended by the coastal state [23]. The US position is that transit passage is a firm right under customary international law, binding even on non-parties to UNCLOS (neither the US nor Iran has ratified the convention) [24].

Iran counters that it need only grant the more limited right of "innocent passage," which can be suspended — particularly, Iranian officials argue, during armed conflict initiated by the transiting state [24]. Legal scholars are divided. A Chatham House analysis notes that while Iran's position has some textual support, the weight of international practice favors the transit passage interpretation [23]. An analysis in The Nation argued that given the US initiated the air campaign and imposed a naval blockade first, Iran's closure has a stronger legal footing than Washington acknowledges [25].

Militarily, the US Navy has sent two guided-missile destroyers through the strait during the current truce, and Trump has stated the Navy may escort oil tankers through [23]. The Pentagon's challenge is that mines and small-boat swarms are difficult to neutralize without sustained minesweeping operations — cheap drones and sea mines can effectively deny passage even against a technologically superior navy [6]. The risk of escalation from an escort operation to a broader naval engagement remains a central concern for Pentagon planners.

The Domestic Politics of Stalemate

Inside Iran

The assassination of Khamenei left Iran without its ultimate arbiter. An unprecedented rift has opened within the hardline camp, pitting the faction of former chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili — which views any concessions as surrender — against Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf's more pragmatic wing, which led negotiations in Islamabad [26][27].

Ultra-hardline lawmakers have refused to sign statements supporting the negotiating team [26]. A Tasnim editorial dismissed demands for comprehensive sanctions relief as fantasies akin to a "magic beanstalk" [26]. Younger officials in the security establishment increasingly frame the conflict as existential and resist concessions, particularly if they conclude Washington's goal is regime change rather than policy change [27].

The IRGC and affiliated networks have economic interests in the status quo. Sanctions-era black-market economics — smuggling networks, currency arbitrage, and captive domestic markets — have made powerful constituencies within Iran's security establishment direct financial beneficiaries of isolation [27]. A deal that lifts sanctions and opens the economy threatens those revenue streams.

Inside the United States

The war has been a windfall for American defense contractors. Lockheed Martin and RTX are positioned to benefit from over $21 billion in foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE — deals accelerated by the conflict [28]. In March, the Pentagon signed agreements to increase annual production of Patriot and THAAD missile defense systems [28]. A $16.5 billion arms package to Gulf states was approved in the same month [29].

Gulf allies are lobbying Washington to ensure their security concerns are addressed before any ceasefire. Saudi Arabia wants Iran's cruise and ballistic missile capabilities "degraded as much as possible" before hostilities end; the UAE has called it "difficult" to coexist with Iran's missile and drone program [30]. These allies' strategic posture — and the arms sales that sustain it — depends on continued Iranian threat perception.

In Congress, 52 senators and 177 House members signed a letter urging Trump to reject any deal allowing continued Iranian enrichment [20]. The political incentive structure on Capitol Hill favors hawkishness: supporting a deal risks attack ads accusing members of being soft on Iran's nuclear program, while opposing a deal carries minimal domestic political cost — even as the economic damage from the closure mounts.

The Steelman Case for Iran's Strategy

Critics frame Iran's closure of the strait as reckless brinkmanship. The strongest counterargument begins with a documented record of actions that, from Tehran's perspective, left it with few alternatives.

The US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 despite Iran's verified compliance, reimposing sanctions that cratered Iran's oil exports and GDP [19]. In January 2020, a US drone strike killed IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani on Iraqi soil [31]. The Stuxnet cyberattack, widely attributed to the US and Israel, physically destroyed Iranian centrifuges years earlier [19]. And in February 2026, the US and Israel launched an air campaign that killed Iran's supreme leader.

Against this backdrop, Iran's defenders argue that the strait is Tehran's only credible deterrent — its asymmetric answer to adversaries with overwhelming conventional military superiority. The Soufan Center's analysis noted that Iran "plans to outlast" the US blockade, viewing economic leverage through Hormuz as the one tool that forces Washington to negotiate rather than dictate [32]. Whether one accepts this framing or not, understanding it is necessary to assess whether a negotiated outcome is achievable.

What Comes Next

The gap between the two sides is wide but not necessarily unbridgeable. Iran wants the blockade lifted and security guarantees before discussing its nuclear program. The US wants nuclear concessions before easing pressure. Both positions have internal logic; both have domestic constituencies invested in their failure.

The most likely near-term scenarios range from a partial reopening of the strait under some kind of managed passage agreement — perhaps the "new mechanism" Iran's proposal references — to continued stalemate as both sides test each other's economic pain thresholds. The wild card is escalation: a mine strike on a US-escorted tanker, an Iranian seizure that triggers a military response, or a domestic political shift in either capital that closes the diplomatic window.

What is clear is the cost of inaction. At $20 billion per day in global GDP losses, every week of continued closure carries a price tag exceeding $140 billion [6]. India's 10-day strategic reserve buffer is a ticking clock [22]. And the physical oil market, already at $132 per barrel for delivered crude, has room to go higher [6].

The question is not whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen. It is whether it reopens through negotiation or through a military operation whose consequences neither side can fully control.