Pakistan Accused of Attacking Afghan University in Cross-Border Incident

On the afternoon of April 27, 2026, mortars and missiles fired from Pakistani territory struck the city of Asadabad, the capital of Afghanistan's Kunar province, hitting Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani University, residential homes, and surrounding areas [1]. Afghan deputy government spokesman Hamdullah Fitrat said seven people were killed and 85 wounded, including women, children, and university students [2]. Afghanistan's Ministry of Higher Education reported that approximately 30 students and professors were among the injured, with extensive damage to campus buildings and grounds [3].

The strikes marked the first major attack since Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban concluded China-mediated peace talks in Urumqi in early April, where both sides had agreed to avoid escalation and "explore a comprehensive solution" [4]. Fitrat described the attacks as "an unforgivable war crime, barbarity, and provocative act" [1].

Pakistan flatly denied the allegations. Its Information Ministry stated that "Pakistan's targeting is precise and intelligence based" and that "No strike has been carried out on Sayed Jamaluddin Afghan University," terming the reports "frivolous and fake" [5][6].

What Happened in Kunar

The attack targeted Asadabad and surrounding areas in Kunar province, one of Afghanistan's easternmost regions bordering Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Kunar Information and Culture Director Najibullah Hanafi confirmed the casualty figures: seven dead and 85 wounded [2]. Earlier reports from Afghan outlet TOLOnews initially cited three killed and 45 injured, figures that climbed as more casualties were tallied [7].

Pakistan's Information Ministry issued a detailed rebuttal, stating that "whenever and wherever Pakistan strikes the Afghan-based terror infrastructure, it will be as per previous actions, well declared, fully owned and backed by precise evidence of targeting terror support infrastructure" [5]. The ministry linked the Afghan reports to what it called propaganda intended to obscure Taliban support for militant groups operating against Pakistan [6].

The discrepancy between Afghan and Pakistani accounts is significant but not unusual in this conflict. Independent verification remains difficult because of restricted media access, the absence of international monitoring bodies on the ground, and the Taliban government's own control over information flows within Afghanistan.

A Ceasefire That Barely Held

The Kunar strikes shattered what was already a fragile pause in hostilities. The broader conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated sharply in late February 2026 when Pakistan launched airstrikes against what it said were Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) camps in eastern Afghanistan [8]. Pakistan described the strikes as retaliation for terrorist attacks in Islamabad, Bajaur, and Bannu [9].

The initial strikes on February 21-22 hit Behsud and Khogyani districts in Nangarhar province, killing at least 13 civilians and injuring seven, according to UNAMA [10]. The situation escalated rapidly. On February 26, Taliban forces launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani military positions and border outposts [11]. Pakistan then declared "open war" against Afghanistan and launched Operation Ghazab lil Haq (Arabic for "Wrath of Truth"), a large-scale air and ground campaign [12].

Source: UNAMA Reports

Data as of Apr 28, 2026CSV

From late February through early March, UNAMA verified 185 civilian casualties in Afghanistan — 56 killed and 129 injured — from indirect fire and aerial attacks, with 55 percent being women and children [10]. The most devastating single incident came on March 16, when Pakistani strikes hit a drug rehabilitation center called Omid on the outskirts of Kabul, a facility located on the grounds of the former US and NATO Camp Phoenix. The Taliban government said over 400 people were killed; the United Nations reported 143 deaths [13][14]. Amnesty International called for an independent investigation, stating the strike "raises serious concerns under international humanitarian law" [15].

A Qatar-mediated ceasefire in October 2025 had already collapsed after follow-up talks in Doha and Istanbul failed [16]. The April 2026 Urumqi talks, hosted by China, appeared to offer a new opening. Afghan officials described the discussions as "constructive," and Chinese officials said both sides had agreed to work toward "an early easing of tensions" [4][17]. That agreement lasted less than three weeks.

The TTP Question: Pakistan's Stated Justification

Pakistan's core grievance centers on the presence of TTP fighters in Afghan territory. The TTP, a separate organization from the Afghan Taliban though ideologically aligned with it, has waged an insurgency against the Pakistani state since 2007 and is responsible for thousands of deaths inside Pakistan [18].

Independent assessments support Pakistan's claims of TTP presence in the Afghan border regions. A UN report identified the TTP as the largest terrorist group operating in Afghanistan [19]. The West Point Combating Terrorism Center has documented TTP militant mobility through Afghan border provinces including Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika [20]. The group reportedly opened new training camps in these provinces since 2024 [18].

Pakistan has invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter — the right of self-defense — to justify cross-border strikes against what it characterizes as terrorist infrastructure [21]. Pakistani officials have repeatedly demanded that the Taliban government expel TTP fighters or dismantle their camps, demands Kabul has largely refused to meet.

The Afghan Taliban's position is more complex. Taliban authorities have generally denied the presence of TTP camps on Afghan soil, a claim that contradicts multiple independent intelligence assessments [18][19]. Critics of Pakistan note that this denial, while unconvincing, does not automatically authorize strikes against civilian infrastructure. The Taliban government has offered to mediate between Pakistan and the TTP, an approach Pakistan's senior officials have rejected as insufficient given the ongoing attacks [22].

The Legality of Striking a University

Under international humanitarian law (IHL), educational institutions are civilian objects and are protected from attack. They lose that protected status only if they are being used to make an "effective contribution to military action" — serving as barracks, weapons depots, or command posts, for example. Even in such cases, the attacking party must take precautions to minimize civilian harm, and the expected military advantage must outweigh anticipated civilian casualties (the principle of proportionality).

No evidence has been publicly presented — by Pakistan, the Taliban, or any independent party — that Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani University was being used for military purposes. Pakistan's denial that it struck the university at all sidesteps the legal question entirely. If the strike did occur as Afghan officials describe, targeting a functioning university with students and professors present during operating hours would constitute a prima facie violation of IHL absent compelling evidence of military use [15].

The broader pattern of strikes during Operation Ghazab lil Haq has drawn similar scrutiny. Amnesty International's concerns about the Kabul rehabilitation center strike apply more broadly: Pakistan has an obligation under IHL to distinguish between military and civilian objects, to take feasible precautions in attack, and to refrain from disproportionate force [15].

Pakistan's counterargument — that it only strikes verified terrorist infrastructure and that reported civilian casualties are fabricated or exaggerated by the Taliban — is difficult to evaluate independently. UNAMA's verified casualty figures, however, consistently show significant civilian harm [10].

International Response and Accountability Gaps

The international response has been vocal but structurally limited. UN human rights experts urged both Pakistan and the Afghan de facto authorities to "commit to a permanent ceasefire, resolve the root causes of conflict, and ensure accountability for violations of international law" [23]. A senior UN official warned the Security Council that crises along Afghanistan's borders were undermining the country's stability [24].

OCHA reported that since February 26, at least 289 civilian casualties had been documented in Afghanistan — 76 killed and 213 injured — with over 115,000 people displaced [25].

However, formal mechanisms for accountability are limited. Afghanistan's Taliban government is not recognized by the United Nations, meaning it cannot bring cases before the International Court of Justice or participate in most international forums as a sovereign state. Pakistan, as a nuclear-armed state with significant diplomatic weight, has historically resisted external scrutiny of its military operations. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), both of which include Pakistan as a member, have issued general calls for restraint without assigning blame or establishing investigative mechanisms.

China's role as mediator is the most consequential diplomatic development, but Beijing's interests in regional stability — particularly regarding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and potential resource extraction in Afghanistan — create their own complications [17].

Humanitarian Consequences

The human costs extend well beyond the immediate casualty figures.

Source: OCHA/UNHCR

Data as of Apr 5, 2026CSV

By early March, nearly 66,000 Afghans had been displaced by the fighting, according to the UN [26]. By early April, that number had grown to approximately 115,000 across eastern, southeastern, and southern Afghanistan [25]. The OCHA situation update noted that cross-border shelling, airstrikes, and armed clashes had caused casualties "in the several hundred, including children and one humanitarian worker" [25].

Afghanistan was already in the midst of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises before the conflict with Pakistan escalated. Nearly 21.9 million people — roughly half the country's population — are projected to require humanitarian assistance in 2026. The humanitarian appeal of $1.71 billion is only 10 percent funded [24].

The strike on a university carries specific second-order consequences. Afghanistan's higher education system was already in crisis: the Taliban's ban on secondary and tertiary education for girls, now in its fourth year, has excluded approximately 2.2 million adolescent girls from secondary school, with another 400,000 blocked each academic year [27]. UNESCO has warned that the education crisis "threatens the future of an entire generation" [28]. Cross-border strikes that damage or destroy the educational infrastructure that does remain — and the fear they generate among students and faculty at other institutions — compound an already catastrophic situation.

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Afghanistan remains the world's third-largest source of refugees, with 4.8 million Afghans displaced abroad according to UNHCR, behind only Syria (5.5 million) and Ukraine (5.3 million) [29]. More than four million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan since 2023, with over 1.5 million returning in 2025 alone, many to communities now under bombardment [27].

Shared Responsibility and the Road Ahead

Assigning sole responsibility for the current crisis to either side requires ignoring inconvenient facts. Pakistan's cross-border strikes have killed civilians, damaged protected infrastructure, and violated the sovereignty of a neighboring state. The verified casualty figures from UNAMA and the scale of displacement documented by OCHA make this clear [10][25].

At the same time, the Afghan Taliban government's refusal to act against TTP fighters operating from its territory — fighters who have killed thousands of Pakistani civilians and security personnel — is a proximate cause of Pakistan's military response. The Taliban's denials of TTP presence contradict UN assessments and independent reporting [18][19]. A government that harbors armed groups conducting cross-border attacks bears a share of responsibility for the consequences, even when those consequences fall disproportionately on Afghan civilians who have no say in either Pakistan's military strategy or the Taliban's security policies.

The Urumqi talks offered a path forward. Their collapse after less than three weeks suggests that neither side was prepared to make the concessions necessary for a durable peace: Pakistan would need to accept limitations on its use of force inside Afghan territory, and the Taliban would need to take verifiable action against TTP infrastructure. Until both conditions are met, the cycle of strikes, retaliation, denial, and civilian suffering is likely to continue.

The students and faculty of Sayed Jamaluddin Afghani University — named, with bitter irony, after the 19th-century Islamic reformer who advocated for Muslim unity and modernization — are the latest to bear the costs of that failure.