Israel Says It Killed Hamas Commander Who Took Part in October 7 Attacks

On May 4, 2026, the Israel Defense Forces announced it had killed Anas Muhammad Ibrahim Hamed, a commander in Hamas's elite Nukhba force, in a precision airstrike in central Gaza [1]. The IDF said Hamed had infiltrated Israeli territory on October 7, 2023, and participated in the massacre at the Nova music festival, where 378 people — 344 civilians and 34 security personnel — were killed [2]. The strike came roughly seven months into a fragile ceasefire brokered by President Donald Trump in October 2025, a truce both sides have accused the other of violating [3].

The killing is the latest in a sustained Israeli campaign to hunt down individuals connected to the October 7 attacks. But as the body count of eliminated commanders grows, a fundamental question persists: does killing Hamas leaders degrade the organization, or does it merely produce replacements?

Who Was Anas Hamed?

The IDF identified Hamed as a Nukhba commander within the Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas's military wing [1]. "Nukhba" — Arabic for "elite" — refers to the special operations force that spearheaded the October 7 cross-border assault. According to the IDF, Hamed "raided the territory of the State of Israel and the Nova festival during the murderous massacre on October 7" and remained "an immediate threat to IDF forces operating in the Gaza Strip" [1].

The military said the strike used "precise munitions and aerial surveillance" and that "multiple measures were taken to mitigate the risk of harm to civilians" [4]. No civilian casualties from this particular strike have been reported in available sources, though the IDF did not release details about the specific location or surrounding conditions of the airstrike.

Hamed was not among Hamas's top-tier political or strategic leadership. He was an operational-level commander — significant enough to be tracked and targeted, but not in the same category as figures like Yahya Sinwar or Mohammed Deif. His killing is better understood as part of the broader effort to pursue every identified participant in the October 7 attacks, regardless of rank.

The Verification Problem

Israel has not publicly disclosed how it confirmed Hamed's identity or his role in the Nova massacre. The IDF's targeting process, as described by Israeli officials and analyzed in legal proceedings, relies on intelligence gathered from signals intercepts, informant networks, drone surveillance, and interrogation of captured fighters [5].

But the historical record raises questions about the reliability of these identifications. In December 2023, IDF soldiers shot and killed three Israeli hostages — Yotam Haim, Alon Shamriz, and Samar Talalka — who had escaped their captors in Gaza's Shejaiya neighborhood, after a soldier misidentified them as threats [6]. In May 2025, an IDF "precision strike" killed a Palestinian man with cerebral palsy whom the military had identified as "a terrorist observing Israeli troops," according to a Haaretz investigation [6]. The IDF also acknowledged that a misidentification led to the killing of a Palestinian toddler in a separate incident [6].

These cases do not prove that the Hamed strike was flawed. But they illustrate that the IDF's targeting apparatus, operating under the pressures of an active conflict, has produced documented errors with fatal consequences — a pattern that independent observers and human rights organizations have repeatedly flagged.

A Campaign of Elimination

Hamed's killing adds to a list of more than 20 senior Hamas military and political figures that Israel has killed since October 7, 2023, according to compilations by the Wilson Center and the Times of Israel [7].

Source: Wilson Center / Times of Israel compilation

Data as of May 5, 2026CSV

The most consequential targets include Yahya Sinwar, considered the primary architect of the October 7 attacks, killed on October 17, 2024, during a gun battle with IDF troops [7]; Mohammed Deif, the chief military commander, killed in an airstrike in Khan Younis in July 2024 [7]; and Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas's political bureau, killed in Tehran on July 31, 2024, reportedly by a remotely detonated bomb that had been planted months earlier [7]. Marwan Issa, deputy military commander and a key October 7 planner, was killed in a strike on the Nuseirat camp in March 2024 [7].

Lower-ranking but operationally significant figures have also been targeted. In early 2026, the IDF killed Iyad Ahmed Abd al-Rahman Shambari, described as the chief of operations in Hamas's intelligence division [8]. The pace of killings has remained steady even during the ceasefire period.

The Legal Framework — and Its Critics

Israel's targeted killing policy operates under a legal framework shaped by a landmark 2006 Israeli Supreme Court ruling in HCJ 769/02 [5]. The Court held that targeted killings are neither categorically prohibited nor categorically permitted under customary international humanitarian law. Instead, each case must be evaluated individually against specific criteria.

The ruling established several requirements: targets must be "taking a direct part in hostilities"; "well-based information" must precede targeting decisions; independent investigation must follow attacks; and when feasible — particularly in occupied territory — arrest is preferable to lethal force [5]. The proportionality principle requires that collateral civilian harm be proportionate to the direct military advantage gained.

Israel justifies the broader policy as an extension of its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, framing strikes as preemptive action against imminent threats [9].

Critics counter that the framework lacks meaningful external oversight. No independent body routinely reviews individual targeting decisions before strikes are carried out. The International Criminal Court has been investigating the situation in Palestine, and UN experts have repeatedly criticized Israel's conduct in Gaza. In December 2024, UN human rights experts issued a statement describing Israel's military operations as an "assault on the foundations of international law" [10]. Human rights organizations characterize targeted killings as extrajudicial executions that deny individuals due process — a right guaranteed under international law regardless of the severity of alleged offenses [9].

Civilian Costs

While no civilian casualties have been reported from the Hamed strike specifically, the broader targeted killing campaign has carried significant civilian costs. The strike that killed Mohammed Deif in July 2024 also killed over 90 other Palestinians [7]. The October 2023 strike that killed Ibrahim Biari, the Jabaliya Battalion commander, killed at least 126 civilians [7].

As of early 2026, the Gaza Health Ministry has published the names of more than 72,000 individual Palestinians confirmed killed since October 2023, with the total toll estimated above 75,000 [11]. A classified Israeli military internal report cited by The Guardian in August 2025 found that approximately 83% of Palestinians killed were civilians — a ratio described as unusually high even compared with other recent conflicts [11]. A separate study by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found that 70% of Palestinians killed in residential buildings were women and children [11].

The IDF has disputed analyses of the civilian-to-combatant ratio, arguing that militant deaths may be undercounted, but has not released alternative casualty figures or detailed methodology to support its position [11].

Does Killing Leaders Work?

The academic and policy literature on "leadership decapitation" — the strategy of eliminating an organization's senior figures — is divided.

Research published by the Belfer Center at Harvard found that decapitation "significantly increases the mortality rate of terrorist groups," particularly those with hierarchical, top-down structures [12]. A study from the American Economic Association, examining Israeli targeted killings specifically, found short-term reductions in attack capability following assassinations [12].

But other research reaches opposite conclusions. A quasi-experimental study published in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism found that most high-profile killings "yielded negligible effects," with some associated with a "backlash effect" — an increase rather than decrease in subsequent attacks [12]. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism noted that groups with "strong organisational cultures" and existing lines of succession are "better able to survive leadership targeting" [13]. Research from conflicts in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, and elsewhere found that targeted killings either had no measurable impact on violence levels or were followed by increases [12].

The net effect, as one widely cited study put it, is "indeterminate" — assassinations simultaneously degrade organizational capacity while increasing motivation for retaliation [12].

Hamas's own trajectory since October 2023 illustrates both dynamics. The organization has lost virtually its entire senior military command structure. Yet according to Israeli and international assessments, it has continued to smuggle weapons, repurpose remnants of IDF munitions for explosive devices, and recruit new fighters [14]. Since the ceasefire began in October 2025, Hamas has reactivated local municipal authorities, redeployed operatives throughout Gaza, reinstated civilian police, and resumed internal security operations [14].

The Framing War: Accountability vs. Extrajudicial Execution

Israel presents the killing of October 7 participants as accountability — a state exercising its right to pursue those responsible for the deadliest attack on Jews since the Holocaust. The IDF's announcement of Hamed's death explicitly linked him to the Nova massacre, reinforcing the narrative that each strike delivers justice for specific atrocities [1].

Hamas and its supporters frame the same strikes as extrajudicial executions carried out by an occupying power against a resistance movement — killings that, in their view, fuel Palestinian grievance and recruitment.

Polling data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) provides a more complex picture than either side's framing suggests [15].

Source: PCPSR Public Opinion Polls

Data as of May 1, 2025CSV

Support among Palestinians for the October 7 attack stood at 72% in December 2023 but declined to approximately 43% by March 2025 [15]. In September 2024, support diverged sharply by region: 64% of West Bank residents considered the attack justified, compared with only 39% of Gaza residents — those living directly under bombardment [15]. By May 2025, roughly half of Gaza residents supported anti-Hamas demonstrations, and nearly half said they would leave Gaza if they could [15].

These figures suggest that opposition to Hamas has grown significantly within Gaza itself, driven less by Israel's targeted killings than by the lived experience of the war's destruction. The decline in support for the October 7 attack has coincided with the war's devastation of Gaza's civilian infrastructure, not with specific assassinations.

The "Dismantling Hamas" Question

Israel's stated war objective has been the complete dismantling of Hamas's military and governmental capabilities. By May 2026, assessments from Israeli and international analysts agree that this objective remains unmet [14].

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), an Israeli think tank, concluded that Israel "did not fully destroy Hamas's military and governmental capabilities, and the release of the hostages until now has been only partial" [14]. Hamas has not been disarmed, Gaza has not been demilitarized, and no alternative governing authority has been established [14].

The Israeli government has not publicly defined specific, measurable benchmarks for when "dismantling Hamas" would be considered complete. Conditions discussed for a gradual Israeli withdrawal include the establishment of Palestinian police forces without Hamas involvement, security stability, agreed-upon demilitarization timelines, and a continued Israeli military presence in a security perimeter [14]. None of these conditions have been met as of May 2026.

The ceasefire itself has been marked by mutual accusations of violations. The IDF claims Palestinian groups violated the ceasefire 139 times between its October 2025 implementation and April 2026, including using medical vehicles to transport weapons [3]. The Gaza Government Media Office reported over 2,400 Israeli violations in the same period, including 1,109 bombings and shellings and 921 instances of shooting at civilians [16].

What This Killing Tells Us

The elimination of Anas Hamed is, in isolation, a tactical event — one commander removed from a battlefield that has consumed tens of thousands of lives. The IDF presented it as evidence that it continues to identify and pursue October 7 participants. Critics see it as another strike in a campaign whose strategic returns remain unproven.

The broader pattern is clear: Israel has successfully dismantled Hamas's senior command structure. But the organization persists, adapts, and reconstitutes. The academic evidence on whether targeted killings produce lasting strategic gains is, at best, inconclusive. And the civilian toll of the campaign — both in individual strikes and in the war as a whole — has drawn sustained international condemnation.

The killing of individual commanders satisfies a demand for accountability that is deeply felt in Israeli society. Whether it brings Israel closer to its stated goal of dismantling Hamas — or merely removes one name from a list that continues to replenish itself — is a question the evidence does not yet resolve.