Netanyahu Directs IDF to Expand Territorial Control of Gaza to 70%

"We were at fifty, we moved to sixty. My directive is to move to — let's go step by step. First of all, seventy. Let's start with that." With those words, delivered at a conference held by the Ein Prat Leadership Academy on May 28, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly confirmed he has ordered the Israel Defense Forces to take control of 70% of the Gaza Strip [1][2].

The directive goes well beyond the boundaries of the October 2025 ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States, which established a "Yellow Line" giving Israel control over approximately 53% of Gaza [3]. It raises fundamental questions about international law, the viability of more than two million displaced Palestinians, the strategic logic of extended urban occupation, and the durability of a ceasefire that, by Israel's own actions, appears increasingly nominal.

The Numbers: What 70% Means on the Ground

The Gaza Strip covers 365 square kilometers — roughly 41 kilometers long and 6 to 12 kilometers wide [4]. Seventy percent of that territory amounts to approximately 255 square kilometers under IDF control, leaving just 110 square kilometers for the entire remaining Palestinian population.

Source: Times of Israel / IDF Reports

Data as of May 29, 2026CSV

The expansion has been incremental. Under the October 2025 ceasefire, the Yellow Line gave Israel direct military control over 53% of Gaza, mostly in the east and north [3]. By December 2025, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir referred to the Yellow Line as a "new border line," signaling Israel's intent to hold those positions indefinitely [5]. By May 2026, Netanyahu stated that Israel had reached 60% control, with an additional restricted zone adjacent to the Yellow Line covering an estimated 11% more of the territory — putting effective Israeli control at roughly 64% [6][2].

"Control" in this context encompasses several categories: fortified buffer zones where the IDF maintains a direct military presence and free-fire authority; the Netzarim Corridor, a military road bisecting the Strip; areas cleared of civilian population and designated as restricted; and territory under active IDF patrol and administration [6][5].

The 2.1 million Palestinians remaining in Gaza would, under a 70% control scenario, be confined to approximately 30% of the territory — roughly 110 square kilometers [2]. For a sense of scale, that is an area slightly smaller than the city of Paris, housing a population comparable to that of greater Ljubljana, under conditions of severe infrastructure destruction, limited water and sanitation, and restricted humanitarian access.

A Ceasefire in Name Only

The October 2025 ceasefire was structured in three phases [7]. In the first phase, Hamas released all remaining Israeli captives in exchange for 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, while the IDF withdrew to the Yellow Line. The second phase was intended to involve a further IDF withdrawal to a "Red Line" further east, accompanied by deployment of an International Stabilization Force to oversee security [7].

That second phase has not materialized. Instead, Israel has moved in the opposite direction — expanding, not contracting, its zone of control. Netanyahu's 70% directive represents a direct repudiation of the trajectory envisioned in the ceasefire framework.

The timing is notable. Netanyahu's announcement came as reports surfaced that the United States was focused on Iran nuclear negotiations, providing what critics describe as diplomatic cover for Israeli territorial expansion [8]. Muhammad Shehada of the European Council on Foreign Relations told Al Jazeera that the directive "would be a death sentence for a lot of people who physically have no place to go" [9].

The Legal Framework: ICJ, ICC, and Enforcement

International legal institutions have issued a series of rulings bearing directly on Israel's presence in Gaza and the broader Occupied Palestinian Territory.

In July 2024, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion declaring Israel's occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, unlawful. The Court found that Israel's settlement regime, annexation practices, and use of natural resources violated international law, including the international prohibition on racial segregation and apartheid. The ICJ mandated Israel to end its occupation, dismantle settlements, and provide reparations [10].

In October 2025, the ICJ delivered a second advisory opinion concerning Israel's obligations regarding the presence and activities of the United Nations and other international organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [11].

On the criminal side, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, alleging war crimes including the use of starvation as a method of warfare and crimes against humanity including murder and persecution [12]. In December 2025, ICC appeals judges rejected Israel's legal challenges, and the warrants remain in force. All 125 ICC member states are obligated to arrest Netanyahu and Gallant if they enter their territory [13].

In 2026, reports emerged that the ICC prosecutor's office had secretly requested additional arrest warrants for ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, along with two unnamed IDF officers [12].

South Africa's genocide case against Israel remains pending before the ICJ, with Israel submitting its opinion in March 2026 after two delays [14].

The enforcement gap, however, remains wide. No mechanism exists to compel Israeli compliance with ICJ advisory opinions, and the ICC relies on member states for arrests — a requirement that most Western governments have not acted on.

The Tunnel Problem: Does More Territory Mean Less Hamas?

Israel's primary stated justification for expanded control is the destruction of Hamas's military infrastructure, particularly its extensive tunnel network. At the war's outset, Gaza's underground network was estimated at 500–600 kilometers in length [15].

Despite over two years of operations, approximately 60% of those tunnels remained intact as of October 2025, according to then-Defense Minister Israel Katz [16]. The IDF has conducted significant operations — destroying 11 kilometers of tunnels under Beit Hanun, uncovering a 7-kilometer network 25 meters deep beneath Rafah, and sealing passages with concrete throughout northern Gaza [15][17].

Yet the record raises a question central to Netanyahu's directive: has territorial control demonstrably degraded Hamas's operational capacity? The evidence is mixed. According to ACLED analysis, since the October 2025 ceasefire, Hamas has been "steadily reorganizing, rearming, reopening damaged tunnels, and reasserting full control over every area of western Gaza under its authority" [18]. In the areas Israel does not control — the 47% west of the Yellow Line — Hamas has maintained governance functions and rebuilt military capabilities.

Proponents of expansion argue that this is precisely the problem: incomplete control leaves Hamas with a base from which to reconstitute. Analysts at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have argued that a large, division-level permanent presence offers the best prospects for long-term security, particularly if the local population believes the counterinsurgency force will remain indefinitely [19].

Critics counter that occupation historically generates its own resistance. CSIS analysis posed the question directly: "Is Israel Headed for a Forever War in Gaza?" [20]. The IDF's own chief of staff, Eyal Zamir, reportedly voiced strong opposition to expanded occupation during a 10-hour security cabinet meeting, citing increased danger to remaining hostages and the unsustainable strain on military resources [20].

The Human Cost: Casualties and Displacement

Source: Gaza Ministry of Health via OCHA

Data as of Apr 29, 2026CSV

Between October 7, 2023 and April 29, 2026, the Gaza Ministry of Health reported 72,599 Palestinians killed and 172,411 injured [21]. These figures, compiled under wartime conditions, are cited by the United Nations but disputed by Israel. An additional unknown number of bodies remain unrecovered beneath rubble.

Displacement has been near-total. Since the ceasefire, nearly 833,000 people changed location, with more than 694,000 moving from southern to northern Gaza [21]. An estimated 75,000 displaced people live in UNRWA collective emergency shelters across 83 displacement sites [22].

Since March 2025, the Israeli authorities have blocked UNRWA from directly bringing humanitarian personnel and aid into the Gaza Strip, leaving pre-positioned food, flour, and shelter supplies inaccessible to hundreds of thousands of people [22].

If 70% of Gaza falls under IDF control, the question of where 2.1 million people can physically exist becomes acute. No country, international body, or plan has formally committed to housing, feeding, and providing medical care for this population at the scale required. Egypt has consistently refused to accept Palestinian refugees, viewing any such transfer as permanent displacement — a position shared by Jordan [23]. No international resettlement framework or funding mechanism remotely adequate to the scale of need has been proposed.

Regional Reaction: Arab States Draw Lines

Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and a coalition of Arab and Muslim nations issued a joint statement in February 2026 rejecting "any attempts to annex the West Bank or separate it from the Gaza Strip" and opposing "the expansion of settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" [23]. The statement warned that Israel's "expansionist policies and unlawful measures will only inflame violence and conflict in the region."

Saudi Arabia's position is particularly consequential. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has made clear that any Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords — a central U.S. foreign policy objective — depends on a two-state solution for the Palestinian territories [23]. A permanent or semi-permanent Israeli occupation of 70% of Gaza runs directly counter to that condition.

A new geopolitical alignment involving Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey has formed in response to regional security concerns, with the four states coordinating on Middle Eastern security issues [24]. This bloc represents a potential counterweight to Israeli-American strategic assumptions about regional acquiescence.

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

The global refugee population already includes 5.5 million Syrians, 5.3 million Ukrainians, and 4.8 million Afghans [25]. Adding a large-scale Palestinian displacement crisis to this picture would strain already overstretched international humanitarian systems.

Historical Precedents: What Occupation Costs

The current Gaza operation, now exceeding 30 months, has already surpassed the duration of every previous Israeli military campaign. The 2006 Lebanon War lasted 34 days. The 2014 Gaza war lasted 50 days. The current conflict, by contrast, shows no endpoint [26].

Civilian casualty ratios provide another comparison point. Research published in the National Center for Biotechnology Information found that the model-estimated proportion of deaths categorized as combatants was 62.1% in the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict, 51.1% in 2014, and just 12.7% in the current conflict — meaning the proportion of civilian deaths has increased sharply [27]. By comparison, the civilian casualty ratio in World War II was 60–67%, in Vietnam 46–67%, and in the Bosnian War approximately 40% [26].

The economic toll has been substantial. The Bank of Israel estimated the overall economic cost of the war at approximately 352 billion shekels ($112 billion), including $77 billion in direct defense costs [28]. Israel's public debt has risen from 60% of GDP before the war to a projected 70.5% by the end of 2026 [29]. Defense spending reached 8.8% of GDP in 2024, and Netanyahu has proposed adding $116 billion to the defense budget over the next decade [28].

The IDF estimates that fully reoccupying Gaza would require up to five divisions — 50,000 to 75,000 troops — with four to five months to complete, followed by an indefinite occupation [20]. Israel's military, designed as a reserve force for a small country, was not built for sustained deployments of this scale. Reports of rising fatigue among troops have led to decisions to seek reductions in some areas [20].

Post-World War II occupations offer a sobering reference. The U.S. occupation of Japan lasted seven years with 350,000 troops in a cooperative environment. The occupation of Iraq lasted over eight years, cost more than $2 trillion, and produced a security environment that remained unstable long after withdrawal. Neither precedent involved a hostile population confined to 110 square kilometers.

The Strategic Debate: Is 70% the Only Option?

The strongest case for expanded control rests on a specific premise: that Hamas cannot be prevented from rearming and regoverning without physical Israeli control of the territory it uses for tunnels, weapons storage, and command infrastructure.

Proponents point to the post-ceasefire period as evidence. Despite Israeli control of 53% of Gaza, Hamas reorganized rapidly in the remaining territory [18]. The argument follows that only a higher threshold of control — 70% or more — would deny Hamas sufficient contiguous territory to operate.

The Washington Institute analysis suggested that if the local population believes the counterinsurgency force is permanent, cooperation with insurgents drops, creating a virtuous cycle of intelligence and security [19]. This model draws on counterinsurgency doctrine applied, with varying success, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland.

The opposing case is equally grounded in evidence. Israel controlled 100% of Gaza from 1967 to 2005, during which period Hamas was founded, grew, and eventually won elections. The 38-year occupation did not prevent the emergence of the very threat Israel now seeks to destroy. ACLED's assessment is direct: as Israel "expands control and sows chaos, Hamas adapts to survive" [18].

The IDF chief of staff's opposition to expansion also carries weight. Zamir's reported concerns — that expanded occupation increases danger to hostages, stretches forces, and creates unsustainable commitments — reflect the institutional military view that territorial control without a political strategy produces diminishing returns [20].

No credible analyst has identified a purely military threshold of territorial control that would permanently prevent Hamas reconstitution absent a political framework for Gaza's governance, economic recovery, and the status of its population.

What Comes Next

Netanyahu's directive moves Israel further from the ceasefire framework and closer to what multiple analysts have described as a permanent occupation of the majority of Gaza. The second phase of the ceasefire — involving further withdrawal and international stabilization — appears indefinitely deferred.

The immediate consequences are measurable: 2.1 million people compressed into 30% of a territory already lacking functional infrastructure, hospitals, water treatment, and housing [2][21]. The legal consequences accumulate: ICC warrants, ICJ rulings, and potential additional prosecutions [12][10]. The diplomatic consequences are visible: Arab states conditioning normalization on outcomes that Israel's current trajectory forecloses [23]. The economic consequences are quantified: $112 billion in war costs, rising debt, and a defense budget consuming nearly 9% of GDP [28][29].

The strategic question — whether 70% territorial control accomplishes what 60% did not — remains unanswered by the evidence available. What is clear is that the decision has been made, and its consequences will be borne primarily by the population with the least ability to influence it.