Israeli Airstrikes and Hamas-Militia Clashes Kill Ten in Gaza

On April 6, 2026, at least ten Palestinians were killed near the Maghazi refugee camp in central Gaza in a sequence of events that combined Israeli drone strikes with armed clashes between Hamas security forces and an Israeli-backed militia [1][2]. The dead included residents of a school housing displaced families, and the incident brought the day's total death toll to at least twelve after separate Israeli attacks elsewhere in the strip [3]. No party — Israel, Hamas, or the militia — has provided a verified breakdown of how many of those killed were combatants versus civilians.

The attack occurred against the backdrop of a ceasefire agreement reached in October 2025 that was meant to end the Gaza war. Six months later, 689 Palestinians have been killed since that agreement was announced, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [4]. The Israeli military has reported 139 ceasefire violations by Palestinian armed groups during the same period [5], while Palestinian and international observers have documented continued Israeli airstrikes, shelling, and gunfire across the strip [4].

What Happened at Maghazi

According to witnesses and local sources, the violence on April 6 began when members of an Israeli-backed militia attacked a school in the Maghazi area that was housing displaced Palestinians, reportedly in an attempt to abduct individuals from the building [1][3]. Residents confronted the militia members, and during the ensuing clashes east of the camp, Israeli drones fired two missiles into the area [1][2].

"The residents tried to defend their homes, but the occupation forces targeted them directly," eyewitness Ahmed al-Maghazi told Reuters [3].

A leader of one of the Israeli-backed militias released a video claiming his fighters "killed some five Hamas members," though the footage could not be independently verified [1][3]. Hamas did not immediately comment on the incident but has previously characterized these militia groups as "Israeli collaborators" [3]. The Israeli military offered "no immediate comment on any of the three incidents" that day [3].

The lack of a clear casualty breakdown reflects a broader pattern. In the chaos of simultaneous militia fighting and drone strikes in a densely populated area, attributing individual deaths to specific actors has become nearly impossible for journalists and monitors on the ground.

The Militias Challenging Hamas

The militia groups operating in Gaza represent a phenomenon that has grown sharply since the October 2025 ceasefire. Multiple armed factions — some clan-based, some with documented ties to Israel — have clashed with Hamas security forces in a contest over territory, resources, and authority [6].

The most prominent groups include:

The Doghmush clan, a large Gaza City family whose members span the political spectrum. In October 2025, clashes between the Doghmush and Hamas in the Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City killed at least 27 people, including eight Hamas members and 19 clan fighters [6]. Clan leader Nizar Doghmush has denied Israeli affiliation, telling the Los Angeles Times that Israel contacted him about managing a humanitarian zone, which he refused — after which, he claims, Israel bombed his neighborhood [6].

The Popular Forces, led by Yasser Abu Shabab and linked to Gaza's Tarabin Bedouin tribe. This group is "widely recognised to be behind" Israeli efforts to establish alternative security structures, and has been accused of looting humanitarian aid [6].

The Strike Force Against Terror, led by Hussam al-Astal, a former Palestinian Authority security officer who has been accused of collaborating with Israel since the 1990s. This group controls the village of Qizan an-Najjar in Khan Younis and clashed with Hamas in early October 2025 [6].

The proliferation of these groups represents a marked escalation. Inter-Palestinian armed incidents in Gaza have risen from roughly a dozen per year before the war to 67 recorded incidents in 2025, with 28 already logged in the first three months of 2026 [7].

Source: ACLED / OCHA

Data as of Apr 6, 2026CSV

Israeli Military Activity Under the Ceasefire

Despite the October 2025 ceasefire, the Israeli military has maintained a significant operational presence in Gaza. On the first day of the truce, Israeli forces pulled back to what is known as the Yellow Line, retaining direct control over approximately 53 percent of the strip [8]. The IDF subsequently drew up plans for a renewed offensive targeting Gaza City in March 2026, aimed at expanding that territorial control, though the operation required U.S. approval [8].

Israeli strikes have continued throughout the ceasefire period. The Gaza Health Ministry reports over 700 deaths since the truce began [3], while the UN has documented airstrikes, shelling, and gunfire as ongoing across the territory [4]. Israel frames these operations as responses to ceasefire violations by Palestinian armed groups, citing 22 violations during the period of the US-Iran conflict alone and 139 total since October 2025 [5].

The IDF has reported four soldier deaths from militant activity during the ceasefire period [3]. Israel has not publicly disclosed its current sortie rate or strike tempo, but the pattern of near-daily incidents documented by OCHA suggests a level of military activity far exceeding what a nominal ceasefire would typically entail.

Source: OCHA / Gaza Health Ministry

Data as of Apr 6, 2026CSV

The Ceasefire's Legal and Political Status

The ceasefire that began in October 2025 was mediated by the United States and structured in phases. The first phase established the truce and secured the return of remaining hostages. The second phase, which began in January 2026, created two new institutions: the Board of Peace, an international body chaired by President Trump, and the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a transitional technocratic body intended to assume governance from Hamas [9][10].

As of April 2026, both institutions face serious obstacles. The NCAG, led by Chief Commissioner Ali Shaath, formally began work in Egypt on January 16, 2026 — but Israel has blocked committee members from entering Gaza [10]. The Board of Peace held its inaugural meeting in Washington on February 19, at which member countries pledged $7 billion for reconstruction, supplementing $10 billion promised by the United States [10].

The central unresolved demand is Hamas disarmament. At the World Economic Forum in January 2026, President Trump stated that Hamas must disarm and release all remaining hostage remains "within weeks" or be "blown away very quickly" [10]. Hamas has signaled willingness to disarm if Israeli forces withdraw and progress is made toward Palestinian statehood, but refuses to unilaterally lay down weapons [9][10].

Mediators have presented Hamas with a weapons decommissioning proposal based on five principles — reciprocity, sequencing, verification, and two others not publicly detailed. As of early April, Hamas had not responded to this proposal [4].

The regional situation has further complicated talks. Israeli-U.S. strikes on Iran beginning February 28 killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other officials, triggering Iranian retaliation and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz [4]. All Gaza crossings were briefly shut, and the broader Middle East escalation has diverted diplomatic attention from the ceasefire's implementation.

Civilian Displacement and Humanitarian Conditions at Maghazi

The Maghazi refugee camp, established in 1949, covers just 0.6 square kilometers and housed approximately 35,000 registered refugees before the war [11]. The camp's population tripled during the conflict as displaced Gazans sought shelter in UNRWA schools and other structures [11]. Two UNRWA school shelters in Maghazi were each accommodating 12,000 people, with nearby schools hosting over 19,000 and 22,000 displaced persons respectively [11].

Israel designated Maghazi a "safe zone," yet the camp has been repeatedly struck [1]. Across Gaza, at least 1.4 million of the territory's 2.1 million people — two-thirds of the population — are living in approximately 1,000 displacement sites as of February 2026 [12]. UNRWA maintains roughly 100 collective emergency shelters hosting approximately 80,000 internally displaced persons [12].

The humanitarian situation extends beyond shelter. By October 2025, 78 percent of Gaza's buildings had been damaged. Ninety-seven percent of schools were damaged or destroyed, with 76 percent directly hit. Only 14 of 36 hospitals were partially functional. Nearly half the population had access to less than six liters of drinking water per day — well below emergency minimums [13]. A famine was declared in Gaza City and surrounding areas in August 2025, and all Gaza populations were assessed as "facing or projected to face crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity" [13].

Since March 2025, Israeli authorities have blocked UNRWA from directly bringing humanitarian personnel and aid into Gaza, though supplies remain pre-positioned outside the territory [12]. The Rafah crossing was closed on February 28, 2026, and only partially reopened for pedestrians on March 15, leaving the Kerem Shalom crossing as the sole operational goods entry point — creating what the UN describes as a "major bottleneck" [4].

Inter-Palestinian Violence as a Distinct Cause of Harm

The April 6 incident highlights a dimension of the conflict that receives less international attention: violence among Palestinian factions as a source of civilian casualties.

The October 2025 Doghmush-Hamas clashes killed 27 people in a single incident [6]. In March 2026, a cell of the "popular army" militia led by Ashraf al-Mansi opened fire on Hamas security forces in al-Nasr neighborhood, while gunmen from the Rami Halas militia kidnapped a Hamas government employee and wounded civilians in the al-Zeitoun neighborhood [5].

Comprehensive data on total inter-Palestinian deaths since October 2023 remains incomplete. Partial figures from OCHA, ACLED, and media reports suggest dozens to low hundreds of deaths from clan feuds, militia confrontations, and Hamas enforcement actions — representing a small but growing share of total conflict deaths. Against a total toll exceeding 72,000 [14], inter-Palestinian violence accounts for a fraction of overall casualties. But its trajectory is accelerating: the rate of armed incidents between Palestinian factions has more than quadrupled since 2023 [7].

This dynamic matters beyond the immediate body count. It reflects the erosion of Hamas's monopoly on force in Gaza — a development with direct implications for any post-war governance arrangement. The Trump administration's peace plan envisions areas that surrender weapons receiving reconstruction aid, while those retaining arms would be treated as "rogue zones" [10]. If multiple armed factions continue operating independently, the conditions-based approach to reconstruction becomes difficult to implement.

Post-War Governance and the Question of Reconstruction

The second-order consequences of intra-Palestinian violence extend directly into the international debate over Gaza's political future.

The Board of Peace framework envisions a disarmed Gaza governed by the technocratic NCAG, with reconstruction funded by international pledges. At the February 2026 inaugural meeting, Board member Marc Rowan stated that 400,000 homes and $30 billion in infrastructure would be built [10]. The UN has estimated total reconstruction costs at over $50 billion [10].

But the framework faces resistance from multiple directions. The NCAG cannot operate from inside Gaza while Israel blocks entry. Hamas retains weapons and refuses full disarmament absent Israeli withdrawal and statehood progress. Armed militias — some backed by Israel itself — are creating parallel power structures.

International actors are split on the path forward. Up to 35 states have joined the Board of Peace, but no other G7 member besides the United States [10]. European Council President António Costa has voiced "serious reservations about key elements of the Board's Charter," citing governance concentration and compatibility with the UN Charter [15]. The EU prefers to work within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2803 rather than join the Board directly, though it has expressed readiness to support the NCAG and an International Stabilisation Force [15].

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey serve as ceasefire guarantors, each with distinct interests. Qatar has funded Hamas governance for years and seeks to maintain regional influence. Egypt prioritizes border security and preventing a refugee influx into Sinai. Turkey positions itself as a broader advocate for Palestinian rights [9]. None has publicly conditioned reconstruction aid on a specific disarmament timeline, but all three have endorsed the phased approach that links governance reform to material support.

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Gaza's displacement crisis exists within a global context. UNHCR data shows the world's largest refugee populations originate from Syria (5.5 million), Ukraine (5.3 million), and Afghanistan (4.8 million) [16]. Gaza's 1.4 million internally displaced persons represent one of the largest IDP populations relative to total population anywhere in the world.

The Compound Fracture

The events of April 6 at Maghazi distill the overlapping crises facing Gaza into a single incident: a militia backed by Israel attacks a school sheltering displaced families, residents resist, Hamas responds, and Israeli drones strike the melee. Ten dead, no clear accounting of who killed whom, and a ceasefire that exists on paper but not on the ground.

The total documented death toll since October 7, 2023, stands at 72,292 according to the Gaza Health Ministry [14], with independent estimates from a Lancet study suggesting the true figure exceeds 75,000 violent deaths through early January 2025 alone [17]. The ceasefire has not ended the killing — it has changed its character. Large-scale ground offensives have given way to targeted strikes, militia skirmishes, and a slow-motion humanitarian collapse.

The international governance architecture meant to manage Gaza's transition — the Board of Peace, the NCAG, the phased disarmament plan — remains largely theoretical while violence continues on the ground. Reconstruction pledges of $17 billion sit alongside a $50 billion estimated need and a territory where 78 percent of buildings are damaged, most schools are destroyed, and famine conditions persist [10][13].

Whether the ceasefire can survive these compound pressures — continued Israeli strikes, rising militia violence, blocked governance institutions, and a regional war between the US-Israel coalition and Iran — remains the central question. The ten dead at Maghazi on April 6 are not an aberration. They are the pattern.