Iran Denies Imminent Nuclear Deal While US-Iran Negotiations Continue

On May 25, 2026, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei told reporters that while negotiators had "reached conclusions on many issues under discussion," he cautioned that "no one can claim that this means an imminent agreement is about to be signed" [1]. Hours earlier, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said a deal could be finalized "today" [2]. That contradiction — both sides acknowledging progress while publicly managing expectations in opposite directions — captures the precarious state of the most consequential diplomatic negotiation since the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

The stakes are higher than they were eleven years ago. The United States and Israel launched airstrikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggering a war that has closed the Strait of Hormuz, stranded roughly 2,000 commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, and driven oil prices above $110 per barrel [3][4]. The negotiations in Qatar are not about preventing a hypothetical crisis. They are about ending a real one.

The 14-Point Framework: What's on the Table

The current deal template is a 14-point one-page memorandum of understanding, negotiated primarily by US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner [5]. It differs fundamentally from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which ran to over 100 pages of detailed technical annexes. The MOU covers three broad areas: a ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a moratorium on Iranian uranium enrichment, and the release of frozen Iranian assets in exchange for sanctions relief [5][6].

The enrichment moratorium is the central sticking point. The US initially demanded "zero enrichment" permanently. Iran rejected that outright [5]. The current negotiating range, according to multiple sources, is a moratorium lasting between 12 and 15 years — with three sources citing at least 12 years and one putting 15 as the likely outcome [5]. Iran had proposed five years; the US had demanded 20 [5].

For context, the 2015 JCPOA capped Iranian enrichment at 3.67% purity for 15 years and limited Iran's centrifuge operations to approximately 5,060 first-generation IR-1 machines at Natanz [7]. The current deal would need to address a far more advanced program: Iran now operates thousands of advanced centrifuges — including IR-6 and IR-8 models — and holds an estimated 441 kg of 60%-enriched uranium, enough to produce material for approximately 10 nuclear weapons if further enriched to weapons-grade 90% [8][9].

Source: IAEA / Arms Control Association

Data as of May 24, 2026CSV

The Nuclear Math: Breakout Time and What It Means

"Breakout time" refers to how long it would take Iran to produce enough weapons-grade uranium (roughly 25 kg enriched to 90%) for a single nuclear device. Under the JCPOA, that timeline was extended to roughly one year. Since the deal collapsed following the US withdrawal in 2018, Iran has steadily shortened that window.

As of early 2026, nonproliferation experts estimated Iran's breakout time at two to four weeks — the shortest of any non-nuclear-weapon state in history [8][9]. The February 28 strikes damaged some nuclear infrastructure, with post-strike estimates placing breakout at approximately 12 weeks under the most likely scenario [8]. But there is significant uncertainty: Iran terminated all IAEA inspector access on February 28, 2026, and the agency has been unable to verify the current state of the program since [9][10].

The 2015 JCPOA's verification regime was among the most comprehensive ever negotiated. It included continuous monitoring of centrifuge manufacturing, real-time surveillance of enrichment facilities, and Iran's implementation of the IAEA's Additional Protocol — an expanded set of requirements for information and inspector access [7]. The current MOU proposes "enhanced IAEA snap inspections" and the removal of highly enriched uranium stockpiles, but the specific verification architecture remains undefined [5]. Given that Iran expelled inspectors during the war, rebuilding any monitoring framework will require negotiations within negotiations.

The Strait of Hormuz: A $110-Per-Barrel Chokepoint

The economic dimension of these talks is inseparable from the military one. Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz on March 4, 2026, after the US-Israeli strikes began [3]. Pre-conflict, approximately 3,000 commercial vessels transited the strait each month. By March, that number had collapsed to roughly 150, and it has remained at approximately 5% of normal levels through May [3][4].

Source: UNCTAD / Al Jazeera

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

The consequences have been severe. The strait handles roughly 20% of global oil supply and significant LNG volumes [11]. Brent Crude surged past $120 per barrel after the closure, and WTI crude has traded above $90 since March, reaching $114.58 in April before settling around $112 in late May [11][12]. War-risk insurance premiums for vessels transiting the strait increased four- to six-fold, adding roughly $250,000 per transit for very large crude carriers [11].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 18, 2026CSV

The Dallas Federal Reserve estimated the disruption could reduce global GDP growth by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points in 2026, depending on duration [12]. UNCTAD projected global merchandise trade growth falling from 4.7% in 2025 to between 1.5% and 2.5% in 2026 [11]. Iran has imposed tolls exceeding $1 million per ship on the limited traffic it permits and bars vessels linked to "hostile nations" [3].

A temporary ceasefire agreed on April 8 was supposed to reopen the strait, but it has been extended multiple times without full reopening [3]. The United Kingdom deployed warships, drones, and fighter aircraft in May to participate in an international mission to secure commercial shipping [3]. The US proposed "guiding" ships through the strait under military escort, though Iran rejected any arrangement that diminishes its sovereignty over the waterway [13].

The Money: Frozen Assets and Sanctions Relief

Iran's economic leverage in these negotiations stems partly from the global costs of the Hormuz closure, and partly from its own desperation. The Iranian economy was already under heavy sanctions pressure before the war.

Iranian frozen assets in international accounts total between $100 billion and $120 billion, according to Al Jazeera's reporting [14]. The MOU framework reportedly envisions the release of approximately $50 billion in frozen assets [5]. Iran's deputy foreign minister confirmed that "lifting sanctions, releasing frozen funds, ending blockade" are all included in the latest proposal to the US [15].

The question is sequencing. Past arrangements — such as the 2023 prisoner exchange, which moved $6 billion in Iranian oil revenues from South Korean banks to restricted accounts in Qatar — imposed strict humanitarian-use-only conditions with US oversight [14]. Congressional Republicans have historically opposed any asset release. Senator Tim Scott's Revoke Iranian Funding Act sought to rescind licenses enabling the $6 billion transfer and mandate Treasury Department reporting on all high-value Iranian assets globally [16]. Whether any asset release in 2026 would require Congressional approval or could proceed under executive authority remains contested.

Who Controls Iran's Negotiating Position?

Understanding Iran's "no imminent deal" messaging requires understanding who is sending it — and why. The assassination of Ali Khamenei on February 28 triggered a succession crisis. The IRGC moved within hours to install Mojtaba Khamenei, Ali's son, as the new supreme leader, bypassing the formal Assembly of Experts electoral process and pressuring its members to ratify the selection [17][18].

Mojtaba Khamenei had never held elected office but had cultivated deep ties to the IRGC over decades as a behind-the-scenes powerbroker [17]. His appointment signaled continuity with hardline governance. The new IRGC commander since March 1, Major General Ahmad Vahidi — considered a hardliner — is reportedly the only senior leader with direct access to Mojtaba Khamenei [19]. Vahidi's closest mentor is Mohsen Rezaee, the Supreme Leader's office counselor [19].

Yet US intelligence assesses that Mojtaba Khamenei has endorsed "the broad template" of the MOU deal framework [20]. CNN reported that while the new supreme leader is providing "final sign-off" on key decisions, the negotiating tactics are handled by the diplomatic team, with Mojtaba's visible involvement serving partly as "a protective shield ... against internal criticism" [20]. This mirrors how Ali Khamenei operated during the 2013–2015 Rouhani negotiations: publicly skeptical, privately permissive — until the deal was done, at which point he could claim credit or distance depending on public reaction.

The historical parallel is instructive but imperfect. In 2013, Hassan Rouhani's election on a platform of engagement gave Ali Khamenei political cover to authorize talks. The current situation lacks that democratic mandate. President Masoud Pezeshkian remains in office, but the Interim Leadership Council that governed during the succession period — and the IRGC's role in installing Mojtaba — means the political dynamics are more opaque [17].

The Regional Calculus: Proxies, Partners, and Red Lines

Critics of any deal argue that sanctions relief would financially empower the IRGC and its proxy networks. Iran historically allocated approximately $700 million annually to Hezbollah's military and political operations, with additional funding flowing to Houthi forces in Yemen and Iraqi Shia militias [21]. After the 2015 JCPOA entered into force, Iran received sanctions relief totaling nearly $100 billion, and its regional military activities expanded even as its nuclear program was constrained [22].

The Stimson Center noted that the assassination of Khamenei and the broader military campaign have disrupted Iran's proxy model, but the "axis of resistance" networks retain local roots and operational capacity independent of Tehran's funding [23][24]. The question for deal skeptics is whether nuclear risk reduction justifies the financial windfall that would flow to these groups through sanctions relief.

Israel's position is unambiguous. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Trump "reaffirmed Israel's right to defend itself against threats on every front" and that "Iran will not have nuclear weapons" [25]. Israel participated in the strikes that started the war and has made clear it views any Iranian enrichment capability as unacceptable.

Saudi Arabia has taken a more calibrated approach. Riyadh called for talks to "address all issues" contributing to regional stability and, alongside Qatar and the UAE, successfully urged Trump to postpone a planned follow-up attack on Iran in mid-May [25]. Saudi Arabia has floated a regional nonaggression pact that would include Iran — a significant diplomatic shift that reflects the Kingdom's priority of economic development over military confrontation [25].

2015 vs. 2026: A Timeline Comparison

The 2015 JCPOA took roughly 20 months from the November 2013 Geneva interim agreement to finalization in July 2015. It involved the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) and produced an extraordinarily detailed legal and technical framework [7].

The 2026 negotiations are compressed by necessity. The war began February 28; the first ceasefire was April 8; the MOU framework emerged in early May. In under three months, negotiators have produced a 14-point template [5][6]. But that template is deliberately skeletal. Multiple officials have noted that "at this stage we are not discussing the details of the nuclear issue" — the immediate priority is stopping the fighting and reopening Hormuz [1][2].

This creates a structural risk. The JCPOA's strength was its specificity: every centrifuge was accounted for, every inspection protocol defined. A one-page MOU that defers nuclear details to future negotiations could produce a ceasefire without addressing the underlying proliferation threat. The Carnegie Endowment warned that "two wars later, Iran's nuclear question is still on the table" — and a ceasefire that does not resolve it may simply set the stage for a third confrontation [10].

What Happens Next

The gap between "agreed in principle" and "signed agreement" can be enormous. Both sides need a deal: Iran's economy is battered, its supreme leader is newly installed, and its strait closure is imposing costs on its own regional partners. The US faces $112 oil, an election cycle, and the reality that the military campaign has not eliminated Iran's nuclear capability.

But the unresolved questions are fundamental. How long will the enrichment moratorium last? What happens to the 441 kg of 60%-enriched uranium? Will IAEA inspectors return, and with what mandate? How much frozen money gets released, and how fast? Can Congressional opponents block asset releases? Will Israel accept any deal that permits future Iranian enrichment?

The fact that both sides are publicly downplaying progress while privately advancing a framework suggests the negotiations are in a fragile but genuine phase. History — from the JCPOA to the Abraham Accords — shows that Middle Eastern diplomacy often moves from "impossible" to "done" with startling speed, and just as quickly from "done" to "collapsed." The next days will determine which pattern holds.