U.S. Marines Deploy to Middle East as Tehran Struck by Heavy Airstrikes

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated surprise airstrikes on dozens of targets across Iran under what the Pentagon designated Operation Epic Fury [1]. The opening salvo killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a targeted Israeli airstrike on Tehran [2], destroyed or damaged nuclear enrichment facilities, and struck IRGC military infrastructure from Tehran to Isfahan. One month later, the conflict has expanded into a multi-front regional war involving proxy forces from Lebanon to Yemen, shut down the world's most critical oil chokepoint, and provoked a constitutional confrontation between the executive branch and Congress over the legal authority to wage war without legislative approval.

The Scale of the Strike Package

The first 24 hours of Operation Epic Fury were nearly double the scale of the opening strikes in the 2003 Iraq invasion [3]. According to a CENTCOM fact sheet, the operation involved more than 50,000 U.S. troops, 200 fighter aircraft, two aircraft carrier strike groups, and B-2 stealth and B-1 strategic bombers [3]. Between late February and mid-March, at least 82 to 108 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from multiple destroyers [4]. B-2 bombers carried out strikes deep inside Iran targeting missile production sites and launch facilities [3].

The USS Tripoli arrived in the region carrying approximately 2,200 Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, accompanied by the amphibious landing dock USS New Orleans [5]. An additional 2,500 Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit departed California aboard the USS Boxer [5]. CNN reported that more than 1,000 additional Army soldiers were preparing to deploy to be available for Iran operations [6], and nearly 7,000 troops total have been added to the region since the conflict began [5].

One strategy reportedly under consideration is the capture of Kharg Island, a strategic oil hub 15 miles off the Iranian coast that processes 90% of Iran's crude oil exports [5].

Targets and Civilian Toll

The combined U.S.-Israeli force struck a range of military and dual-use targets: nuclear enrichment facilities at Natanz and Isfahan, the Malek Ashtar University Aerospace Complex in Tehran, IRGC command centers, missile production plants, and air defense networks [7]. Israel separately struck the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting headquarters on March 3 [8]. Iran's parliament building was also reportedly targeted [8].

Civilian casualties have been substantial. The Iranian human rights NGO HRANA documented 3,114 deaths by March 17, including 1,354 civilians, 1,138 military personnel, and 622 unclassified [8]. An Israeli airstrike on March 9 in Tehran's Resalat neighborhood destroyed a Basij-affiliated building along with three residential buildings, killing between 40 and 50 people [8]. On a separate occasion, a strike on a girls' school in Minab killed 180 civilians [9].

Source: HRANA / Al Jazeera

Data as of Mar 17, 2026CSV

International humanitarian law experts have flagged these incidents. The Atlantic Council noted that if the school was hit intentionally or because insufficient precautions were taken, the strikes "would almost certainly be clear violations of international law" [9].

Iran's Nuclear Program: What Was Struck and What Remains

The strikes came at a moment when the IAEA had lost access to all four of Iran's declared enrichment facilities [10]. The Agency's February 27, 2026, Board of Governors report stated it could not verify "whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities" or determine the "size of Iran's uranium stockpile at the affected nuclear facilities" [10].

Before the June 2025 Israeli strikes that preceded this conflict, Iran had accumulated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 — enough, according to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, for "as many as 10 nuclear bombs" should Iran decide to weaponize [11]. The stockpile was stored primarily at an underground tunnel complex at Isfahan [10]. Satellite imagery from late January 2026 showed roofs being constructed over damaged buildings at Natanz and Isfahan, suggesting efforts to salvage remaining materials [10].

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in late February that Iran was "not currently enriching uranium," though this claim could not be independently verified because of the IAEA's lack of access [10].

The gap between what is claimed and what can be verified is the central problem. The IAEA's inability to monitor Iranian facilities means that neither the success of the strikes nor the status of Iran's nuclear material can be confirmed by independent observers.

The Strait of Hormuz and Economic Fallout

Iran's retaliation extended beyond military targets. The IRGC issued warnings prohibiting vessel passage through the Strait of Hormuz — the waterway through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply transits — effectively halting commercial shipping [12]. As of March 12, Iran had carried out 21 confirmed attacks on merchant vessels [12].

The consequences for global energy markets have been severe. Brent crude oil surpassed $100 per barrel on March 8 for the first time in four years, peaking at $126 per barrel [12]. Combined oil production from Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE dropped by 6.7 million barrels per day by March 10 and at least 10 million barrels per day by March 12 [13].

Source: Kpler / EIA

Data as of Mar 12, 2026CSV

Goldman Sachs projected that a sustained closure of the strait for 30 days would push Brent above $150, with 60- and 90-day scenarios risking "structural damage to the global economy comparable to the 1979 oil shock" [14]. On March 23, oil prices fell nearly 11% after President Trump announced a temporary hold on strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure, with Brent dropping to $99.94 [15]. That reprieve proved short-lived; prices have since rebounded above $112 [15].

Beyond oil, the humanitarian dimension of the blockade is growing. By mid-March, 70% of the region's food imports were disrupted, forcing retailers to airlift staples and causing consumer price spikes of 40 to 120% [9]. Iranian strikes on desalination plants — the source of 99% of drinking water in Kuwait and Qatar — have raised fears of a broader humanitarian crisis [9].

Iran's Retaliatory Capabilities and Proxy War

Iran's response has drawn on the distributed proxy network it built over four decades. Hezbollah resumed rocket and drone attacks on Israel within two days of the February 28 strikes, just 15 months after the November 2024 ceasefire ended the last Israel-Hezbollah war [16]. Israeli military intelligence reported movement of Hezbollah mobile rocket launchers to forward positions in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley [16].

Iran also launched direct strikes against Gulf states. Attacks on Bahrain killed three people, strikes on Kuwait killed four soldiers and four civilians, strikes on Oman killed three, and strikes on Saudi Arabia killed two [17]. An Iranian projectile struck the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Manama, Bahrain, causing multiple civilian casualties [9].

On March 28, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen entered the conflict, claiming responsibility for ballistic missile attacks on southern Israel and threatening to resume attacks on Red Sea shipping [18]. The CSIS assessed that "Iran's forty-year strategic investment in a distributed proxy architecture spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has not been destroyed by air campaigns" [16].

The entry of the Houthis into the conflict on Day 29 underscores a risk that military planners acknowledged before the strikes: degrading Iran's conventional military capacity does not neutralize its unconventional reach.

The Succession Crisis in Tehran

The assassination of Khamenei created an immediate leadership vacuum. Under Article 111 of the Iranian constitution, an Interim Leadership Council was established on March 1, consisting of Guardian Council member Alireza Arafi, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i, parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and President Masoud Pezeshkian [2].

The Assembly of Experts convened from March 3 to 8 and elected Mojtaba Khamenei — Ali Khamenei's son — as the new supreme leader on March 9 [2]. The selection of a dynastic successor was widely noted as unprecedented in the Islamic Republic's history. NBC News reported that the new supreme leader has vowed to continue blocking the Strait of Hormuz [19].

Whether this leadership transition has weakened or consolidated the Iranian regime's resolve remains a matter of debate among analysts. RAND noted that the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei suggests the regime prioritized continuity and defiance over any opening for negotiation [20].

The Coalition Question

The United States assembled a narrow coalition for the operation. Israel was the only partner in the strikes themselves [17]. Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, seven allied nations — the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, and France — signed a political statement of support after British PM Keir Starmer and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte convinced French President Macron to lift his objection [21]. The statement, however, did not commit any naval vessels or military resources [21].

Most NATO members declined to join a U.S.-led Hormuz coalition, and Trump publicly criticized not only NATO allies but also Indo-Pacific partners — Japan, South Korea, and Australia — for refusing to participate in attacks on Iran [22].

Gulf states, despite being targeted by Iranian retaliation, have resisted pressure to formally join the U.S.-led military effort. CNN reported that Gulf governments view "regime change through war as highly dangerous" and have declined to provide basing rights for offensive operations [23]. The contrast with the 2003 Iraq invasion is stark: that operation was backed by a coalition of 49 nations. Operation Epic Fury has explicit military participation from two [17].

The administration's strongest argument for acting without broader coalition support is that multilateral consensus was structurally unachievable given the diplomatic configuration — and that waiting for consensus would have allowed Iran's nuclear program to advance past the point of military intervention. Critics counter that the absence of allied buy-in is itself evidence that the threat assessment did not meet the threshold for preemptive action [24].

Legal Authority: Article II vs. the War Powers Resolution

The administration has grounded the strikes in the president's Article II constitutional authority as commander-in-chief, not in any existing Authorization for Use of Military Force [24]. No AUMF covers Iran. The 2001 AUMF authorizes force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks; the 2002 Iraq AUMF, which was repealed in 2023, authorized force against Saddam Hussein's government [24].

Legal scholars have raised pointed objections. A JURIST commentary titled "No Authorization, No Imminence, No Plan" argued that the strikes lacked the three conditions that have historically justified unilateral presidential military action: congressional authorization, an imminent threat to U.S. persons, and a defined strategic objective [25]. FactCheck.org reported that the "legality of the latest Iran attack is in question" across multiple legal frameworks [24].

The Lawfare blog published an analysis noting that while Article II grants the president authority to repel sudden attacks, initiating a sustained air campaign against a sovereign nation's military and civilian infrastructure "stretches the self-defense rationale past its breaking point" [26].

Congress has voted three times on War Powers Resolutions to constrain the president's authority. All three failed. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA), joined by Minority Leader Chuck Schumer and Senator Adam Schiff, forced repeated votes [27]. The closest margin was 53-47, with Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) the only Republican to vote with Democrats [28]. The House separately rejected a constraining measure on March 4 [29].

Under the War Powers Resolution, if the administration filed its notification letter on or around February 28, the 60-day clock for continued military action without congressional authorization expires in late April 2026 [24]. JINSA, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, has called on Congress to pass a new AUMF specifically for Iran, arguing that retroactive authorization would "regularize" the legal framework [30].

Historical Precedent: Do Airstrikes Stop Nuclear Programs?

The question of whether bombing a country's nuclear infrastructure reliably prevents weapons development has a mixed historical record.

Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor was initially viewed as a nonproliferation success. Subsequent research, however, including analysis of captured Iraqi archives, found that the attack "may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons" [31]. Iraq launched a covert nuclear weapons program after the strike that did not previously exist, and a decade later stood "on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability" [32]. The Belfer Center at Harvard concluded that the Osirak strike "triggered a covert nuclear weapons program" while forcing Iraq onto "a more difficult and time-consuming technical route" [32].

Israel's 2007 strike on Syria's Al-Kibar reactor is generally considered more successful, in part because Syria's program was far less advanced and lacked the scientific infrastructure to reconstitute [31].

The Arms Control Association warned in a 2012 analysis directly relevant to Iran that the Osirak case demonstrates "the limits of military force as a nonproliferation tool" and that strikes risk "driving programs underground where they are harder to monitor and verify" [31].

Applied to the current situation, this history raises a specific concern: Iran's enrichment knowledge cannot be bombed. Facilities can be destroyed, but the technical expertise to rebuild exists within Iran's scientific community. If IAEA access — already nonexistent before the strikes — is not restored, any reconstitution effort would proceed without international monitoring.

Where Things Stand at Day 29

As of March 29, the conflict shows no clear trajectory toward resolution. Vice President JD Vance stated on March 28 that the war would continue "a little while longer" [33]. President Trump has alternated between signaling openness to talks with Iran's new leadership and escalating military operations [34].

Three American troops have been killed [35]. The Houthis have entered the war [18]. Oil prices remain above $110 per barrel. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Iran's proxy network continues operations across four countries. And Congress has not authorized the military action that is being conducted in its name.

The constitutional, strategic, and humanitarian questions raised by Operation Epic Fury are not abstract. They are accumulating consequences — measured in casualties, in barrels of oil not shipped, in legal precedents set or broken — that will shape U.S. foreign policy and Middle Eastern security for years beyond whenever this conflict ends.