EU Launches Diplomatic Push to Resolve Strait of Hormuz Crisis

On March 16, as EU foreign ministers filed into the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels for an emergency session, their chief diplomat Kaja Kallas had already tried — and failed — to sell them on the fastest available military option. Could the EU's existing Aspides naval mission, currently escorting ships through the Red Sea against Houthi attacks, be extended eastward into the Persian Gulf? The answer, Kallas told reporters afterward, was emphatic: "No appetite." [1]

What emerged instead was something more ambitious and far less certain — a diplomatic framework modeled on the Black Sea Grain Initiative that brokered Ukrainian wheat shipments through a war zone in 2022. It is Europe's attempt to carve a third path between two unpalatable options: joining a U.S.-led military coalition that no allied nation has signed up for, or standing by as the worst oil supply disruption in modern history deepens into a food and fertilizer catastrophe.

"Nobody Wants to Go Actively in This War"

The rejection of military involvement was swift, broad, and bipartisan across Europe's political spectrum. Germany led the opposition. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul demanded "more clarity" from Washington before any discussion of European participation, while Defence Minister Boris Pistorius asked pointedly what European frigates could accomplish that the entire U.S. Navy cannot [2]. The UK's Prime Minister Keir Starmer shut down any NATO framing, saying the mission "won't be, and it's never been envisioned to be, a NATO mission." [2] Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Lithuania, and Estonia all echoed the refusal in varying degrees of diplomatic firmness.

The frustration runs deeper than strategic caution. Multiple European officials have pointed out that the United States launched Operation Epic Fury — the joint U.S.-Israeli strike campaign that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28 — without consulting its European allies. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's spokesperson crystallized the sentiment: "This war has nothing to do with NATO — it is not NATO's war." [3]

Even Denmark, which suggested Europe should keep an "open mind" on freedom of navigation, drew a sharp line between supporting maritime access and endorsing the underlying conflict. Poland invited the Trump administration to work through proper NATO channels — a procedural suggestion that doubles as a rebuke of unilateral action [2].

The Black Sea Model: Kallas's Diplomatic Gambit

Having found no military appetite, Kallas pivoted within hours to what may prove to be the EU's most consequential diplomatic proposal of the crisis. She revealed that she had already spoken with UN Secretary-General António Guterres about replicating the Black Sea Grain Initiative — the 2022 UN- and Turkey-brokered deal that kept Ukrainian agricultural exports flowing through mined waters during active hostilities — as a template for Hormuz [4].

"We have to find diplomatic ways to keep this open so that we don't have a food crisis, fertilizers crisis, energy crisis as well," Kallas told Reuters [5]. The proposal envisions a negotiated humanitarian corridor that would allow critical commodities — not just oil, but fertilizers, food inputs, and liquefied natural gas — to transit the strait under some form of international guarantee.

The analogy is imperfect but instructive. The Black Sea Grain Initiative succeeded, at least temporarily, because it offered something to all parties: Ukraine got export revenue, Russia got sanctions relief on its own agricultural and fertilizer exports, Turkey got diplomatic prestige, and the developing world got grain. The question now is whether a similar alignment of incentives can be constructed for Hormuz — and whether Iran, in the middle of an active war, would agree to any arrangement that reduces its most powerful remaining leverage.

Iran's Selective Blockade Complicates the Picture

Tehran has not sealed the strait entirely. Instead, it has pursued a discriminatory blockade that is reshaping global energy flows in real time. Iran has declared the waterway open to all nations except the United States and its allies, while selectively granting passage to ships from countries it considers neutral or friendly [6].

China is in active negotiations with Iran for guaranteed passage of crude oil and Qatari LNG carriers [6]. India has secured transit for at least two LPG tankers and a Saudi oil shipment of one million barrels [6]. Turkey has received clearance for individual vessels. Most provocatively, Iran has floated the possibility of allowing broader tanker traffic — but only for cargoes priced in Chinese yuan rather than U.S. dollars [7].

This selective approach serves multiple Iranian strategic objectives simultaneously. It fractures any potential coalition against the blockade by offering favorable terms to key Asian economies. It advances the long-term goal of de-dollarizing oil markets. And it weaponizes energy access as a diplomatic tool, rewarding neutrality and punishing alignment with Washington.

For Europe, which falls squarely in the "Western allies" category Iran has excluded, the selective blockade makes a negotiated corridor not just desirable but essential. Unlike China and India, European nations have no bilateral channel to Tehran that could secure ad hoc passage rights.

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 9, 2026CSV

Europe's Energy Vulnerability — Again

The Hormuz crisis has landed on a continent that was already nursing wounds from its painful divorce from Russian energy. Having spent three years and hundreds of billions of euros diversifying away from Moscow's gas and oil, Europe now faces the closure of a chokepoint through which 20% of global oil transits [8]. Approximately 13% of global fertilizer exports also pass through the strait, threatening agricultural productivity just as spring planting season begins across the Northern Hemisphere [8].

Oil prices have surged from roughly $67 per barrel before the February 28 strikes to above $100, with analysts projecting prices could reach $150–$200 if the crisis deepens further [8]. The EU is already debating emergency measures including energy tax cuts, government subsidies, and even a temporary suspension of the EU carbon market to cushion the blow [9].

The compound effect is devastating. Europe's energy infrastructure was rebuilt around the assumption that while Russian supply was unreliable, the global market — accessed through open sea lanes — would provide alternatives. The Hormuz closure invalidates that assumption. As Kallas herself acknowledged, the blockade is also perversely benefiting Russia, whose energy revenues fund its war in Ukraine, by driving up the global prices Moscow receives for the oil it does sell through non-Hormuz routes [1].

What Would a Hormuz Corridor Actually Look Like?

The original Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Turkey and the UN in July 2022, established a Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul where Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, and UN officials inspected outbound ships. It created designated shipping lanes, required advance notification of vessel movements, and operated under a framework of mutual non-attack guarantees. Russia ultimately withdrew from the deal in July 2023, but for a year it moved over 32 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs [4].

A Hormuz equivalent would need several components that do not yet exist. First, a mediator: Turkey played this role in the Black Sea; for Hormuz, the UN would likely need to partner with a Gulf state — Oman, which borders the strait's southern shore, is the most frequently mentioned candidate, though the UAE and Qatar could also serve. Second, a defined scope: Iran would need to agree on which commodities qualify for transit. Third, an inspection and notification mechanism to prevent military materiel from transiting under humanitarian cover. Fourth, and most critically, Iran's consent — something that is far from guaranteed while bombs are still falling on its territory.

Iran's three stated conditions for any de-escalation — recognition of its security rights, compensation for war damage, and guarantees against future aggression [10] — suggest that Tehran views the strait not as a humanitarian issue to be negotiated separately from the war, but as integral leverage in ending the broader conflict. This is the fundamental tension the EU's proposal must overcome.

The Transatlantic Rift Widens

The EU's diplomatic turn stands in stark contrast to Washington's approach. President Trump has publicly demanded that China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the UK send warships to forcibly reopen the strait, warning allies that "we will remember" those who refuse [11]. The U.S. military itself has acknowledged it lacks adequate minesweeping capacity to clear the waterway for weeks or months [12].

The gap between American and European approaches is not merely tactical but philosophical. Washington frames Hormuz as a freedom-of-navigation issue requiring military enforcement. Brussels frames it as a humanitarian and economic crisis requiring negotiated access. The EU's explicit refusal to join a military coalition — and its simultaneous outreach to the UN for a diplomatic framework — represents one of the sharpest transatlantic foreign policy divergences since the 2003 Iraq War.

Whether Europe's diplomatic bet pays off depends on variables largely outside its control: Iran's willingness to negotiate while under bombardment, the UN's capacity to broker under extreme time pressure, and whether the United States would accept a negotiated corridor that implicitly legitimizes Iran's ability to control access to a waterway the U.S. considers international waters.

The Stakes of Inaction

What is clear is that the status quo is unsustainable. Every day the strait remains closed costs the global economy billions in disrupted trade. European consumers face surging fuel and food prices heading into what could become the most economically painful spring since the 2022 energy crisis. The fertilizer shortage alone, if unresolved before planting season ends, could translate into reduced crop yields and higher food prices lasting well into 2027.

Kallas's Black Sea model is, at minimum, a signal that Europe is done waiting for the war to resolve itself — and done waiting for instructions from Washington. Whether it becomes the foundation for an actual agreement or remains an aspirational talking point will depend on diplomatic conversations that are only now beginning in New York, Brussels, and through whatever back channels still connect Europe to Tehran.

For a continent that has spent the last four years learning to act independently on energy security, the Hormuz crisis is the ultimate test. The question is no longer whether Europe will chart its own course — it already has. The question is whether anyone else will follow.