Colombia's 2026 Election Poised to Decide the Future of the Country's Oil Industry

On May 31, 2026, Colombians go to the polls in what amounts to a referendum on the country's economic model. The three leading presidential candidates offer starkly different visions for Colombia's oil sector — the single largest source of export revenue and a contributor of roughly 10–15% of total government income [1][2]. The winner will inherit a fiscal crisis, a shrinking reserve base, and a policy vacuum left by President Gustavo Petro's decision to halt new exploration contracts without passing any legislation to make the ban permanent [3].

Source: AS/COA Poll Tracker / AtlasIntel

Data as of May 15, 2026CSV

The Candidates and Their Oil Agendas

Iván Cepeda, the leftist candidate of Petro's Historic Pact coalition, leads first-round polls at roughly 37%, according to AtlasIntel's mid-May survey [4]. Cepeda has positioned himself as a continuity candidate on energy policy but with a pragmatic gloss. "The country requires a comprehensive energy policy that diversifies the economy and avoids dependence on hydrocarbons," Cepeda told reporters, while clarifying that his approach involves "a gradual transition to renewable sources of energy rather than an immediate dismantling of the hydrocarbon sector" [5].

Behind him, attorney Abelardo de la Espriella has surged to 32.9% in mid-May polling, consolidating the right-wing vote [4]. De la Espriella and center-right senator Paloma Valencia (polling at roughly 17%) both advocate reopening exploration licensing and permitting hydraulic fracturing. Valencia's running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo, stated the position bluntly: "We will reactivate the exploitation of fossil fuels, and we will promote fracking with environmental responsibility, but also with a lot of innovation" [5].

If no candidate clears 50%, a runoff on June 21 will decide the presidency; the winner takes office August 7 [5]. Polling suggests Cepeda would face a competitive second round against either right-wing challenger, making the oil question likely to dominate the final weeks of campaigning.

The Fiscal Pressure Cooker

The stakes are not abstract. Ecopetrol, the majority state-owned oil company, contributes approximately 4 percentage points of GDP to the national treasury through taxes, royalties, and dividends [6]. Oil and mining products account for over 45% of Colombia's exports and roughly 11% of government revenues [1][7]. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative reported that extractives generated 56% of the country's export earnings and 32% of foreign direct investment in its most recent assessment [1].

Against that backdrop, the IMF's September 2025 Article IV consultation painted a sobering picture. The central government deficit reached 7.1% of GDP in 2025 — roughly 2 percentage points above earlier projections — and the government suspended the fiscal rule through 2027 by invoking an escape clause [8]. The Fund called for "a decisive and credible fiscal adjustment," recommending immediate cuts equal to 0.5% of GDP and structural reductions of more than 3 percentage points between 2026 and 2028 [8].

Any incoming president will face a basic arithmetic problem: declining oil revenues compound a deficit that is already near historic highs. A phase-out of production — even a gradual one — without replacement revenue sources would widen that gap further. The 2026 draft budget already targets a deficit of 6.2% of GDP [8].

What Petro's Exploration Ban Actually Did

In January 2023, then-Energy Minister Irene Vélez announced at Davos that Colombia would no longer award new oil and gas exploration contracts [3]. Petro became the first leader of a major petroleum-producing nation to make such a pledge. But the ban was never codified in law, regulation, or presidential decree — it remained an administrative decision that a successor could reverse on day one [9].

Source: EIA / Ecopetrol filings

Data as of Dec 1, 2025CSV

The production data tell a more nuanced story than either side's narrative. Colombian crude output peaked at roughly 1 million barrels per day in 2015 and had already declined 23% by 2024, to approximately 758,000 bpd [10][11]. Gas production fell 7.8% in 2023 alone [9]. The International Energy Agency projects output could fall to 620,000 bpd by 2028 — a further 20% decline — if current trends continue [9].

But attributing the decline solely to Petro's policies requires ignoring structural factors. Colombia's onshore fields were already aging, with average well recovery of just 0.5 million barrels of oil equivalent during the 2018–2024 drilling period [12]. Deeper wells (average true vertical depth of 1,800 meters) mean higher per-well capital costs [12]. Global oil price volatility and the COVID-19 demand collapse of 2020 also suppressed investment years before Petro took office.

That said, the exploration ban demonstrably reduced the pipeline of future projects. Without new licensing rounds, the country's reserve replacement depends entirely on enhanced recovery at existing fields and Ecopetrol's own exploration budget. Ecopetrol managed to replace 104% of its production in 2024, incorporating 260 million barrels of proven reserves — more than double the 2023 figure — and reported a reserve life of 7.8 years at end of 2025 [13][14]. Whether that replacement rate is sustainable without new concessions to private operators is the central technical question of the election.

The Reserve Clock

Source: Worldometer / ANH

Data as of Jun 1, 2025CSV

Colombia holds roughly 1.94 billion barrels of proven reserves as of 2025, down from 2.4 billion in 2013 [14][15]. At current production rates, that translates to approximately 7–8 years of remaining supply. For comparison, Brazil holds over 12 billion barrels with a reserve life exceeding 15 years, while Ecuador holds around 8 billion barrels [15]. Colombia's reserve position is among the most precarious of any significant Latin American producer.

Ecopetrol's 2025 investment plan of 24–28 trillion pesos (roughly $5.5–6.5 billion), with 17.2 trillion earmarked for exploration and production, reflects the urgency [11]. The company plans 10 exploration wells in 2025, focused on the Llanos basin and the offshore Caribbean [11]. The offshore Sirius prospect, a joint venture with Brazil's Petrobras, could hold 6.1 trillion cubic feet of gas, with first production expected by 2030 and total investment potentially reaching $5 billion [16]. In December 2024, Petrobras confirmed this was the largest gas discovery in Colombian history [9].

These projects exist regardless of the election outcome. But the right-wing candidates argue that reopening licensing rounds would attract the private capital needed to arrest the production decline before reserves run out.

Jobs, Departments, and the Transition Gap

The oil and gas sector's direct employment footprint is difficult to pin down precisely, but the broader extractive workforce — including coal mining — supports an estimated 130,000 jobs in associated supply chains, with roughly 30,000 direct coal mining jobs alone [17]. These positions are concentrated in departments like Meta, Casanare, Santander, and Cesar, regions with few alternative high-wage employers.

The Petro government signed a pledge for green jobs and just transition with the International Labour Organization in 2019 and launched pilot retraining projects in the coal region of Cesar [18][19]. The Ministry of Labor set a goal of developing a national just transition strategy by 2023 [19]. But independent evaluations of these programs remain scarce. The Stockholm Environment Institute found in a 2024 assessment that Colombia's just transition policies remained largely at the planning stage, with significant gaps between ambition and implementation [20].

The renewable energy pipeline offers some counter-narrative: nearly 4.5 gigawatts of solar and onshore wind capacity awarded between 2019 and 2021 could generate up to 120,000 jobs annually during this decade [17]. Whether those jobs materialize in the same regions and at comparable wages remains unproven.

The Steelman Case for Expansion

Colombia accounts for less than 0.2% of global CO₂ emissions, with per-capita emissions of roughly 1.7 tons [21]. Proponents of expanded extraction make an argument grounded in emissions accounting: if Colombia curtails production, importers will simply source heavier, more carbon-intensive crude from Venezuela — whose oil industry is among the dirtiest in the world, with large volumes of methane vented and flared during production [22] — or from Middle Eastern producers. A Colombian phase-out would, on this logic, reduce government revenue and cost Colombian jobs without achieving any net reduction in global emissions.

This argument has gained traction beyond the right. Even Petro's former Finance Minister pushed in May 2024 to increase production to 1 million bpd, acknowledging the fiscal reality [9]. The IEA's 2023 review of Colombia noted the tension explicitly: the country needs to ramp up clean energy investment while compensating for the loss of fossil fuel export revenues, a balancing act that few countries have managed [23].

Critics of the expansion argument counter that Colombia's climate commitments — including Law 2169 of 2021, which targets a 51% emissions reduction by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2050 — create legal obligations that constrain any expansion strategy [24]. They also point to the 2018 Supreme Court ruling recognizing the Colombian Amazon as an "entity subject of rights" and ordering zero-deforestation action plans, a decision that established a precedent for courts to enforce environmental obligations against the executive [25].

Foreign Capital and the Election Premium

Investment in Colombia's oil sector is expected to reach $4.68 billion in 2025, an uptick despite the policy uncertainty [16]. But the composition of that investment has shifted. Ecopetrol now dominates, having acquired Repsol's 45% stake in the CPO-09 contract in early 2025 [11]. Foreign private operators have been more cautious, with the U.S. State Department's 2025 Investment Climate Statement noting ongoing regulatory uncertainty as a drag on inflows [26].

The OPEC Fund and Inter-American Development Bank have committed over $150 million to renewable projects in Colombia [16]. Meanwhile, interest in offshore wind has drawn expressions of interest from seven foreign companies, including Spain's BlueFloat Energy and Denmark's Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners [16]. These investments are conditioned less on the election outcome than on regulatory stability and grid infrastructure.

The larger concern for foreign investors is the fiscal trajectory. The IMF's call for 3+ percentage points of structural fiscal adjustment over three years creates a policy environment where any new president will face pressure to maximize oil revenues in the short term, regardless of campaign rhetoric [8].

Legal and Constitutional Constraints

Whichever candidate wins, their policy freedom is more constrained than campaign speeches suggest. Law 2169 of 2021 established binding emissions reduction targets [24]. The 2018 Supreme Court Amazon ruling created a judicial precedent for environmental enforcement [25]. Colombia's network of bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements — including with the United States, Canada, and the European Union — imposes arbitration obligations that make abrupt policy shifts costly.

Conversely, Petro's exploration ban demonstrated the limits of executive action without legislation: with no law or decree underpinning the ban, it exists as a policy preference that a new president can overturn with a phone call [9]. The Constitutional Court has not ruled on whether the government has the authority to permanently ban exploration, leaving the legal terrain ambiguous.

What Comes Next

The arithmetic is unforgiving. At current rates, Colombia's oil reserves will be substantially depleted within a decade. The country's fiscal deficit demands either new revenue or painful spending cuts. The just transition programs that would ease the social cost of decline remain underfunded and unproven.

If Cepeda wins and maintains something close to Petro's approach, Colombia will likely see continued production declines, intensifying fiscal pressure, and growing dependence on Ecopetrol's ability to replace reserves from its own portfolio. If de la Espriella or Valencia prevails and reopens licensing rounds, the question becomes whether foreign capital will return quickly enough to reverse the production slide — and whether courts and climate law will permit the full expansion that right-wing candidates envision.

Either way, the next president will govern a country where the oil clock is ticking. The margin for error is measured in barrels, budgets, and years — and Colombia is running short on all three.