Colombians Vote in Presidential Election as Pro-Israel Candidates Challenge Leftist Incumbent

The Stakes

On May 31, 2026, more than 41 million registered Colombian voters began casting ballots in the first round of a presidential election that will determine whether the country continues the leftist trajectory set by Gustavo Petro — Latin America's most vocal critic of Israel since October 2023 — or swings sharply to the right [1]. A candidate needs more than 50 percent to win outright; otherwise, the top two finishers advance to a June 21 runoff [2].

The race has been reduced in much international coverage to a referendum on Israel. That framing captures one real axis of disagreement. But it risks obscuring a more complex picture: an electorate grappling with the worst internal security crisis in a decade, record cocaine production, U.S. sanctions against the sitting president, and an economy still recovering from double-digit inflation.

The Candidates and Where They Stand

Three candidates dominate the field. Iván Cepeda, 63, a senator from Petro's Historic Pact coalition, leads recent polls at roughly 33–44 percent depending on the survey, with the most recent Invamer poll placing him at 44.3 percent [3][4]. Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, a celebrity criminal defense lawyer running with the Defenders of the Homeland Party, polls second at 21.5–30.9 percent [4][5]. Paloma Valencia, 48, a senator from former president Álvaro Uribe's Democratic Centre party, sits third at 12.6–19.8 percent, though her support nearly doubled from 10 percent in earlier surveys [4][5].

Centrist candidates Sergio Fajardo and Claudia López register in single digits [2].

On Israel, the divide is sharp. Cepeda has pledged to maintain Petro's diplomatic rupture, describing Israel's military campaign in Gaza as genocide and filing a police complaint against former president Iván Duque for "apology of genocide" after Duque visited Israel [6]. De la Espriella has proposed moving Colombia's embassy to Jerusalem and restoring military and police cooperation with both Israel and the United States within his first 90 days [7]. Valencia chairs the Israel Allies Foundation caucus in the Colombian Senate and has called Petro's severing of ties "irresponsibility and fanaticism" [1][8].

On security — the issue 37 percent of voters rank first — the gap is equally wide [5]. Cepeda advocates continuing Petro's "Total Peace" negotiation framework with armed groups, supplemented by military action to minimize casualties [7]. De la Espriella proposes an "iron fist" approach modeled on El Salvador's Nayib Bukele: ending all negotiations, bombing rebel camps, building ten megaprisons, and resuming aerial fumigation of coca crops [7][5]. Valencia takes a somewhat more institutional line, proposing a "new Plan Colombia" in partnership with the United States and European allies, expanding the police and armed forces, and a strong security plan to retake territory from criminal groups [7][9].

On the economy, de la Espriella and Valencia both pledge tax cuts, deregulation, and expanded fossil fuel production, with de la Espriella targeting a 40 percent reduction in the size of the state [7]. Cepeda supports continuing Petro's labor reforms, including the 23 percent minimum wage increase that marked Petro's tenure [7].

On coca and drug policy, Colombia has reached record levels: 253,000 hectares of coca cultivation and a potential 2,664 metric tons of cocaine production under Petro's deemphasis of forced eradication [10]. De la Espriella favors militarized eradication, including aerial fumigation and strikes on suspected drug-trafficking boats and planes [7]. Valencia emphasizes aggressive security-force deployment against trafficking networks [7]. Cepeda favors the dialogue-based approach continued from Petro's framework [7].

The Israel Dimension: What Petro Actually Did

Petro's actions against Israel went well beyond rhetoric. In February 2024, he suspended purchases of Israeli arms. By June 2024, he had severed diplomatic ties, and Israel's ambassador Gali Dagan departed [11]. In August 2024, he signed a decree banning coal exports to Israel — Colombia had exported roughly three million metric tons of coal to Israel in 2023, about 5.4 percent of total coal exports [12]. In October 2025, following the detention of two Colombian nationals aboard a Gaza-bound flotilla, Petro expelled all remaining Israeli diplomats and moved to abrogate the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, which had only taken effect in August 2020 [13][14].

The economic impact has been measurable but limited. Bilateral trade was modest: Colombian exports to Israel totaled approximately $366 million in 2019, with a positive trade balance of $281 million, driven overwhelmingly (92 percent) by mining products [15]. After the coal ban, enforcement was initially porous — from August 2024 through April 2025, Colombia still shipped 1,072,412 tons of coal to Israel, a 39 percent reduction rather than a full halt [12]. A stricter decree in August 2025 closed the loopholes. From January to July 2025, total coal exports dropped 35.5 percent to $2.85 billion compared with the same period in 2023 [12]. However, this broader decline reflects multiple factors beyond the Israel ban, including global market conditions.

Domestic Economics: What Voters Actually Feel

The Israel debate plays out against an economic backdrop that weighs more heavily on most voters' daily lives.

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Unemployment stood at 8.3 percent in 2025, down significantly from the pandemic peak of nearly 16 percent in 2020 but still a persistent concern, particularly among young Colombians [16]. Unemployment and basic needs together account for 33 percent of voter priorities [5].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Inflation spiked to 11.7 percent in 2023 — the highest in over a decade — before declining to 6.6 percent in 2024 [16]. The inflationary shock eroded purchasing power and fueled discontent, even as Petro's supporters pointed to his historic minimum wage increases as a counterbalance [7].

Meanwhile, Petro's relationship with Washington deteriorated sharply. In September 2025, the Trump administration decertified Colombia's counternarcotics cooperation — the first such designation since 1997 — revoked Petro's U.S. visa, and placed him, his wife, his son, and a close adviser on the Treasury Department's sanctions list [17]. Trump publicly called Petro an "illegal drug leader" and threatened to halt approximately $230 million in annual U.S. funding [17]. The visa was later reinstated through the end of Petro's term [17].

A full 78 percent of Colombian voters say maintaining strong relations with the United States is essential for the next administration — a data point that may matter more to electoral outcomes than any position on Israel [18].

The "Pro-Israel vs. Anti-Israel" Frame: Real or Overstated?

Colombia's Jewish community numbers between 4,500 and 14,700 people, depending on the source and methodology, concentrated primarily in Bogotá and Cali [19]. The Arab-descended community is far larger: Colombia's national statistics agency estimates 3.2 million residents of Middle Eastern descent across four immigrant generations, with roughly 90 percent concentrated on the Atlantic Coast, particularly in Barranquilla [20]. The Lebanese diaspora alone numbers about 700,000 [20].

Neither community is large enough to swing a national election on identity-group voting alone. And there is little polling evidence that Israel-Gaza attitudes are a primary driver for either community's vote. Security concerns dominate in the Caribbean departments where Arab-Colombians are concentrated, while corruption scandals have eroded Petro's standing across demographic groups [18].

The international framing is partly a product of organized advocacy. The Israel Allies Foundation operates caucuses in 65 legislatures worldwide, including 14 in Latin America [8]. Valencia's role as chair of the Colombian Senate caucus is a formal institutional link, not a grassroots movement. De la Espriella's Jerusalem embassy proposal echoes similar pledges by right-wing leaders across the region — Argentina's Javier Milei launched the "Isaac Accords" to boost Israel-Latin America cooperation — but these proposals tend to energize evangelical and conservative base voters rather than persuade undecided moderates [21].

The more accurate reading may be that Israel functions as a tribal marker in Colombia's left-right polarization rather than an independent issue. Petro's stance signals alignment with the global South, non-alignment, and anti-imperialism; the right's pro-Israel stance signals alignment with the United States, market economics, and security hardlines. The substantive policy content — whether Colombia's embassy sits in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, whether coal flows to Haifa — is secondary to what the position communicates about a candidate's broader worldview.

The Security Crisis That Overshadows Everything

The collapse of Petro's "Total Peace" framework is arguably the election's defining issue. Talks with the ELN (National Liberation Army) fell apart after the January 2025 Catatumbo massacre, in which ELN forces — reportedly in coordination with Venezuelan security elements — launched an offensive to seize coca-growing territory from FARC dissident factions [10]. By early May 2025, the violence had killed at least 117 people and displaced more than 65,000 in the northeastern border region [10]. Over 235,000 individuals were forcibly displaced by conflict in Colombia in 2025 [5].

Polling reflects the damage: 66.2 percent of voters say Petro's Total Peace policy made them feel more insecure, 65 percent believe the initiative is moving in the "wrong direction," and 73 percent say the government has lost territorial control to illegal armed groups [18]. The EMC (Estado Mayor Central), the dominant FARC dissident faction under commander Iván Mordisco, broke off negotiations entirely [10].

Yet Petro's overall approval rating has risen to approximately 50 percent — up from lower points during his term — suggesting that dissatisfaction with Total Peace does not translate neatly into rejection of the broader leftist agenda [22]. Cepeda's lead in the polls, if it holds, would confirm this.

The Legal and Institutional Case for Petro's Israel Stance

Petro's defenders invoke a body of international legal opinion. In August 2025, 86 percent of members of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) voted for a resolution stating that Israel's actions in Gaza meet the definition of genocide under the 1948 UN Convention [23]. South Africa's case at the International Court of Justice — alleging Israeli violations of the Genocide Convention — remains ongoing, and the ICJ has issued provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent acts of genocide [23]. A September 2025 UN Human Rights Council report provided further documentation of potential violations of international humanitarian law [23].

Colombia's own history gives the argument additional resonance. As a country that spent decades negotiating its own peace process, and as a state party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Colombia's foreign policy establishment has long framed itself as a defender of international humanitarian law. Petro's supporters argue his Israel stance is consistent with that identity [24].

Critics — including the two right-wing candidates — counter that Petro's moves were unilateral executive actions taken without congressional approval, damaged trade relationships, and isolated Colombia diplomatically at a moment when it needed U.S. cooperation against armed groups [1][9].

Latin America's Broader Shift: Is Colombia an Outlier?

Colombia's election occurs amid a regional rightward turn. Bolivia, Honduras, Chile, and Costa Rica have all elected leaders aligned with both the Trump administration and Israel since 2025 [21]. Ecuador under Daniel Noboa expanded Israeli security cooperation and withdrew from UN Palestinian rights committees [21]. In Brazil, while Lula maintains a critical stance toward Israel, the opposition — led by figures like Flávio Bolsonaro — has proposed moving Brazil's embassy to Jerusalem [21].

In no Latin American country has a sitting leftist government's Israel stance clearly become an electoral liability in isolation. Bolivia's Evo Morales severed ties with Israel in 2009; the issue played no measurable role in subsequent Bolivian elections. Chile's Gabriel Boric downgraded relations with Israel but faced electoral pressure primarily on domestic economic issues. Mexico's Claudia Sheinbaum has maintained a critical posture without apparent electoral cost [25].

The Colombia case differs in degree rather than kind. Petro went further than any peer — expelling all diplomats, abrogating a free trade agreement, banning commodity exports — at a moment when his domestic credibility on security was weakest. The interaction between foreign-policy radicalism and domestic-policy failure creates an opening that a pure Israel stance, absent the security crisis, likely would not.

What a Right-Wing Victory Could — and Could Not — Reverse

If de la Espriella or Valencia wins a runoff, reversing Petro's Israel policies would face structural constraints. The FTA abrogation triggers a six-month wind-down period during which commitments remain in force, but a new president could initiate renegotiation immediately [14]. Restoring diplomatic relations requires no congressional action — it is an executive prerogative.

However, Colombia's congressional composition could limit broader policy shifts. The March 2026 legislative elections did not give any single bloc a governing majority, and coalition-building would be necessary for major legislative action on security, drug policy, or economic reforms [10]. Colombia's Constitutional Court has historically asserted authority over executive actions that implicate fundamental rights, and any return to aerial fumigation of coca — a key de la Espriella proposal — would need to satisfy court-imposed conditions regarding health and environmental impacts [10].

Colombia's ICC membership, ratified in 2002, is embedded in the constitutional framework and cannot be reversed by executive decree. Any attempt to withdraw from the Rome Statute would require congressional action and would face legal challenges [26].

Foreign Influence: What Is Documented

No Colombian electoral authority has publicly announced investigations into foreign electoral interference in the 2026 cycle as of the election date. However, documented vectors of external influence exist in multiple directions.

The Trump administration's sanctions against Petro and the threat to cut $230 million in aid constituted direct pressure on the political environment, though aimed at the outgoing president rather than specific candidates [17]. The Israel Allies Foundation's parliamentary network represents an institutional channel for pro-Israel advocacy, with Valencia's caucus chairmanship as the most visible Colombian connection [8].

On the other side, Cepeda has raised concerns about U.S. "meddling" in the election, pointing to the sanctions as an attempt to prejudice voters against the left [27]. The ACLED conflict data project documented Venezuelan security-force involvement in the Catatumbo border violence, though this was a military rather than electoral intervention [10].

Organized crime represents another vector. InSight Crime has documented how armed groups attempt to influence local elections through intimidation and vote-buying in conflict-affected departments — a more immediate and documented form of electoral interference than any state-level foreign operation [28].

What Comes Next

If no candidate exceeds 50 percent — the near-universal expectation — the June 21 runoff will determine Colombia's direction. The critical variable is not which candidate is more "pro-Israel" or "anti-Israel" but whether the roughly 62 percent of voters who remained undecided in earlier polls consolidate behind a vision of negotiated peace or militarized security [18].

The Israel question will travel with whoever wins. But it will travel as one strand in a much thicker rope — bound up with the United States relationship, coca policy, constitutional constraints, and the daily reality of displacement and violence that shapes life for millions of Colombians far from the chambers where foreign-policy debates take place.