Trump Administration Excluded from International Leaders Summit in Colombia

On April 28, 2026, representatives from 54 countries gathered in the Caribbean coastal city of Santa Marta, Colombia, for the inaugural Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels [1]. The United States was not among them. Neither were China, India, Russia, or the oil-rich Gulf states [2]. The absence of the world's five largest greenhouse gas emitters — collectively responsible for more than half of global CO₂ output — was not an oversight. It was the point.

"This is not the space for them," Colombia's Environment Minister Irene Vélez Torres said of nations unwilling to engage constructively on phasing out fossil fuels [3]. The State Department, for its part, said the administration would "not participate in the bogus climate agenda," characterizing the conference as promoting reliance on "intermittent and costly energy sources" [4].

The result is a diplomatic snapshot that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago: a major multilateral conference, organized by a U.S. treaty ally, pointedly excluding Washington — and attracting significant global participation anyway.

What Happened in Santa Marta

The conference was co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands, growing out of a decision made by 18 nations participating in the Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative at a senior officials meeting in Bonn in June 2025 [5]. It was conceived as an alternative to the COP process, which fossil-fuel producing countries led by Saudi Arabia and Russia had effectively stalled during negotiations at COP30 in Belém, Brazil [6].

The 54 attending nations represent roughly one-third of global fossil fuel demand and one-fifth of global production [7]. Among them were major fossil fuel producers: Australia, Canada, Norway, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and Angola [2]. European participants included France, Denmark, Spain, and representatives from the European Union. Climate-vulnerable small island states — Fiji, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, the Maldives — sent delegates as well [5].

Several heads of state attended in person, led by Colombia's President Gustavo Petro. France used the occasion to unveil a national fossil fuel "roadmap" setting deadlines to phase out coal by 2030, oil by 2045, and gas by 2050 [2]. Former Irish President Mary Robinson, attending on behalf of The Elders, called the gathering "a new multilateral space for a committee of doers" [5].

The conference did not produce binding commitments. Organizers described it as the first in a "series of conferences" aimed at establishing formal negotiations for a binding Fossil Fuel Treaty within one year [5]. Ministers and officials focused on redirecting fossil fuel subsidies toward renewable energy, creating employment alternatives for displaced workers, and addressing investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms that allow corporations to sue governments over climate regulations [3]. Colombia, which has 129 oil and gas projects covered by such mechanisms, announced its intention to renounce those treaties [3].

The Emissions Gap at the Table

The conference's central paradox is that the nations most responsible for carbon emissions were absent.

Source: Global Carbon Project / Conference records

Data as of Apr 28, 2026CSV

The 54 attending nations collectively emit approximately 8.2 gigatons of CO₂ annually. The United States alone produces roughly 5 gigatons; China, 12.6 gigatons [8]. With the absent countries accounting for the majority of global emissions, critics questioned whether a coalition of willing but relatively smaller emitters could produce meaningful change.

Supporters of the conference argued that this was precisely the point — previous COP negotiations had been paralyzed by the veto power of major petrostates and reluctant emitters. "When the largest emitters have been present at COP negotiations, they have pushed for a veto to prevent any discussion of transitioning beyond fossil fuels," Vélez Torres said [1]. By excluding obstructionist actors, organizers hoped to build concrete transition plans among governments genuinely committed to action.

Johan Rockström, director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, emphasized that the conference addressed "tricky questions about how to phase out fossil fuels" that had been sidelined in broader negotiations [4]. A representative from the Center for International Environmental Law called it "the first serious attempt to center fossil fuels in global climate cooperation" [7].

The Broader Context: Two Summits, Two Visions

The Santa Marta conference cannot be understood in isolation from the broader deterioration in U.S.-Latin American relations under the Trump administration. Seven weeks earlier, on March 7, Trump hosted his own selective summit: the "Shield of the Americas" gathering at a golf resort in Doral, Florida [9].

That summit brought together leaders from 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations — but conspicuously excluded the left-leaning governments of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, countries that represent more than half the region's population and GDP [10]. The meeting focused on security cooperation, anti-cartel operations, intelligence sharing, and migration enforcement. Trump appointed former Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem as special envoy for the initiative [9].

President Petro responded pointedly: "With 17 small, weak countries lacking experience in dealing with cocaine, you cannot make a southern shield; it will be punctured" [11]. Trump later acknowledged the exclusion of Colombia as "a mistake," though the apology did little to repair the broader diplomatic rift [12].

The two summits reflect competing visions for hemispheric cooperation. The Shield of the Americas gathered ideologically aligned conservative governments around a U.S.-defined security agenda. The Santa Marta conference assembled a broader, more diverse coalition around a specific policy goal — fossil fuel transition — that directly conflicts with the Trump administration's domestic energy agenda.

U.S.-Latin America: The Economic Stakes

The economic relationship between the United States and Latin America remains enormous, even as diplomatic ties fray.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau / USTR

Data as of Mar 1, 2025CSV

Total U.S. goods trade with Latin America exceeds $1 trillion annually, with Mexico alone accounting for $935 billion in 2024 [13]. U.S.-Colombia bilateral trade totaled approximately $37 billion in goods in 2025, with an additional $17.6 billion in services trade in 2024, bringing the total relationship to roughly $55 billion [14]. The United States remains Colombia's largest trading partner.

The Biden administration had requested $2.2 billion in foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean for FY2025, with Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, and Venezuela identified as priority recipients [15]. Under the Trump administration, much of this assistance has been frozen or redirected. The administration announced cuts to Colombian aid and threatened tariffs on Colombian exports in disputes over deportation flights and drug enforcement [16].

In January 2025, a confrontation over deportation flights set the tone for the relationship. When Petro refused to allow U.S. military aircraft carrying deportees to land in Colombia, Trump threatened 25% emergency tariffs on all Colombian goods, escalating to 50% within a week [16]. Colombia briefly retaliated with its own 25% tariffs on U.S. imports before a deal was struck. The tariffs were suspended but remain "held in reserve" [17].

The April 2025 "Liberation Day" tariff order imposed a baseline 10% tariff on most Latin American nations, with some facing significantly higher rates — Guyana at 38%, Nicaragua at 18% [18]. These measures, combined with migration enforcement actions and rhetoric about reclaiming the Panama Canal, have generated widespread resentment across the region.

Historical Precedent: Has This Happened Before?

The exclusion of the United States from a major multilateral summit in the Americas has limited precedent. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), founded in 2011, was designed from its inception to exclude the United States and Canada — providing a regional forum without Washington's presence [19]. But CELAC is a regional body; the Santa Marta conference is a global initiative, making the U.S. absence more conspicuous.

At the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, several Latin American leaders openly challenged U.S. drug policy and the exclusion of Cuba, but the United States still attended. The 2018 Summit of the Americas in Lima saw Trump skip the event — a voluntary absence, not an exclusion [20].

What makes 2026 different is the combination of involuntary exclusion from one summit (Santa Marta) and selective inclusion at another (Shield of the Americas). The Trump administration is simultaneously being shut out of coalitions it opposes and building smaller coalitions of its own — a strategy that fragments rather than consolidates hemispheric institutions.

The Steelman Case Against the Summit

There are legitimate grounds for skepticism about the Santa Marta conference's significance.

First, without the United States, China, and India at the table, any agreements reached lack the participation of countries responsible for roughly 60% of global emissions. A fossil fuel transition plan that does not account for the world's largest economy, its largest manufacturer, or its most populous democracy has obvious structural limitations.

Second, the conference produced no binding commitments — only a framework for future negotiations [5]. Developing countries at the summit highlighted that financing remains the largest barrier to transition, with borrowing costs for renewable energy averaging 15% in Africa compared to 2% in Europe and North America [1]. Without mechanisms to close that gap, declarations of intent risk remaining aspirational.

Third, some of the attending nations themselves face domestic contradictions. Colombia, the host, still depends heavily on coal and oil exports. Several Latin American attendees continue to expand fossil fuel production even as they signed on to transition rhetoric. The conference prompted domestic backlash in Colombia about how realistic a post-fossil-fuel era would be [21].

Fourth, some attending governments have privately acknowledged they still require U.S. cooperation on security, trade, and development — regardless of their climate diplomacy. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, while endorsing the summit by saying "concrete alliances of the willing can take us a long way," represents a government that has carefully avoided a complete break with Washington on energy policy [3].

Finally, the absence of China — the world's largest coal consumer and largest renewable energy investor — arguably weakens the summit's credibility as much as the U.S. absence does. A "coalition of the willing" that excludes both superpowers of the energy transition risks becoming a forum for mid-sized powers to make aspirational statements rather than a genuine decision-making body.

Who Gains: Regional Blocs and Institutional Credibility

The Santa Marta conference represents a test case for whether alternative multilateral frameworks can gain traction outside the established COP process.

CELAC, which has served as China's preferred venue for engaging Latin America — hosting triennial China-CELAC summits without U.S. participation — provides one model [19]. The November 2025 CELAC-EU Summit in Santa Marta (the same city, notably) produced a joint declaration that deepened European-Latin American cooperation on climate, trade, and digital governance [22]. The Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative now builds on that momentum.

China's strategic engagement with Latin America has accelerated alongside U.S. withdrawal. Beijing formalized a comprehensive partnership with CELAC through the 4th Joint Plan of Action (2025-2027), expanding cooperation beyond trade into political, cultural, and security dimensions [19]. The number of Latin American countries recognizing Taiwan has fallen from 18 in 2017 to just seven [19].

BRICS outreach to Latin American nations — Brazil is a founding member, and Argentina briefly joined before withdrawing — offers another institutional pathway that sidelines Washington. Whether these frameworks represent lasting geopolitical realignment or temporary responses to a confrontational U.S. administration remains an open question.

The Trump Administration's Posture

The administration's response to the Santa Marta conference was dismissive rather than retaliatory. The State Department's characterization of the summit as a "bogus climate agenda" [4] was consistent with a broader pattern: withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for a second time, dismantling EPA climate protections, appointing fossil fuel industry executives to energy and interior positions, and paying nearly $900 million to energy companies to abandon offshore wind projects in favor of fossil fuel development [2].

The administration has not sought inclusion in the Santa Marta process. Its Latin America strategy, as articulated through the Shield of the Americas, prioritizes security partnerships with ideologically aligned governments over broad multilateral engagement. The appointment of Noem — a political ally rather than a career diplomat — as special envoy signals that Latin America policy is being run through a domestic political lens rather than a diplomatic one [9].

Critics within the foreign policy establishment, including analysts at the Chatham House and the Wilson Center, have argued that the Shield of the Americas approach is strategically self-defeating — excluding the region's largest economies while claiming to address problems like narcotics trafficking that require their cooperation [23]. The Chatham House assessment was blunt: the coalition "is destined to fail" [23].

Defenders of the administration's approach argue that engaging with hostile left-wing governments legitimizes anti-American rhetoric and that building a coalition of willing partners — even a smaller one — produces more concrete results than consensus-driven summits that yield only vague communiqués.

What Comes Next

The Santa Marta conference concluded with a commitment to hold follow-up meetings and begin formal treaty negotiations within 12 months [5]. Whether that timeline holds depends on political will, financing, and the degree to which attending nations face domestic pushback for committing to fossil fuel phase-outs.

For the United States, the more consequential question is cumulative rather than event-specific. Each summit it is excluded from, each regional institution that solidifies without its participation, and each bilateral relationship that deteriorates under tariff threats represents an incremental loss of influence in a hemisphere Washington has long considered its strategic backyard.

The Monroe Doctrine assumed the Western Hemisphere would remain a U.S. sphere of influence. In April 2026, 54 countries met in Colombia to plan the future of global energy — and the United States was not in the room.