US Weighs Potential Military Presence in Somaliland to Counter Iran and Houthi Threats in Red Sea

In late November 2025, General Dagvin Anderson, commander of U.S. Africa Command, flew into Hargeisa and drove to Berbera, where he toured the deep-water port and its Soviet-built airstrip alongside Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi "Irro" [1]. The visit was not announced in advance. Within weeks, reports surfaced that the Trump administration had opened discussions with Somaliland's leadership about a potential basing agreement — with U.S. diplomatic recognition of the breakaway territory as part of the exchange [2].

The timing is not coincidental. Since October 2023, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping have cut Suez Canal container traffic by as much as 86%, rerouted thousands of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, and inflicted billions of dollars in added costs on global trade [3]. A fragile U.S.-Houthi ceasefire brokered by Oman in May 2025 collapsed within months, and although a broader Gaza peace deal in October 2025 temporarily quieted the attacks, the underlying threat remains [4]. Washington wants options. Berbera, sitting on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden roughly 150 miles from Yemen, looks like one.

But Somaliland is not a country — at least not one that any United Nations member state other than Israel has recognized. The proposal would entangle the Pentagon in an unresolved sovereignty dispute, test the limits of U.S. statutory authority, and risk blowback from Somalia, the African Union, Turkey, and China. Whether the strategic gain justifies those costs is the central question.

The Red Sea Crisis by the Numbers

The scale of disruption that prompted this discussion is hard to overstate. Before the Houthi campaign began, approximately 2,068 ships transited the Suez Canal in November 2023. By December 2024, that figure had fallen to roughly 877 [3]. Container ship traffic specifically dropped 75% year-over-year in 2024, with the decline persisting into 2025 [5].

Source: Suez Canal Authority / IMF PortWatch

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

Ships rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope added approximately 11,000 nautical miles, ten additional days of travel, and roughly $1 million in fuel costs per voyage [3]. Spot container rates from Shanghai to Europe surged 256% between December 2023 and February 2024 [5]. Suez Canal Authority revenues fell 64.3% — from $648 million to $337.8 million in comparable monthly periods [6]. War-risk insurance premiums for Red Sea transits spiked to levels that made the route uneconomical for most operators [7].

Signs of recovery appeared in late 2025 after the Houthis halted attacks following the Gaza agreement. The Suez Canal Authority reported 229 vessels returning in October 2025, and CMA CGM announced resumed Suez routes for January 2026 [6]. But the ceasefire's durability remains uncertain, and the structural vulnerability of the Bab-el-Mandeb chokepoint has not changed.

What Would a Berbera Base Actually Do?

The specific military assets under discussion have not been officially disclosed. Reporting from multiple outlets indicates the talks center on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms — likely MQ-9 Reaper drones — along with logistics support for naval patrol vessels and possible pre-positioned supplies [1][8]. Somaliland has also offered access to critical minerals including lithium and coltan [9].

The comparison point is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, which hosts over 5,000 personnel and costs $63 million per year in lease payments under a 20-year deal signed in 2014 [10]. The U.S. has committed to spending $1.4 billion upgrading Camp Lemonnier over the life of the lease [10]. No comparable cost figures for a Berbera facility have been published, though Somaliland's track record with the UAE — which secured a base lease near Berbera for a reported $1 billion in infrastructure investment — suggests the price of entry would not be trivial [11].

A key geographic limitation deserves attention: Berbera sits roughly 1,400 miles from the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, where most Houthi attacks have occurred. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is approximately 20 miles from the strait. A Berbera base would provide redundancy, a second deep-water port, and a long runway for ISR operations, but it would not replace Djibouti's proximity advantage for rapid-response naval interdiction. Proponents argue its value lies in distributed basing — reducing the risk of a single point of failure — rather than replacing Camp Lemonnier [8].

The Recognition Problem

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, reasserting borders that briefly existed as the independent State of Somaliland for five days in 1960 before merging with Italian Somalia. Since then, it has built a functioning government, held multiple elections, printed its own currency, and created security forces — meeting the criteria for statehood under the Montevideo Convention [12].

No country recognized Somaliland until December 26, 2025, when Israel became the first U.N. member state to do so. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the move alongside ambassador exchanges and cooperation agreements [13]. The reaction was swift: Somalia demanded Israel withdraw its recognition, calling it "state aggression" [14]. Egypt, Jordan, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the European Union all condemned the decision [15].

The African Union's opposition is rooted in its foundational principle of respecting colonial-era borders — the fear that recognizing Somaliland would set a precedent for separatist movements across the continent [12]. For Washington, the legal obstacles are specific: U.S. statutory restrictions on security agreements with non-state entities create ambiguity about which agencies could sign a basing deal and under what authority. Congress has taken a step toward resolving this with H.R. 3992, the Republic of Somaliland Independence Act, introduced in June 2025 by Rep. Scott Perry (R-Pa.), which would direct the U.S. to recognize Somaliland as an independent state [1]. The bill has not advanced out of committee.

Without recognition — or at minimum a creative legal workaround — any basing agreement would exist in a gray zone that could be challenged by Somalia at the International Court of Justice or by allies within the AU framework.

Somalia's Leverage and Regional Rivals

The recognized government in Mogadishu views Somaliland as one of its federal member states and has made clear it would treat a U.S. base there as a violation of its sovereignty [14]. Somalia has multiple tools to retaliate.

Turkey operates its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu, established in 2017, and in February 2024 signed a memorandum of understanding to serve as a partner in Somalia's maritime security for ten years, receiving 30% of revenue from Somalia's exclusive economic zone [16]. If pushed, Mogadishu could deepen this relationship at Washington's expense.

China operates a military base in Djibouti roughly eight miles from Camp Lemonnier [17]. While China has not publicly approached Somaliland for basing rights, Beijing has cultivated ties with Mogadishu and could use a U.S.-Somaliland deal as justification for expanding its own military footprint in the region — perhaps through a port access agreement with Somalia proper.

Source: Al Jazeera / IISS

Data as of Apr 8, 2026CSV

The Horn of Africa is already one of the most militarized coastlines on earth. Djibouti alone hosts bases from the U.S., China, France, Japan, and Italy [17]. The UAE operates facilities in Somaliland near Berbera, and Israel is reportedly constructing a base there following its recognition deal [18]. Adding a U.S. installation risks accelerating what analysts at the Critical Threats Project have called a "patchwork of proxy relationships in which local conflicts serve as vectors for external rivalries" [19].

The DP World Precedent

Before the U.S. entered the picture, the UAE's DP World had already established a major presence in Berbera. Under a 2018 deal, DP World secured a 30-year concession with 51% ownership of the port, investing $442 million in renovation and expansion [11]. Somaliland holds 30%, with Ethiopia taking the remaining 19% as part of a broader trade corridor agreement [11].

The UAE separately leased the old Soviet military base adjacent to the port, which Abu Dhabi has expanded for naval and intelligence operations monitoring Houthi activity in the Gulf of Aden [20]. Reports indicate Abu Dhabi invested roughly $1 billion in infrastructure, military training, and job creation tied to its Somaliland presence [11].

This precedent cuts both ways. It demonstrates that foreign basing arrangements in Somaliland are operationally feasible despite the lack of international recognition. But it also shows that such deals exist at the pleasure of shifting geopolitics: in January 2026, Somalia expelled UAE military personnel from its territory over Abu Dhabi's dealings with Somaliland and Israel [21]. A U.S. base would face the same vulnerability to regional realignments.

The Case That a Base Would Be Counterproductive

The strongest argument against forward basing near Yemen is that it plays directly into the Houthis' propaganda framework. The movement's ideology, rooted in its alignment with Iran's "Axis of Resistance," explicitly frames the conflict as a struggle against American and Israeli imperialism in the Muslim world [22]. U.S. and U.K. airstrikes on Yemen in 2024 — intended to degrade Houthi capabilities — instead bolstered recruitment and popular support by providing evidence for this narrative [23].

"In reality, air strikes by the U.S. and U.K. benefit the Houthis by providing evidence to back up their propaganda narratives against the U.S. and its allies," the Middle East Institute assessed [22]. The Houthis' mere survival after sustained military operations allowed them to present themselves as among the most resilient fighters in the region [23].

A permanent base in Somaliland would present an even more concrete target for this narrative — a visible, ongoing American military installation on the doorstep of the Arabian Peninsula. Critics argue that standoff capabilities (ship-based missiles, carrier-based aircraft, over-the-horizon drones from Djibouti) can achieve the same military effects without providing the Houthis a permanent symbol to organize against [24].

Defenders of the base concept counter that deterrence requires visible presence, that the Houthis will use anti-American rhetoric regardless of where U.S. forces are stationed, and that the real audience for a Berbera base is not the Houthis but Iran — signaling that Washington will not cede the western Indian Ocean [8].

What Somalilanders Want

Berbera's population has grown to an estimated 620,000 in the metro area, though the city proper is closer to 70,000 [25]. Since DP World took over port operations, the mayor has reported rising population numbers and tax revenues, and local officials have expressed optimism about further development [25].

But elite enthusiasm for recognition deals does not necessarily reflect public consent. Somaliland's government has publicly rejected forced displacement and framed recognition discussions as rooted in diplomacy and national interest [25]. The territory hosts 571,400 internally displaced persons [26], and any base construction near the port would raise questions about land acquisition, environmental impact on coastal ecosystems, and changes to the local security environment.

Somaliland's parliament has not publicly debated or voted on a U.S. basing agreement. The democratic institutions that underpin Somaliland's case for statehood — its constitution approved by referendum in 2001, its competitive elections — also imply that a deal of this magnitude should require legislative approval rather than executive fiat [12].

Cold War Echoes: The Last Time the U.S. Was in Berbera

Washington has been here before. After Siad Barre expelled Soviet advisors in November 1977 following Moscow's support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden War, the U.S. secured a defense pact with Somalia by late 1980 that included access to the Soviet-built port and airfields at Berbera [27]. The Soviets had used Berbera to monitor maritime traffic transiting the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf; the Americans inherited the same strategic logic [28].

But the relationship proved shallow. By the mid-1980s, U.S. interest in the Berbera facilities had waned as the Pentagon assessed the base's operational limitations [29]. When Barre was overthrown in 1991, the rationale for the partnership evaporated entirely. The U.S. did not need Berbera for the Gulf War, and the friendship with an increasingly despotic ruler had become a liability [29].

The structural lesson is that basing agreements tied to the patronage needs of a local government — rather than to deep institutional relationships — are inherently fragile. Barre wanted American backing to consolidate power; Somaliland wants recognition to secure statehood. In both cases, the U.S. is the means, not the end. If recognition is delivered (or definitively denied), the incentive structure for the host changes immediately.

What Would Stability Require?

For a Somaliland basing arrangement to survive a 10-to-20-year horizon, several conditions would need to hold simultaneously:

Continued Somaliland political stability. The territory has maintained peaceful transfers of power since the 1990s, but its democratic institutions have never been tested under the pressure of hosting a foreign military base with the attendant security restrictions, protests, and foreign attention.

No resolution of the Somalia sovereignty dispute. Paradoxically, Somaliland's value to the U.S. partly depends on the status quo — an unrecognized but functional state eager for patrons. Full recognition might reduce Somaliland's eagerness to offer concessions; reabsorption into Somalia would obviously end any deal.

Stable U.S.-Gulf relations. The UAE's existing presence in Berbera means any U.S. base would operate alongside Emirati and potentially Israeli facilities. A falling-out between Washington and Abu Dhabi — or between Washington and Jerusalem — could complicate base operations.

Congressional buy-in. Without legislation like H.R. 3992 passing, the legal basis for a basing agreement remains uncertain. Executive agreements can be reversed by the next administration.

Manageable blowback from Mogadishu. Somalia's ability to retaliate by inviting rival powers or blocking U.S. counterterrorism operations (which currently operate from Somali territory against al-Shabaab) represents a concrete cost that must be weighed against the benefits of a Berbera facility.

The historical record in the Horn of Africa — from the 1977 Berbera deal to Camp Lemonnier's fraught lease renewals with Djibouti, which doubled the rent in 2014 [10] — suggests that none of these conditions can be taken for granted.

An Uncertain Bet

The Berbera proposal sits at the intersection of several of Washington's most difficult strategic problems: Red Sea security, great-power competition in Africa, the legal ambiguity of unrecognized states, and the perennial question of whether forward military presence deters threats or creates new ones.

What is clear is that the status quo — relying solely on Camp Lemonnier and carrier-based naval operations — has not prevented the most sustained disruption to global shipping lanes in decades. What is less clear is whether a base in an unrecognized territory, opposed by the recognized government that claims it, condemned by the African Union, and located 1,400 miles from the primary threat, would improve that situation enough to justify the diplomatic and strategic costs.

The discussions between AFRICOM and Hargeisa are ongoing. So are the risks.