Houthis Claim Attack on Israel as Zelenskyy Conducts UAE Diplomacy

On March 28, 2026, Yemen's Houthi rebels fired a barrage of ballistic missiles at southern Israel—their first direct strikes since the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran began one month ago [1]. The same day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed defense cooperation pacts with the UAE and Qatar, capping a three-nation Gulf tour built around a simple trade: Ukrainian counter-drone expertise for Gulf security partnerships [2].

These two events, separated by thousands of kilometers but bound by overlapping Iranian threats and global energy anxieties, illustrate how the Middle East has become the intersection point for conflicts that reach from Eastern Europe to the Horn of Africa.

The Houthi Barrage: What Happened

Brigadier-General Yahya Saree, the Houthis' military spokesperson, announced the attack on the group's Al Masirah satellite television channel, claiming rebels had struck "sensitive Israeli military sites" in southern Israel with ballistic missiles [1]. Sirens sounded around Beersheba—near Israel's Dimona nuclear research facility—for the third time overnight [3].

The Israeli military confirmed it intercepted one ballistic missile. A second missile, described as a cruise missile, was fired hours later; Israel said both projectiles were intercepted with no casualties or damage [1][3].

Saree declared that strikes "will continue until the declared objectives are achieved" and "until the aggression against all fronts of the resistance ceases" [1]. Deputy Information Minister Mohammed Mansour added that the Houthis were "conducting this battle in stages," listing the closure of the Bab al-Mandeb strait—a chokepoint for roughly 12% of global trade—among their options [1].

From Gaza Solidarity to Iran War Proxy

The Houthis framed their earlier campaign, which began in November 2023, as retaliation for Israel's military operations in Gaza. That framing justified over 130 missiles and more than 150 explosive-laden drones launched at Israel between late 2023 and early 2025 [4].

The trajectory has been one of escalation. By the time a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was reached in January 2025, the Houthis had fired over 40 ballistic missiles and dozens of drones and cruise missiles at Israel, including a July 2024 suicide drone that struck a Tel Aviv apartment building and killed one person [4][5]. When the IDF resumed operations against Hamas in March 2025, the Houthis responded with 91 ballistic missiles and at least 41 drones between March and October 2025 [4].

On May 4, 2025, a Houthi missile evaded Israeli air defenses and struck near a terminal at Ben Gurion Airport—the group's most high-profile hit on Israeli soil [6].

The current attacks represent a new phase. With the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran in late February 2026, the Houthis shifted from a nominally Gaza-linked campaign to open participation in a broader regional conflict [1][3].

Source: GDELT Project

Data as of Mar 28, 2026CSV

Iran's Investment in Its Last Standing Proxy

The Houthis' ability to project force across more than 1,600 kilometers owes much to Iranian support. Following severe blows to Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran shifted operational focus to Yemen, making the Houthis its most important remaining proxy force [7].

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provides weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support—including assistance in targeting vessels in the Red Sea [8]. In late January 2024, U.S. forces intercepted a shipment carrying military aid from Iran to the Houthis, one of at least 20 such seizures documented by U.S. and international partners [8].

The scale of this pipeline became clearer in June 2025, when Yemen's National Resistance Forces intercepted 750 tons of Iranian weapons en route to the Houthi-controlled port of al-Salif. The haul included land-attack cruise missile engines, electro-optical seekers for anti-ship ballistic missiles, Shahed-107 one-way attack drones, man-portable air defense systems, and anti-ship cruise missiles [7].

The Trump administration identified hundreds of millions of dollars that the Houthis have moved through exchange houses, cryptocurrency wallets, and financial institutions [7]. Precise dollar figures for Iran's total support remain contested; the Council on Foreign Relations has noted that Iran provides "more sophisticated weaponry than [the Houthis] could acquire on their own, especially missiles and drones" but specific budget estimates from U.S. or Israeli intelligence have not been publicly disclosed [8].

Israel's Deterrence Problem

Israel faces an asymmetric challenge. Against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the IDF could conduct ground operations. Against the Houthis, separated by over 1,600 kilometers of hostile or neutral territory, that option does not exist [6].

Israeli intelligence on the Houthis was limited before October 7, 2023. The country lacked prioritized signals intelligence collection and a human source network in Yemen [6]. The Israeli Navy's first direct operation against the Houthis came in June 2025, targeting the port of Hodeidah with warships in what the military described as "a unique long-range strike conducted from hundreds of kilometers away" [6].

Most Houthi projectiles have been intercepted or have fallen short. But even a high interception rate carries costs: each Patriot missile costs roughly $4 million [2], and the sheer volume of attacks—over 280 missiles and drones since November 2023 [4]—strains Israel's missile defense stockpiles. The May 2025 Ben Gurion Airport strike demonstrated that even a single successful penetration can inflict strategic embarrassment [6].

Regional actors have signaled caution about Israeli strikes deep into Yemen. Saudi Arabia, which fought its own costly war against the Houthis from 2015 to 2022, and Egypt, whose Suez Canal revenues depend on Red Sea stability, both view Israeli military operations in Yemen as a potential escalation factor [6][9].

The Red Sea Toll: $7 Billion and Counting

The Houthi campaign against commercial shipping has been the most economically consequential dimension of the conflict. Since November 2023, the group has attacked more than 100 merchant vessels, sinking four ships, seizing one, and killing at least eight seafarers [10][11].

The Russell Group estimated that goods worth approximately $1 trillion were disrupted between October 2023 and May 2024 alone [10]. The Suez Canal bore the heaviest direct costs: just 13,213 ships transited the canal in 2024, a 50% decline from over 26,000 in 2023. Revenue fell from a historic high of $10.3 billion to roughly $4 billion—a loss of nearly $7 billion for Egypt [12][13].

Twenty-nine energy and shipping companies across 65 countries rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 11,000 nautical miles, ten days of travel time, and an estimated $1 million in fuel costs per voyage [10]. Freight rates on the Shanghai-Rotterdam route remained roughly 80% higher in January–October 2025 compared to the same period in 2023 [10].

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 23, 2026CSV

The attacks paused twice—first after the January 2025 Gaza ceasefire, and again from mid-November 2025 through late February 2026 [10][14]. But with the Houthis now openly entering the Iran war and Mansour raising the possibility of closing the Bab al-Mandeb strait [1], shipping companies face renewed uncertainty. Crude oil prices have reflected this anxiety, surging from roughly $57 per barrel in early January 2026 to nearly $99 by mid-March [15].

Zelenskyy's Gulf Gambit

Against this backdrop, Zelenskyy arrived in Abu Dhabi on March 27 as part of a three-country Gulf tour that also included Saudi Arabia and Qatar [2]. His pitch was straightforward: Ukraine has spent years shooting down Russian drones and has developed methods to defeat them at a fraction of the cost of Western systems. Zelenskyy disclosed that 201 Ukrainian anti-drone experts had already been deployed to the Middle East [2].

The cost differential is stark. Al Jazeera reported that while each Patriot missile costs nearly $4 million, Ukraine's counter-drone methods run approximately $2,000 per engagement [2]. For Gulf states facing Iranian drone and missile attacks, the appeal is clear.

In the UAE, Zelenskyy met President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and agreed to deploy Ukrainian expert teams to collaborate on air defense and security [2][16]. In Qatar, the two countries signed a formal defense cooperation agreement covering "collaboration in technological fields, development of joint investments and the exchange of expertise in countering missiles and unmanned aerial systems" [2].

These agreements build on a February 2025 visit to Abu Dhabi, where Zelenskyy and MBZ signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement [17].

The UAE's Balancing Act

The UAE occupies one of the most complex diplomatic positions of any state in the current environment. It maintains economic ties with Russia, defense cooperation with Ukraine, diplomatic engagement with Iran, and a close security partnership with the United States.

Russia-UAE trade reached $11.5 billion, with both sides pledging to double that figure [18]. UAE imports of Russian oil surged from near zero before the invasion to 96,000 barrels per day by 2023 [18]. Western officials have noted that UAE regulatory structures have enabled Russian actors to evade sanctions through intermediary companies [18].

Simultaneously, the UAE has facilitated 17 mediation efforts for prisoner exchanges between Russia and Ukraine, resulting in the release of 4,641 detainees [17]. In January 2026, Abu Dhabi hosted trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States [19].

Whether this amounts to productive diplomacy or strategic hedging is a matter of perspective. The UAE has produced concrete humanitarian results—the prisoner exchanges are real. But its ability to pressure Moscow on the core territorial questions at stake in Ukraine remains undemonstrated. Russia-UAE trade continues to grow even as the UAE hosts Ukraine peace talks, a dynamic that critics describe as having it both ways [18][20].

For Zelenskyy, the calculation is pragmatic. Ukraine needs defense partnerships and revenue wherever it can find them. If the UAE's balancing act means Abu Dhabi will buy Ukrainian drone expertise while also trading with Moscow, Kyiv appears willing to accept those terms [2][16].

Yemen's Civilians: Caught Between Conflicts

The Houthis' missile campaigns receive global attention. The conditions of the 22.3 million Yemenis who require humanitarian assistance receive considerably less [21].

Yemen remains one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Eighteen million people—52% of the population—face crisis-level food insecurity, with more than 41,000 projected to face catastrophic hunger in Houthi-controlled territory [21]. Over 100 districts face what aid organizations have described as "an unprecedented increase in malnutrition levels" [21].

The Houthis themselves have compounded the crisis. Sixty-nine UN employees remain in Houthi detention, disrupting aid operations [22]. Human Rights Watch has documented how these arrests have degraded the capacity of organizations trying to provide assistance in Houthi-controlled areas [22].

U.S. and Israeli strikes on Houthi-controlled areas have also killed civilians. Human Rights Watch reported that some Israeli strikes targeted critical civilian infrastructure—ports through which humanitarian aid enters, power stations, and Sanaa Airport—assessments that the organization said likely amounted to war crimes [21].

The Houthis frame their external campaigns as solidarity with Palestinians and resistance against U.S.-Israeli aggression. But the group has not explained how missile strikes on Israeli military sites or threats to close shipping lanes address the malnutrition crisis among the population it governs [21][22].

What Comes Next

Three questions will shape the coming weeks.

First, whether the Houthis follow through on threats to close the Bab al-Mandeb strait. A full closure would constitute a severe disruption to global energy flows and trade, far exceeding the damage inflicted during the 2023–2025 shipping campaign.

Second, whether Israel escalates strikes on Yemen in response to the latest barrage. Previous Israeli operations in Yemen have drawn criticism from regional neighbors and humanitarian organizations. Deeper strikes carry the risk of civilian casualties and broader regional opposition.

Third, whether Zelenskyy's Gulf defense partnerships produce tangible results beyond the initial agreements. Ukraine's counter-drone expertise is a real asset, but converting memoranda of understanding into operational cooperation—and revenue—requires sustained political will from all parties.

What is already clear is that the Middle East's two major active conflicts are no longer separate crises. The Houthis' entry into the Iran war, Zelenskyy's defense diplomacy in the Gulf, and the UAE's simultaneous engagement with Moscow and Kyiv all point to a region where the lines between wars are blurring—and where the economic consequences, from oil prices to shipping costs, are global.