US Military Contingency Plans to Strike Iran Revealed if Nuclear Talks Collapse

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury — the largest combined military strike in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. What had been a classified contingency plan, developed across months of failed nuclear diplomacy, became a shooting war in a matter of hours. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed. Iran's nuclear facilities were hit with 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs. And within days, Iran retaliated against targets across 11 countries simultaneously [1].

The contingency plans behind this campaign had been assembled over years but accelerated sharply after the collapse of negotiations in early 2026. Understanding those plans — what they anticipated, what they missed, and what they failed to account for — is central to understanding how the United States now finds itself managing a fragile ceasefire with no clear path to resolving the nuclear question it set out to answer.

The Target List: Fordow, Natanz, and the Limits of Bunker Busters

The US target list centered on three primary nuclear facilities: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, buried 60 to 90 meters inside a mountain near Qom; the Natanz enrichment complex, with newer underground halls estimated at more than 80 meters deep; and the Isfahan uranium conversion facility [2][3].

Only one weapon in the US arsenal can reach targets at those depths: the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a 30,000-pound bomb designed specifically for Hard and Deeply Buried Targets. Only the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber can deliver it [3]. The Air Force maintains approximately 19 operational B-2s at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri [4]. During the June 2025 strikes, seven B-2s dropped 14 GBU-57s on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan — committing more than a third of the entire fleet to a single mission [5].

The results were mixed. The Natanz aboveground facilities were assessed as "completely destroyed," with signs of underground infrastructure collapse. Isfahan's conversion facility was estimated at 90% destroyed. But Fordow — the most critical target — presented a different picture. While entrances were sealed and "major damage" was reported, a leaked Defense Intelligence Agency assessment indicated that lower structures may remain operational [6]. As NPR reported, the GBU-57 may have failed to reach its deepest targets, and analysts noted similar limitations would apply to Isfahan's lower levels [7].

After the February 2026 strikes, the Pentagon restocked its GBU-57 inventory, signaling preparation for additional rounds [8].

The Military Buildup: Three Carrier Groups and 80,000 Troops

Beginning in late January 2026, the United States executed its largest military buildup in the Middle East since 2003 [9]. The deployment unfolded rapidly:

• USS Abraham Lincoln (Carrier Strike Group 3) arrived in CENTCOM's area of operations on January 26 [10].
• USS Gerald R. Ford (Carrier Strike Group 12) was already positioned in the region.
• USS George H.W. Bush (Carrier Strike Group 10) departed Norfolk on March 31 and arrived by April 23, bringing the total to three carrier strike groups — a concentration of naval power not seen in the region in over two decades [11].

Source: Congressional Research Service / DoD

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

US troop levels in the Middle East surged from roughly 34,000 in January 2024 to an estimated 80,000 or more by March 2026 [12]. Each carrier strike group costs approximately $6.5 million per day to operate [13]. The broader deployment was running at an estimated $30 million per day before hostilities began, and spending accelerated dramatically once operations started: the first 24 hours of Operation Epic Fury cost an estimated $779 million, with the pre-strike buildup adding another $630 million [13]. By early March, independent analysts at CSIS calculated total spending at roughly $16.5 billion over 12 days. A senior Pentagon official later estimated total war costs at $25 billion, though CNN reported the real figure is likely $40–50 billion when accounting for base repairs and destroyed equipment [14].

Iran's Nuclear Progress: From 12 Months to 10 Days

The urgency behind the contingency planning is visible in the collapse of Iran's nuclear "breakout timeline" — the estimated time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single device.

Source: Arms Control Association / IAEA

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that timeline stood at approximately 12 months [15]. After the Trump administration withdrew from the deal in 2018 and Iran began exceeding enrichment limits, the timeline compressed steadily: to roughly six months by 2019, three months by 2021, and approximately two weeks by 2023 [15]. By early 2025, independent estimates placed it at 7 to 10 days [16].

Source: IAEA Quarterly Reports

Data as of May 7, 2026CSV

Iran's stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium — a short technical step from the 90% weapons-grade threshold — grew from zero in mid-2019 to 252.1 kg by May 2025, just before the first strikes [16]. As of May 7, 2026, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi reported that Iran holds 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched material, enough for approximately 10 weapons if further enriched [16]. The post-strike breakout estimate has extended to roughly 1–3 months, but this figure carries significant uncertainty because Iran terminated all IAEA access on February 28, 2026 — disabling surveillance cameras, removing seals, and creating what the agency has called the most significant verification blackout since it began monitoring Iran's program [17].

Trigger Conditions and the Chain of Command

The contingency plans outlined a phased escalation model. According to analysts briefed on the planning, the campaign would begin with degrading Iran's ability to project force — targeting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air defense systems, maritime assets (including Iran's roughly 400 fast attack boats in the Strait of Hormuz), IRGC infrastructure, and command-and-control networks [1].

If that initial phase failed to produce compliance, secondary targets would expand to dual-use infrastructure: electric generating plants, oil facilities, and key export hubs like Kharg Island, which handles the majority of Iran's crude exports. Nuclear enrichment facilities were categorized as a later-phase target, to be struck if diplomatic offramps were exhausted [1].

Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula described the framework as a "contest for escalation control" [1]. The failure condition that ultimately triggered the strikes was the collapse of negotiations following Iran's withdrawal from indirect talks mediated by Oman in February 2026.

The strikes were launched without congressional authorization [18]. President Trump cited Article II constitutional authority as Commander in Chief [19]. Legal scholars have challenged this basis. "The strikes on Iran are blatantly illegal," one law professor told CNN, noting the president's obligation to seek congressional approval before initiating hostilities [20]. The 1973 War Powers Resolution requires the president to seek congressional authorization within 60 days of sustained military engagement — a clock that began ticking on February 28 [21]. Trump has asserted he does not need congressional authorization, citing the subsequent ceasefire as evidence that operations are limited in scope [22].

The Retaliation: 11 Countries, American Casualties

Iran's response was immediate and geographically dispersed. Tehran launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles at targets across 11 countries — Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, Lebanon, and Cyprus — making it the most widespread military conflict since World War II by number of nations directly struck [23].

US bases took direct hits. Two ballistic missiles struck Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, housing thousands of American troops, was hit by multiple ballistic missiles, killing three US service members and wounding eight [24]. Three additional US F-15E pilots were killed when Kuwaiti air defenses mistakenly shot them down [24]. All six crew members of a US refueling aircraft were killed when it crashed in western Iraq on March 13 [24]. Satellite imagery published by Iranian state media showed damage to at least 228 structures or pieces of equipment at US military sites across the region [25].

In Iraq, Iran-backed militia groups launched coordinated attacks on US forces at Erbil airport, the Harir airbase, and the Victoria military base in Baghdad [23].

Hezbollah and the Proxy Escalation

The conflict triggered the feared second front. Hezbollah re-entered hostilities on March 2, firing rockets into northern Israel for the first time since the November 2024 ceasefire. In the following weeks, Hezbollah carried out sustained barrages — over 100 rockets in a single evening — escalating into what became the 2026 Lebanon war, which has killed more than 2,000 civilians and militants [23].

Despite the broader April 8 ceasefire between the US, Israel, and Iran, Hezbollah has continued near-daily attacks averaging roughly 30 strikes per day as of early May [23]. Iran's broader proxy network — including Kataeb Hezbollah in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen — widened and escalated operations against US assets across the region [26].

Allies Who Said No

A significant element of the contingency planning that proved problematic was allied basing and overflight access. In January 2026, Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman informed Washington they would not allow their airspace or bases to be used for strikes against Iran [27]. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait separately communicated the same message to Tehran [27].

The refusal became a public flashpoint when Trump announced "Project Freedom" — a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force. Saudi Arabia responded by threatening to revoke US military use of Prince Sultan Air Base and Saudi airspace. Kuwait said it would revoke US basing rights entirely until Trump reversed course [28]. The administration backed down.

These refusals did not prevent Iran from retaliating against Gulf states anyway. Tehran struck bases in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE regardless of their non-participation — precisely the scenario Gulf governments had feared [29].

The Case That Strikes Are Counterproductive

A substantial body of opinion among former officials and analysts holds that military action against Iran's nuclear program is self-defeating.

The Arms Control Association has argued that strikes "drive Iranian leaders away from negotiations and strengthen the argument inside Iran that only possessing nuclear weapons can protect the state from external attack" — and that other nations in the region would draw a similar conclusion, increasing broader proliferation risks [30]. The June 2025 strikes "severely damaged Iran's major uranium enrichment facilities, but not its resolve to retain a nuclear program or its nuclear know-how," the organization assessed in March 2026 [31].

Former Iranian diplomat Seyed Hossein Mousavian told NPR the strikes were unprecedented — Iran targeted by two nuclear states without UN Security Council approval — and compared the pretext to the manufactured justifications used before the 2003 Iraq invasion [32].

The historical record on strikes against nuclear programs is ambiguous. Israel's 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor is often cited as a success, but subsequent analysis by nuclear proliferation scholars has argued it actually accelerated Iraq's covert weapons program by shifting it from a visible, IAEA-monitored facility to a dispersed, clandestine one [30]. Israel's 2007 strike on Syria's Al-Kibar reactor faced no meaningful retaliation but targeted a program far less advanced than Iran's current capabilities.

Current and former national security officials have warned that leaving Iran with any residual enrichment capability — including 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched uranium and working centrifuges — while simultaneously destroying IAEA monitoring access could "intensify and accelerate the regime's determination to create a working weapon" [16].

The Legal Vacuum

The administration's legal basis for unilateral action rests on Article II commander-in-chief authority and a self-defense rationale [19]. The State Department published a legal justification for Operation Epic Fury in April 2026, citing the inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter [33]. Critics counter that Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force absent Security Council authorization or a genuine imminent threat — and that Iran's nuclear program, while advancing, did not constitute an imminent armed attack [31].

The UN Security Council did not authorize the use of force. Congress did not declare war or pass an authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) specific to Iran [18]. As of May 2026, the War Powers Resolution's 60-day clock has long expired, and congressional efforts to assert authority have produced hearings but no binding legislation [21].

Where Things Stand

As of early May 2026, a fragile ceasefire announced on April 7 holds between the US, Israel, and Iran, though Hezbollah continues operations independently [23]. The IAEA remains locked out of all Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran's enrichment stockpile has grown past pre-strike levels. The US maintains three carrier strike groups in the region at a cost of tens of millions of dollars per day. And the fundamental question the contingency plans set out to resolve — whether Iran can be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons through military force — remains unanswered.

The damage assessments tell the story of that uncertainty. The Trump administration claims the strikes set the program back "many years" [6]. The DIA's initial leaked assessment said months [34]. Independent analysts at CSIS and the Institute for Science and International Security have offered estimates ranging from one to three years, depending on assumptions about surviving centrifuges and stockpiles [6]. With no IAEA inspectors on the ground and Iran's program now operating in complete opacity, no one outside Tehran knows which estimate is closest to the truth.