US Backs Pipeline Proposal Designed to Reduce Shipping Dependence on Strait of Hormuz

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis turned a decades-old hypothetical into a lived reality. When Iran declared the strait "closed" on March 4, following coordinated U.S. and Israeli strikes, roughly 20 million barrels per day of oil flow — about one-third of global seaborne crude trade — was severed [1][2]. Brent crude surged past $120 per barrel within days, and analysts began modeling scenarios at $200 [3]. The International Energy Agency called it "the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" [4].

Now, with WTI crude still hovering near $100 a barrel as of late April 2026 — up nearly 58% year-over-year — Washington is pushing a proposal to ensure this kind of disruption cannot happen again [5]. The question is whether overland pipelines can actually deliver on that promise, or whether they merely replace one vulnerability with another.

The Scale of What Flows Through Hormuz

Before the crisis, oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz had been climbing steadily, reaching 20.9 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025 [6]. That figure includes nearly 15 million barrels per day of crude oil — roughly 34% of global crude trade — plus condensates, refined products, and liquefied natural gas [6].

Source: EIA / IEA

Data as of Feb 1, 2026CSV

At pre-crisis prices of roughly $65 per barrel, the daily dollar value of crude alone transiting the strait exceeded $970 million. At crisis-peak prices above $110, that figure surpassed $1.6 billion per day. A sustained 30-day closure — which is effectively what occurred starting in March 2026 — disrupts on the order of $30–50 billion in crude flows, depending on price assumptions, before accounting for LNG, refined products, and downstream economic effects [4][7].

Historical precedent offered some guidance but underestimated the scale. During the 1980s Tanker War, Iran and Iraq attacked more than 400 vessels over eight years, but the strait never fully closed. Insurance costs spiked and some shipping was rerouted, but global oil supply was never cut by more than 2 million barrels per day [8]. The 2026 closure was categorically different: a near-total blockade enforced by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which declared that "not a litre of oil" would pass [3].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

ARAM Express: The Proposal

Into this crisis, a policy concept called "ARAM Express" has gained traction in Washington. Originated by Richard Goldberg of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and outlined in a policy memo reviewed by Fox News Digital, the proposal envisions a U.S.-backed consortium with Gulf partners to build a "multidirectional overland network for oil, gas and petrochemicals" [9].

The plan calls for pipelines extending westward to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and southward toward the Arabian Sea — creating multiple export corridors that bypass Hormuz entirely [9]. Goldberg has argued that "European buyers are desperate for long-term supply resilience, and Asian customers are equally exposed" [9].

Specific details on projected throughput capacity, estimated construction costs, and precise routing remain thin in public reporting. The proposal appears to function more as a strategic framework than a shovel-ready engineering plan. No specific financial guarantees from the U.S. government have been publicly announced, though the broader policy environment suggests potential mechanisms. Congress raised the DFC's contingent liability ceiling from $60 billion to $205 billion in the FY 2026 NDAA, and the White House's FY 2026 budget proposed $3.8 billion in discretionary funding for the agency — a 280% increase from FY 2025 [10]. Whether DFC loans, Export-Import Bank financing, or other export credit instruments would be directed toward Gulf pipeline infrastructure has not been confirmed.

Existing Bypass Infrastructure: What Already Exists

The ARAM Express proposal does not start from zero. Three major pipelines already offer partial bypass capacity, though none individually — and not even collectively — can replace what flows through Hormuz.

Source: Al Jazeera / CNBC

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (Petroline): This 1,201-kilometer pipeline runs from the Abqaiq oil processing center to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Its full capacity, when accompanying natural gas liquids lines are converted to carry crude, is 7 million barrels per day [11]. Before the crisis, it was running at only about 770,000 barrels per day. By March 2026, Saudi Aramco had ramped throughput to 2.9 million barrels per day [12]. On April 9, an Iranian drone attack on a pumping station reduced throughput by 700,000 barrels per day, but Saudi Arabia announced full restoration within three days [11][13].

UAE's Habshan-Fujairah Pipeline (ADCOP): This 380-kilometer pipeline, operational since 2012, connects Habshan in Abu Dhabi to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, outside the strait. Its capacity is approximately 1.5–1.8 million barrels per day [14]. Exports from Fujairah averaged 1.62 million barrels per day in March 2026, up from 1.17 million in February [12]. Drone attacks in March also disrupted loadings at Fujairah's terminus [12].

Iraq's Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline: This line connects northern Iraq to Turkey's Mediterranean coast, with a nameplate capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day but actual throughput of only about 200,000 barrels per day [12]. The fundamental problem: most of Iraq's exportable crude comes from southern fields around Basra, which lack inland connections to the northern pipeline system. When Hormuz closed, Basra effectively had nowhere to send its oil, and storage tanks reached capacity [12].

Combined, these three systems offer roughly 10.4 million barrels per day of theoretical capacity — about half of pre-crisis Hormuz volumes. In practice, operational throughput has been well below nameplate capacity.

The Iraq-Jordan Corridor and Other Proposed Routes

Beyond ARAM Express, several other pipeline proposals have gained renewed urgency.

Basra-Aqaba Pipeline: First proposed in 1983, this would run from Iraq's southern oil fields to Jordan's Red Sea port of Aqaba. Phase one was designed for 2.25 million barrels per day, with a second phase adding another million [15]. In May 2026, Iraq began preliminary work on a 700-kilometer Basra-Haditha pipeline segment that could eventually connect to export routes through Syria's Baniyas, Turkey's Ceyhan, and Jordan's Aqaba [16]. The Atlantic Council has argued that "every year the corridor remains unbuilt is a year in which the region's most crisis-tested economic relationships remain hostage to infrastructure that was never completed" [17].

However, the Basra-Aqaba project has been stalled for decades by cost overruns, security concerns, and political disagreements [15]. At a time when major Gulf infrastructure projects have historically run 30–70% over schedule, no firm construction timeline or cost estimate has been made public for ARAM Express or its constituent elements. The question of what happens if Iran escalates further before any new pipeline is operational — as the drone attack on the Saudi Petroline demonstrated — remains unanswered in publicly available planning documents.

The Security Paradox: Trading One Vulnerability for Another

The strongest counterargument to the pipeline strategy is that it may simply relocate risk rather than reduce it. George Voloshin, an energy analyst, has warned that "pipelines and pumping stations are static, high-value targets," pointing to the 2019 Houthi drone strikes that temporarily shut down the East-West Pipeline [12]. The April 2026 Iranian drone attack on a Saudi pumping station reinforced this concern [11].

The Atlantic Council, drawing on lessons from Ukraine and Iraq, has noted that "energy infrastructure becomes a strategic target during regional conflicts" and that overland corridors present "concentrated risk points where infrastructure can be targeted relatively easily" [18]. In contrast, dispersed maritime routing offers a form of redundancy: attacking one ship does not shut down an entire export corridor.

Gulf energy infrastructure spans thousands of kilometers of terrain that cannot be guarded continuously [18]. Defense analysts have recommended drone surveillance, thermal sensors, and fixed monitoring systems along pipeline routes, but acknowledge that above-ground pipeline segments and single export corridors remain "predictable vulnerabilities" [18].

A pipeline network that concentrates alternative export capacity along a small number of overland routes could, in this view, create exactly the kind of high-value target that adversaries would prioritize. Rather than forcing an adversary to blockade an entire strait — a militarily difficult operation requiring sustained naval presence — an overland pipeline requires defending every kilometer of exposed pipe across potentially hostile terrain.

Supporters counter that the advantage lies in redundancy through multiple corridors. If ARAM Express builds westward routes (to the Red Sea and Mediterranean) and southward routes (to the Arabian Sea) simultaneously, an attacker would need to strike multiple systems across multiple countries to achieve the same disruption as a Hormuz closure [9]. The argument has merit, but depends entirely on the number and geographic dispersion of the corridors actually built.

Abraham Accords, China, and the Geopolitical Chessboard

The pipeline proposal exists within a broader strategic framework that extends well beyond energy infrastructure. The Abraham Accords normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states created a new diplomatic architecture in the Middle East, and U.S. policymakers have positioned energy cooperation as a key pillar [19].

Some analysts view the accords as "a direct answer to China's Belt and Road Initiative," arguing that an expanded framework would "construct a competing network rooted in shared security interests and American sponsorship" [19]. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), launched in 2023, offers Gulf governments an alternative to routing resources through Beijing [20].

Yet China's involvement in Gulf energy infrastructure is already deep. The China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Company built the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline in 2012 [20]. ADNOC recently signed a framework agreement worth an estimated $12 billion with China's Wanhua Chemical for downstream projects [20]. Whether ARAM Express or any U.S.-backed consortium would explicitly exclude Chinese participation has not been publicly stated, but the competitive dynamic is unmistakable.

One of the most politically sensitive questions is whether pipeline routes could involve Israel, even indirectly. An unnamed Gulf analyst cited in reporting on the proposal stated bluntly: "As for routes involving Israel, even indirectly, the politics are extremely difficult" [9]. The ongoing regional conflict makes this dimension even more fraught.

Precedent: What the BTC and TAP Pipelines Teach

The United States has backed geopolitically motivated pipeline projects before, with mixed results.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, championed by the Clinton administration in the 1990s, was designed to bring Caspian oil to market while bypassing both Russia and Iran. The 1,768-kilometer pipeline, which cost $3.9 billion and took years to complete, now delivers more than one million barrels per day from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast [21][22]. U.S. policymakers argued it would promote economic development, strengthen civil society in transit countries, and prevent Russia or Iran from monopolizing Caspian export routes [22].

Those goals were partially achieved. The BTC did diversify Caspian energy flows and strengthen ties between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. But it also became a target: Iran signaled in 2026 a possible strike on the pipeline given its role in supplying Israel [23]. The geopolitical rationale proved durable — the pipeline's significance increased after sanctions on Russian energy in the 2020s — but the security vulnerabilities that critics warned about in the 1990s have never fully gone away.

The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which brings 10 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas annually to European consumers, demonstrated both the value and the friction of politically motivated energy infrastructure [24]. TAP helped reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but construction faced significant local opposition. In Italy, the pipeline terminal required uprooting century-old olive trees near Melendugno, generating protests [25]. The environmental and community impacts of building through inhabited areas proved more contentious than advocates anticipated.

These precedents suggest that U.S.-backed pipelines can achieve energy diversification goals, but rarely on schedule, rarely on budget, and never without significant local friction.

Community and Environmental Impacts: The Unasked Questions

Publicly available reporting on ARAM Express contains almost no discussion of community impacts, land rights, water access, or environmental review for the proposed corridors. This is a significant gap. Any pipeline network running through multiple Gulf and Middle Eastern states would cross terrain inhabited by communities whose land and water resources could be affected.

The BTC and TAP experiences illustrate the pattern: environmental and community concerns receive minimal attention during the strategic planning phase and then become major political obstacles during construction. The legal frameworks governing compensation and environmental review vary significantly across potential transit nations — Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, and Yemen all have different regulatory regimes for infrastructure development and eminent domain.

Without published environmental impact assessments or community consultation frameworks, it is difficult to evaluate what protections exist for affected populations. This represents one of the least developed aspects of the current proposal.

The Math Problem

The fundamental challenge facing any pipeline bypass strategy is arithmetic. Pre-crisis Hormuz transit was 20.9 million barrels per day. Existing bypass capacity is roughly 10.4 million barrels per day at full nameplate, though actual utilization has been well below that. Even if ARAM Express added several million barrels per day of new capacity — and no public estimate of its targeted throughput has been released — the gap between existing infrastructure and pre-crisis Hormuz volumes would remain substantial.

The proposal may be better understood not as a full replacement for the strait but as a partial hedge — reducing the leverage that any single chokepoint provides. If Gulf states can route 60–70% of their exports overland during a crisis, the remaining 30–40% still depends on maritime access, but the economic and strategic impact of a closure drops significantly.

Whether that partial hedge justifies the multi-billion-dollar investment, the years of construction, and the creation of new static targets in an already volatile region is the question that policymakers, investors, and the communities along the proposed routes will have to answer.

What Comes Next

The ARAM Express proposal remains in its early stages, with key questions — financing mechanisms, precise routing, throughput targets, construction timelines, environmental review — still unanswered publicly. The crisis that prompted it is ongoing: as of late April 2026, Iran has proposed reopening the strait, but oil prices remain elevated and markets are skeptical of a rapid normalization [26].

The proposal's trajectory will likely depend on three factors: whether the current crisis resolves quickly enough to reduce the political urgency; whether Gulf states and international investors are willing to commit the tens of billions of dollars required for new pipeline infrastructure; and whether the security challenges that plague existing pipelines — drone attacks, sabotage, cyber threats — can be addressed credibly enough to justify concentrating export capacity in overland corridors.

The 2026 Hormuz crisis proved that the world's dependence on a single maritime chokepoint is a structural vulnerability with trillion-dollar consequences. Whether pipelines are the right answer, or merely the most politically convenient one, remains an open question.