Iran Threatens Strikes on Middle East Power Plants Supporting US Bases

On March 22, 2026, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps issued a statement read on state television that left little room for ambiguity: if the United States bombs Iranian power plants, Iran will destroy the electrical infrastructure of every Gulf state hosting American forces [1]. "Do not doubt that we will do this," the IRGC warned [2]. The threat came hours after President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that he would "hit and obliterate" Iran's power plants unless Tehran "fully opens, without threat, the Strait of Hormuz" within 48 hours [3].

The exchange marks the most dangerous escalation yet in a conflict now entering its 24th day—one that has already killed over 1,400 people in Iran, at least 21 civilians in Gulf states, and 13 American service members [4][5]. But Iran's explicit targeting of Gulf power and desalination infrastructure introduces a threat category that goes beyond military confrontation. In the arid Gulf states, where power stations and desalination plants are often co-located, shutting down electricity means shutting down the water supply.

The Target List

Iran's Fars news agency, which operates close to the Revolutionary Guard, published a list of specific facilities it described as potential targets [2]. The list included desalination plants across the Gulf and, most alarmingly, the UAE's Barakah nuclear power plant—a four-reactor facility in the western desert near the Saudi border [2]. Iran's judiciary-affiliated Mizan news agency republished the same list [2].

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf reinforced the threat in a public statement: "Vital infrastructure as well as energy and oil infrastructure across the entire region will be considered legitimate targets and will be irreversibly destroyed" if Iranian power plants are attacked [6]. The IRGC added that companies with American shareholding operating in the region would face "complete destruction" [6].

The specificity of these threats—naming a nuclear power plant, publishing facility lists through state-controlled media—represents a departure from Iran's earlier retaliatory rhetoric, which focused on US military installations and Israeli targets.

The Bases That Draw From Civilian Grids

The United States maintains its largest overseas military concentration in the Gulf. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar serves as the forward headquarters of US Central Command and hosts approximately 10,000 troops [7]. Bahrain is home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet and roughly 9,000 personnel [7]. Kuwait's Camp Arifjan functions as US Army Central headquarters, with Ali Al Salem Air Base positioned near the Iraqi border [7]. Additional installations operate in the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia [8].

These bases were established or expanded during and after the 1991 Gulf War, and their infrastructure was integrated into host-nation systems [7]. Exact figures on how much power each base draws from civilian grids versus independent generators are not publicly available, a gap in transparency that defense analysts have noted for years. What is clear is that the bases are physically connected to the same electrical and water networks that serve millions of Gulf residents.

As of mid-2025, approximately 40,000 to 50,000 American troops were stationed across the Middle East, a number that had risen from roughly 34,000 before the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023 [9]. The current naval presence—two aircraft carriers and 16 surface warships—is the largest in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq [9].

Iran's Demonstrated Capability

Iran's threat to strike Gulf infrastructure is not hypothetical. Since the war began on February 28, Iran has already conducted strikes across all six Gulf Cooperation Council member states—the first time in history that every GCC country has been hit [4].

The UAE absorbed the heaviest volume: 1,422 detected drones and 246 missiles in the first eight days alone, accounting for roughly 55 percent of all recorded strikes [10]. Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura refinery caught fire from incoming Iranian drones [10]. Qatar halted liquified natural gas production after strikes damaged its Mesaieed and Ras Laffan facilities [10]. Iranian missiles and drones hit civilian airports in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Kuwait, along with hotels and other non-military targets [11].

Iran's arsenal includes medium-range ballistic missiles like the Shahab-3 (range exceeding 1,900 km), land-attack cruise missiles like the Soumar (2,500 km range), and Shahed-series one-way attack drones deployed in saturation waves [12]. Short-range Fateh variants, Zolfaghar, and Qiam-1 missiles cover Gulf targets at distances of 150 to 800 km [12]. The combination of cheap, numerous drones forcing defenders to expend costly interceptors while ballistic missiles target high-value sites has proven effective at overwhelming Gulf air defenses.

Source: Al Jazeera / Defense Security Monitor

Data as of Mar 12, 2026CSV

What Losing Power Means in the Desert

The Gulf states' vulnerability to infrastructure attacks is uniquely severe. In nations where summer temperatures exceed 50°C, electrical power is not a convenience—it sustains air conditioning, water treatment, hospital operations, and telecommunications. Critically, most Gulf countries produce their drinking water through energy-intensive desalination. Power stations and desalination plants are frequently co-located or share the same industrial complexes [2].

Iran's explicit mention of desalination facilities signals an understanding of this dependency. If power plants supplying both US bases and civilian populations are destroyed, the civilian consequences would be immediate and severe: hospitals losing power, water treatment ceasing, telecommunications going dark, and millions of people in extreme heat without cooling.

Iranian strikes have already killed three people in Bahrain, four soldiers and four civilians in Kuwait, and three people in Oman [4]. The infrastructure damage extends beyond casualties—disrupted LNG production in Qatar, refinery fires in Saudi Arabia, and airport shutdowns across the region have cascading economic effects that compound the humanitarian toll.

The Legal Gray Zone of Dual-Use Targets

Under international humanitarian law, the principle of distinction requires belligerents to differentiate between military objectives and civilian objects [13]. International law does not formally recognize a "dual-use" category—objects are either military objectives or civilian objects, with the latter protected from attack [13].

However, this binary framework strains under the reality of modern infrastructure. Power plants that feed military bases also serve civilian populations. The question of whether such facilities become legitimate military targets has been tested repeatedly in recent conflicts.

During the 1991 Gulf War, Coalition forces struck Iraq's power infrastructure, with the US Department of Defense arguing the grid's dual-use nature justified the attacks—a position later criticized by human rights organizations [14]. Russia's systematic attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure since October 2022 left up to 8 million households without power and drew condemnation as violations of international humanitarian law [14]. In 2024, ICC pretrial judges issued arrest warrants for senior Russian military officials over their role in strikes targeting Ukraine's electricity grid [14].

The Lieber Institute at West Point has noted that attacking power infrastructure requires a case-by-case proportionality analysis: the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated must outweigh the expected civilian harm [14]. A power plant that supplies 5 percent of its output to a military base and 95 percent to civilian homes presents a fundamentally different calculus than a dedicated military generator.

Iran's published target list—which includes desalination plants and a nuclear power facility serving civilian populations—would face serious legal scrutiny under these standards. But the same scrutiny applies to Trump's threat to "obliterate" Iranian power plants, which also serve tens of millions of Iranian civilians.

Gulf States Trapped Between Patrons

The Gulf states find themselves in the conflict's most uncomfortable position. They did not choose this war—the US and Israel launched surprise strikes on Iran on February 28 without advance consultation with Gulf governments [15]. Yet Iran's retaliatory attacks have hit their territory, killed their citizens, and damaged their most valuable economic infrastructure.

The Gulf Cooperation Council condemned Iran's attacks as "treacherous" and "heinous," stating they would take "all necessary measures" to defend their security [11]. But condemnation has not translated into military action. No Gulf state has participated in offensive operations against Iran [11]. Gulf and Iranian diplomats are reportedly back-channeling to prevent further attacks, with discussions centering on the role and presence of US military infrastructure [16].

The strategic dilemma is acute. Some Gulf states attempted to signal neutrality by limiting US access to bases early in the conflict, but this did little to shield them from Iranian strikes [11]. At the same time, joining military operations against Iran risks even worse retaliation. A CNBC analysis noted that Gulf states have said "a price must be paid" for the attacks but have so far held back, aware that escalation could prove catastrophic [11].

The Atlantic Council assessed that "the Gulf that emerges from the Iran war will be very different," suggesting the conflict may fundamentally reshape the security architecture that has governed US-Gulf relations for three decades [17].

The Strategic Logic Under Pressure

The US military presence in the Gulf has expanded and contracted multiple times since the 1991 Gulf War, driven by shifting strategic priorities: containing Iraq, counterterrorism after 9/11, countering ISIS, and now confronting Iran directly. The current justification centers on containing Iranian influence, protecting oil shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz, and projecting force across the region [8].

But the war has exposed the cost of this arrangement for host nations. Permanent US bases that require host countries to accept infrastructure vulnerability and entanglement in US-Iran conflict represent a bargain that looked different before Iran demonstrated its willingness and ability to strike civilian targets in every GCC state.

The International Crisis Group has called for "finding an off-ramp" to the conflict, warning that the current trajectory—with Trump threatening to destroy Iranian power infrastructure while Iran threatens to destroy Gulf infrastructure—risks a cycle of escalation with no diplomatic exit [18].

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 16, 2026CSV

What Happens When the Deadline Passes

Trump's 48-hour ultimatum expires on the evening of March 24 [3]. Iran's response has been unequivocal: the IRGC stated it would "completely close" the Strait of Hormuz if the US follows through, and would not reopen it until any destroyed power plants are rebuilt [19]. US Central Command's leader told reporters the Iran campaign is "ahead or on plan," suggesting military operations will continue regardless of diplomatic signals [20].

The immediate question is whether Trump's threat to strike Iranian power plants materializes, and if so, whether Iran follows through on its counter-threat against Gulf infrastructure. The published target list from Fars and Mizan news agencies suggests operational planning, not rhetorical posturing.

For the 60 million people living in the GCC states, the stakes are existential in a literal sense. Their electricity, their drinking water, and their hospital systems depend on the same infrastructure that two belligerents have now placed in their crosshairs. The legal, moral, and strategic frameworks meant to protect civilian populations from exactly this kind of targeting are being tested in real time—and so far, they are not holding.