Trump Says US Will Recover Uranium from Iran at 'Leisurely Pace'

On April 17, 2026, President Donald Trump told Reuters that the United States would work with Iran to recover its enriched uranium stockpile, describing the effort with a phrase that startled arms control analysts: "We're going to go in with Iran, at a nice leisurely pace, and go down and start excavating with big machinery... We'll bring it back to the United States" [1]. Trump referred to the material as "nuclear dust" — a term with no recognized meaning in nuclear science — suggesting the uranium buried beneath facilities bombed by U.S. and Israeli forces in June 2025 and February 2026 is inert rubble rather than fissile material requiring careful handling [2].

The remark came one day after Trump said Iran had agreed to "hand back" its enriched uranium stocks, a claim no Iranian official has confirmed [3]. It arrived amid stalled negotiations over a three-page memorandum of understanding that would trade uranium surrender and an enrichment moratorium for the release of up to $20 billion in frozen Iranian assets [4]. With a fragile ceasefire set to expire on April 22, the gap between Trump's casual framing and the technical, diplomatic, and legal realities of uranium disposition defines the central tension of these negotiations.

The Stockpile: What Iran Has, and What It Means

Before the June 2025 strikes, the International Atomic Energy Agency documented the most detailed picture of Iran's nuclear inventory in a confidential letter to member states dated June 12, 2025. Iran held 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to up to 60% purity, 184.1 kg enriched to up to 20%, 6,024.4 kg enriched to up to 5%, and 2,391.1 kg enriched to up to 2% [5].

Source: IAEA Quarterly Reports

Data as of Jun 12, 2025CSV

The 60%-enriched material is the focus of international concern. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was permitted to maintain a stockpile of no more than 300 kg of uranium enriched to 3.67% [6]. By early 2025, Iran had exceeded that cap by more than an order of magnitude in both quantity and enrichment level.

Source: IAEA GOV/2025/24

Data as of Jun 12, 2025CSV

The technical significance is straightforward. Enriching uranium from natural (0.7% U-235) to 60% accounts for over 90% of the separative work needed to reach weapons-grade (90% U-235). The remaining step — from 60% to 90% — requires roughly 564 SWU, about 1% of the total effort already invested [7]. The Institute for Science and International Security estimated in late 2024 that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for its first nuclear weapon in approximately one week, and enough for six weapons within a month, using its existing centrifuge cascades and 60%-enriched feedstock [8].

What 'Leisurely' Means — and What Experts Say It Should Mean

Trump did not define "leisurely pace" in operational terms. No timeline for uranium recovery has been publicly announced. The three-page MOU under negotiation reportedly addresses the question in general terms: some highly enriched uranium would be shipped to a third country, and some would be down-blended in Iran under international monitoring [4].

Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, has criticized the U.S. negotiating team's grasp of the technical details. She said that lead negotiator Steve Witkoff "had a poor grasp of the details" and "was focused on the wrong details and did not have the nuclear expertise or the expert team available to him to assess how the Iranian proposal would have impacted risk overall" [9].

The term "leisurely" is particularly fraught because the IAEA has been unable to verify Iran's nuclear inventory for over eight months. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has emphasized that "without robust access and transparency, any discussion of asset release or sanctions relief risks enabling a scenario where nuclear capabilities advance under the guise of diplomacy" [9]. Without inspectors on the ground confirming what remains in Iran's bombed facilities, any recovery timeline is built on estimates rather than verified data.

Nonproliferation scholars generally agree that the maximum window between a deal announcement and completed uranium removal should be measured in months, not years. The precedent under the JCPOA was clear: Iran shipped over 11 tonnes of low-enriched uranium to Russia in December 2015 as a precondition of Implementation Day — the date sanctions relief began [10]. That shipment happened within weeks, not at a "leisurely pace."

The Deal Framework: Pakistan, $20 Billion, and Unresolved Gaps

The current negotiations have been mediated primarily by Pakistan, with earlier rounds facilitated by Oman. The Islamabad Talks on April 11-12, 2026, brought together a 300-member U.S. delegation led by Vice President JD Vance, alongside envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and a 70-member Iranian team led by parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Pakistan's mediating team was led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir [11].

Those talks ended without agreement after approximately 21 hours. The main sticking points were the nuclear program and control of the Strait of Hormuz [11].

On the financial side, Axios reported that the U.S. is considering releasing $20 billion in frozen Iranian funds in exchange for Iran surrendering its enriched uranium [4]. This represents a compromise between Washington's earlier offer of $6 billion for humanitarian purchases and Iran's demand of $27 billion [4]. Trump complicated this framing by posting on Truth Social that "no money will change hands," though he did not specifically deny the unfreezing proposal [12].

The MOU would also require Iran to accept a "voluntary" moratorium on uranium enrichment. The U.S. has pushed for 20 years; Iran has countered with five [13]. Iran would retain the right to operate nuclear research reactors for medical isotope production, but all facilities would need to be above ground, with damaged underground sites remaining permanently out of commission [4].

A second round of in-person talks was scheduled for April 20 in Pakistan, two days before the ceasefire expiration [14].

How This Compares to the JCPOA

The original JCPOA established a faster, more prescriptive uranium disposition process. Under that agreement, Iran was required to reduce its stockpile from approximately 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg and maintain enrichment at no higher than 3.67% for 15 years. The excess — over 11 tonnes — was shipped to Russia in December 2015, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry described it as "one of the most significant steps" toward implementation [10].

Russia received the material, provided natural uranium in return, and held additional enriched uranium sufficient for at least six more years of refuelings for Tehran's research reactor [15]. The arrangement had a defined counterparty (Russia), a clear timeline (before Implementation Day), and verification by the IAEA under an Additional Protocol providing enhanced inspection access.

The current proposal differs in several respects. The counterparty is ambiguous — Trump said the uranium would come to the United States, but the MOU reportedly envisions a "third country" for some of the material [4]. The timeline is undefined. Verification access has been interrupted since mid-2025. And the IAEA's role, while referenced by Grossi, has not been formally written into the emerging agreement framework.

The shift from a multilateral, timeline-bound process to a bilateral, pace-undefined one sets a precedent that could complicate future negotiations with other states.

Where Would the Uranium Go?

The physical logistics of uranium recovery from bombed facilities are unprecedented. The U.S. and Israeli strikes in June 2025 (Operation Midnight Hammer) targeted the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, Natanz Nuclear Facility, and Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center with GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs and Tomahawk missiles [16]. A second wave of strikes in February 2026 further damaged Iran's nuclear infrastructure [17].

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported in March 2026 that Iran likely transferred highly enriched uranium to Isfahan before the June 2025 strikes, raising questions about how much material survived in what condition and where it currently resides [18].

If recovered, the uranium would need to go to a facility capable of handling and down-blending highly enriched material. The United States has several such facilities, including the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which has processed weapons-grade uranium for decades. Russia's Tenex has similar capabilities and handled Iran's JCPOA shipments. France's Orano (formerly Areva) operates enrichment and conversion plants. But no recipient country or facility has been publicly named, and political willingness to accept Iranian uranium — in the current geopolitical environment — cannot be assumed [4].

Iran's Case: Sovereignty, Sequencing, and the NPT

Iran's negotiating position rests on arguments that Western coverage frequently reduces to intransigence but which have a legal and strategic logic.

First, Iran invokes Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which affirms the "inalienable right" of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including enrichment [19]. Iranian officials have consistently framed enrichment capability as a sovereign right, not a bargaining chip. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists published an analysis in February 2026 arguing that turning "Iran's claimed right to enrich uranium into a new deal" requires acknowledging this legal framework rather than dismissing it [20].

Second, Iran has sequencing concerns. Surrendering enriched uranium before receiving sanctions relief or asset releases would leave Tehran with no leverage if the U.S. reverses course — a scenario with direct precedent. The Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions despite Iranian compliance certified by the IAEA. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, which came after Muammar Gaddafi voluntarily surrendered his nuclear program in 2003, is widely cited in Iranian strategic discourse as evidence that disarmament invites regime change rather than security [21].

Third, Iran's counterproposal — a five-year enrichment moratorium rather than 20 — reflects a calculation that shorter timelines reduce the risk of locking in permanent restrictions without permanent guarantees. Iranian officials have indicated willingness to cap enrichment at low levels and dilute some highly enriched uranium, but not to eliminate the program entirely [22].

The Council on Foreign Relations described Iran's stance as a "creative negotiating position" that attempts to maintain red lines — no freeze on enrichment, no deal without sanctions relief — while accommodating some U.S. demands [23].

Historical Precedents: Libya, South Africa, and the Speed Question

Only a handful of countries have undergone uranium disposition processes, and none under conditions analogous to the current situation.

South Africa voluntarily dismantled seven nuclear explosive devices by 1991 and declared its program in 1993. The process was internally managed and took several years, but occurred under a cooperative government transition and with IAEA verification. As of 2015, South Africa still possessed most of its weapons-grade uranium, using some for medical isotope production [24].

Libya's disarmament was faster. In 2003-2004, 13 kilograms of highly enriched uranium were airlifted from Libya to Russia, with U.S. and British assistance [21]. The program was small and the material quantities minimal compared to Iran's stockpile.

No historical case involved recovering fissile material from bombed underground facilities under an active ceasefire with unresolved terms. The closest operational analogy may be post-war Iraq, where IAEA inspectors spent years cataloguing and securing nuclear material after the 1991 Gulf War — a process that took the better part of a decade.

There is no documented case in which a "leisurely" uranium recovery timeline led directly to a proliferation incident. But the conditions have never been tested at this scale, with this much highly enriched material, under this level of diplomatic uncertainty.

Gulf State Reactions and the Cascade Risk

The outcome of U.S.-Iran negotiations has direct implications for nuclear ambitions across the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has pursued civilian nuclear energy with increasing assertiveness. In November 2025, Energy Secretary Chris Wright confirmed the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a cooperation deal on civilian nuclear energy [25]. Reports indicate the agreement may permit some form of uranium enrichment on Saudi soil, a departure from the "gold standard" nonproliferation agreements that prohibit enrichment and reprocessing [26].

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly stated that Saudi Arabia will acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does. Saudi and Omani officials have proposed locating nuclear facilities for Iran on a Gulf island as part of a regional nuclear consortium — a concept the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists explored in June 2025 as a potential basis for a new deal [27].

The Stimson Center assessed in 2026 that Saudi Arabia's nuclear calculus is shaped not only by Iran's program but by "eroding U.S. security guarantees, Israel's growing assertiveness, the risk of a hardliner in Tehran pursuing nuclear weapons, and Riyadh's own ambitions for strategic autonomy" [28]. Senators Edward Markey and Jeff Merkley reintroduced the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act on March 25, 2026, seeking to require congressional approval before any U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement takes effect [26].

The United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt have also explored or expanded civilian nuclear programs. A deal perceived as allowing Iran to retain enrichment infrastructure — even under a moratorium — could accelerate these programs, producing a multi-state enrichment landscape in the Middle East within a decade.

What Happens If the Deal Collapses

The ceasefire expires on April 22, 2026. Trump told Reuters that "if no deal, fire resumes" [1]. If negotiations fail before uranium recovery begins, the consequences extend beyond resumed hostilities.

Iran's enriched uranium — whatever quantity survived the strikes — remains in place, potentially scattered across damaged facilities without IAEA monitoring. The agency's inability to verify the stockpile for over eight months means the international community is operating with imprecise knowledge of what exists and where [5].

A collapse would also freeze the financial negotiations, leaving $20 billion in Iranian assets locked and removing any incentive for Iran to cooperate on nuclear transparency. It could validate the position, held by hardliners in both Washington and Tehran, that diplomacy is performative and military force is the only effective tool.

Alicia Sanders-Zakre of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons has argued that "the only successful nonproliferation path forward lies in negotiations, not military action" [9]. The strikes of 2025 and 2026 destroyed facilities but did not destroy knowledge, centrifuge designs, or the political will to reconstitute a program.

The phrase "leisurely pace" may have been intended to project confidence. But in the grammar of nuclear nonproliferation, pace is not a stylistic choice. It is a variable that determines whether fissile material remains under control or becomes a source of cascading risk across the most volatile region on earth.