US and Iran Negotiators Hold Direct High-Level Peace Talks in Pakistan

The first round of direct, in-person negotiations between the United States and Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution concluded in Islamabad on April 11, 2026, with both sides exchanging written texts to confirm preliminary agreements [1]. Vice President JD Vance led the American delegation; Iran sent a team of more than 70 officials headed by parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi [2]. The talks followed six weeks of open warfare between the U.S., Israel, and Iran — a conflict that killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, closed the Strait of Hormuz, and triggered the largest oil supply disruption in history [3].

What Brought Them to the Table

On February 28, 2026, the United States joined Israel in launching airstrikes against Iranian nuclear and military facilities [4]. Iran retaliated by closing the Strait of Hormuz and launching missile strikes against U.S. assets hosted by Gulf Arab states [5]. After weeks of escalation — including Iranian attacks on merchant shipping and retaliatory U.S. strikes on IRGC positions — Pakistan brokered a two-week ceasefire beginning April 8 [6].

The ceasefire itself was precarious. Israel continued strikes in Lebanon. Iran insisted the ceasefire covered Lebanese territory; the U.S. and Israel maintained it did not [7]. Against this backdrop, Islamabad became the venue for what Pakistani officials described as a modest goal: "a deal to keep talks going" [8].

Why Pakistan — and Who Brokered It

Pakistan's emergence as mediator surprised observers. The country played no role in the 2015 JCPOA negotiations or the Abraham Accords. But Islamabad possessed a rare asset: simultaneous trust from both Washington and Tehran [9].

The back-channel began in September 2025, when Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief General Asim Munir visited the White House and met Trump, Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio [10]. After war broke out, Munir spoke directly to Trump on March 22-23, and Pakistan formally offered to host talks the following day. Sharif publicly echoed the offer on social media, tagging Trump, Araghchi, and U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff [10].

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar conducted shuttle diplomacy throughout the conflict, serving as the facilitator once talks began [11]. Rasheed Wali Janjua, director of research at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, noted: "No other country enjoyed the same kind of trust from both parties" [9].

Critics have raised concerns about Pakistan's dual role. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies published an analysis warning that Pakistan's intelligence services maintain deep ties to Iran's security apparatus, creating potential conflicts of interest [12]. Time magazine framed Pakistan's hosting as an "unlikely rebrand as peace broker" for a country more commonly associated with harboring militants [13].

The Agenda: Trump's 15-Point Plan vs. Iran's Counterproposal

The framework for negotiations traces to March 25, when the Trump administration transmitted a 15-point peace proposal through Pakistani intermediaries [14]. The plan demanded that Iran:

• Commit never to pursue nuclear weapons and dismantle its three main nuclear facilities
• Suspend ballistic missile production
• Reopen the Strait of Hormuz unconditionally
• Cease funding Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis
• Accept limits on its conventional defense capabilities [14][15]

In exchange, the U.S. offered sanctions relief.

Iran rejected the proposal within 24 hours, calling it "extremely maximalist and unreasonable" [14]. Tehran issued five counter-conditions: a halt to all U.S. and Israeli "aggression and assassinations"; mechanisms guaranteeing the war would not resume; payment of war reparations; cessation of attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon and allied militias in Iraq; and international recognition of Iran's authority over the Strait of Hormuz [16].

On April 7, Iran submitted a formal 10-point peace plan, which Trump publicly dismissed as "not good enough" [17]. The actual Islamabad negotiations operated somewhere between these two positions.

First Phase Results

A U.S. official confirmed on April 11 that "no agreements have been made yet" in a formal sense, though both sides were exchanging written texts to confirm areas of convergence [18]. Sources indicated progress on several fronts:

• Some movement toward unfreezing Iranian assets (reportedly $6 billion held abroad) [1]
• A possible understanding on limiting strikes to southern Lebanon, short of a full Lebanese ceasefire [1]
• Apparent agreement on the principle of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, though Iran's demand to charge transit fees remained unresolved [7]

The nuclear question — the Trump administration's stated top priority — remained the most contentious item [19].

How the Terms Compare to the JCPOA

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action operated from a fundamentally different baseline. Under that deal, Iran agreed to reduce its enriched uranium stockpile by 97% (from 10,000 kg to 300 kg), cap enrichment at 3.67%, limit centrifuges to 6,104, and accept extensive IAEA inspections including access to undeclared sites [20].

Source: IAEA Reports / Arms Control Association

Data as of Apr 9, 2026CSV

The situation in April 2026 bears little resemblance to 2015. Iran held 441 kg of 60%-enriched uranium as of April 9 — enough for approximately 10 nuclear weapons if further enriched to 90% weapons-grade [21]. The U.S. and Israeli strikes in February and June 2025 reportedly destroyed significant nuclear infrastructure, but Iran terminated all IAEA access on February 28, 2026, making independent verification impossible [21].

Where the JCPOA limited enrichment to civilian levels with intrusive verification, the Trump administration's 15-point plan demanded complete dismantlement — a far more sweeping requirement that reflects both Iran's nuclear advances and the leverage created by military strikes. Iran's counter-position implicitly treats its nuclear program as a settled right requiring "international recognition and guarantees" rather than a capability to be negotiated away [16].

Iran's Internal Power Struggle

The composition of Iran's negotiating delegation itself reflects a factional compromise. Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker, represents the pragmatic conservative wing. Araghchi, the foreign minister, has attempted to build consensus for a deal. But the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operates as a parallel power center [22].

IRGC Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi has publicly sought to curb Araghchi's authority. Together with the IRGC Aerospace Commander, Vahidi insisted that Iran's missile program remain entirely off the table [23]. A group of Basij militia members — the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary — marched to the foreign ministry at night to protest the ceasefire decision [24].

The structural problem is straightforward: the civilian government has the will to negotiate, but the IRGC holds the power. As one analysis noted, the IRGC functions "less as a military force and more as an armed criminal oligarchy with a political agenda" [22]. Hardliners argue Iran held the upper hand — its closure of Hormuz caused genuine economic pain to the West — and should not have agreed to a ceasefire at all [24].

Iran's leadership transition complicates matters further. Khamenei was killed in the February 28 strikes. His son Mojtaba Khamenei has been backed by authorities as successor, but this transition occurred during wartime with limited institutional consolidation [25]. The question of who can ultimately authorize concessions — and whether any agreement can survive IRGC opposition — remains open.

The Steelman Case for Iran's Position

From Tehran's perspective, the credibility problem is existential. In 2015, Iran signed the JCPOA and complied with its terms — a fact confirmed repeatedly by IAEA inspectors. In 2018, the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew and reimposed sanctions despite that compliance [26]. Iran's enrichment escalation after 2019 was, in its framing, a direct consequence of the U.S. breaking its word.

Any new agreement faces a structural dilemma: executive agreements (the legal form of the JCPOA) can be reversed by subsequent presidents, as Trump demonstrated. A Senate treaty — requiring two-thirds approval — would provide greater durability but is politically implausible given current congressional dynamics [27]. Senator Lindsey Graham has already introduced legislation requiring congressional review of any peace deal with Iran [28].

Iran's demand for "mechanisms to ensure the war doesn't resume" and "international recognition and guarantees" reflects this history [16]. Without structural changes to how U.S. commitments are made — something that likely exceeds what any single administration can deliver — Tehran has grounds to question whether signing is worthwhile. The counterargument, pressed by U.S. negotiators, is that Iran's position after six weeks of war is considerably weaker than in 2015, and that leverage only declines from here.

Regional Reactions: Public Statements vs. Private Channels

The Gulf Cooperation Council states publicly welcomed the ceasefire. Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry called for "comprehensive sustainable pacification" [29]. Egypt urged that talks "take into account the legitimate security concerns" of Gulf nations [29].

Behind closed doors, the picture is more hawkish. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly urged Trump to continue the war, calling the military campaign a "historic opportunity" to remake the Middle East [30]. Gulf states that initially cautioned against war now argue that Iran's attacks on their territory — which targeted U.S. military assets hosted in multiple Arab states — demonstrated the danger of allowing Iran to remain armed [30][5].

Israel, which participated in the initial strikes but is not party to the Islamabad talks, has continued military operations in Lebanon throughout the ceasefire period [7]. European responses have focused on humanitarian concerns and calls for diplomacy, while the UK House of Commons Library published a detailed briefing on the conflict's legal and strategic dimensions [31].

Domestic U.S. Political Constraints

The Trump administration faces a legal and political timeline pressure. Under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA), any agreement related to Iran's nuclear program triggers mandatory congressional review [27]. The administration has not committed to a specific legal framework — the White House press secretary declined to say whether Trump would seek congressional authorization, stating "he likes to maintain options at his disposal" [27].

The precedent set by the original JCPOA is instructive: the State Department classified it as neither a treaty nor an executive agreement, but a political commitment — a classification that made it easy for the next president to abandon [27]. If the Trump administration follows the same path, Iran's concerns about durability would be validated. If it pursues Senate ratification, the two-thirds threshold appears unreachable.

The U.S. delegation in Islamabad — Vance, Witkoff, and Jared Kushner — signals Trump's preference for personal diplomacy over institutional process [2]. Whether any agreement emerging from these talks can survive its structural vulnerability to future reversal remains the central question for both sides.

The Economic Stakes: Oil Markets and Global Supply

Source: CNBC / Kpler

Data as of Apr 11, 2026CSV

The war's economic impact has been extraordinary. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted approximately 20% of global oil supplies [3]. Export volumes from the Middle East Gulf fell from 15 million to roughly 7 million barrels per day [3]. The International Energy Agency characterized it as "the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" [3].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 6, 2026CSV

Brent crude surged from roughly $70 per barrel pre-war to $125 at peak, with analysts considering the possibility of $200 oil if the strait remained closed [32]. U.S. gas prices hit $4 per gallon on March 31, a 30% surge [3]. The ceasefire announcement on April 8 brought immediate relief — oil dropped below $100 — but prices remain far above pre-conflict levels [33]. WTI crude stood at $114 per barrel as of early April, up 86.7% year-over-year.

The global knock-on effects extended beyond fuel prices: Pakistan asked cricket fans to watch games from home to conserve fuel; Australia reported widespread gas station shortages; airlines cancelled flights across the Asia-Pacific [3].

If Talks Collapse: Second-Order Consequences

The consequences of failure extend across multiple domains.

Nuclear threshold: With 441 kg of 60%-enriched uranium and IAEA access terminated, Iran is assessed to be capable of producing enough weapons-grade material for multiple devices in weeks to months [21]. U.S. strikes damaged but did not eliminate this capacity — satellite imagery shows Iran repaired ballistic missile facilities faster than nuclear sites [21].

Military options: Both the U.S. and Israel retain the capability to strike Iranian nuclear facilities again, though the February-March campaign demonstrated the limits of airpower alone. Iran's dispersal and hardening of key sites after 2020 complicates targeting [4].

Regional proxy conflicts: Iran's demand that the U.S. cease attacks on Hezbollah and allied militias in Iraq reflects its broader regional architecture. A collapse in talks could reinvigorate these networks — or, conversely, Iran's weakened state after six weeks of war may limit its ability to sustain them regardless [16].

Oil markets: If the ceasefire breaks down and the Strait of Hormuz closes again, the oil shock would resume immediately. Iran and Oman had been drafting a protocol to "monitor" Hormuz traffic — a possible offramp — but its status remains unclear [34].

What Comes Next

Pakistan has set expectations carefully. The goal of the Islamabad talks was never a comprehensive peace agreement but rather, as Al Jazeera reported, "a deal to keep talks going" [8]. Both sides have reasons to continue: the U.S. faces domestic pressure from high fuel prices; Iran faces the reality that its military position deteriorates with each week of conflict.

The exchange of written texts on April 11 suggests a framework for continued negotiation, even if no binding commitments have been made [18]. Whether the ceasefire holds long enough for that framework to produce results depends on variables neither side fully controls — Israeli operations in Lebanon, IRGC factional politics, and the durability of Pakistan's mediating role among them.

The first direct U.S.-Iran talks in 47 years have ended their opening phase. The harder phases lie ahead.