Trump Says U.S. Considering Winding Down Iran War

On March 20, 2026, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social that the United States is "getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts in the Middle East with respect to the Terrorist Regime of Iran" [1]. The statement arrived on day 20 of Operation Epic Fury, the largest American military campaign in the Middle East since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Within hours of Trump's post, Pentagon officials confirmed that the USS Boxer amphibious ready group, carrying thousands of Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, had departed California and would reach the Persian Gulf in roughly three weeks [2].

The contradiction—declaring near-victory while deploying reinforcements and requesting $200 billion in new war funding from Congress—captures a conflict that has scrambled the usual political alignments and raised questions about what "winding down" actually means.

How the War Began

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, a coordinated barrage of strikes targeting more than 2,500 Iranian military and government facilities [3]. B-2 stealth bombers flew 30-hour missions from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Multiple carrier strike groups converged on the Persian Gulf. Strikes hit Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, Kermanshah, and Tabriz in broad daylight [3].

The operation killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials [4]. Iran responded with retaliatory missile and drone attacks against U.S. military bases, Israeli territory, and Gulf state allies, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared the Strait of Hormuz closed to most international shipping [4].

Trump listed four objectives for the campaign: degrading Iran's missile capability and industrial base, eliminating the Iranian navy and air force, preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and protecting U.S. allies in the Middle East [1].

The Human and Financial Toll

By March 13—twelve days into the conflict—U.S. Central Command reported at least 13 American troops killed, including 7 from enemy fire, with approximately 200 wounded [5]. Iran's Health Ministry reported over 1,200 Iranian civilians killed and more than 10,000 injured [5]. A single strike on an Iranian school killed at least 165 civilians, according to Iranian state media [5]. Across the region, 773 people were killed in Lebanon as Hezbollah re-entered the fight, 12 civilians and 2 soldiers died in Israel, and at least 16 people were killed across Gulf states [5].

Approximately 3.2 million Iranians have been temporarily displaced, along with 830,000 from Lebanon [5].

The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated the first 100 hours of the war cost approximately $3.7 billion—about $891 million per day [3]. By March 13, total spending had reached approximately $16.5 billion [5]. The Pentagon has since submitted a supplemental budget request to the White House for more than $200 billion to sustain operations and replenish expended weapons systems [6]. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told reporters the figure "could move," adding: "Takes money to kill bad guys" [7].

Source: CSIS / NPR / Washington Post

Data as of Mar 20, 2026CSV

What 'Winding Down' Means—and Doesn't

Trump's statement explicitly rejected a ceasefire. "I don't want a ceasefire," he wrote, while simultaneously suggesting the military effort could be scaled back [8]. The administration has not publicly outlined a troop withdrawal timeline, specific force reduction numbers, or conditions that would trigger a drawdown [2].

A senior Iranian source told CNN that "contrary to Trump's claims of a reduction in military activity in the region, Iran has no such estimate and concludes that the enemy's military posture in the region hasn't changed significantly" [9].

Adding to the ambiguity, Trump and his advisers have simultaneously discussed potentially occupying Kharg Island, Iran's primary oil export terminal, which handles roughly 90% of the country's crude exports [10]. U.S. forces bombed military targets on the island on March 13 but spared its oil infrastructure [10]. An invasion of the island would represent an escalation, not a drawdown.

The Strait of Hormuz Crisis

Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has produced the conflict's most far-reaching economic consequences. The strait's two unidirectional shipping lanes normally carry roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day—approximately 20% of global seaborne oil trade and 25% of maritime oil shipments globally [4]. About 20% of liquefied natural gas shipments also pass through the waterway [11].

Iran adopted a selective blockade strategy, allowing tankers carrying Iranian crude to pass freely while blocking Gulf states from exporting [12]. Oil prices surged from approximately $67 per barrel before the strikes to a peak of $126 per barrel, with Brent crude surpassing $100 on March 8 for the first time in four years [4]. U.S. gas prices climbed 55 cents year-over-year to an average of $3.63 per gallon by mid-March [5].

Source: FRED / U.S. Energy Information Administration

Data as of Mar 16, 2026CSV

Trump demanded that allied nations step up to secure the waterway, warning on March 16: "We will remember" countries that fail to contribute [13]. By March 19, a coalition had begun forming. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan indicated willingness to "contribute to appropriate efforts" to ensure safe passage [14]. France committed to sending two frigates for merchant ship escorts under the framework of Operation Aspides, with a dozen additional ships deploying to the wider Middle East [14]. India proposed sending its navy to safeguard oil supplies transiting the strait [4].

The nations most dependent on Hormuz traffic—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar for exports; China, Japan, India, and South Korea for imports—face the most acute pressure. What any coalition would cost these nations, compared to the billions the U.S. currently spends maintaining its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, remains undefined.

Iran's Military Posture After the Strikes

The administration argues that Operation Epic Fury has severely degraded Iran's conventional military capabilities. Over 90 Iranian naval vessels have been damaged or destroyed, and more than 15,000 targets have been struck [5]. Both of Iran's operating uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow were hit in earlier Israeli strikes in June 2025, likely rendering them inoperable for weapons-grade enrichment [15].

But the picture is more complicated than the administration acknowledges. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in early March that the agency had "no evidence of a structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons" in Iran prior to the strikes [15]. When asked if Iran had been "days or weeks away from building a bomb," Grossi answered "no" [15]. The Arms Control Association reported that Iran had proposed a "years-long pause on enrichment" with broad verification measures during February negotiations—suggesting the administration "did not exhaust the diplomatic options" before military action [15].

Iran's proxy network, designed to survive exactly this kind of decapitation strike, has reactivated across the region [16]. Hezbollah, despite sustained Israeli targeting that killed its former leader Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, reconstituted command authority under Secretary-General Naim Qassem and resumed rocket and drone attacks on Israel within two days of the strikes on Iran [16]. The Houthis in Yemen initially limited themselves to protest and declarations but have threatened to resume Red Sea shipping attacks [17]. Iraqi and Syrian militias have struck U.S. positions as well [16].

The Legal and Constitutional Question

Operation Epic Fury was launched without a Congressional declaration of war or a new Authorization for Use of Military Force. The administration has cited both Article II of the Constitution—the president's authority as commander-in-chief—and, in some instances, the 2001 AUMF passed after the September 11 attacks [18]. Legal scholars have challenged both justifications. The 2001 AUMF authorized force against groups responsible for the 9/11 attacks; critics argue applying it to Iran distorts the law's original intent beyond recognition [18].

On March 4, the Senate rejected a War Powers Resolution that would have required Trump to obtain Congressional consent for continued military operations, with the vote falling 47-53 [18]. A similar resolution failed in the House the next day. A 56% majority of Americans oppose the military action, according to an NPR/PBS News/Marist poll, while only 36% approve of Trump's handling of Iran [19]. Among Republicans, however, support stands at 84% [19].

Lessons From Previous Withdrawals

The United States has a pattern of rapid military success followed by prolonged, costly occupation and ambiguous withdrawal. The Council on Foreign Relations published an analysis arguing that the Iran campaign mirrors Iraq's failed approach in several critical ways: limited coalition support (unlike Iraq's 49-country backing), no articulated post-conflict stabilization strategy, and an assumption that regime change produces self-sustaining political outcomes [20].

Former General David Petraeus's question from the early Iraq War—"Tell me how this ends"—remains unanswered for Iran [20]. Trump suggested "Iranians will be on their own to install a successor government" if the air campaign succeeds, an approach that contrasts sharply with formal military doctrine requiring Phase IV stabilization operations [20].

In Iraq, the 2011 withdrawal was followed by the rise of ISIS and a return of U.S. forces. In Afghanistan, the 2021 withdrawal led to the Taliban's return to power within days. In July 2025, Baghdad and Washington finalized a phased withdrawal framework with U.S. combat forces exiting central and western Iraq by December while counterterrorism operations continue from Kurdistan [21]. Each case suggests that air campaigns, however decisive tactically, do not resolve the underlying political conditions that generate instability.

The Hawkish Case for Staying

Defense officials and regional allies point to several risks of premature withdrawal. Iran retains significant stocks of enriched uranium—approximately 400 kilograms enriched to 60% purity, enough for as many as 10 nuclear weapons if further processed [22]. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed before the strikes that Iran could theoretically produce weapons-grade material within a week [15]. Every government watching the strikes, the argument goes, now has stronger incentive to pursue nuclear weapons—because states that abandon such programs (Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011) have been attacked [20].

Hezbollah has demonstrated it can regenerate combat capability even after leadership decapitation [16]. Iran's proxy network spans Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Gulf allies—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain—have invested heavily in the U.S. security umbrella and would view withdrawal as abandonment. China and Russia, already expanding their Middle East influence, would fill any vacuum.

The $200 billion supplemental request, hawks argue, is the cost of finishing what was started. Leaving now would mean the economic damage from the Hormuz blockade was endured for nothing.

The Anti-War Case for Leaving

Critics challenge the war's legal, strategic, and economic foundations. Congress never authorized the conflict; both chambers rejected War Powers Resolutions but along party lines rather than on principled grounds [18]. The 2001 AUMF was written to target al-Qaeda, not a sovereign nation that had no involvement in the September 11 attacks [18].

The IAEA found no structured weapons program [15]. Iran had proposed pausing enrichment with verification [15]. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed that Iran lacked ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States and estimated it would take until 2035 to develop ICBMs [15]. The "imminent threat" justification, critics argue, was manufactured.

At $16.5 billion in twelve days and a $200 billion ask pending, the financial burden falls on American taxpayers to secure shipping lanes that primarily benefit Asian and European energy consumers [6]. Japan, South Korea, China, and India—the largest importers of Persian Gulf oil—have contributed no military forces to the conflict [14]. The United States produces more oil than it consumes; the energy security rationale applies more to allies than to Americans themselves.

Twenty-five years of Middle East military intervention—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria—have produced no durable political settlements. Each intervention created new instabilities. The Iran campaign, launched without public debate, adequate coalition support, or a post-conflict plan, follows the same trajectory [20].

What Comes Next

Trump's "winding down" rhetoric may be an opening negotiating position, a trial balloon for domestic consumption, or a genuine signal of intent. The simultaneous deployment of additional Marines, the $200 billion funding request, and discussions about invading Kharg Island suggest the conflict's trajectory remains escalatory regardless of the president's public statements.

The formation of an allied maritime coalition for the Strait of Hormuz represents the most concrete development toward burden-sharing. Whether France, Britain, Japan, India, and others can secure the waterway without U.S. naval dominance is untested. The U.S. Fifth Fleet has maintained continuous presence in the Persian Gulf since 1995; replacing its capabilities is not a matter of deploying a few frigates.

For now, the gap between the president's words and the Pentagon's actions defines the conflict. The war is three weeks old. Its costs are measured in billions of dollars and thousands of lives. And the question General Petraeus asked two decades ago in Iraq echoes again: Tell me how this ends.