Trump Renews Iran Warning as Oil Prices Rise Amid Stalled Nuclear Diplomacy

On May 18, 2026, President Donald Trump warned Tehran that the "clock is ticking" — the latest in a series of escalatory statements directed at Iran as ceasefire negotiations stall and oil markets shudder [1]. Brent crude rose above $111 per barrel, up from roughly $70 in late February before U.S. military strikes began [2]. The warning came hours after a drone struck a nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates, raising fears of further escalation across the Persian Gulf [1].

The crisis has been building since February 28, when the United States launched military operations against Iran following the collapse of indirect nuclear talks. Three months later, the conflict has produced the largest oil supply disruption in recorded history, a constitutional standoff over war powers in Washington, and an Iranian nuclear program that has grown more advanced — not less — since the era of "maximum pressure" began.

Iran's Nuclear Program: From the JCPOA to 440.9 Kilograms

The numbers tell a stark story. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration — Iran held no 60%-enriched uranium and was limited to enriching at 3.67% [3]. When Trump withdrew the United States from the deal in 2018, Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium remained at zero [3].

By October 2024, Iran had accumulated 182 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium. By February 2025, that figure had risen to 275 kg, with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warning that Iran was "pressing the gas pedal" by increasing production from seven kilograms per month to over thirty [4]. As of May 17, 2026, according to Grossi, Iran holds 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched uranium — enough, if further enriched to 90% weapons-grade, for approximately ten nuclear weapons [3].

Source: IAEA Reports

Data as of May 17, 2026CSV

Breakout time — the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade material for a single device — is estimated at two to four weeks using Iran's existing stockpile and surviving centrifuges at the Fordow facility [3]. However, transforming fissile material into a deliverable nuclear warhead would require an additional 12 to 18 months [3].

Critically, the IAEA's ability to verify any of this has collapsed. Iran terminated all IAEA access on February 28, 2026. Surveillance cameras have been disabled and seals removed from all declared facilities [3]. The agency cannot verify the extent of strike damage, the status of enriched material, or whether covert enrichment continues at undeclared sites.

Oil at $111: Anatomy of a Price Shock

Brent crude traded at approximately $70 per barrel in late February 2026 [1]. By May 18, international benchmark Brent crude futures had climbed above $111 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) reached $106.97 [2]. That represents a roughly 59% increase in under three months.

Source: CNBC / EIA

Data as of May 18, 2026CSV

The price spike is overwhelmingly driven by supply disruption rather than changes in underlying demand. The conflict has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow waterway between Iran and Oman through which nearly 20% of global oil supply, or approximately 20.5 million barrels per day, transited before the crisis [5]. Global oil supply plummeted by 10.1 million barrels per day to 97 mb/d in March, which the IEA characterized as "the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market" [5].

The IEA's May 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook projects that global oil inventories will fall by an average of 8.5 million barrels per day during the second quarter, pushing Brent to an average of $106 per barrel through May and June [6]. Global oil demand growth has weakened to 0.2 mb/d in 2026, down from 0.6 mb/d projected a month earlier, as elevated prices dampen consumption [6].

A drone strike on a UAE nuclear power plant over the weekend added a new dimension of risk, raising questions about the vulnerability of civilian energy infrastructure across the Gulf [1].

The Strait of Hormuz: What Full Closure Would Mean

Before the conflict, some 20.5 million barrels of oil and 6.8 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas transited the Strait of Hormuz daily [5]. Countries directly dependent on this chokepoint include Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain — collectively responsible for a significant share of global hydrocarbon exports.

In response to the disruption, IEA member countries agreed on March 11 to release an unprecedented 400 million barrels from emergency reserves [5]. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve held 415.4 million barrels as of February 18, 2026, with a maximum drawdown capacity of 4.4 million barrels per day [7].

But these reserves are finite. At current depletion rates, 400 million barrels covers roughly four days of global consumption [7]. Strategic reserves are designed for short-duration disruptions, typically benchmarked against 90-day supply coverage. As the Al Jazeera analysis noted, once a crisis extends beyond that timeframe, "the release mechanism transitions from a solution to a delay mechanism" [7].

Three Carrier Strike Groups: The Largest U.S. Buildup Since 2003

The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf is now the largest since the 2003 invasion of Iraq [8]. Beginning in late January 2026, the Pentagon deployed air, naval, and missile defense assets across the region in what became a rapid, multi-phase buildup.

As of late April, three carrier strike groups are operating in the theater: the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea, the USS Gerald R. Ford in the Red Sea, and the USS George H.W. Bush, which arrived in CENTCOM's area of responsibility on April 23 [8][9]. This three-carrier posture is rare and historically associated with the opening phases of major combat operations.

Supporting assets include three Littoral Combat Ships — USS Canberra, USS Tulsa, and USS Santa Barbara — equipped with mine countermeasure packages, a capability directly relevant to the threat of Iranian mining of the Strait of Hormuz [10]. Air components were reinforced by F-15E Strike Eagles relocated from RAF Lakenheath in the UK to Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and twelve F-22 fighter jets deployed to Ovda Airbase in southern Israel [8].

The scale of deployment mirrors and in some respects exceeds the pre-invasion posture of 2003, when two carrier strike groups were positioned in the Gulf before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Deadlocked Negotiations

The core impasse is specific: Washington demands the complete cessation of uranium enrichment and the transfer of Iran's 400–450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to a third country [11]. Tehran has rejected this as a non-starter.

Mediators — principally Oman, with Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey also involved — have reportedly proposed a compromise allowing Iran limited enrichment up to 1.5% and transferring excess uranium to Turkey or Russia [11]. Neither side has accepted these terms.

The talks have been conducted indirectly, with U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in separate rooms, communicating through Omani intermediaries [11]. Trump said "most points were agreed to, but the only point that really mattered, nuclear, was not," describing Iran as "unyielding" [11]. Araghchi countered that an agreement was "just inches away" but criticized "maximalist demands" from U.S. negotiators [11].

In late April, Iran's foreign minister conducted a diplomatic push visiting Pakistan and Oman, but there were no signs of direct engagement with Washington [12]. Iran has shared revised peace deal terms with the U.S. but stated it has not discussed nuclear matters, with "all focus on ending the war" [1].

No mediator has publicly characterized the gap as bridgeable.

The Maximum Pressure Paradox

The current crisis provides the clearest test case yet for the theory that coercive pressure — sanctions, threats, and military strikes — can force Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions. The evidence to date suggests the opposite.

When Trump first withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran held no highly enriched uranium. Seven years of escalating sanctions and military threats later, Iran possesses 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched material and has reduced IAEA access to zero [3].

The Arms Control Association has argued that "renewed U.S. military strikes on Iran would be counterproductive, reckless, and unjustified on nonproliferation grounds," noting that while "strikes can set back Iran's nuclear program and destroy key infrastructure, military force cannot eliminate Tehran's proliferation risk" [13]. The organization warned that "at the end of the conflict, Iran will retain the nuclear expertise and likely key materials necessary for building a nuclear bomb" [13].

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reached a similar conclusion, noting that Iran's nuclear question remains "still on the table" despite two wars [14]. David Wallsh, writing for the Atlantic Council, argued that "an exclusively punitive policy unaccompanied by diplomatic off-ramps incentivizes Tehran to fight fire with fire by imposing costs on its perceived aggressors" [15].

Defenders of maximum pressure counter that without coercive tools, Iran would have advanced even further toward a weapon and that the JCPOA merely delayed rather than prevented Iranian nuclearization. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies and other hawkish policy groups have argued that the pre-war enrichment acceleration vindicated the decision to abandon the deal and that only the credible threat of force can change Tehran's calculus.

Inside Iran: Hardliners Ascendant

The breakdown in negotiations has shifted the internal balance of power in Tehran decisively toward hardliners.

The divide became unusually public when several ultraconservative members of parliament refused to sign a letter backing Iran's negotiating team, triggering what Iran International described as "an unprecedented public clash" between Raja News and the Revolutionary Guards-linked Tasnim News Agency [16]. The confrontation pits supporters of former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili against allies of parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who recently led Iran's delegation in talks [16].

The Irish Times reported that "battle-hardened commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and those aligned with them are now the key decision makers on matters of security, war and diplomacy," indicating that hardline military elements have gained influence over pragmatist civilians [17].

Pragmatists in Tehran appear increasingly willing to pursue compromise to preserve stability, but a younger generation of hardline officials increasingly frames the conflict as existential and views concessions as surrender [16][17]. Iran International reported that Tehran rejected the latest U.S. terms as hardliners pushed for escalation [18].

Whether elements within the Iranian government are deliberately stalling negotiations for internal political advantage — rather than because of disagreements over substance — remains difficult to establish definitively from outside. But the pattern of public factional conflict and the ascendancy of IRGC-aligned decision-makers suggests that the domestic political incentives for rejecting compromise are strong.

War Powers: A Constitutional Standoff

President Trump initiated military action against Iran on February 28, 2026, and notified Congress on March 2, in accordance with the War Powers Resolution of 1973 [19]. Under Section 5(b) of that resolution, the president must terminate the use of force within 60 days absent congressional authorization — a deadline that expired on May 1.

On that date, the Trump administration submitted a report to Congress asserting that military force had "concluded" [19]. Constitutional law experts have disputed this characterization. U.S. military operations — including the naval blockade — remain ongoing, and one legal scholar argued that "the hostilities are continuing as a consequence of the administration's enforcement of the blockade" [20].

On March 4, the Senate rejected a war powers resolution by a 47–53 vote that sought to require congressional consent for continued military action. A similar measure failed in the House the following day [19]. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Trump "has all the authorities he needs under Article 2" of the Constitution [20].

In response, Representative Tom Barrett introduced a formal Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that would give Trump explicit legal authority to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon while imposing safeguards and a sunset expiration of July 30, 2026 — 90 days after the reported conclusion of hostilities [21]. The bill aims to reassert Congress's Article I war powers while providing a legal framework for ongoing operations.

The constitutional question is unresolved. No court has ruled on whether the current blockade constitutes "hostilities" under the War Powers Resolution, and the political dynamics in Congress make it unlikely that either chamber will force the issue before the Barrett AUMF reaches a vote.

What Comes Next

The situation as of mid-May 2026 is defined by compounding risks: a nuclear program beyond the reach of inspectors, oil prices at levels that threaten a global recession, the largest U.S. military deployment in the Middle East in over two decades, stalled negotiations with no credible path to breakthrough, and a constitutional gray zone around the authority for continued operations.

Trump's "clock is ticking" warning raises an immediate question: ticking toward what? A resumed bombing campaign would face the same limitations that nonproliferation analysts have identified — the inability of airstrikes to eliminate nuclear knowledge or fissile material that may have been dispersed to unknown locations. A diplomatic breakthrough would require one or both sides to move on the enrichment question, which neither has shown willingness to do.

The oil market, meanwhile, is pricing in continued disruption. The IEA's projection of an 8.5 mb/d inventory drawdown through the second quarter means that every week without resolution depletes the global buffer against an even sharper price shock [6]. The 400 million barrels released from emergency reserves buy time, but not much of it [7].

For the 50 million barrels per day of oil production that depends on Persian Gulf stability, and for a global economy already strained by elevated energy costs, the margin for miscalculation grows narrower by the day.