Trump Expresses Skepticism Over Iran's Offer to Reopen Strait of Hormuz

On April 27, 2026, Iran transmitted a proposal through Pakistani mediators to the United States: reopen the Strait of Hormuz, end the war, and defer nuclear negotiations to a later phase [1][2]. President Donald Trump discussed the offer with senior aides but signaled he was unlikely to accept it, calling Iran "unyielding" on the only issue he said mattered — its nuclear program [3]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio went further, describing the proposal as "an extortion scheme" and insisting that any agreement must "definitively prevent them from sprinting towards a nuclear weapon at any point" [4].

The rejection, or near-rejection, of the offer comes two months into a war that has already redrawn the energy map of the world. The Strait of Hormuz — a 21-mile-wide channel between Iran and Oman through which roughly 20% of the world's oil and 20% of its liquefied natural gas transited before the conflict — has been effectively closed to commercial shipping since late February [5][6]. The economic toll is mounting daily, and the question of whether to engage with Tehran's proposal or hold out for a more comprehensive deal is shaping up as one of the most consequential foreign policy decisions of the Trump presidency.

What Iran Is Actually Offering

The proposal, relayed via Islamabad, contains three core elements [1][7]:

1. Reopening the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping.
2. A mutual end to hostilities, including the lifting of the US naval blockade on Iran.
3. Deferral of nuclear negotiations to a subsequent diplomatic phase.

Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been conducting a regional tour — visiting Pakistan, Oman, and Russia — to build support for the framework [8]. Tehran has also floated a separate idea: persuading Oman to support a toll-collection mechanism for vessels transiting the strait, a concept that legal scholars and maritime experts have widely condemned as a violation of international shipping norms [9][10].

The proposal conspicuously omits any restrictions on Iran's uranium enrichment, which the US has demanded be reduced to zero [3]. This is the central reason for Trump's skepticism. Without nuclear concessions, the administration views the deal as trading its strongest point of leverage — control over the strait via naval blockade — for nothing more than a return to the pre-war status quo.

The Economic Stakes: A $126-Per-Barrel Reality

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has produced the most severe energy supply shock since the 1970s. Before the war, approximately 15 million barrels per day of crude oil — 34% of global crude trade — passed through the strait [5]. By April, shipments had fallen to roughly 3.8 million barrels per day [6].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 20, 2026CSV

WTI crude oil prices have surged 43.4% year-over-year, reaching $114.58 per barrel at their peak in April 2026 after starting the year below $60 [11]. Brent crude crossed $100 per barrel on March 8 for the first time in four years and hit $126 at its peak [12]. LNG spot prices in Asia more than doubled after QatarEnergy declared force majeure at its Ras Laffan facility — the world's largest LNG plant, responsible for 20% of global production — reaching $25.40 per million BTU [6].

The Dallas Federal Reserve has modeled the economic damage across three scenarios [13]:

Source: Dallas Fed Research

Data as of Mar 20, 2026CSV

A one-quarter closure shaves 0.2 percentage points off global GDP growth. A two-quarter closure costs 0.3 points. A three-quarter closure — roughly the scenario unfolding if the current standoff persists through year-end — would reduce global growth by 1.3 percentage points, the equivalent of trillions of dollars in lost output. The Dallas Fed characterized the disruption as three to five times larger than previous geopolitical oil shocks, including the 1973 Arab oil embargo (6% of supply removed), the 1979 Iranian Revolution (4%), and the 1990 Gulf War (6%) [13].

Who Pays the Price: Asia's Exposure

The burden of the Hormuz closure falls overwhelmingly on Asia. In 2024, 84% of crude oil and condensate shipments through the strait were bound for Asian markets [5].

Source: EIA / IEA 2025 data

Data as of Apr 28, 2026CSV

Japan faces the most acute risk: it imports 1.6 million barrels per day through the strait, and a sustained closure threatens to widen its trade deficit, weaken the yen, and push the economy toward stagflation [14]. South Korea ranks second in vulnerability, followed by India and China [14]. China, the world's largest crude importer, sources roughly 40% of its oil imports and 30% of its LNG imports via Hormuz [6].

Growth forecasts for developing Asia and Pacific economies have been cut by up to 1.3 percentage points [14]. Maritime insurance premiums for the Persian Gulf have risen 50%, with major providers issuing cancellation notices for war risk coverage [15]. Thailand, the Philippines, and other oil-import-dependent economies in Southeast Asia are also exposed [14].

Alternative supply routes exist but are limited. The only major pipeline bypass is the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which can carry about 1.5 million barrels per day — a fraction of normal strait traffic [16]. Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline has some spare capacity but cannot offset the full shortfall. Strategic petroleum reserves in Japan, South Korea, and China provide a buffer measured in weeks, not months [16].

The Legal Battlefield: UNCLOS, Innocent Passage, and "Persistent Objection"

Iran's claim to control the Strait of Hormuz rests on a legal argument that most international law scholars reject but that has proven difficult to enforce.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Articles 37 through 44 guarantee all ships a right of "transit passage" through international straits, which "shall not be impeded" and cannot be suspended [17]. The Strait of Hormuz is widely recognized as such a strait.

Iran, however, signed UNCLOS in 1982 but never ratified it, specifically because it rejects the transit passage regime [17][18]. Tehran instead invokes the older 1949 Corfu Channel ruling by the International Court of Justice and the 1958 Territorial Seas Convention, which grant coastal states broader authority under the doctrine of "innocent passage" — including the power to determine whether a vessel's passage is "non-innocent" and therefore prohibited [18]. Iran argues it is a "persistent objector" to the transit passage rule, and that its decades-long, consistent rejection exempts it from what might otherwise be customary international law [17].

The US Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain, has historically kept the strait open through forward naval presence, with approximately 8,000–9,000 personnel in the region [19]. Since the February strikes, however, the fleet's mission has inverted: rather than ensuring safe passage for all vessels, it is now enforcing a blockade on Iranian shipping [20]. The deployment of the USS George H.W. Bush carrier strike group, adding roughly 6,000 more troops, has further bolstered US naval forces in the area [19].

On April 11, US warships crossed through the Strait of Hormuz for the first time since the war began — a demonstration of force that underscored Washington's ability to operate in the waterway even as commercial shipping remains paralyzed [21].

The Case for Engagement: What Skepticism Risks Foreclosing

Not everyone in the foreign policy establishment agrees with Trump's posture. Analysts who favor engagement point to several signals suggesting Iran's proposal, while imperfect, represents a genuine opening.

Iran has allowed some oil tankers through the Strait as a confidence-building measure, a step Trump himself acknowledged [22]. The April 7 ceasefire — brokered by Pakistan and accepted by Trump on Truth Social — resulted in a temporary reduction in military exchanges, even if the underlying drivers of conflict remain unresolved [23].

Iran's February negotiating position included a willingness to blend down its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 to lower levels — a concession that several nonproliferation experts characterized as meaningful [24]. The IAEA's director, Rafael Grossi, stated that the agency saw "no sign of a structured nuclear weapons program" in Iran, contradicting claims by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff that Iran had been "testing for weaponization since 2003" [24].

Diplomacy specialists note that the current impasse reflects a slowdown rather than a collapse. "There are plenty of examples in history that illustrate how diplomacy is rarely linear but is often marked by deadlocks, setbacks and backdoor engagement," one analyst told Al Jazeera [25]. Pakistan's role as intermediary — passing written messages between Washington and Tehran — mirrors early phases of crisis diplomacy in previous conflicts [22].

The risk, in this view, is that rejecting the Hormuz proposal forecloses a path toward broader negotiations at a moment when both sides have reasons to de-escalate but lack a face-saving mechanism to do so.

Trump's Iran Record and the Credibility Gap

Tehran's skepticism of American negotiating intentions has its own history. Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018 despite Iran's compliance with the agreement, as certified by the IAEA at the time [24][26]. The January 2020 assassination of IRGC commander Qasem Soleimani further hardened Iranian perceptions that Washington negotiates in bad faith.

The Arms Control Association's April 2026 analysis concluded that US Special Envoy Witkoff "did not have sufficient technical expertise or diplomatic experience to engage in effective diplomacy" during the 2025–2026 talks, and that "it is unlikely that any outcome short of complete Iranian capitulation to US demands at the negotiating table would have averted the military strikes" [24]. Iran participated in Israeli strikes against its territory in June 2025 while diplomacy was still nominally ongoing — an episode that Iranian officials cite repeatedly as evidence of American duplicity [24].

Iran's position that uranium enrichment is a sovereign right under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty reflects a longstanding red line that predates the current government [24]. Whether or not one accepts that framing, it means that the US demand for "zero enrichment" effectively asks Iran to concede its core negotiating position before talks begin — a demand that no Iranian government has accepted since the nuclear program's inception.

Who Benefits from a Threatened Strait

The Hormuz crisis has created clear winners in the US energy sector. With Asian and European buyers scrambling for non-Gulf supply, US crude exports — which have grown from 400,000 barrels per day in 2015 to approximately 4 million barrels per day — are in high demand [16]. Higher global prices translate directly to higher revenues for American producers.

However, analysts caution that this benefit comes with domestic costs. "US producers aren't going to say, 'We can't give you the oil because we need to keep prices cheap here in the US.' They will sell that barrel to them every time," one energy analyst told CNN [27]. The result is upward pressure on US gasoline prices, eroding the discount that American crude has historically traded at relative to Brent.

Whether this constituency has directly influenced the administration's posture is not documented in public reporting. But the alignment of interests — between an administration reluctant to make concessions and a domestic energy sector profiting from the status quo — is difficult to ignore.

If Diplomacy Fails: The Escalation Map

The February 28 strikes — code-named Operation Epic Fury — involved B-2, B-1, and B-52 bombers targeting Iran's military infrastructure and ballistic missile facilities, while Israeli Air Force decapitation strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials [23][28]. Iran retaliated with hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles aimed at Israel and US military installations across Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE [28].

Iran's strategy has been to widen the conflict beyond direct military exchange and into economic and political dimensions, seeking to make the war too costly for the US and Israel to sustain [28]. The Hormuz closure is the centerpiece of that strategy.

The April 7 ceasefire reduced the tempo of strikes, but the conflict's underlying structure remains intact [23]. Recorded Future's scenario analysis identifies several escalation pathways if diplomacy collapses [29]:

• Iran retains asymmetric leverage through the Hormuz chokepoint and proxy networks, even as its conventional military capacity has been degraded.
• Houthi forces in Yemen could intensify attacks on Red Sea shipping, opening a second maritime front.
• Israel's calculus is shaped by the elimination of Iranian leadership and the desire to prevent reconstitution of Iran's ballistic missile program.
• Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whose territories have already been struck by Iranian missiles, face pressure to either align more closely with the US coalition or seek independent diplomatic channels with Tehran.

War-game scenarios conducted in recent years suggest that a conflict exceeding 30 days of active military exchange between the US and Iran carries a high probability of drawing in additional regional actors, particularly if energy infrastructure is targeted [29]. The current conflict has already exceeded that threshold.

What Comes Next

The diplomatic window has not closed entirely. Iran's regional tour — with Araghchi visiting Moscow for talks with Vladimir Putin after stops in Islamabad and Muscat — suggests Tehran is building a coalition of support for its position while keeping indirect channels to Washington open [8][30].

Trump faces a choice between two forms of risk. Accepting a deal that reopens the strait without nuclear concessions would relieve global energy markets but leave Iran's enrichment capacity intact. Rejecting the deal maintains maximum pressure but at a cost measured in rising oil prices, strained alliances with energy-dependent Asian partners, and the ever-present danger of further military escalation.

The Strait of Hormuz, 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, has become the physical expression of a question that has defined US-Iran relations for decades: whether coercion or compromise is the faster path to a world in which Iran does not possess nuclear weapons. Two months into a war that has already killed thousands and rattled the global economy, neither path looks short.