Trump Tells Iran Negotiators Not to Rush Nuclear Deal

On May 24, 2026, President Donald Trump publicly instructed his negotiating team "not to rush into a deal" with Iran, declaring that "time is on our side" [1]. The statement came just one day after Trump himself announced that a peace agreement reopening the Strait of Hormuz had been "largely negotiated" and would be announced shortly [2]. The whiplash between those two messages — a deal is nearly done, but also don't hurry — captures the central tension of US-Iran diplomacy in its most consequential phase since the original 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

From Diplomacy to War and Back Again

The current negotiations did not begin in a vacuum. They represent the third distinct phase of Trump-era engagement with Iran, following a convoluted 14-month path that has included direct talks, Israeli military strikes, a full-scale US-Israeli air campaign, a ceasefire, and now the outlines of a framework agreement.

The first phase began in April 2025, when Trump sent a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei setting a 60-day deadline for a nuclear agreement [3]. Five rounds of talks followed in rapid succession — mediated by Oman and held alternately in Muscat and Rome — between April and May 2025. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi led the discussions, with expert-level technical meetings joining from the third round onward [3].

Those talks collapsed in June 2025 after Israel launched large-scale strikes targeting Iran's military leadership and nuclear scientists [3]. Iran suspended negotiations indefinitely.

The second phase opened in February 2026, after widespread domestic protests weakened Iran's bargaining position. Three rounds of indirect talks in Muscat and Geneva produced what Araghchi called "a general agreement on guiding principles" [3]. But on February 28, the United States and Israel launched comprehensive strikes against Iran — killing Khamenei and targeting nuclear and ballistic missile facilities [4].

The third and current phase emerged from the April 8 ceasefire that ended nearly six weeks of active conflict [5]. Since then, negotiators have been working toward a memorandum of understanding that would extend the ceasefire for 60 days while addressing nuclear, economic, and maritime issues simultaneously.

What's Actually on the Table

According to reporting by Axios, the draft MOU includes several core elements [6]:

Nuclear commitments: Iran would commit to never pursue nuclear weapons, negotiate a suspension of uranium enrichment (with a moratorium of 12 to 15 years under discussion), and agree in principle to dispose of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium [6].

Strait of Hormuz: Iran would clear the mines it deployed in the strait, allowing ships to pass freely with no tolls. In exchange, the US would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports [6].

Sanctions relief: The US would issue sanctions waivers allowing Iran to sell oil freely during the 60-day period, with broader sanctions lifting contingent on verified nuclear concessions. "If no highly enriched uranium is given up, they will get no relief," a US official told Axios [6].

Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on May 24 that "significant progress, although not final progress, has been made" [7].

The Enrichment Gap: How Close Is Iran to a Bomb?

Iran's uranium stockpile remains the most urgent variable in the negotiations. As of early 2026, Iran possessed approximately 440–461 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 — a level with no civilian application that sits just below the 90% weapons-grade threshold [8].

Source: IAEA Reports / Arms Control Association

Data as of May 25, 2026CSV

According to Witkoff himself, this stockpile could be upgraded to weapons-grade material within one to two weeks [8]. A single cascade of 175 IR-6 centrifuges could produce enough material for one nuclear weapon every 25 days starting from the 60% stock [8].

For comparison: when the JCPOA was signed in 2015, Iran's enrichment was capped at 3.67% and its stockpile was limited to 300 kg of low-enriched uranium [9]. When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iran was still in compliance with those limits. The escalation from 3.67% to 60% occurred entirely in the post-withdrawal period, with Iran breaching its limits starting in July 2019 [8].

In May 2026, Iranian parliamentary spokesman Ebrahim Rezaei warned that Iran could enrich to 90% if attacked again — a statement that functions as both threat and bargaining chip [10].

Complicating verification, the IAEA reported in February 2026 that it had lost "continuity of knowledge" regarding Iran's enriched uranium after Tehran suspended cooperation following the June 2025 Israeli strikes [11]. Iran refused to allow inspectors to visit bombed facilities, creating a gap in the agency's ability to account for all nuclear material.

Iran's Economic Collapse: Pressure or Desperation?

Trump's assertion that "time is on our side" rests primarily on Iran's economic deterioration. The numbers support extreme pressure but also suggest limits to how much more Iran can absorb.

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Iran's inflation, already at 32.5% in 2024 according to World Bank data, has spiraled far higher in 2026. The IMF estimated 68.9% annual inflation for the year, but reports from inside Iran suggest the actual figure has exceeded 100% [12]. The rial has collapsed to approximately 1,750,000 per US dollar — a 60% decline since the February war [13].

The IMF projects Iran's GDP will contract by 6.1% in 2026 [13]. War damage to steel and petrochemical facilities — sectors that generated $25–30 billion in exports in 2024 — has left over a million workers unemployed [13]. Iran's oil exports fell 26% in early 2026, with crude loadings dropping below 1.39 million barrels per day [14].

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of May 18, 2026CSV

Global oil prices have surged in response, with WTI crude reaching $114.58 per barrel in April 2026 — up 75% year-over-year — driven partly by the Strait of Hormuz closure and Iranian supply disruptions.

A Fortune investigation found that Iranian authorities are struggling to meet government payroll, with meat becoming a luxury item and an estimated 7 million Iranians going hungry [12].

The Case That Delay Helps Iran

Despite this economic devastation, nonproliferation analysts have identified several ways that extended negotiations could strengthen Iran's position rather than weaken it.

First, time allows potential reconstitution of enrichment capacity. While US-Israeli strikes damaged known facilities, Iran's dispersed and hardened underground sites may retain operational centrifuges. Without IAEA access, the international community cannot verify what capability remains [11].

Second, the war has fractured regional coalition unity. Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE urged Trump to suspend the military assault, fearing Iranian retaliation and further damage to global energy markets [4]. Saudi Arabia has called for talks to "address all issues" contributing to Middle East instability — language interpreted as distancing Riyadh from Washington's maximalist demands [4].

Third, historical precedent suggests that delay in nuclear negotiations rarely favors the party seeking nonproliferation. North Korea used extended timelines to advance its weapons program, "slowing the disablement process to protest delays in promised heavy fuel oil shipments" while continuing fissile material production [15]. Libya's 2003 denuclearization — once held up as a model — is now viewed by proliferating states as a cautionary tale after Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011 despite surrendering his nuclear program [16].

Israel's Alarm, Saudi Caution

Senior Israeli security officials have expressed alarm at the proposed deal, warning that it could grant Iran time for economic and military recovery [4]. Their concern: once a ceasefire is extended and sanctions are partially waived, it becomes politically difficult for Washington to resume military operations even if Iran later reneges on nuclear commitments.

Israel's position reflects a fundamental red line: no deal should allow Iran to retain enrichment capacity at any level. This conflicts directly with Iran's stated non-negotiable — its "right to enrich" — which Tehran has included in its 10-point negotiating proposal [5].

Saudi Arabia has taken a more nuanced stance. The Stimson Center assessed that Riyadh's nuclear ambitions "will not depend on Iran or the war's outcome" — suggesting Saudi Arabia is hedging regardless of deal terms [17]. Trump reportedly called Saudi, UAE, Qatari, Pakistani, Turkish, Egyptian, and Jordanian leaders alongside Netanyahu to discuss finalizing terms, and requested that Muslim leaders normalize ties with Israel as part of any broader agreement [4].

European JCPOA signatories — France, Germany, and the UK — have been largely sidelined from the current bilateral US-Iran track, though the UK House of Commons Library noted their interest in ensuring any new agreement includes "robust verification mechanisms" comparable to or exceeding the original JCPOA [18].

Verification: The Make-or-Break Issue

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warned in April 2026 that "all of that will require the presence of IAEA inspectors; otherwise you will not have an agreement, you will have an illusion of an agreement" [19].

The Arms Control Association argued that US negotiators must ensure the IAEA receives access to verify both declared and undeclared sites, and cautioned against "bilateral arrangements that sideline the IAEA" in favor of US-only verification [11]. The proposed deal reportedly includes Iran's commitment to implement the Additional Protocol — which allows surprise inspections at undeclared sites — but the specific scope of access to military facilities remains a central point of disagreement [19].

Under the original JCPOA, Iran agreed to provisional application of the Additional Protocol and allowed enhanced monitoring of its supply chain. The current US demands reportedly go further, seeking permanent rather than provisional implementation and access to sites damaged in the 2026 strikes to verify the status of nuclear materials [11].

Domestic Political Constraints

Any agreement Trump reaches faces the same structural challenge that confronted Obama: the US Senate. In a 2015 letter, 49 Republican senators warned that "an Iran agreement without broad congressional support will not survive" a future administration [20]. That dynamic has not disappeared — it has merely shifted parties.

AIPAC spent tens of millions of dollars supporting preferred congressional candidates and has backed Trump's military actions against Iran [21]. The organization's influence creates a ratchet effect: any deal perceived as insufficiently restrictive faces immediate domestic opposition, while the absence of a deal faces less organized political cost.

Congressional war powers debates have also constrained the administration's freedom of action. The House considered a Senate resolution to limit Trump's war powers in Iran, reflecting bipartisan discomfort with an open-ended military commitment [20].

The Pace Problem: JCPOA Took 18 Months

The original JCPOA required approximately 18 months of intensive negotiations following the November 2013 interim agreement, with technical experts meeting continuously in Vienna. By contrast, the current US-Iran track has produced roughly eight rounds of talks across 13 months (April 2025 to May 2026) — but with a war, a ceasefire, and the death of Iran's supreme leader intervening [3].

The compressed timeline Trump appears to envision — a 60-day framework followed by final agreement — is far more ambitious than what produced the 2015 deal. Whether "not rushing" means days, weeks, or months of additional delay remains unclear. But every day without a deal is a day Iran retains its 460 kg of 60%-enriched uranium and the theoretical capability to sprint toward a weapon.

What Comes Next

The fundamental question is whether Trump's "not rushing" instruction reflects genuine strategic patience — a belief that economic pressure will extract additional concessions — or domestic political positioning ahead of a deal he intends to sign regardless.

Iran's economic situation is dire enough that most analysts expect Tehran to accept some version of the current framework. But the deal's durability depends on verification mechanisms that have yet to be agreed, regional buy-in that has yet to be secured, and domestic political support that has yet to be tested.

The historical record offers no reassurance. Extended nuclear negotiations have produced successful agreements (South Africa, Libya in 2003), complete breakdowns (North Korea after 2019), and worst-case outcomes where delay enabled weapons acquisition (Pakistan, North Korea pre-2006) [15][16]. Which precedent applies here depends on variables — Iranian leadership calculations, IAEA access, coalition cohesion — that remain genuinely uncertain.

What is certain: the clock is running on Iran's enriched uranium, on its collapsing economy, and on the fragile ceasefire that makes negotiations possible at all.