Report Documents Rising Government Pressure on Underground Catholics in China

In December 2025, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association's vice-chairman, Bishop Meng Qinglu, announced a new nationwide campaign: "Study the Regulations, Observe Discipline, Cultivate Virtue, and Build a Good Image" [1]. The campaign, initiated by the National Religious Affairs Administration, made the study of Chinese law and Xi Jinping's speeches compulsory for Catholic clergy [1]. Two months earlier, the Association had formally adopted regulations requiring all Catholic clergy to surrender their passports to state-controlled bodies and seek written approval at least 30 days before any trip outside mainland China [1].

These measures represent the latest escalation in a decade-long effort to bring China's estimated 12 million Catholics under full government control — and, according to a report released April 15, 2026, by Human Rights Watch, they are part of a pattern of rising coercion aimed at eliminating the "underground" Catholic church entirely [1].

The Report's Core Findings

The Human Rights Watch report, based on interviews with nine people outside China who have firsthand knowledge of Catholic life inside the country, documents a range of enforcement actions: arbitrary detention of bishops and priests, forced disappearances, house arrests, church closures, surveillance camera installations inside places of worship, and bans on religious education for minors [1].

At least 10 Catholic bishops — all recognized by the Vatican — are currently in indefinite detention, under house arrest, or have been forcibly disappeared, according to the report [1]. Among the most prominent cases:

• Bishop James Su Zhimin of Baoding diocese, Hebei province, age 94, has been detained without judicial process since 1997 [2][4].
• Bishop Augustine Cui Tai of Xuanhua diocese, Hebei province, was last arrested in April 2021 and has not been seen since [1][4].
• Bishop Peter Shao Zhumin of Wenzhou diocese, Zhejiang province, was taken by authorities in January 2024 and remains in custody [4].
• Bishop Thaddeus Ma Daqin of Shanghai has been under house arrest since 2012, when he publicly renounced his membership in the Patriotic Association during his own ordination ceremony [1][4].
• Bishop Vincent Guo Xijin, the Vatican-appointed bishop of Mindong, was demoted in favor of a government-selected replacement and is under house arrest [1].

The report also found that a church in Xuchang city, Henan province, was closed in December 2025 for "violating relevant regulations by allowing minors to enter the church to play music instruments" [1]. A September 2025 internal document attributed to the Central United Front Leading Group directed that parents "must not organize home-based religious education to instill religious ideas to their children" [1].

Human Rights Watch sent an inquiry to Chinese authorities on April 7, 2026. No response was received by the time of publication [1].

Legal Mechanisms Behind the Pressure

The enforcement rests on multiple overlapping legal frameworks. The 2018 revision of the Regulations on Religious Affairs — China's primary statute governing religious practice — requires all religious venues, clergy, and organizations to register with the state [3]. Unregistered religious activity is, by definition, illegal under these regulations.

Provincial implementation varies. In Hebei province, home to one of China's largest Catholic populations, authorities have ordered clergymen to post signs prohibiting minors from entering religious venues [1]. In Shaanxi province, after one underground congregation accepted the Vatican-China agreement and registered as an official church, local authorities rescheduled services to inconvenient hours, which a community member said resulted in reduced attendance [1]. A Catholic with firsthand knowledge of conditions in Shaanxi told Human Rights Watch in January 2026 that authorities had begun strictly enforcing bans on youth religious participation, a move "aimed at cutting generational ties within the Catholic community" [1].

In December 2025, the Patriotic Association adopted "Provisional Regulations on the Standardized Management of Exit-and-Entry Travel Documents for Catholic Clergy," formalizing a system in which clergy must submit their passports to the "Two Associations" — the Patriotic Association and the Chinese Catholic Bishops' Conference — and apply in writing 30 days before any travel outside mainland China [1]. An Online Code of Conduct for Religious Professionals, issued in September 2025, bans the circulation of unauthorized religious content online [5].

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has recommended that the U.S. State Department designate China as a "Country of Particular Concern" — the most severe classification — in every annual report since 1999 [6]. The 2025 USCIRF report found "no improvement" in China's religious freedom conditions [6].

The Vatican-China Agreement: What It Promised and What It Delivered

The 2018 Provisional Agreement on the Appointment of Bishops was designed to resolve a decades-old rift. Since 1957, when the Chinese Communist Party established the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, China's Catholics have been divided: those who worship through the state-sanctioned Patriotic Association, and those in the "underground" church who maintained loyalty to Rome and refused to accept government-appointed bishops [7].

Under the 2018 agreement — the full text of which has never been made public — Beijing proposes candidates for bishop, and the pope retains veto power [8]. The agreement was renewed in 2020 and 2022 for two-year terms, and in October 2024, it was extended for four years [8].

The Vatican has never exercised its veto. In 2022 and 2023, the Chinese government unilaterally appointed bishops in apparent violation of the agreement; Pope Francis later accepted the appointments [8][9]. The deal resulted in the recognition of several previously underground bishops by Beijing, including Joseph Zhang Weizhu and Melchior Shi Hongzhen [1]. But recognition has not uniformly translated into freedom: Zhang Weizhu was arrested in 2021 and held at an undisclosed location even after his official recognition [4].

One church member quoted in the Human Rights Watch report described the agreement bluntly: "The agreement was used as the most intelligent weapon to legally destroy underground churches" [1].

Cardinal Joseph Zen, the 94-year-old Bishop Emeritus of Hong Kong and the agreement's most prominent critic, has argued that the deal effectively "kills" the underground church by removing its theological rationale — loyalty to Rome — while offering no protection against state reprisal [9]. "I now think that Cardinal Parolin cares less about the Church than about diplomatic success," Zen said, referring to Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Vatican Secretary of State who was the agreement's principal architect [9].

Beijing's Counter-Narrative

China's 2018 white paper on religious policy states that there are 60,000 registered Catholic churches and places of assembly across 98 dioceses [7]. Officials have pointed to the Vatican-China agreement itself as evidence of normalization, framing it as proof that Catholic life is not only permitted but actively supported within the legal framework of the state.

The Patriotic Association's December 2023 five-year Sinicization plan calls for church doctrines, governance, rituals, and art to develop "Chinese characteristics compatible with socialist society" [5]. From the government's perspective, this is integration, not persecution — a process of bringing Catholic practice into alignment with Chinese law and socialist values, as it has with Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism.

Independent assessment of these claims is constrained. Human Rights Watch noted that its researchers are barred from entering China, and the report relied on sources outside the country [1]. No foreign journalist or NGO has been granted independent access to survey Catholic communities. Registration statistics cited by Beijing cannot be independently verified. Seminary enrollment data is not publicly available in disaggregated form.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not respond to Associated Press inquiries about the Human Rights Watch report [2].

Sinicization Across Religions: Targeted Campaign or Uniform Policy?

Skeptics of the "rising crackdown" framing note that enforcement has intensified across all religious communities in China, not just Catholic ones. The Sinicization campaign, launched formally by Xi Jinping in April 2016, encompasses all five officially recognized religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism [5][10].

Protestant house churches face constant surveillance and raids. Churches must display national flags and portraits of Xi, replace traditional hymns with patriotic songs, and preach obedience to the socialist order [10]. In March 2026, Foreign Policy reported on the detention of Pastor Jin Mingri and the closure of Beijing's Zion Church, one of the largest independent Protestant congregations [11]. The U.S. Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution in 2025 condemning the Chinese Communist Party's persecution of religious minority groups, including Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists, and specifically naming the Zion Church case [12].

Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns have been subjected to political reeducation, and authorities have altered or removed religious imagery from monasteries [10]. Uyghur Muslims face mass internment, forced labor, and cultural erasure in Xinjiang — measures that the U.S. government and several Western parliaments have characterized as genocide [6].

The comparative evidence suggests that while Catholics are not uniquely targeted, the underground church's specific vulnerability lies in its organizational structure. Unlike Protestant house churches, which are decentralized, the Catholic hierarchy of bishops and dioceses creates identifiable targets for enforcement. The Vatican connection adds a foreign-relations dimension — as one expert on Beijing-Vatican relations told Human Rights Watch, "Groups must not have any relations with foreign churches because that is seen as a national security issue" [1].

The Population Divide: Who Belongs Where?

Most estimates place China's total Catholic population at 10 to 12 million [1][7]. The split between the Patriotic Association and the underground church is roughly even — approximately 6 million in each [8]. China's 2018 white paper claims 6 million registered Catholics across 98 dioceses [7].

Since the 2018 agreement, the Vatican has urged underground Catholics to register with the official church, framing it as a step toward unity. Some communities have done so. But the Human Rights Watch report documents cases in which registration led not to protection but to new forms of control — such as the Shaanxi congregation whose services were rescheduled after it officially registered [1].

The precise number of underground Catholics who have attempted to register since 2018 is unknown. No Chinese government agency publishes disaggregated registration data, and the underground church, by definition, does not maintain centralized records accessible to outside researchers.

Source: OpenAlex

Data as of Jan 1, 2026CSV

Pope Leo XIV and the Future of the Agreement

The election of Pope Leo XIV in May 2025 introduced a new variable. Unlike his predecessor, Leo received Cardinal Zen for a 30-minute private audience — a meeting that Francis had repeatedly declined [13]. In his first address to the Vatican diplomatic corps, Leo referenced "the intensifying signs of tension in East Asia," whereas Francis never mentioned East Asia in his annual addresses [13].

Cardinal Stephen Chow of Hong Kong met Pope Leo on September 2, 2025, in what was described as an opportunity for the pope to "gain a fuller picture and a better understanding" of the situation [14]. Human Rights Watch has called on Leo to direct "an urgent review" of the 2018 agreement and to press the Chinese government to end the persecution of underground churches, clergy, and worshippers [3].

The agreement is not set for renewal until 2028, but its terms allow for ongoing consultation. The question facing the Vatican is whether continued engagement with Beijing has produced any measurable protection for underground Catholics — or whether, as critics argue, it has provided diplomatic cover for their elimination.

Diplomatic Precedent Beyond China

The Vatican-China agreement does not exist in isolation. The Holy See maintains relations or seeks engagement with several authoritarian states hosting Catholic minorities, including Vietnam, Cuba, and Eritrea. If the agreement is renewed or expanded despite documented pressure on underground Catholics, critics argue it establishes a template: states can secure Vatican cooperation by offering a formal role in bishop appointments while simultaneously dismantling the independent church.

The Hill argued in 2025 that Pope Leo XIV has an opportunity to "reorient Vatican diplomacy away from Russia and China and toward the West" [15]. Whether Leo chooses that path — or maintains the engagement framework inherited from Francis — will shape not only the future of 12 million Chinese Catholics but the broader credibility of Vatican diplomacy in contexts where religious freedom is at stake.

Limitations of the Evidence

Several important caveats apply to the available evidence. Human Rights Watch's report relies on nine sources outside China, not on-the-ground investigation [1]. The full text of the Vatican-China agreement remains secret, making it impossible to assess compliance against specific terms [8]. China bars foreign researchers and journalists from independent access to Catholic communities. Registration and enrollment data cited by Beijing cannot be independently verified. And satellite imagery of church demolitions — available in some cases for Protestant churches — has not been systematically compiled for Catholic sites.

The U.S. Congress has held hearings and passed resolutions on the topic, but American government assessments also rely substantially on exile testimony and NGO reporting [6][12]. Court records for detained bishops are not publicly available in China.

What is documented — through consistent reporting across Human Rights Watch, USCIRF, Catholic news agencies, and media outlets over multiple years — is a pattern: bishops detained or disappeared, churches closed or placed under surveillance, clergy stripped of travel documents, and a systematic campaign to absorb the underground church into a state body that answers to the Chinese Communist Party.