Poland Begins F-35 Pilot Training as NATO Defense Commitments Deepen

On May 9, 2025, a small group of Polish Air Force officers became the first foreign military sales pilots to graduate from F-35 training at Ebbing Air National Guard Base in Arkansas [1]. The milestone capped months of classroom instruction, simulator sessions at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, and live flying in Block 4 variants of the F-35A Lightning II — the same aircraft that Poland expects to begin receiving on home soil in mid-2026 [2]. For a country whose senior pilots still carry institutional memories of flying Soviet-designed MiGs under Moscow's doctrine of centralized ground control, the transition to America's most advanced stealth fighter represents more than a procurement decision. It is a generational bet on where Poland's security lies.

The Training Pipeline

Six Polish pilots were among the first cohort training at Ebbing following a 12-week theoretical and simulator course at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida [3]. The full training program is structured around seven groups of pilots: two groups will undergo a specialized 10-month instructor course, while the remaining five groups will complete a six-month training program before returning to Poland for operational service [3]. Ground crew and maintenance technician training is scheduled to begin in the third quarter of 2025, with completion expected by late 2026 [3].

Poland's 32nd Tactical Air Base in Łask, central Poland, is being prepared to receive the first aircraft. Lockheed Martin completed final assembly of three F-35A "Husarz" jets in early 2025, with deliveries of the remaining 25 aircraft set to begin in 2026 and run through 2029–2030 [4]. Full operational capability — meaning a combat-ready squadron — is projected for approximately 2030 [2].

The schedule has not been without friction. Deliveries originally planned for March–June 2026 slipped to November–December 2026, and four jets expected in early 2027 shifted to late that year [5]. The delays reflect a broader F-35 program problem: Lockheed Martin delivered 110 aircraft globally in 2024, every one of them an average of 238 days late, primarily because of the troubled Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) hardware and software upgrade [6].

The Price Tag and How It Compares

Poland signed its Letter of Offer and Acceptance on January 31, 2020, for 32 F-35A jets at a total cost of $4.6 billion — roughly $143.75 million per aircraft including training, simulators, logistics support, and the Autonomic Logistics Information System [7]. The U.S. State Department had originally approved the sale at a ceiling of $6.5 billion, but the final price dropped partly because Poland chose not to pursue industrial offset agreements, saving an estimated $1 billion [8].

The per-unit flyaway cost works out to approximately $87.3 million per jet [7]. For comparison, Norway's 52 F-35s carried an estimated lifetime cost of $769 million per aircraft when lifecycle sustainment is factored in, and Finland secured a lower per-unit acquisition price than Norway — roughly 34% less — by purchasing later in the production run when economies of scale had reduced costs [9]. In August 2025, the U.S. State Department approved a separate $1.85 billion sustainment package for Poland's F-35 fleet, signaling the long-term cost trajectory that comes with operating fifth-generation aircraft [10].

As a share of Poland's GDP (approximately $842 billion in 2024), the $4.6 billion acquisition alone represents roughly 0.55% of one year's economic output. When sustainment costs are layered on over a 30-year operational life, the total burden grows substantially, though precise lifetime estimates remain classified.

Defense Spending: NATO's New Leader

Poland's defense expenditure has undergone a dramatic transformation. From roughly 1.8–2.0% of GDP through most of the 2010s, spending surged to 2.4% in 2022 following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, then jumped to 3.9% in 2023 and an estimated 4.0% in 2024 [11][12].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

By 2025, NATO estimates placed Poland's defense spending at 4.48% of GDP — the highest of any alliance member, surpassing even the United States at 3.4% [12]. The government's draft 2026 budget projects a further increase to 4.8% [13].

Source: NATO

Data as of Jun 1, 2025CSV

Among NATO's eastern frontline states, Poland's spending leads the Baltic trio: Lithuania at 4.0%, Latvia at 3.7%, and Estonia at 3.4% [12]. This cluster of high spenders along Russia's western border represents a marked shift from pre-2022 patterns, when most European NATO members struggled to meet the alliance's 2% guideline.

Source: NATO / Notes From Poland

Data as of Sep 1, 2025CSV

Whether Warsaw can sustain these levels is an open question. Poland has no binding legal mechanism — comparable to, say, a constitutional debt brake — that locks future governments into a specific defense-spending floor. The current spending trajectory reflects broad political consensus forged by the war in Ukraine, but economists at the Atlantic Council have warned that the combination of high defense spending, expansive social programs, and infrastructure investment will eventually force trade-offs [14].

The Offset Question: What Poland Didn't Get

Unlike earlier F-35 buyers such as Norway, the Netherlands, and Italy — all of which secured industrial participation agreements that routed billions of dollars in manufacturing work to domestic firms — Poland deliberately forfeited offset arrangements [8]. The Ministry of Defence concluded that proposals from U.S. partners "did not match Polish requirements" and would have been too costly, citing three reasons: the proprietary nature of F-35 technology, the already-fixed global supply chain, and Poland's inability to join the program from its initial phase [8].

The decision was controversial. By contrast, Norway's status as a Level 3 partner in the Joint Strike Fighter program allowed Norwegian firms like Kongsberg to produce key components, including composite aerostructures and missile parts, generating billions in industrial return [9]. Poland's industrial participation is currently limited to PZL Mielec, a Lockheed Martin subsidiary since 2015 that produces F-16 fuselage structures and has been positioned as a potential subcontractor for additional F-35 components [15]. In early 2025, Lockheed Martin officials signaled that Poland could eventually join the global F-35 supply chain based on "high production quality, favorable geography, and competitive costs" — but no formal agreements have been signed [15].

Soviet Shadows: How Memory Shapes Doctrine

The cultural dimension of Poland's F-35 transition runs deeper than most NATO procurement stories. Lt. Col. "Shooter," a Polish F-16 pilot interviewed at the 32nd Tactical Air Base in Łask, told Fox News Digital that Poland's threat perception is shaped by living memory. "There are still people that lived in communism," he said. "We remember, and we don't want anything like that to happen again." Looking at Russia's wars in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine, he described an institutional conviction: "We have this intuition probably written in our DNA. When they are doing something, they're not going to stop unless the cost of the further operation is going to be more than what they're going to gain" [16].

This is not mere rhetoric. A 2005 U.S. Department of Defense study on the Polish Air Force's earlier conversion from MiG-29s to F-16s documented how Soviet-era training doctrine — built on rigid ground control of pilot actions, centralized decision-making, and suppression of individual initiative — created significant challenges for pilots transitioning to Western systems [17]. The biggest hurdle was not technical but cultural: moving from a "collectivistic approach" to the more autonomous, mission-command style practiced in NATO air forces [17]. Two decades later, that institutional shift is now largely complete, but the experience has left a distinctive mark on Polish Air Force culture — a combination of Western tactical proficiency and Eastern European threat awareness that officers describe as an asset rather than a liability.

Criticism: The Right Hardware for the Right War?

Not everyone in Warsaw views the F-35 acquisition as an unalloyed success. Security analyst Dariusz Kozerawski has argued that "despite increased defence spending, it does not translate into Poland's actual defence capabilities" in the near-term strategic window of three to five years, warning that Poland appears "prepared for a war of the past" [18]. Military consultant Maciej Lisowski has raised similar concerns about other big-ticket items, calling the $10 billion deal for 96 Apache helicopters "completely crazy" given how drones have made rotary-wing aircraft more vulnerable in modern combat [18].

The criticism crystallized in September 2025, when a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace exposed a stark capability gap. Polish forces shot down only 3 of 21 drones, using expensive fighter jets firing missiles costing over a million euros each — while Ukraine routinely intercepts over 90% of Russian drone swarms numbering 800 or more [18]. Analyst Marek Świerczyński observed that large procurements were "inspired more by domestic politics than clearly declared strategy," with major projects remaining "untouchable" politically [18].

The counter-argument, advanced by NATO planners and Polish defense officials, is that fifth-generation aircraft provide capabilities — stealth penetration of contested airspace, advanced sensor fusion, networked command — that no combination of drones and ground-based air defenses can replicate. The F-35's role in NATO's integrated air defense architecture and its potential involvement in nuclear deterrence missions (discussed below) represent strategic functions that sit outside the drone-vs.-jet debate.

Nuclear Dimensions and Russian Responses

Poland's F-35 acquisition carries implications that extend beyond conventional warfare. Under NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, American B61 gravity bombs are currently hosted by Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey, with allied pilots trained to deliver them using "dual-capable" aircraft [19]. Poland is not part of this arrangement, but Polish President Andrzej Duda has publicly stated: "If there were a decision by our allies to deploy nuclear weapons within the nuclear sharing also on our territory in order to strengthen the security of NATO's eastern flank, we are ready" [20].

Analysts at the Foundation for Strategic Research and War on the Rocks have noted that Polish F-35s could be integrated into NATO's nuclear mission without permanently stationing weapons on Polish soil — a model that would enhance deterrent credibility while avoiding the political complications of forward-deployed nuclear arms [19][21]. The head of Poland's National Security Bureau has floated precisely this option [20].

Russia's response has been predictable in tone if imprecise in specifics. Experts close to the Kremlin have threatened that Poland could become a nuclear attack target, and broader Russian commentary has framed NATO's eastward expansion of fifth-generation capabilities as destabilizing [22]. However, analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) have argued that Russia is already deterred by NATO and that Moscow's escalatory rhetoric reflects "exaggerated threat perceptions" rather than genuine intent to strike alliance territory [22]. Russia's own behavior — carefully avoiding direct military confrontation with NATO even while waging war in Ukraine — suggests the deterrent is functioning, though the introduction of stealth aircraft closer to Russian borders inevitably changes the signaling calculus on both sides.

Belarus has not been a significant independent voice on the issue, functioning largely as an extension of Russian strategic messaging since 2020.

Political Durability: Can the Next Government Walk Away?

The F-35 contract survived Poland's most consequential political transition in years. The Law and Justice (PiS) party government of Mateusz Morawiecki signed the original deal in January 2020. When Donald Tusk's Civic Coalition took power in December 2023, defense observers watched closely for any sign of wavering. There was none. Maj. Gen. Cezary Wisniewski, deputy general commander of the Polish Armed Forces, stated plainly: "We are committed to the old contract, which was signed up during the previous government. F-35 is a very crucial platform for the Polish air power projection concept. I don't see any issues with that contract going forward" [23].

The legal architecture reinforces this continuity. The contract is a government-to-government Letter of Offer and Acceptance under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales framework — a binding international agreement that would require formal diplomatic action to rescind, not merely a domestic procurement decision that a new minister could cancel [7]. Precedents from other NATO members offer limited comfort to those hoping for reversal: Switzerland briefly reconsidered its F-35 order following a cost dispute, but ultimately proceeded; no NATO member has successfully unwound an FMS-based F-35 contract after signing [23].

Poland has also begun exploring additional fighter purchases beyond the initial 32 F-35s. Options under consideration include more F-35As, Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighters, or Eurofighter Typhoons, pending approval of a new 15-year military capability plan [23]. A decision could come within one to ten years, according to Wisniewski.

What Comes Next

Poland's trajectory — from Soviet client state to NATO's largest per-capita defense spender, from MiG-29s to F-35s — is without precedent in the alliance's history. The first F-35 Husarz jets are expected to touch down at Łask in mid-2026, and by decade's end, Poland aims to operate a full squadron of 32 stealth fighters alongside its existing fleet of 48 F-16s [2][4].

The strategic logic is clear enough: a country of 38 million bordering both Russia's Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, with Ukraine's war raging a few hundred kilometers to the east, has chosen to make itself the hardest possible target. Whether that logic is matched by the right mix of capabilities — whether stealth jets answer the drone swarms and hybrid threats that define modern conflict — remains the central question that Poland's defense establishment has yet to fully resolve.

Since 2022, Warsaw has committed more than $50 billion to U.S. military equipment [14]. The bills are arriving. The pilots are training. The hangars at Łask are being built. What Poland is constructing is not just an air force but a statement about where the frontline of European security now lies — and who intends to hold it.