Pentagon Officials Alarmed by Trump's Push to Reduce US Military Presence in Germany

On April 29, 2026, President Donald Trump posted on social media that "The United States is studying and reviewing the possible reduction of Troops in Germany, with a determination to be made over the next short period of time" [1]. The announcement — made without prior coordination with the Department of Defense — came as Trump escalated a public feud with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over the US-led war against Iran, now in its third month. Senior Pentagon officials were caught off guard [2].

The threat reprises a pattern from Trump's first term, when he ordered the withdrawal of 9,500 troops from Germany in 2020 over defense spending grievances, only for the plan to stall and be formally reversed by President Biden in 2021 [3]. But the 2026 version arrives in a markedly different context: a shooting war in the Middle East that depends on German-based infrastructure, a Congress that has already legislated troop floors in Europe, and a Germany that has undergone a historic defense transformation since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Trigger: A Diplomatic Rift Over Iran

The immediate cause was Merz's public criticism of America's Iran campaign. On April 28, the German chancellor said the US was being "humiliated" by Iran and described the war as "ill-considered," comparing it to past US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq [4]. "The Americans clearly have no strategy, and the problem with conflicts like this is always that you don't just have to go in; you also have to get out again," Merz told reporters during a school visit in Marsberg [4].

Trump fired back, writing that "The Chancellor of Germany should spend more time on ending the war with Russia/Ukraine (Where he has been totally ineffective!), and fixing his broken Country, especially Immigration and Energy, and less time on interfering with those that are getting rid of the Iran Nuclear threat" [5]. By the next day, the troop review was public.

Merz subsequently sought to de-escalate, describing his relationship with Trump as "good" and emphasizing transatlantic cooperation during a visit to troops in Munster [4]. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul struck a more stoic tone: "We are prepared for that" [6].

What Is Actually at Stake: The Scale of America's German Footprint

Germany hosts the largest concentration of US military personnel outside the United States. As of December 2025, 36,436 active-duty service members were permanently stationed there, according to the Defense Manpower Data Center [1]. The broader Kaiserslautern Military Community alone encompasses 56,000 military and civilian personnel — the largest American military population overseas [7].

Source: US Defense Manpower Data Center

Data as of Dec 1, 2025CSV

That number represents a steep decline from the Cold War peak of roughly 227,000 troops in 1990, but it has stabilized and even ticked upward since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Across the entire European Command area of responsibility, approximately 84,000 US service members are deployed — the highest figure since the Cold War [7].

The installations in Germany serve functions far beyond European defense:

• Ramstein Air Base hosts over 16,200 personnel and serves as headquarters for US Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA). It is the primary hub for airlift, logistics, and drone operations across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa [7].
• US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is headquartered in Stuttgart, coordinating all US military operations on the African continent [8].
• US European Command (EUCOM) is also based in Stuttgart [3].
• Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, near Ramstein, is the only US Level II Trauma Center overseas. It has been treating casualties from the Iran war since it began on February 28, 2026, pausing its labor and delivery services to handle the influx of wounded [9].

As of early April, the Pentagon reported 13 US troops killed and more than 380 wounded in Operation Epic Fury [10]. Landstuhl has been central to the medical evacuation chain, with roughly 25 wounded soldiers treated there and a dozen evacuated onward to Walter Reed in Maryland [9].

Retired Lt. General Ben Hodges, former commander of US Army Europe, characterized the withdrawal proposal as "clearly about retribution" against Merz. "This is not a strategy move. If this continues, we're only hurting ourselves," Hodges told Newsweek [11].

The Cost Question: Would Withdrawal Save Money?

Trump's burden-sharing argument has remained consistent since his first term: Germany is wealthy enough to defend itself, and American taxpayers should not subsidize its security. But defense economists have repeatedly challenged the premise that withdrawal would produce savings.

The Pentagon is analyzing the cost implications of relocation, but experts warn that building new facilities to accommodate relocated personnel — whether at home or in Eastern Europe — would cost billions [11]. During the 2020 withdrawal planning, Pentagon estimates for relocating 9,500 troops ranged into the billions of dollars, with a multi-year timeline for completion [12]. The broader European posture costs over $30 billion annually, but that spending supports global force projection, not just European defense [7].

Germany also contributes substantially to hosting costs. Berlin covers a significant share of local infrastructure, utilities, and support services for US bases — an arrangement that would not transfer to a new location. The Kaiserslautern Military Community's decades of accumulated infrastructure, including training ranges, warehouses, and command facilities, has been described by military planners as the "industrial heart" of EUCOM [12].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Germany's Defense Transformation

The burden-sharing debate has shifted substantially since 2020. Germany spent just 1.38% of GDP on defense when Trump first threatened withdrawal. By 2024, that figure had reached approximately 1.9%, and in 2025, Germany exceeded the 2% NATO target for the first time since 1991, reaching 2.3% of GDP [13].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The transformation has accelerated under Chancellor Merz. Germany's 2026 defense budget stands at roughly €108 billion — a 36-year high — combining the regular defense budget with what remains of the €100 billion Sondervermögen (special fund) created by the Scholz government after Russia's 2022 invasion [14]. Germany plans to reach NATO's newly raised target of 3.5% of GDP by 2029 [14].

In 2025, for the first time in the modern alliance's history, all 32 NATO members met or exceeded the 2% of GDP defense spending guideline [15]. European allies and Canada achieved a 20% increase in defense spending in a single year. At The Hague summit, allies committed to a 5% GDP target by 2035 [15].

Source: NATO

Data as of Jun 1, 2025CSV

This raises a question that some defense analysts take seriously: if Germany is now spending at historic levels and building a capable military, does the strategic rationale for a large US presence diminish? The steelman version of the withdrawal argument holds that a wealthier, remilitarizing Germany no longer needs the security umbrella it required in 1955.

But critics counter that the US presence in Germany serves American interests — force projection to the Middle East and Africa, intelligence capabilities, medical infrastructure — at least as much as it serves German ones. The Iran war has made this point viscerally concrete.

Congressional Guardrails

Congress has already moved to constrain the president's ability to reduce forces in Europe. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, passed in December 2025 with a bipartisan vote of 312-112, prevents the Pentagon from maintaining fewer than 76,000 troops in Europe for longer than 45 days [16]. The bill authorizes a record $901 billion in national security spending — $8 billion more than Trump requested [16].

If the Pentagon wants to reduce troop levels beyond the 45-day window, the Secretary of Defense and EUCOM leadership must certify to Congress that they have consulted all 32 NATO allies and that the reduction serves US national security interests [17]. They must also provide an analysis of how the drawdown would affect NATO warfighting plans and the alliance's ability to respond to Russian aggression [17].

The NDAA also prohibits shifting military hardware valued at more than $500,000 from Europe without similar justification [17].

A Congressional Research Service report has examined the separation-of-powers question surrounding NATO withdrawal more broadly, noting that while the president has broad authority over troop deployments as commander-in-chief, Congress controls the purse and has historically used authorization and appropriations riders to constrain executive action on force posture [18].

Eastern Flank Anxiety

The proposal has generated concern well beyond Berlin. Poland, which hosts 10,000-12,000 US troops and has been building major infrastructure to support a permanent American presence, has consistently advocated for deeper US commitment [19]. Key projects include the Powidz logistics complex, the Aegis Ashore missile defense system at Redzikowo, and expanded facilities at Drawsko Pomorskie [19].

The Baltic states view the US presence as existential. Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna has warned that Russia could "return to Baltic borders with even more troops and military equipment than before" within "two to three years, or less" [19]. NATO's eastern flank faces growing Russian "grey zone" threats including UAV incursions and sabotage attempts, prompting frontline states to build layered defensive programs combining fortifications, surveillance, and short-range air defenses [19].

This creates a structural contradiction in the burden-sharing debate: the same allies Trump pressures to spend more are simultaneously requesting additional US troops, not fewer. Poland spends 4.12% of GDP on defense — more than double the NATO target — and still wants a larger American footprint [15].

Russia's Calculus

Moscow has historically welcomed signs of US-European friction. During the 2020 withdrawal episode, Russian officials expressed satisfaction at the prospect of reduced US forces in Germany, though they raised concerns about potential redeployment to Poland and the Baltic states, which they framed as violations of the NATO-Russia Founding Act [20].

The Wilson Center analysis noted that the Kremlin "is programmed to look for opportunities and weakness, and will regard the announcement as yet another indicator of deteriorating political relationships between the US and Germany" [20]. Russian state media have amplified the story.

Whether a reduction would materially alter Russian threat calculations is debated. Some analysts argue that US forward presence is already "priced into" Russian military planning, and that NATO's collective capabilities — with or without a specific troop count in Germany — determine the actual balance of forces. Others contend that visible US withdrawal sends a political signal that matters more than the arithmetic of divisions.

In February 2026, Undersecretary of War Elbridge Colby indicated that any posture review would result in only limited withdrawals, with "the vast bulk" of troops in Germany, Italy, and the eastern flank remaining in place [21]. That assurance preceded Trump's April escalation.

A Pattern, Not an Anomaly

Trump's use of troop withdrawals as diplomatic leverage is by now a well-established pattern. He threatened withdrawal from Germany in 2018 and 2020, from South Korea repeatedly, and has publicly questioned the value of NATO itself. In each case, the threats generated institutional resistance from the Pentagon, congressional pushback, and allied anxiety — followed by partial or complete reversal.

The 2026 episode follows this template but occurs under more consequential conditions. The US is fighting an active war that depends on German-based medical and logistics infrastructure. Congress has erected specific legal barriers. And Germany, far from the defense free-rider of 2020, is in the midst of the largest military buildup in its postwar history.

Whether the review produces an actual drawdown order, a token reduction for political effect, or — as in 2020 — no action at all, will depend on factors beyond the Trump-Merz relationship: the trajectory of the Iran conflict, the resilience of congressional constraints, and the Pentagon's willingness to push back on a commander-in-chief who has shown he does not welcome institutional resistance.

What is clear is that the 36,000 American service members in Germany, many of them currently supporting a war effort in the Middle East, have become bargaining chips in a dispute between two leaders who cannot agree on the war they are conducting together.