Palestinians Vote in Local Elections in West Bank and Parts of Gaza

On April 25, 2026, polling stations opened across the occupied West Bank and in the central Gaza city of Deir el-Balah for Palestinian municipal elections — the first vote to include any part of Gaza in more than 20 years [1]. Over one million eligible voters were called to choose representatives for local councils that oversee basic services: water, roads, electricity, waste collection, and building permits [2]. The vote proceeded under Israeli military occupation, with no national elections held since 2006, amid a war that has killed tens of thousands in Gaza and displaced the vast majority of the territory's population.

The elections are both a logistical feat and a political minefield. They were hailed by the Palestinian Authority as a step toward democratic renewal and by international backers as evidence of institutional capacity. But critics — ranging from boycotting factions to skeptical voters — called them a distraction, a democratic façade, or worse, a mechanism that risks consolidating authoritarian rule while conferring legitimacy on an occupation that constrains every aspect of Palestinian political life [3][4].

The Scope: Who Votes, Where, and Who Doesn't

The Central Elections Commission (CEC) registered 1,029,550 eligible voters across the West Bank and Gaza [5]. In practical terms, competitive elections — meaning more than one list of candidates on the ballot — took place in 183 local councils: 90 municipal councils and 93 village councils [5]. An additional 237 councils were decided by "acclamation," meaning a single uncontested list was appointed without a vote — a practice concentrated in PA strongholds like Ramallah and Nablus, where Fatah discouraged challengers [6].

In Gaza, voting was confined to a single municipality: Deir el-Balah, where approximately 70,000 residents were eligible to cast ballots at 12 polling centers [1]. The CEC described the Gaza vote as a "pilot" — a symbolic exercise chosen because Deir el-Balah is one of the few areas in Gaza not destroyed by Israeli military operations [1]. The city's prewar population of roughly 110,000 has swelled to over 350,000 due to displacement [7].

Source: Central Elections Commission / Reuters

Data as of Apr 25, 2026CSV

The geographic limitation is stark. The remaining municipalities across Gaza — including Gaza City, Khan Younis, and Rafah — did not participate. Israeli forces control approximately 53 percent of Gaza's territory, and the CEC was unable to coordinate logistics directly with Israel or with Hamas [1][8].

Two Decades Without a Vote: The Election Gap

Palestinian elections have been sporadic and frequently cancelled. The last national legislative elections were held on January 25, 2006, when Hamas won a decisive majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council [9]. That victory triggered an international aid freeze and, within 18 months, a civil war between Hamas and Fatah that split Palestinian governance between Gaza and the West Bank [10].

Since 2006, the Palestinian Legislative Council has not conducted meaningful business. President Mahmoud Abbas, elected in 2005 to a four-year term, remains in office more than 20 years later with no re-election. Legislative and presidential elections were scheduled for May 2021 but were indefinitely postponed by Abbas on April 29, 2021, ostensibly over Israel's refusal to allow voting in East Jerusalem [9][11].

Source: Palestinian Central Elections Commission

Data as of Apr 25, 2026CSV

Local elections have occurred more frequently but remain irregular. Municipal votes were held in the West Bank in 2012 and 2017, but Gaza was excluded from both cycles due to the Hamas-Fatah split [5]. The 2026 vote is the first to include any part of Gaza since 2005.

Structurally, the rules have changed. A new election law imposed several requirements: candidates must affirm commitment to the PLO's political program and international agreements; full electoral lists are now required (previously, a "half plus one" slate sufficed); non-refundable registration fees were increased; and the minimum candidate age was set at 25 [12]. The CEC also introduced a mixed electoral system with open lists and lowered the electoral threshold from 8 percent to 5 percent [12].

Boycotts and Candidate Restrictions

Five Palestinian factions boycotted the elections: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestine People's Party, FIDA, and the Palestinian National Initiative (Mubadara) [5]. Their objection centered on the requirement that candidates commit to the PLO's program, which they argued imposed politically defined constraints that contradict constitutional principles and excluded dissenting voices [5][12].

Mustafa Barghouti, leader of the Palestinian National Initiative, said the law "imposes politically defined commitments on candidates" and cited this as grounds for his movement's boycott [12].

The result was an electoral field dominated by Fatah-affiliated and independent lists. Hamas did not field candidates and did not officially endorse any slate, though it said it would respect the results [8]. "Hamas is not participating in this election and does not support any of the lists," spokesperson Hazem Qassem said, adding that the group is "fully ready to provide all the conditions for the success of this electoral event" [1].

In practice, the combination of candidate restrictions and faction boycotts meant that roughly 5,131 candidates competed across the 183 contested councils — 3,773 for municipal seats and 1,358 for village councils [5]. Each list was required to include at least four women among its 15 candidates [7].

Hamas: Standing Aside, or Standing Behind?

Hamas's decision not to participate formally did not eliminate concerns about its influence. In Deir el-Balah, four lists competed: "Peace and Construction," "Deir al-Balah Unites Us," "The Future of Deir al-Balah," and "The Renaissance of Deir al-Balah" [7]. Each presented itself as independent and service-oriented.

But the list "Deir al-Balah Unites Us" drew scrutiny. Two of its candidates appeared in photographs with Hamas officials or police officers, raising questions about whether the list serves as a proxy for the group [8]. Hamas continues to operate a parallel governance structure across roughly 47 percent of Gaza: taxing residents, running schools, and deploying police [8].

Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies warned that elections held prematurely "led to Hamas winning, and it led to a standoff which led to a civil war" in 2006 [8]. He cautioned: "You've got to be really careful when it comes to holding elections with a territory like Gaza" where groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. and the EU remain influential [8].

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib of the Atlantic Council called the timing "extremely reckless and irresponsible," noting that Gazans face arrest and violence for speech critical of Hamas [8].

The precedent from 2006 is instructive. When Hamas won that legislative election, the response was swift: the United States and European Union cut all funds to the PA. The Fatah-led government returned $50 million in U.S. aid. Israel withheld monthly tax and customs receipts it collects on the PA's behalf [10]. The Quartet for Middle East Peace — the U.S., EU, Russia, and the United Nations — established conditions that remain in force: any Palestinian government must commit to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of prior agreements [10].

If Hamas-aligned candidates were to win significant local seats, these conditions would create pressure on international donors to reconsider funding flows. The EU is the PA's largest funder, and the U.S. conditions aid on the PA meeting the Quartet principles [10][13]. At the local level, Israeli coordination on civil administration — including permits, water allocation, and movement of goods — runs through the PA; a Hamas presence in local governance could complicate or sever those channels.

International Monitoring and Conditions

The elections drew broad international attention. A joint statement from the EU and its member states, along with 28 countries including the United States, Canada, and Japan, welcomed the vote [13]. At the CEC's invitation, diplomatic representatives monitored polling on the ground. The CEC accredited 2,539 observers from 69 monitoring bodies, with 336 observers from 12 institutions in Deir el-Balah alone [13].

France's involvement carried a specific condition: as part of its recognition of Palestine, President Emmanuel Macron secured Abbas's commitment to hold national elections by June 2026 [13]. Whether these local elections satisfy that commitment, or merely serve as a precursor, remains an open question.

The UN Deputy Coordinator for the region, Ramiz Alakbarov, called the elections "an important opportunity for Palestinians to exercise their democratic rights during an exceptionally challenging period" [1].

What's Actually on the Ballot

Local councils in the West Bank and Gaza manage day-to-day services — but the issues differ sharply between the two territories.

In Deir el-Balah, candidates focused on crisis management. Water scarcity dominated voter concerns. Candidate Faten Harb said: "All women are demanding adequate access to water," listing top priorities as "ensuring water reaches everyone, improving cleanliness, and managing solid waste" [7]. Candidate Khalil Abu Samra proposed a three-phase recovery: "relief, recovery, and strategic plans," including cooperation with the EU and international donors [7]. The city's infrastructure has been devastated; the population has tripled with displaced families living in tents and temporary shelters.

In the West Bank, concerns were more routine but no less pressing: street repairs, waste management, parks for children, water pipe maintenance, and economic opportunity [6]. But voters expressed deep skepticism about whether local councils can deliver on any of these promises under occupation. A businessman told Al Jazeera: "They will choose new decisionmakers, and I believe they will do the same" as their predecessors [6].

The structural reality is that West Bank councils operate within severe constraints. In Area C — which encompasses 60 percent of West Bank territory — Israel retains direct civil and security control [3]. Even in Areas A and B, where the PA has partial jurisdiction, local officials cannot address settler violence, military raids, or the permit system that governs construction and movement.

Elections Without Sovereignty: The Core Debate

The most fundamental disagreement over these elections is not about logistics or candidates but about what elections mean under occupation.

Critics argue that holding elections without sovereignty produces "participation without power" [3]. Palestinian analyst writing in Al Jazeera contended that the PA, created through the Oslo Accords, "was designed not to serve Palestinian national liberation, but to manage daily life under occupation" — effectively reducing occupation costs for Israel by transferring responsibilities that international law assigns to the occupying power [3]. In this view, elections legitimate that arrangement rather than challenge it.

The geographic fragmentation reinforces this critique. Voting occurred across disconnected enclaves while Gaza was largely excluded. Palestinians with Israeli citizenship do not participate in PA elections. The jurisdiction and capacity of elected representatives fluctuate according to Israeli military decisions, not democratic mandates [3].

Proponents counter that postponing elections indefinitely is its own form of democratic damage. The PA has governed without a popular mandate for nearly two decades. Abbas has ruled by decree, the Legislative Council is defunct, and approval ratings for the PA as an institution hover between 20 and 30 percent — meaning roughly 70 to 80 percent of Palestinians distrust it [4][6]. A 26-year-old pharmacist in the West Bank told Al Jazeera: "It's been since before I was aware that there were significant elections. We've always lived like this" [6].

The argument for proceeding rests on a pragmatic calculation: imperfect elections are preferable to no elections at all, and local governance — however constrained — is the one arena where Palestinians can exercise some agency over their daily lives. The CEC framed the Gaza vote specifically as a mechanism to "link the West Bank and Gaza politically as one system" [1], reinforcing the principle of territorial unity at a time when physical partition is deepening.

What Comes Next

These elections do not resolve any of the fundamental questions of Palestinian governance. National elections — for the presidency and the legislature — remain unscheduled. Abbas, now 90, has not named a successor through any democratic process. The Hamas-Fatah split persists. And the war in Gaza continues, with Israeli forces occupying large swaths of territory and no agreed framework for reconstruction or transition.

The local councils elected on April 25 will serve four-year terms [5]. Their practical authority will depend on factors largely outside their control: whether Israel coordinates with PA-administered councils, whether international donors sustain funding, and whether Hamas allows elected councils in Gaza to operate independently of its parallel governance structures.

For 70,000 voters in Deir el-Balah, the act of casting a ballot carried symbolic weight beyond the municipal services at stake. As one voter told the Christian Science Monitor: it was about demonstrating that Palestinians value democratic participation and peaceful development, even amid ongoing instability [7]. But as grocery owner Hisham Ahmed asked: "Why should we vote...when we could be bombed at any moment?" [7]

The tension between those two sentiments — between the aspiration for democratic self-governance and the daily reality of occupation and war — defines not just this election but the broader Palestinian political condition. Whether these local votes represent a genuine first step or a performative exercise will depend on what follows them.