Lebanon Says Hezbollah and Israel Agree to Reciprocal Halt to Attacks

On the evening of June 1, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hezbollah had agreed to halt hostilities after a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and communications with Hezbollah through mediators [1]. Hours later, Lebanon's state news agency reported Israeli airstrikes continuing across southern Lebanon [2]. The pattern—announcement, then violation—has become familiar in a conflict that has killed thousands, displaced over a million people, and reduced southern Lebanon's infrastructure to rubble.

The question is whether this latest arrangement represents anything more than a tactical pause dressed in diplomatic language.

What Was Actually Agreed

The core of the arrangement, as described by Lebanese and U.S. officials, is narrow: Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs (Dahieh) would cease in exchange for Hezbollah refraining from attacks against Israel [3]. Trump stated that "there will be no Israeli troops going to Beirut" and that Hezbollah had agreed "all shooting will stop" [4].

Lebanon's presidency said it had "received confirmation of Hezbollah's agreement to the US proposal, which calls for a reciprocal cessation of attacks" [3]. Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, the longtime intermediary between Hezbollah and the international community, separately told U.S. Ambassador to Beirut that Hezbollah "would be ready to totally commit to a comprehensive ceasefire" and that he was "ready to guarantee it" [5].

But the terms remain vague on several fronts. The agreement does not appear to explicitly address drone operations, cyber attacks, cross-border raids, or targeted assassinations—all of which have been features of the conflict. Geographic scope is also ambiguous: while the Beirut suburbs are covered, the status of southern Lebanon, where Israeli ground forces remain deployed across five divisions, is less clear [6]. Berri proposed a ceasefire "on the ground, in the air and at sea" that would include Israel ceasing house demolitions in southern Lebanon, but whether Israel accepted those broader terms has not been confirmed [5].

A History of Broken Truces

The track record of ceasefire agreements between Israel and Hezbollah provides little basis for optimism.

The foundational agreement is UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon War. It called for a full cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from south of the Litani River, the disarmament of all non-state armed groups, and the deployment of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces [7]. None of these provisions were fully implemented. By 2024, Hezbollah had amassed an estimated 120,000–200,000 munitions—far exceeding its pre-2006 arsenal—and maintained extensive military infrastructure south of the Litani, including tunnels, weapons caches, and launch sites [7]. Israel, for its part, continued near-daily drone surveillance flights over Lebanese airspace, which Lebanon considers violations of its sovereignty [7].

The most recent precedent is the April 17, 2026 ceasefire, brokered by the United States after the devastating April 8 strikes on Beirut that killed at least 357 people [8]. That agreement established a 10-day truce with three key provisions: Israel would retain the right to act in "self-defense" while refraining from offensive operations; Lebanon would take steps to prevent Hezbollah from attacking Israel; and the ceasefire could be extended if progress was made [9]. Hezbollah was not a formal signatory [10].

The April ceasefire collapsed almost immediately. Hezbollah resumed rocket strikes after Israeli operations that Israel characterized as "self-defense," while Hezbollah called them offensive violations [10]. A senior Hezbollah official publicly stated that the group "will not respect what Israel and Lebanon decide in their latest talks" [10].

Who Brokered This—and Who Enforces It

The United States is the primary broker, with Trump personally announcing the arrangement after direct communication with Netanyahu and indirect channels to Hezbollah through Lebanese intermediaries [1]. No other governments appear to have formally co-signed or witnessed the agreement.

The enforcement picture is bleak. UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force that has operated in southern Lebanon since 1978, is winding down. The UN Security Council's August 2025 resolution renewed UNIFIL's mandate for a final time through December 31, 2026, directing a drawdown and withdrawal [11]. As Israeli forces have pushed past the Litani River, Lebanese civilians have openly questioned UNIFIL's purpose [12].

A separate monitoring body, the U.S.-led International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism (IMIM), was established after the November 2024 ceasefire, but its capacity to enforce compliance is limited [13]. UNIFIL participates in IMIM meetings but does not formally monitor ceasefire implementation [13]. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has proposed a new force to replace UNIFIL, comprising "hundreds or even thousands of troops," but no Security Council action has been taken [14].

In short, the June 2026 arrangement has no formal enforcement mechanism, no neutral monitoring body with teeth, and no clear process for adjudicating violations.

Hezbollah's Calculus: Regroup or Collapse

Hezbollah has suffered catastrophic losses since October 2023. The IDF estimates approximately 3,800 Hezbollah fighters killed as of late 2024, with at least 7,000 more sustaining injuries severe enough to remove them from combat [15]. Israel's September 2024 operations—including the electronic device attacks on Hezbollah's communications network—were followed by the assassination of Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, Hashem Safieddine [15].

Source: IDF / Washington Institute estimates

Data as of Jun 1, 2026CSV

The group's military capacity has been sharply reduced. According to IDF and Washington Institute estimates, Hezbollah's rocket arsenal is down to roughly 20% of its pre-war size, its drone corps to 30%, and approximately one-third of its pre-war fighting force has been killed [15][16]. The IDF claims that since the November 2024 ceasefire alone, it has killed over 400 Hezbollah operatives, struck hundreds of Hezbollah sites, and conducted over 1,200 raids in southern Lebanon [15].

For Hezbollah, a halt in hostilities—even an informal one—offers a chance to rebuild. The Washington Institute assessed the group as "beaten but still dangerous," noting that despite heavy losses, Hezbollah retains organizational cohesion and the ability to reconstitute [16]. Critics of the ceasefire, particularly in Israel, argue that any pause allows Hezbollah to rearm through Iranian supply lines, replenish its depleted leadership ranks, and fortify remaining positions.

Hezbollah's political leadership likely also sees a ceasefire as a way to prevent further erosion of its domestic standing. The group's decision to open a front against Israel in support of Hamas after October 7, 2023 was deeply unpopular among many Lebanese, who blame Hezbollah for inviting destruction on a country already reeling from economic collapse [17].

The Human Cost

The scale of civilian suffering in Lebanon is staggering. Since the escalation began in October 2023, approximately 4,000 Lebanese have been killed, and over one million have been displaced [18]. The 2026 phase of the war—triggered by Israel and the United States launching operations against Iran in late February 2026 and Hezbollah's retaliatory rocket strikes—has added at least 3,000 more dead and displaced another million people, representing more than 20% of Lebanon's population [6].

Source: UN OCHA / World Bank / IDF estimates

Data as of Jun 1, 2026CSV

The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon's reconstruction and recovery needs stood at $11 billion, based on damage assessed through December 2024 [19]. That figure has almost certainly grown since. The damage to physical structures alone was estimated at $6.8 billion, with $7.2 billion in economic losses from reduced productivity, forgone revenues, and operating costs [19]. In southern Lebanon, more than 40,000 structures—about 25% of all buildings—had been destroyed or heavily damaged by November 2024 [20].

Even where ceasefires have held, reconstruction has been obstructed. Human Rights Watch documented Israeli forces unlawfully destroying reconstruction equipment in December 2025 [21], and the destruction of roads, bridges, and other infrastructure has prevented displaced residents from returning [22]. Over 64,000 people remained displaced as of late 2025, unable to go home even after the November 2024 ceasefire [23].

Can Lebanon Speak for Hezbollah?

A fundamental tension runs through this announcement: the Lebanese state is presenting itself as the guarantor of a deal involving an armed group that operates independently of state authority.

Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri—a Shia Muslim who heads the Amal Movement, Hezbollah's political ally—has served as the primary intermediary [5]. Berri maintains a direct communication channel with Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, who remains in hiding [5]. But Berri's dual role as parliament speaker and Hezbollah's messenger raises questions about whether his guarantees carry the weight of state authority or merely reflect his personal relationship with the group.

The Lebanese government's capacity to enforce any commitment on Hezbollah's behalf is limited. The Lebanese Armed Forces are "overly stretched" according to Al Jazeera reporting, and have never had the capability or political mandate to disarm Hezbollah [24]. The November 2024 ceasefire included provisions for Lebanon to "take steps to prevent Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups from carrying out attacks against Israel" [9]—a commitment the state lacks the means to fulfill.

This creates a diplomatic fiction: the international community negotiates with Beirut, Beirut relays messages to Hezbollah, Hezbollah signals conditional agreement through Berri, and everyone treats this as a binding arrangement. When it breaks down, each party can blame the others.

Israel's Framing: Ceasefire or Tactical Pause?

Israeli officials have been careful in their language. Defense Minister Israel Katz articulated the standing Israeli position that "if there is no calm in the north, there will be no calm in Beirut" [25]. Israel has consistently characterized its operations in Lebanon as self-defense, a framing that preserves maximum operational flexibility regardless of any ceasefire language.

The distinction between a "ceasefire," a "cessation of hostilities," and a "tactical pause" is not semantic—it has direct implications for durability. A formal ceasefire typically involves defined terms, monitoring mechanisms, and consequences for violations. What Trump announced on June 1 more closely resembles a mutual de-escalation commitment with no enforcement structure, no formal signatories beyond the two governments (with Hezbollah conspicuously absent as a direct party), and no timeline [1].

Israel's retention of five divisions in southern Lebanon [6], its continued expansion of ground operations past the Litani River [12], and its destruction of civilian infrastructure all suggest that the Israeli military views any halt as conditional and reversible. Iran's Revolutionary Guards have stated that "crossing the red lines in Lebanon and Gaza" would mean "direct war" [25], adding another layer of escalation risk.

What Makes This Different—Or Doesn't

Proponents of the June 1 arrangement point to several factors that distinguish it from prior failed agreements. First, Hezbollah's military degradation is real and unprecedented—the group has never been this weakened since its founding [16]. Second, the U.S.-Iran war that triggered the 2026 escalation has its own ceasefire as of April 8, potentially reducing Iran's incentive to fuel proxy conflicts [8]. Third, UNIFIL's impending departure may create pressure on all parties to establish alternative security arrangements [11].

Skeptics counter that Hezbollah's weakness could make a ceasefire less stable, not more. A wounded Hezbollah may feel compelled to demonstrate continued relevance through provocative actions, while Israel may see an opportunity to inflict further damage before the group recovers. The absence of any formal enforcement mechanism—and the imminent loss of UNIFIL—means violations go unmonitored and unpunished.

The Council on Foreign Relations noted that a prior ceasefire extension in the 2026 conflict lasted only three weeks before collapsing [26]. The Japan Times reported that even as Lebanon announced the latest halt, attacks continued on the ground [2].

What Comes Next

The durability of the June 1 arrangement will likely be tested within days, if not hours. The immediate indicators to watch are whether Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon actually stop (they had not as of June 2), whether Hezbollah rocket fire into northern Israel ceases, and whether either side uses the ambiguity of "self-defense" provisions to justify renewed operations.

Longer term, several structural issues must be resolved for any lasting peace: the status of Israeli ground forces in Lebanon, the fate of UNIFIL and its successor, Hezbollah's disarmament (or lack thereof), and the reconstruction of southern Lebanon—a $11 billion project that cannot begin in earnest while military operations continue [19].

Lebanon, already in the grip of an economic crisis that predates the current war, cannot absorb these costs alone. The World Bank estimates that $3–5 billion in reconstruction will require public financing, with $6–8 billion needing private investment [19]. International donors will be reluctant to fund rebuilding in an active conflict zone.

For now, the gap between diplomatic announcements and ground reality remains wide. The question is not whether Lebanon says Hezbollah has agreed to a halt—it is whether Hezbollah, Israel, and the conditions that drive their conflict have actually changed enough to make this time different. The evidence so far suggests they have not.