Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Extended by Three Weeks

On April 23, 2026, President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Lebanon had agreed to extend their ceasefire by three weeks, following a high-level meeting in the Oval Office attended by representatives from both countries, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, and U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa [1]. The extension pushed back the expiration of a 10-day ceasefire brokered just one week earlier, on April 16 [2]. Trump said he hoped to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun at the White House during the extended truce period [1].

The announcement marked the latest chapter in a series of temporary agreements that have repeatedly paused — but never resolved — the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that has killed more than 2,000 people and displaced over one million since fighting resumed in March 2026 [3].

A Pattern of Extensions

The cycle of ceasefires and extensions began with the November 27, 2024 agreement, brokered by the Biden administration with French support. That deal established a 60-day halt to hostilities following Israel's October 2024 ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Under its terms, Israel was to withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory while Hezbollah was to pull its fighters north of the Litani River, with 5,000 Lebanese troops deploying to enforce compliance and a five-country monitoring panel overseeing the process [4].

Israel did not meet the January 26, 2025 withdrawal deadline. Instead, the two sides agreed to extend it to February 18, 2025 [5]. Even after that second deadline, Israeli forces remained in Lebanon. By September 2025, UNIFIL reported that Israel had "fortified positions" at multiple points inside Lebanese territory [6].

Source: Multiple sources

Data as of Apr 24, 2026CSV

The ceasefire effectively collapsed on March 2, 2026, when Hezbollah launched strikes on Israel following the U.S.-Israeli assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the broader 2026 Iran war [7]. Israel responded with airstrikes across Lebanon, including on Beirut, triggering a full-scale resumption of the war that had technically been paused for 15 months [3].

By mid-April 2026, with casualties mounting and diplomatic pressure building, the Trump administration brokered a new 10-day cessation of hostilities beginning April 16 [2]. That truce was extended on April 23 — before it had even reached its original expiration date [1].

What the Agreements Actually Require

The April 2026 ceasefire terms, published by the State Department, are notably less specific than the 2024 agreement. Israel "retains the right to act in self-defense against imminent or ongoing threats, while refraining from offensive military operations in Lebanon." Lebanon, "with international support, is to take steps to prevent Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups from carrying out attacks against Israel" [2].

The 2024 agreement was more detailed. It required the disarmament of Hezbollah south of the Litani River, the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese troops, a full Israeli withdrawal, and international monitoring [4]. According to UNIFIL, compliance was poor on both sides. By late 2025, UNIFIL had documented more than 10,000 Israeli ceasefire violations, including 7,500 airspace violations and 2,500 ground violations [8]. Israel was accused of killing at least 15 people during this period, including a Lebanese Army officer [9]. Hezbollah, for its part, violated the agreement by moving fighters south of the Litani and fired on Israeli forces at least once [9].

The Lebanese army did begin a phased disarmament process. In January 2026, it announced the completion of the first phase of a five-phase plan to bring all non-state weaponry south of the Litani under government control [10]. But this progress was swept aside when the war resumed in March.

The Displacement Crisis

The human toll has been severe. The 2026 fighting displaced more than 1.2 million people — roughly 20% of Lebanon's population — according to UNHCR and Lebanese government figures [11]. More than 562,000 people crossed from Lebanon into Syria, of whom 63% were Syrians and 37% were Lebanese or other nationals [11].

Source: UNHCR / OCHA

Data as of Apr 22, 2026CSV

When the April 16 ceasefire took effect, displaced civilians began returning to southern Lebanon, but the process has been halting and dangerous. Nearly 40,000 homes were destroyed or damaged in the fighting, according to a preliminary Lebanese government assessment [12]. In Nabatieh, one of the hardest-hit cities, entire neighborhoods lay in ruins [12].

Residents closest to the Israeli border have largely been unable to return. Israel has established what it calls a "Yellow Line" — a military zone stretching roughly 10 kilometers north of the border, encompassing approximately 452 square kilometers of Lebanese territory [13]. The Israeli military renewed its ban on civilian return to this zone as recently as April 23, defining it on a published "security zone" map [14]. Damaged bridges south of the Litani have further complicated movement [12].

The humanitarian organization CARE reported on April 22 that "for many families the ceasefire has not brought a sense of safety — only a brief pause in the violence" [15].

Israel's Buffer Zone and the Withdrawal Question

The buffer zone is the central point of contention in negotiations. Netanyahu has stated that Israeli forces "are remaining in Lebanon in a reinforced security buffer zone" that is "a security strip ten kilometres deep" [13]. Lebanese officials say this amounts to the occupation of 6% of their territory [16].

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has been explicit: Lebanon "cannot sign any agreement that does not include a full withdrawal of Israeli forces" [16]. He told the Washington Post that a trilateral meeting with Netanyahu is "unlikely as long as Israel is occupying 6% of Lebanon's territory and continuing to conduct strikes there despite the ceasefire" [16].

The legal status of the buffer zone is contested. UN experts have stated that "Israel's enduring occupation of at least five positions and two so-called buffer zones north of the Blue Line blatantly contradicts the ceasefire agreement" [8]. Israel's military rationale is straightforward: it argues the zone is necessary to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing military infrastructure along the border, as happened after the 2006 war [13].

The 20-Year Failure of Resolution 1701

The precedent is not encouraging. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted unanimously in August 2006 to end the previous Israel-Hezbollah war, called for a full cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Hezbollah from south of the Litani, the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, and the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese troops alongside UNIFIL peacekeepers [17].

Over the next 18 years, none of these core objectives were met. Hezbollah did not disarm. Instead, it expanded its arsenal from an estimated 15,000 rockets in 2006 to between 120,000 and 200,000 by 2023 [17]. It deployed fighters, built tunnels, constructed airstrips, and established military installations south of the Litani — in direct violation of the resolution [17].

The Lebanese army deployed troops in the south but lacked both the political will and military capacity to confront Hezbollah. Israel, while withdrawing ground forces, conducted near-daily airspace violations [8].

UNIFIL's mandate has been progressively weakened. Troop levels fell from 10,500 to roughly 7,500 by early 2026 due to cost-cutting measures [18]. In August 2025, the Security Council passed Resolution 2790, setting out the "final extension" of UNIFIL's mandate through December 2026, with drawdown and withdrawal planned for 2027 [18].

This history raises a direct question: if a UN resolution backed by 10,000 peacekeepers could not enforce Hezbollah's disarmament or constrain Israeli operations over two decades, what does a three-week extension of a bilateral ceasefire accomplish?

Hezbollah's Military Reconstitution

The evidence suggests that Hezbollah has used periods of reduced fighting to rebuild. Before the October 2023 escalation, Hezbollah's arsenal was estimated at 150,000 rockets and missiles [19]. Israeli strikes destroyed a significant portion of that stockpile, along with command infrastructure and leadership. By January 2026, the Alma Research Center estimated the remaining arsenal at approximately 25,000 items, mostly short- and medium-range rockets [19].

But Hezbollah has been reconstituting. Modern Diplomacy reported in March 2026 that the group had "spent months rearming for the war it saw coming," replenishing drone and rocket inventories through Iranian support and domestic manufacturing [20]. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force personnel have remained active in Lebanon, providing supervision, training, and technical support [19].

The loss of Syria as a supply corridor following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has complicated resupply, but border routes remain difficult to fully control [19]. The group faces structural challenges, including what the Alma Center described as "a prolonged leadership crisis alongside significant weakening of its mid-level command ranks" [19]. Still, it retains the capacity for direct confrontation with Israel.

What the U.S. Wants — and What Lebanon Needs

The Trump administration's approach to the ceasefire differs markedly from the Biden-era effort. The 2024 agreement was a structured diplomatic document with specific benchmarks, monitoring mechanisms, and an international coalition. The 2026 ceasefire reads more like a confidence-building measure — a "gesture of goodwill" by Israel, as the State Department put it, with no detailed withdrawal timeline or disarmament schedule [2].

The U.S. has two strategic motivations for extending the Lebanon ceasefire, according to Axios: advancing direct Israel-Lebanon peace talks, and preventing renewed fighting from undermining the effort to reach a deal with Iran [21].

Lebanon's government, meanwhile, is looking to Washington as the only actor capable of pressuring Israel. "We are entering these negotiations convened by the U.S. convinced that the U.S. is the party that can have leverage over Israel," Prime Minister Salam told the Washington Post. "We hope they will continue exercising their leverage over Israel" [16].

Whether Washington is using that leverage, and toward what end, remains unclear. No public conditions — such as arms transfer restrictions or sanctions — have been reported as part of the extension deal. The contrast with the Biden administration, which at least maintained the appearance of enforcing withdrawal deadlines, is visible.

What Lebanese People Actually Want

Lebanon remains deeply divided over the ceasefire and the broader question of how to end the conflict. Public attitudes break along familiar sectarian and political lines, but a thread of exhaustion runs through all communities.

The New Arab reported that residents of southern Lebanon have "little faith" the ceasefire will last, with many citing Israel's record of violating the 2024 agreement [22]. The Christian Science Monitor found civilians rushing to check on homes — or what remained of them — while remaining uncertain whether the pause would hold [23].

Al Jazeera documented the polarization in a report headlined "Mixed views in Lebanon ahead of controversial talks with Israel." For some Lebanese, direct negotiations with Israel represent the state's only realistic option. Others reject the talks entirely, viewing them as a capitulation, and argue that only Hezbollah's armed resistance serves Lebanon's interests [24].

Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces party, has called for strengthening state sovereignty and disarming Hezbollah, arguing that Lebanon cannot stabilize while the group maintains an independent military force [24]. Hezbollah politician Hassan Fadlallah said the group wanted the ceasefire to continue but "on the basis of full compliance by the Israeli enemy," and urged the government to cancel all direct contact with Israel [24].

The Intercept argued that the ceasefire framework, by freezing the conflict without a political resolution, may serve the interests of armed factions more than civilian populations. Israel gets a security buffer without formally ending the war. Hezbollah gets time to rebuild. And Lebanese civilians get a temporary reduction in violence while remaining displaced, their homes destroyed, their country carved up [25].

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Lebanon's displacement crisis exists within a broader global context. Syria remains the world's top refugee-producing country at 5.5 million, followed by Ukraine at 5.3 million, according to UNHCR data [26]. Lebanon, already hosting over a million Syrian refugees before the 2026 war, now faces a displacement crisis on top of a refugee crisis, compounded by an economic collapse that began in 2019.

The Structural Question

The three-week extension announced on April 23 buys time. Whether it buys anything more is the question that neither the ceasefire's architects nor its beneficiaries have answered.

The pattern is clear: a ceasefire is brokered, deadlines are set, compliance is partial at best, the deadline is extended, and the underlying issues — Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah disarmament, Lebanese sovereignty, civilian return — remain unresolved. The November 2024 agreement's 60-day framework became an open-ended arrangement that lasted 15 months before collapsing. The April 2026 truce is already on its second iteration in a week.

Resolution 1701 showed that even a formal UN resolution with peacekeeping troops cannot enforce compliance when neither party has an incentive to fulfill its obligations. The current framework has fewer enforcement mechanisms, fewer international participants, and a broader regional war as its backdrop.

For over a million displaced Lebanese, the calculus is simpler and more urgent. Every day the ceasefire holds is a day without airstrikes. Every extension is another week to check on a house, bury a relative, or decide whether to attempt a return to a village that may no longer exist. The policy debate over withdrawal timelines and disarmament benchmarks matters because it determines whether those days of relative safety become permanent — or just another pause before the next war.