Israeli Airstrikes Target Critical Iranian Military Sites in Tehran

On March 28, 2026—exactly one month after the first bombs fell—IDF spokesman Effie Defrin stood before reporters and declared that "within a few days" Israel would finish targeting all of Iran's "critical" military production facilities [1]. Behind that clinical assessment lies a campaign of historically unprecedented scale: joint U.S.-Israeli strikes across dozens of Iranian cities, the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, retaliatory Iranian missile strikes on six Arab states, and a death toll approaching 3,000 people across the region [2][3].

The conflict has moved faster than any Middle Eastern war in a generation. What began as a surprise operation on February 28 has already redrawn the region's strategic map, forced Gulf monarchies to choose sides, and triggered what the International Energy Agency calls the "greatest global energy security challenge in history" [4].

What Was Struck: A Systematic Campaign Against Military Infrastructure

The U.S.-Israeli air campaign has targeted Iran's military-industrial base with a scope that dwarfs previous Israeli operations in the region. According to U.S. Central Command, coalition forces have struck over 3,000 targets in Iran since February 28 [5]. CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper stated on March 5 that the operation aimed to "raze or level Iran's ballistic missile industrial base" [5].

The numbers reported by CENTCOM are striking: more than two-thirds of Iran's ballistic missile production facilities, UAV production sites, and shipyards have been destroyed [1]. Israeli aircraft struck hundreds of missile launch sites and rendered over 300 ballistic missile launchers inoperable, leaving Iran with an estimated 100 to 200 launchers remaining [5]. Admiral Cooper reported that ballistic missile attacks from Iran declined by roughly 90 percent since the campaign began [5].

Specific targets in Tehran included the IRGC Malek-Ashtar building, which was completely destroyed in the opening days [6]. On March 23, Israeli Air Force jets dropped more than 100 precision-guided bombs on IRGC bases, intelligence headquarters, and weapons production sites in the capital [7]. The IDF also struck the headquarters of Iran's Marine Industries Organization, responsible for producing naval weapons and vessels [1].

Beyond conventional military targets, the campaign expanded to nuclear infrastructure. On March 2, coalition forces hit the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Isfahan Province—the first strike on an Iranian nuclear site [6]. Israel subsequently struck a uranium processing facility in Yazd, described by the IAF as a "unique facility" in Iran's nuclear infrastructure [8]. Before-and-after satellite imagery released by CENTCOM showed the Qom Turbine Engine Production Plant—which produced gas turbine engines for IRGC attack drones—reduced to rubble [5].

The operation also killed 30 Iranian generals in its opening minutes, along with nine nuclear scientists [3]. The IDF confirmed killing Quds Force commander Saeed Izadi and struck the vehicle of IRGC commander Behnam Shahriyari [3].

The Human Cost: Casualties Across the Region

The war's death toll has spread far beyond Iran's military targets. The NGO Human Rights Activists in Iran (HRANA) documented 3,114 deaths in Iran by March 17, including 1,354 civilians, 1,138 military personnel, and 622 unclassified [3]. Al Jazeera's live tracker reported 1,937 killed and nearly 25,000 injured in Iran as of late March, with 240 women and 212 children among the dead [2].

Source: Al Jazeera Live Tracker

Data as of Mar 29, 2026CSV

The damage to civilian infrastructure has been extensive. According to Iranian authorities, over 6,668 civilian units were hit by U.S.-Israeli strikes, including 5,535 residential units, 1,041 commercial units, 14 medical centers, 65 schools, and 13 facilities affiliated with the Iranian Red Crescent Society [3]. Iran's Red Crescent reported searching for survivors trapped under rubble in Tehran following multiple strike waves [9].

In Israel, 19 people were killed and 5,492 injured, with significant damage from strikes on Dimona and Arad [2]. Thirteen U.S. military personnel died, including six crew members in a KC-135 refueling aircraft crash in Iraq on March 13 [2]. Lebanon, drawn into the war through Hezbollah's retaliatory strikes, suffered 1,116 deaths, including at least 121 children, with over one million displaced [2].

The wide geographic spread of casualties—from Bahrain (3 killed) to Kuwait (6 killed) to the UAE (11 killed)—reflects a conflict that rapidly exceeded anyone's initial expectations about scope [2].

The Legal Debate: Self-Defense or Aggression?

The strikes have generated a sharp split among international law experts. The majority view, represented by scholars and UN officials, holds that the operation violated the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force.

UN Special Rapporteur Ben Saul stated: "This is not lawful self-defence against an armed attack by Iran, and the UN Security Council has not authorised it" [10]. Yusra Suedi, assistant professor of international law at the University of Manchester, argued the attacks amounted to unjustified use of force and likely constituted the crime of aggression, noting that under international law, true imminence requires something "instant" and "overwhelming" with "no other choice" [10]. Brian Finucane of the International Crisis Group called the offered rationales "scattershot," stating that "none of them amount to a serious international legal argument" [10].

Rebecca Ingber, a professor at Cardozo School of Law and former State Department adviser, noted that force is only permissible under two narrow circumstances—UN Security Council authorization or self-defense against an armed attack—and termed the use-of-force prohibition a "bedrock" principle of international law [10].

Defenders of the strikes advance three distinct justifications. First, scholars including former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Professor Geoff Corn argue the U.S. was already in an ongoing armed conflict with Iran spanning decades of proxy attacks, eliminating the need to demonstrate imminence before each strike [11]. Former State Department Legal Advisor Brian Egan has stated that "once a State has lawfully resorted to force in self-defense...it is not necessary...to reassess whether an armed attack is imminent prior to every subsequent action" [11].

Second, proponents cite an evolved definition of imminence: Iran possessed 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent, reportedly within days of producing weapons-grade material at 90 percent enrichment [11]. Under the Tallinn Manual's "last feasible window of opportunity" standard, this nuclear threshold justified action even absent a temporally imminent conventional attack [11].

Third, some invoke the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, citing reports that Iranian forces killed 20,000 to 30,000 civilians during January 2026 protests [11]. This argument draws on the precedent of NATO's Kosovo intervention, widely considered "illegal but legitimate" [11].

Why Now? The Proxy War Calculus

The stated rationale for the operation extends well beyond any single provocation. President Trump's February 28 video announcement cited Iran's "menacing activities" including the 1979 hostage crisis, decades of support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and killings of protesters [12].

Iran's proxy network—Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen—has for thirty years operated as a strategy to compel Israel to defend on multiple fronts simultaneously, reducing its ability to confront Iranian capabilities directly [13]. The Stimson Center documented how this architecture of indirect warfare was designed to pressure Israel while maintaining plausible deniability for Tehran [13].

The October 2024 Iranian missile barrage against Israel, while causing minimal casualties, demonstrated that direct strikes on Israeli territory were no longer hypothetical. Israeli strategic planners appear to have concluded that degrading proxy networks alone—as Israel attempted through its 2024 Lebanon operations and ongoing Gaza campaign—was insufficient so long as the command infrastructure in Tehran remained intact [12].

Vice President Vance stated on March 28 that the war would continue "a little while longer," suggesting the campaign's objectives extend beyond military target destruction [14].

Iran's Response: Operation True Promise IV

Iran's retaliation, codenamed Operation True Promise IV, marked a dramatic escalation from its previous direct strikes on Israel. Tehran launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles not only at Israel but at U.S. military bases across the Gulf [15].

For the first time in its history, Iran attacked all six Gulf Cooperation Council states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE [15]. Major targets included Bahrain's capital Manama, Kuwait International Airport, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, and Erbil International Airport in Iraqi Kurdistan [15].

The strikes on Saudi Arabia killed two people. Iran also attacked a military base in Saudi Arabia housing U.S. troops, wounding American service members [16]. According to reporting from Defence Security Asia, 13 U.S. bases in the Middle East were rendered "nearly uninhabitable" after Iranian missile strikes, forcing CENTCOM to disperse troops [5].

The Houthis formally entered the war on March 28, launching a ballistic missile toward Israel that triggered air raid sirens in Beersheba [12]. Hezbollah joined the conflict on the first day, launching strikes into Israel [12].

Regional Realignment: The Gulf States Choose Sides

Iran's decision to strike GCC states produced what may prove the conflict's most significant diplomatic consequence. Three sovereign Arab states—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE—condemned Iran by name within hours of being struck, with no corresponding condemnations of the U.S.-Israeli operation [15].

Saudi Arabia condemned "the blatant Iranian aggression," offered "all its capabilities" to targeted states, and demanded international enforcement [15]. On March 21, Saudi Arabia expelled Iranian defense officials, giving them 24 hours to leave the country [15].

On March 26, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan issued a joint condemnation of Iran and its affiliated armed groups, and their attacks on regional countries and infrastructure [15].

The Center for American Progress noted that the strikes disrupted "a fragile regional equilibrium between the United States, Israel, and Iran that Arab governments had spent years trying to preserve" [17]. Gulf states had been pursuing limited de-escalation with Tehran—not out of trust, but to prevent their region from becoming the primary battlefield between Iran, Israel, and the United States [17]. Iran's retaliatory strikes eliminated that middle ground.

Turkey and Egypt have maintained more measured positions. Neither has faced direct Iranian strikes, and both have historical reasons to avoid full alignment with either side. Egypt's response has focused on the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon, where over one million people have been displaced [2].

Economic Shockwaves: Oil, Hormuz, and Global Markets

The war's economic impact has been severe and immediate. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted 20 percent of global oil supplies and significant liquefied natural gas shipments—described as the largest disruption to energy supply since the 1970s oil crisis [4][18].

Source: CNBC / Al Jazeera

Data as of Mar 29, 2026CSV

Brent crude surged from approximately $70 per barrel before the war to $82 by March 2, then breached $100 on March 8 for the first time in four years [4]. Prices peaked at $126 per barrel before easing to around $100-105, still more than 40 percent above pre-war levels [4].

The Dallas Federal Reserve estimated that the Hormuz closure would raise average WTI oil prices to $98 per barrel and lower global real GDP growth by an annualized 2.9 percentage points [18]. Europe faces a second energy crisis driven by the suspension of Qatari LNG exports through the strait [18].

The IEA's characterization of the situation as the "greatest global energy security challenge in history" reflects the scale of disruption [4]. Strategic petroleum reserve releases by major consuming nations have provided only partial relief, as analysts note that reserves cannot substitute for the sustained loss of 20 percent of global seaborne oil trade [19].

What Comes Next

As the war enters its second month, several dynamics remain unresolved. The IDF's claim that it will finish destroying Iran's critical military production within days raises the question of what follows: does the campaign end, or do objectives expand?

Iran's military capacity, while degraded, has not been eliminated. With 100-200 missile launchers remaining and proxy networks still active across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, Tehran retains the ability to sustain lower-intensity attacks [5][12]. The Houthi entry into the war on March 28 signals that Iran's network of allied groups remains willing to fight [12].

The Strait of Hormuz closure creates pressure on all parties. Gulf states whose economies depend on oil exports have strong incentives to seek a resolution, but Iran's willingness to weaponize the strait suggests Tehran views economic leverage as its best remaining card [18].

The war has already produced consequences that will outlast any ceasefire. Iran's nuclear infrastructure has been struck for the first time. The Gulf states have openly sided against Tehran. And the international legal order governing the use of force has been tested in ways that scholars on both sides acknowledge will set precedents for decades [10][11].

Vice President Vance's statement that the war will continue "a little while longer" offers limited clarity [14]. The Middle East Forum has outlined multiple scenarios for Iran's path forward—from continued retaliation to internal political transition—but the range of outcomes reflects genuine uncertainty about how a conflict of this scale reaches its conclusion [20].