Israeli Airstrikes on Southern Lebanon Kill Thirteen

Israeli warplanes struck the southern Lebanese towns of Habboush, Zrariyeh, and Ain Baal on May 1, 2026, killing thirteen people and wounding at least thirty-two others [1][2]. The strikes came less than two weeks after a US-brokered ceasefire was supposed to halt fighting between Israel and Hezbollah — and they represent the latest chapter in a two-month war that has already surpassed the 2006 conflict in both casualties and displacement.

What Happened on May 1

Eight people died in Habboush, including a child and two women, with twenty-one others wounded [1]. In Zrariyeh, four were killed — two of them women — and four more were injured [2]. A separate strike on Ain Baal, near the coastal city of Tyre, killed one person and wounded seven [1].

The Israeli military had issued an evacuation warning for Habboush, directing residents to move to "open areas at least one kilometre from the town" [2]. Warplanes struck less than an hour after the warning was issued [1]. Lebanon's health ministry noted that two Lebanese Red Cross paramedics were among those killed across the day's strikes [2].

The same day, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Israeli troops and positions in southern Lebanon, including a drone strike that wounded two Israeli soldiers near Margaliot in northern Israel [3][4]. The group characterized its operations as retaliatory responses to Israeli ceasefire violations [1].

Combatants Versus Civilians: A Contested Count

Lebanon's health ministry reported all thirteen deaths without distinguishing between combatants and civilians, consistent with its methodology throughout the conflict of recording all casualties at hospitals and in the field through its network of emergency operations centers [2]. The ministry's cumulative toll since March 2 stands at more than 2,600 dead, including 103 emergency workers and paramedics [1].

Israel's military has not published a specific casualty assessment for the May 1 strikes. More broadly, the IDF has described its targets as Hezbollah military infrastructure, including "command centers, intelligence headquarters, rocket and naval units, and assets of the Radwan Force and aerial unit" [7]. Israel has consistently maintained that its strikes target combatants and military assets, though it has not released detailed breakdowns of combatant-to-civilian ratios for individual operations.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has documented cases where Israeli strikes "hit, and in some instances destroyed, multi-storey residential buildings, killing entire families in Lebanon" [6]. A March 8 strike on a residential building in Sir el-Gharbiyeh killed at least thirteen civilians, including five women, five men, two boys, and a girl [6]. These findings suggest that the civilian toll has been substantial, though independent verification of each incident remains difficult.

The Casualty Rate in Historical Context

The 2026 war has compressed an extraordinary level of destruction into a brief period. In just two months since March 2, 2026, more than 2,618 people have been killed in Lebanon — including 172 children — and 7,544 wounded [8]. That translates to roughly 1,300 deaths per month.

By comparison, the 2006 Lebanon War killed approximately 1,191 Lebanese over 34 days, a rate of about 1,050 per month [10]. The 2023-2024 escalation, which lasted roughly thirteen months from October 2023 through the November 2024 ceasefire, killed 3,961 people — approximately 305 per month [10].

The 2026 rate is therefore higher on a per-month basis than either previous conflict.

Source: Lebanese Health Ministry, HRW, UN estimates

Data as of May 2, 2026CSV

The single deadliest day came on April 8, 2026, when Israel launched what the IDF described as its "largest attack across Lebanon" since the war began, with approximately fifty aircraft carrying out roughly 100 strikes in ten minutes [7][9]. More than 300 people were killed that day alone [9].

Where the Strikes Have Hit

The May 1 attacks struck Habboush, Zrariyeh, and Ain Baal, but these are far from isolated targets. Since March 2, Israeli forces have carried out more than 1,840 attacks across southern Lebanon, including 1,486 air or drone strikes and 318 shelling, artillery, or missile attacks [11].

The most heavily targeted municipalities include Bint Jbeil (418 attacks), Nabatieh (397), Tyre (394), Marjayoun (228), and Sidon (113) [11]. Towns like Jal al-Deir, Jabal Blat, and Khiam have been effectively depopulated as Israel establishes military positions [11].

The destruction of critical infrastructure — particularly bridges connecting southern villages to the western Bekaa Valley and to hospitals — has isolated over 150,000 people and blocked humanitarian access [11][12]. The Dalafa bridge, a key link between southern communities and essential services, has been destroyed [11].

A Displacement Crisis Exceeding 2006

More than 1.2 million people — roughly one in five Lebanese residents — have fled their homes since March 2, making this the largest displacement event in Lebanese history [12]. That figure exceeds both the 974,000 displaced during the 2006 war and the approximately 900,000 displaced during the 2023-2024 escalation [12].

Source: UNHCR, Lebanese Government

Data as of May 2, 2026CSV

More than 136,000 displaced people are sheltering in 660 collective shelters, most of them schools operating far beyond capacity [12]. The UN and partners have appealed for $308.3 million to fund emergency assistance for three months, but UNHCR's operation in Lebanon is only 14 percent funded [12].

Israeli evacuation orders now cover approximately 1,470 square kilometers — about 14 percent of Lebanese territory [11].

Israel's Legal Justification and International Objections

Israel frames its operations in Lebanon as defensive measures under international humanitarian law. Defense Minister Israel Katz stated the policy: "Where there is terror and missiles, there are no homes and no residents, and the IDF will control the security zone up to the Litani River" [9]. The IDF has described its ground operations as establishing "a forward defensive posture" to "remove threats and create an additional layer of security for residents of northern Israel" [7].

The specific legal basis cited is the right of self-defense and the doctrine of responding to imminent threats. Israel points to ongoing Hezbollah attacks — including daily drone strikes against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon [4] — as evidence that the threat remains active and ongoing.

International legal bodies have pushed back. OHCHR documented incidents where "Israeli forces had given ineffective warnings, or no warnings at all" before strikes [6]. The UN found that strikes on densely populated areas, including central Beirut and the Bekaa Valley, constitute "prima facie violations of the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law" [6][8].

UN experts went further in an April 2026 statement: "This is not self-defence. It is a blatant violation of the UN Charter, a deliberate destruction of prospects for peace, and an affront to multilateralism and the UN-based international order" [8].

The OHCHR report also addressed Hezbollah's conduct, finding that the group "fired unguided rockets that lacked the precision needed to hit desired military targets, instead damaging buildings and other civilian infrastructure in Israel," likely in violation of international humanitarian law [6].

The International Bar Association's Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) separately condemned Israel's large-scale strikes and called for accountability [14].

Hezbollah's Military Activity and Israel's Stated Justification

The immediate context for the 2026 war is the broader Iran-Israel conflict. On March 2, Hezbollah launched strikes on Israel in retaliation for Israel's assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, effectively ending the November 2024 ceasefire [5][7].

Since then, Hezbollah has shifted its tactical approach. The group moved from heavy bombardment to near-daily precision drone strikes against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, deploying kamikaze and fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drones that have exposed gaps in IDF countermeasures [4]. A Times of Israel report noted that the IDF's "lack of preparedness for first-person view drones in Lebanon" has become "a growing vulnerability" [4].

Israel has said its May 1 strikes targeted Hezbollah fighters operating south of the Litani River and sites posing imminent threats to its troops [7]. Hezbollah's continued drone operations on the same day lend some credibility to Israel's claim that the group maintains active military assets in the area, though the specific connection between those assets and the civilian locations struck remains unverified by independent observers.

The Ceasefire: Two Agreements, Both Fraying

Two ceasefire agreements frame the current situation, and both have failed to hold.

The November 2024 ceasefire, brokered by the United States and France, required Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon and Hezbollah to move its forces north of the Litani River within sixty days. A five-country monitoring panel led by the United States was established, with 5,000 Lebanese troops deployed to ensure compliance [5].

That agreement broke down almost immediately. The United Nations counted more than 10,000 Israeli ceasefire violations between November 2024 and March 2026, along with hundreds of Lebanese deaths [5]. The Lebanese Armed Forces recorded "almost daily violations" [5]. Simultaneously, Israeli and Arab sources reported that Hezbollah was rearming through Beirut's seaport and smuggling routes from Syria, acquiring missiles, rockets, and antitank weapons in violation of the disarmament provisions [7].

The monitoring mechanism — the US-chaired body responsible for holding both sides accountable — was, as the International Crisis Group assessed, never given "enough weight to enable it to perform a meaningful role in making military action the exception rather than the rule" [13].

The April 17, 2026 ceasefire, brokered by the United States during the broader Iran war, established a ten-day truce later extended by three weeks on April 23 by agreement between Israel and Lebanon [5][13]. Its provisions require Lebanon, with international support, to prevent Hezbollah and other non-state groups from attacking Israel and recognize the Lebanese Armed Forces as the sole legitimate security force [13].

A core dispute undermined this ceasefire from the start: whether Lebanon was included in the broader US-Iran truce. The US and Israel maintained that Lebanon was a separate track. Iran insisted Lebanon was "an inseparable part of the cease-fire." Vice President J.D. Vance described this as a "legitimate misunderstanding" [9]. In practice, both Israel and Hezbollah have continued attacks since April 17, treating the ceasefire as aspirational rather than binding [3].

Does Military Pressure Reduce Long-Term Harm?

Israel's strategic argument rests on the premise that degrading Hezbollah's precision missile arsenal reduces the long-term threat to Israeli civilians. The IDF's April 8 wave of strikes targeted approximately 100 sites in ten minutes, aimed at command centers, rocket units, and the group's aerial and naval infrastructure [7].

There is some evidence that the 2024 campaign damaged Hezbollah's capabilities. CNN reported in March 2026 that "Hezbollah is a shadow of the force it once was" after the 2024 strikes that killed much of its senior leadership, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah [15]. The group entered the 2026 war with diminished command structures and reduced stockpiles.

But the evidence also points in the opposite direction. An analysis by the Alma Center, an Israeli research institute, found that Israel's targeted elimination campaign between the 2024 ceasefire and 2026 focused disproportionately on low-level operatives (73.6 percent of targets), with only 3.5 percent at the senior leadership level [16]. The assessment concluded that Hezbollah's "military rehabilitation pace exceeds the scope of interdiction activity conducted by the IDF" — meaning the group was rearming faster than Israel could degrade its capabilities [16].

Israel itself acknowledged this dynamic. In late April 2026, Israeli officials told the US administration that "its current policy of restraint in Lebanon is undermining its deterrent capability," warning that "relying only on reactive responses, without taking the initiative, gives Hezbollah an opportunity to recover and strengthen its ideological position" [16].

Meanwhile, analysts critical of the strategy argue that intensive strikes fuel the conditions for recruitment. One expert quoted by Time observed that Israel's approach is "limping on one leg, totally dismissing" diplomacy, which is "equally essential" for lasting outcomes [9]. With 1.2 million people displaced and entire communities destroyed, the population of southern Lebanon faces conditions — poverty, displacement, loss of family members — historically associated with increased support for armed groups.

The 2006 war offers a partial precedent. Israel's stated goal then was to destroy Hezbollah's military capacity. Within several years, Hezbollah had rebuilt its arsenal to levels exceeding pre-war stockpiles. The current campaign faces the same structural challenge: military operations can impose short-term costs but have not historically prevented long-term reconstitution.

What Comes Next

The extended ceasefire is set to expire in mid-May 2026. Both sides have treated it as a pause rather than an endpoint. Israel continues to strike what it describes as Hezbollah military infrastructure. Hezbollah continues daily drone operations against Israeli positions.

The UN Security Council has the situation under active review [13]. The United States remains the primary mediator but faces credibility challenges, having been unable to enforce either the 2024 or 2026 ceasefire frameworks. France, the other key guarantor of the 2024 agreement, has been sidelined by the shift to US-only mediation in 2026.

For the residents of Habboush, Zrariyeh, and hundreds of other southern Lebanese towns, the legal and diplomatic questions are secondary to a more immediate reality: evacuation warnings arrive less than an hour before the bombs.