Israeli Airstrike Kills Three Lebanese Journalists

On March 28, 2026, four precision missiles struck a vehicle marked with press insignia on the Jezzine Road in southern Lebanon, killing three journalists and bringing the death toll among media workers in the four-week-old Israel-Lebanon war to at least five [1]. The dead were Al Manar TV correspondent Ali Shoeib, Al Mayadeen reporter Fatima Ftouni, and her brother Mohammed Ftouni, a videographer for the same network [2]. A paramedic who arrived at the scene was also killed [1].

The Israeli military acknowledged the strike and claimed Shoeib was not merely a journalist but an operative of Hezbollah's elite Radwan Force intelligence unit [3]. Neither Al Manar nor Al Mayadeen accepted that characterization. The incident raises questions that have trailed Israel through more than two years of conflict across Gaza and Lebanon: when does a journalist lose civilian protection, who decides, and what accountability exists when that judgment proves wrong?

The Dead

Ali Shoeib was one of Al Manar TV's most recognized war correspondents. He had covered southern Lebanon for the Hezbollah-owned network for nearly three decades, reporting on Israeli military operations, strikes on positions inside Israel, and targeted killings across the region [3]. He maintained a Telegram channel with roughly 53,000 followers, where he posted near-real-time reports on developments along the border [4].

Fatima Ftouni was a reporter for Al Mayadeen, a Beirut-based pan-Arab news channel. She had been on air with a live report from southern Lebanon shortly before the strike [1]. Mohammed Ftouni, her brother, worked alongside her as a video journalist [2]. Al Mayadeen has now lost six journalists since hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah resumed on March 2, 2026 [1].

The strike occurred on the Jezzine Road in the Jezzine district of southern Lebanon [5]. According to Al Mayadeen, four precision missiles hit the vehicle [1]. Other journalists at the scene were wounded [1].

Israel's Claim: Journalist or Intelligence Operative?

The IDF stated that it had specifically targeted Shoeib, describing him as a "terrorist in the Radwan Force intelligence unit" [6]. The military alleged he had been "operating systematically to expose the locations of soldiers operating in southern Lebanon," maintained "continuous contact with other terrorists in the Radwan Force," and used "his position at the channel to disseminate Hezbollah propaganda materials" [3][7].

The IDF further alleged that Shoeib had communicated with senior Hezbollah commanders including Ali Karaki, the Southern Front commander killed in September 2024; Mohammad Afif, the media relations chief killed in November 2024; and Muhammad Nimah Nasser, an Aziz division commander killed in July 2024 [3].

No evidence supporting these claims has been made public. The IDF did not address why the strike also killed two Al Mayadeen journalists who had no alleged connection to Hezbollah's military wing, nor did it explain the decision to strike a marked press vehicle rather than target Shoeib at another time or location [1][7].

Al Manar, Hezbollah, and the Question of Affiliation

Al Manar TV is owned and operated by Hezbollah. The U.S. Treasury Department designated it a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity" in 2004, calling it "an arm of Hizballah's terrorist network" [8]. France, Spain, and Germany have banned the channel's broadcasts [8]. The EU has sanctioned Hezbollah's armed wing but has not specifically designated Al Manar [8].

This designation complicates the legal picture. Under international humanitarian law, journalists are civilians entitled to protection "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities," per Article 79 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions [9]. Employment by a media outlet affiliated with an armed group does not, by itself, strip that protection. The International Committee of the Red Cross has affirmed that even journalists embedded with armed forces retain civilian status so long as they do not participate directly in hostilities [9].

The legal question turns on what constitutes "direct participation in hostilities." Broadcasting propaganda, even for a designated terrorist organization, is not equivalent to taking up arms. However, if the IDF's claims are accurate—that Shoeib was actively transmitting Israeli troop positions to Hezbollah's military units—that activity would likely cross the threshold into direct participation, making him a legitimate military target under the laws of armed conflict [9].

The problem is evidentiary. Israel has presented no documentation to substantiate the Radwan Force allegation. The journalists who died alongside Shoeib—Fatima and Mohammed Ftouni—worked for Al Mayadeen, which, while often described as sympathetic to Hezbollah and Iran, is not a Hezbollah-owned entity [2]. No allegations of military activity have been made against either of them.

The Broader Toll on Journalists

The March 28 strike was not an isolated event. In the 26 days since the 2026 Lebanon war began on March 2, at least five journalists have been killed in Lebanon [10]:

• Mohamed Sherri, Al Manar TV's head of political programs, killed alongside his wife in an Israeli airstrike on a residential building in Beirut's Zuqaq al-Blat neighborhood on March 18 [11].
• Hussain Hamood, a freelance journalist who worked for Al Manar TV, killed in an Israeli strike on Nabatieh on March 25 [10].
• Ali Shoeib, Fatima Ftouni, and Mohammed Ftouni, killed on March 28 [1].

Since hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah first escalated in October 2023, at least 22 media workers have been killed in Lebanon by Israeli forces, according to The Public Source, a Lebanese investigative outlet [12].

Source: Committee to Protect Journalists

Data as of Feb 26, 2026CSV

The scale is staggering when measured globally. The Committee to Protect Journalists recorded 129 journalists and media workers killed worldwide in 2025—the highest annual toll in its 30-plus years of record-keeping. Israel was responsible for approximately two-thirds of those deaths: 86 journalists, predominantly in Gaza [13]. Of the 47 cases CPJ classified as deliberate "murder" of journalists in 2025, Israel was responsible for 81 percent [13].

A separate trend line stands out: drone killings of journalists rose from 2 in 2023 to 39 in 2025 [13].

Accountability: A Pattern of Impunity

The historical record on accountability for journalist killings by Israel is stark. A CPJ investigation published in 2024 found that Israel had never held its military accountable for killing a journalist across more than two decades and at least 20 documented cases [14]. The Military Advocate General (MAG), Israel's internal mechanism for reviewing operational conduct, never opened a criminal investigation into a single journalist killing during its nine years of operation under the assessment system [14].

The case of Reuters videographer Issam Abdallah illustrates the pattern. On October 13, 2023, an Israeli tank fired two 120mm rounds at a group of clearly identifiable journalists near Alma al-Chaab in southern Lebanon, killing Abdallah and injuring six colleagues [14]. Five independent investigations—by UNIFIL, Reuters, AFP, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch—all concluded the strike was deliberate [14]. Audio analysis revealed an Israeli drone had circled the journalists 11 times in the 25 minutes before the strike. Two tank rounds landed 37 seconds apart, followed by approximately one minute and 45 seconds of heavy machine gun fire [14].

More than a year later, the IDF told CPJ the incident remained "under review." No criminal charges were filed. The MAG did not respond to CPJ's formal request for a criminal investigation [14].

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has questioned the MAG's independence, citing its "dual role" in both advising on operations and then investigating potential violations arising from those same operations [14].

For the March 28 strike, the available accountability pathways are limited. The International Criminal Court lacks automatic jurisdiction because neither Israel nor Lebanon are state parties to the Rome Statute, and the UN Security Council has not referred the matter [14]. Lebanese authorities can investigate domestically, but enforcing any findings against Israeli military personnel is functionally impossible. Israel's own MAG system has produced zero prosecutions for journalist killings in over two decades [14].

International Response

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the strike "a flagrant crime that violates all laws and agreements that protect journalists," citing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and UN Security Council Resolution 1738, which specifically condemns attacks on journalists in conflict zones [1][5]. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam described it as "a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law" [1].

CPJ's Regional Director Sara Qudah stated after the March 25 killing of Hussain Hamood: "Israel must immediately end its attacks on the press, uphold its obligations under international law, and be held fully accountable for killing members of the press" [10]. The International Commission of Jurists has called on all competent authorities to investigate such attacks as potential war crimes [15].

Reporters Without Borders, which ranked Israel as the leading killer of journalists worldwide in both 2024 and 2025, has called for international judicial action [16]. However, concrete measures beyond statements remain scarce. No government has imposed targeted sanctions related to journalist killings, and no international tribunal has opened a formal investigation specifically into attacks on press in Lebanon.

The Chilling Effect

The practical consequence of journalist deaths in southern Lebanon is measurable in coverage gaps. Since the war began on March 2, Israeli strikes have hit Al Manar's headquarters and Hezbollah's Al-Nour radio station [2]. CPJ has documented the injury of four journalists, strikes on four media outlets, obstruction of news crews, and displacement of press members in Lebanon during March alone [10].

With over 1,142 people killed and nearly one million displaced in Lebanon since March 2—roughly 20 percent of the country's population—the need for independent reporting from the conflict zone has rarely been greater [17]. Each journalist killed or displaced reduces the available information about what is happening on the ground, to civilian populations on both sides of the border.

The 2026 Lebanon war is now less than a month old. The rate of journalist deaths—five confirmed in 26 days—exceeds even the early pace of journalist casualties in Gaza following October 7, 2023, which ultimately became the deadliest conflict for journalists in CPJ's recorded history [13].

What the Law Requires—and What It Cannot Enforce

Under international humanitarian law, the obligations are clear in principle. Attacking forces must distinguish between civilians and combatants. Journalists are civilians unless they directly participate in hostilities [9]. Even when a legitimate military target is identified within a group that includes civilians, the principle of proportionality requires that anticipated civilian harm not be excessive relative to the military advantage gained [9]. The principle of precaution requires all feasible steps to minimize civilian casualties [9].

If the IDF believed Shoeib was a legitimate target, it still bore obligations regarding the other occupants of the vehicle—journalists who, by Israel's own account, had no alleged military role. Striking a marked press vehicle with four precision missiles, killing all three occupants and a responding paramedic, raises serious questions about whether proportionality and precaution requirements were met.

These questions will likely go unanswered. The mechanisms that exist to investigate—Israel's MAG, Lebanese domestic courts, international bodies—have either demonstrated consistent inability to hold perpetrators accountable or lack the jurisdiction to act. The global impunity rate for targeted killings of journalists stands at 80 percent, according to CPJ [14]. For killings attributed to Israel since October 2023, the accountability rate is effectively zero [14].