Israel Widens Lebanon Strikes to Areas Outside Hezbollah-Controlled Territory

On March 2, 2026, Israeli warplanes struck targets across Lebanon in response to Hezbollah projectile fire following the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei [1]. Within days, the strikes expanded well beyond the southern border region and Beirut's southern suburbs — Hezbollah's traditional strongholds — into the Bekaa Valley, the outskirts of Tripoli in northern Lebanon, and municipalities administered by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) rather than Hezbollah [2][3]. The geographic widening of the campaign has killed more than 1,029 people, including 118 children, and displaced roughly 1.2 million — about 20 percent of Lebanon's population — raising urgent questions about proportionality, civilian protection, and the future of a country already hollowed out by years of economic collapse [4][5].

The Expanding Geographic Footprint

Israel's strikes have historically concentrated on southern Lebanon below the Litani River and Beirut's Dahiyeh (southern suburbs), areas where Hezbollah maintains open political and military control. The current campaign has broken that pattern.

Between March 2 and 9, 2026, the Centre for Information Resilience verified 99 Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon, including 41 incidents in Beirut proper — not just the southern suburbs [6]. Israeli jets hit targets in the Bekaa Valley town of Nabi Chit, killing at least 41 people in a single day [7]. A strike near the Beddawi refugee camp close to Tripoli, in Lebanon's far north, killed at least two people — a location hundreds of kilometers from the southern front [8]. Israeli forces also bombed the Comfort Hotel on the border of Hazmieh and Baabda, neighborhoods within greater Beirut that fall under LAF and state administrative control [3].

On March 12, the Israeli military expanded its forced evacuation orders from the Litani River northward to beyond the Zahrani River — roughly 40 kilometers from the Israeli border [9]. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, Israel's evacuation orders now cover more than 1,470 square kilometers, approximately 14 percent of Lebanon's total territory [9].

By comparison, the 2006 Lebanon War — which lasted 33 days and was itself widely criticized for disproportionate force — concentrated strikes primarily on the south and Dahiyeh, with selective infrastructure attacks on Beirut's airport, bridges, and fuel stations [10]. The current campaign's geographic reach into the Bekaa, northern Lebanon, and non-Hezbollah municipalities represents an expansion without clear precedent in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict.

Civilian Toll and Displacement

The human cost has been severe. As of March 22, 2026, Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health reported 1,029 deaths, including 118 children and 40 medical workers [4]. The World Health Organization confirmed at least 98 children among the dead [5]. Since the November 2024 ceasefire alone, Israeli attacks have killed more than 300 people, including at least 127 civilians, according to UN figures [11].

Source: UNHCR/NRC/Lebanese Government

Data as of Mar 28, 2026CSV

The displacement crisis affects every governorate. The Lebanese government reports 1.2 million internally displaced persons [5]. An additional 562,000 people — 63 percent of them Syrian refugees — have crossed from Lebanon into Syria since hostilities intensified [12]. Israel's evacuation orders now affect an estimated 750,000 people living within the designated strike radius [9].

The Nabatiyeh and South governorates have been hardest hit, followed by Mount Lebanon, which includes Beirut's southern suburbs [13]. But the expansion of strikes into the Bekaa and northern areas has pushed displacement pressures into regions that previously served as refuge for those fleeing the south.

The Legal Debate: Proportionality, Distinction, and Dual-Use Targets

Israel's stated rationale for striking beyond traditional Hezbollah zones rests on several claims under international humanitarian law (IHL). The Israeli Defense Forces have characterized targets as Hezbollah "arms depots," "command infrastructure," "weapons storage facilities," and "military training sites" [2][14]. In issuing evacuation warnings, the IDF has stated it "will not hesitate to target anyone who is present near Hezbollah members, facilities, or means of combat" [4].

IHL requires belligerents to observe three core principles: distinction (differentiating between combatants and civilians), proportionality (ensuring civilian harm is not excessive relative to the military advantage gained), and precaution (taking feasible steps to minimize civilian casualties) [15].

Legal scholars have challenged Israel's application of these principles on multiple fronts. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that the proportionality doctrine prohibits "launching an attack which may be expected to cause excessive civilian loss or damage in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" [15]. A single IDF strike targeting a senior Hezbollah leader in central Beirut injured 120 people and killed at least 22 civilians — a ratio that UN experts characterized as a violation of both distinction and proportionality [16].

On dual-use infrastructure, Israel has argued that certain civilian facilities were being repurposed for Hezbollah's "terrorist infrastructure" [17]. But Human Rights Watch, after conducting site visits and interviews, found "no evidence of military use at the locations" and argued that any "possible contribution to military action was too attenuated to make the sites lawful targets" [17]. A UN human rights expert went further, stating that "international humanitarian law does not permit attacks on the economic or financial infrastructure of an adversary, even if they indirectly sustain its military activities" [18].

The International Commission of Jurists has called on Israel to "cease indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks" [19]. Scholars at Just Security have questioned the legality of the entire military campaign, arguing that the scope of destruction goes beyond what any reasonable interpretation of self-defense permits [20].

Israel's defenders, including the American Jewish Committee, argue that Hezbollah's practice of embedding military assets in civilian areas creates the conditions for civilian harm and that Israel's evacuation warnings demonstrate compliance with the precautionary principle [21]. The IDF maintains that each strike is reviewed by military lawyers and that targets are selected based on intelligence confirming military use [14].

Evidence of Hezbollah Presence in Non-Hezbollah Areas

The question of whether Hezbollah has genuinely embedded military infrastructure in ostensibly neutral zones has become central to the legal and strategic debate.

UNIFIL provides the most authoritative independent evidence. Since the November 2024 ceasefire, UNIFIL has discovered more than 360 illegal weapons caches and other Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon [22]. During searches in the Saluki area, a weapons cache was found inside a mosque, and beneath it soldiers discovered a vehicle laden with rockets and explosives [22]. Several tunnels used by Hezbollah for living quarters and weapons storage were also uncovered [22].

The IDF has reported targeting "shafts used for storing weapons in several Hezbollah military posts," claiming that "exceptional military activity by Hezbollah had been detected at these sites" in the months preceding the March 2026 escalation [23].

However, the UNIFIL discoveries were concentrated in southern Lebanon — Hezbollah's acknowledged zone of influence — not in the Bekaa Valley, Tripoli, or non-Hezbollah municipalities that Israel has recently struck. UNIFIL peacekeepers have also noted that "the presence of Israeli soldiers in Lebanese territory prevents our full freedom of movement," limiting independent verification [22]. The distinction between areas where Hezbollah weapons have been confirmed and areas where Israel claims they exist but independent evidence is lacking remains a critical gap in the public record.

The LAF-Hezbollah Entanglement

The relationship between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah complicates any clean division of Lebanese territory into "Hezbollah" and "non-Hezbollah" zones.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies has documented an unofficial arrangement in which "control of the territory has been divided between the LAF and Hezbollah," with security in southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs "ensured by Hezbollah operatives" [24]. This tacit division directly contravenes UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias [24].

The entanglement runs deeper than territorial division. Reports emerged that Suhil Bahij Gharb, the LAF's chief of military intelligence for southern Lebanon, leaked sensitive information from a joint US-France-UNIFIL command center to Hezbollah after the November 2024 ceasefire [25]. Chatham House research has documented Hezbollah's systematic influence over Lebanese military and security institutions [26].

Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's government has sought to distance the state from Hezbollah's actions. After the March 2026 escalation, Salam condemned Hezbollah's projectile fire as "irresponsible" and ordered the LAF to "immediately take all necessary measures to prevent any military operation" from Lebanese territory [1]. But whether such declarations translate into effective control remains an open question — one that Israel uses to justify treating nominally state-controlled territory as a legitimate theater of operations.

Does this entanglement provide legal grounds for expanding strike zones? International law scholars are divided. Some argue that a state's inability to prevent armed groups from operating within its territory can, under certain conditions, provide a basis for strikes under the doctrine of self-defense. Others counter that the failure of the Lebanese state does not transfer military liability to civilian populations living in those areas, and that the principle of distinction still requires targeting specific military objectives rather than entire administrative zones [15][19].

Infrastructure Destruction and Economic Consequences

The World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, released in March 2025 and covering the period through December 2024, estimated Lebanon's total conflict-related economic cost at $14 billion — $6.8 billion in physical damage and $7.2 billion in economic losses from reduced productivity and foregone revenue [13].

Source: World Bank RDNA 2025

Data as of Mar 7, 2025CSV

The housing sector absorbed the largest share at $4.6 billion, followed by commerce, industry, and tourism at $3.4 billion. Infrastructure sectors — energy, transport, water, and municipal services — accounted for $1 billion in needed public financing [13]. The World Bank estimated total reconstruction needs at $11 billion, of which $3 to $5 billion would require public financing [13].

These figures predate the March 2026 escalation. Human Rights Watch has documented the destruction of at least four Litani River bridges, financial institutions, and reconstruction-related facilities in the latest round of strikes [4][17].

For context, the 2006 war caused an estimated $3.5 billion in damage — $2 billion to buildings and $1.5 billion to infrastructure — and destroyed 640 kilometers of roads, 73 bridges, and 15,000 homes [10]. The current conflict's damage toll already exceeds the 2006 figure by roughly four times, and continues to grow.

Lebanon's real GDP contracted 7.1 percent in 2024 [13]. The cumulative GDP decline since 2019 approaches 40 percent [13]. The banking sector remains insolvent, carrying more than $72 billion in losses since the 2019 financial crisis, with depositors still limited to withdrawing $400-$500 per month [27]. The $11 billion reconstruction bill amounts to roughly half of Lebanon's pre-crisis GDP — a figure the state cannot plausibly finance without massive international support.

Displacement Flows and Humanitarian Response

The displacement crisis extends well beyond Lebanon's borders. More than 562,000 people have crossed into Syria since the escalation — a reversal of the flow that saw 1.4 million Syrians seek refuge in Lebanon over the past decade [12]. UNHCR data shows Syria remains the world's largest refugee-producing country, with 5.5 million refugees globally [28].

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

For many displaced, the options are stark. While 18 percent of Syrian refugees express a desire to return to Syria within 12 months, over 70 percent describe such movement as "temporary or exploratory" — conditional on safety and economic feasibility [12]. European policymakers have expressed concern about a new wave of displacement toward Europe, with the European Council on Foreign Relations warning that the EU must act to prevent a refugee crisis [29]. The current EU approach centers on a 2024 aid package focused primarily on border management and return assistance for Syrians [29].

UNRWA has issued a combined humanitarian appeal for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan for 2026, reflecting the regional dimension of the crisis [30]. The UN's Lebanon Crisis Response Plan for 2025 had already been underfunded before the latest escalation [31].

International Diplomatic Response

The international response has been fragmented. France requested an emergency UN Security Council meeting following the March 2026 escalation and called on Israel to "refrain from any land-based or long-term interventions in Lebanon" [32][33]. France has also proposed a peace plan that would include Lebanon declaring readiness to negotiate a permanent non-aggression agreement with Israel [34].

The United States, Israel's principal ally on the Security Council, has focused its diplomatic pressure on demanding that Lebanese authorities accelerate Hezbollah's disarmament rather than on constraining Israeli operations [1]. During negotiations over UNIFIL's mandate renewal (Resolution 2790), the US pushed for termination dates while 14 other Council members opposed, resulting in a compromise 16-month mandate through December 2026 [1].

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has repeatedly stated that "there is no military solution, only diplomacy" [35]. UNIFIL has documented more than 10,000 Israeli ceasefire violations since November 2024, including 7,500 airspace violations and 2,500 ground violations [11]. The Lebanese government has filed formal UN complaints [36]. But no binding censure or conditioning of military aid has resulted — a contrast with the 2006 war, when sustained US and international pressure contributed to a ceasefire within 33 days.

Human Rights Watch has characterized Israeli actions as potential war crimes, including "forced displacement" and "wanton destruction" [4]. The organization emphasized that "civilians who do not evacuate following orders are still fully protected by international humanitarian law" [4].

What Comes Next

The March 2026 escalation has left Lebanon in a position with few historical parallels: a state too weak to control an armed group within its borders, too broke to rebuild what has been destroyed, and too fractured to negotiate effectively with an adversary that treats the distinction between state and non-state territory as functionally irrelevant.

The UN Security Council's UNIFIL mandate expires in December 2026 [37]. If it is not renewed — or if the US conditions renewal on terms unacceptable to other Council members — the last institutional mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire and documenting violations will disappear.

The $11 billion reconstruction figure continues to grow with each new round of strikes [13]. Lebanon's banking system cannot finance recovery. The IMF has conditioned any rescue package on structural reforms — including a "financial gap law" passed in late 2025 — that remain partially implemented [27]. Without international financing, reconstruction will stall, and the displacement crisis will deepen.

The legal and strategic questions raised by this campaign — whether a state's failure to disarm a militia justifies strikes across its entire territory, whether the dual-use doctrine can be stretched to cover financial institutions and reconstruction equipment, whether evacuation orders satisfy the precautionary principle when civilians have nowhere safe to go — will shape the law of armed conflict for years to come.