Israel Demolishes Towns and Villages in Southern Lebanon in Expanding Military Operations

In the small village of Mansouri, roughly six miles from the Israeli border, residents can hear the detonations clearly. "The demolitions are louder than airstrikes," said Abed Ammar, a 35-year-old emergency responder. "We can hear them very clearly from here" [1]. Across southern Lebanon, Israeli forces have been conducting controlled demolitions and airstrikes that have reduced entire communities to rubble — a campaign that Lebanese officials, international organizations, and satellite imagery analysts say mirrors the methods Israel has used in Gaza.

Since Israel's ground operations began in late September 2024, and particularly after their expansion in March 2026, the Israeli military has occupied at least 55 towns and villages in southern Lebanon [1]. Lebanese officials estimate that 62,000 homes have been damaged or destroyed since the beginning of March 2026 alone [1]. Amnesty International documented more than 10,000 structures heavily damaged or destroyed between October 2024 and January 2025 — and that was before the most intensive phase of demolitions began [2].

The Scale of Destruction

The damage is not evenly distributed. Amnesty International's satellite imagery analysis of 24 municipalities found that in three — Yarine, Dhayra, and Boustane — more than 70% of all structures were heavily damaged or destroyed [2]. Seven additional municipalities lost more than half their buildings [2].

Source: Amnesty International

Data as of Aug 1, 2025CSV

Specific cases illustrate the scope. In Kfar Kila, over 1,300 structures — 52% of the municipality's total — along with 133 acres of orchards were destroyed between September 2024 and January 2025 [2]. In Aita Ash-Shaab, approximately 1,000 buildings were leveled, including four mosques [3]. In Odeisseh, more than 580 structures were destroyed, along with a mosque and cemetery [3]. In Maroun el Ras, 700 structures were demolished alongside a soccer field and playground [3].

The destruction has not been limited to buildings. All major bridges over the Litani River were destroyed, and the Qasmiyeh bridge — the last remaining coastal crossing to the south — was struck in the final hours before the April 2026 ceasefire [1]. Agricultural land, orchards, roads, and water infrastructure have been targeted across the region [2][3].

Corey Scher, a researcher at Oregon State University who has analyzed satellite imagery of the destruction, described what he observed: "Large swaths of towns, villages being effectively wiped off the map" [1]. He noted that "previously damaged areas in Lebanon are now being completely leveled. And it looks like what Gaza looked like, when we also saw a complete leveling" [1].

Displacement: A Population Uprooted

The human toll has been staggering. At the peak of the crisis in late September 2024, nearly 900,000 people were internally displaced within Lebanon as sustained Israeli airstrikes hit the south, the Bekaa Valley, Baalbek, and southern Beirut [4]. After the November 2024 ceasefire, approximately 871,859 displaced people returned to their areas of origin, while 113,578 remained displaced [5].

But the March 2026 resumption of hostilities displaced an estimated 780,000 people anew [5]. More than 667,000 registered on the government's displacement platform, with over 100,000 registering in a single day [5]. Cross-border movement added to the crisis: more than 78,000 Syrians crossed from Lebanon, along with over 7,700 Lebanese nationals [4].

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

While Lebanon's displacement numbers do not place it among the world's largest IDP crises by absolute numbers, the country's small size — a population of roughly 5.5 million — means that a displacement of 780,000 represents approximately 14% of the entire population forced from their homes.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on March 16, 2026 that "hundreds of thousands of Shiite residents of southern Lebanon will not return to their homes south of the Litani area until the safety of Israel's northern residents is guaranteed" [6]. Human Rights Watch found that this statement "suggests an intent to forcibly displace the civilian population based on religion" [6].

The Ceasefire and Its Collapse

The November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement, brokered with U.S. mediation and signed by Israel, Lebanon, and five other countries, mandated a 60-day halt to hostilities [7]. Under its terms, Israel was to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon while Hezbollah would pull back north of the Litani River. Alleged violations would be reported to a tripartite mechanism and UNIFIL [7].

The agreement frayed almost immediately. UNIFIL recorded more than 10,000 Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and 1,400 military activities inside Lebanese territory between November 27, 2024 and the end of February 2026 [7][8]. Israeli forces maintained control of five positions inside Lebanon — near Labbouneh, Marwahin, Aitaroun, Hula, and Sarada — that they were supposed to vacate to allow deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces [8]. That transition never occurred [8].

Much of the destruction documented by Amnesty International took place after the ceasefire went into effect [2]. The demolitions continued "well into January 2025 during the ceasefire period," according to Amnesty's investigation [3].

On March 1, 2026, hostilities resumed in full. By March 16, Israel's army had begun ground operations with five divisions. On March 22, Defense Minister Katz announced that he and Prime Minister Netanyahu had "ordered the acceleration of the demolition of Lebanese houses in the border villages in order to thwart threats to Israeli communities — in accordance with the Beit Hanoun and Rafah models in Gaza" [6][9]. On March 24, Katz declared that the IDF would demolish all Lebanese border settlements and destroy all Litani River crossings [9].

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich added on March 5 that "very soon, Dahieh will look like Khan Younis" — referring to Beirut's southern suburb and the heavily destroyed city in southern Gaza [6].

Israel's Justification: Military Necessity and Hezbollah's Infrastructure

Israel's stated rationale rests on two pillars: the military necessity of destroying Hezbollah infrastructure embedded in civilian areas, and the prevention of future cross-border attacks.

The IDF has presented evidence of extensive Hezbollah tunnel networks beneath southern Lebanese villages. In the town of Qantara, the military said it discovered and destroyed two major tunnels spanning approximately two kilometers, built over a decade with "direct guidance" from Iran, reaching depths of 25 meters [10]. The tunnels contained approximately 30 rooms, 30 separate shafts — some with rocket launchers aimed at Israel — and bunk beds sufficient to house fighters for extended periods [10][11].

These tunnel networks, the IDF says, were designed to support thousands of Radwan Forces — Hezbollah's elite commando unit — and included weapons caches, communications equipment, and operational infrastructure [10]. Photographs released by the military showed tunnels extending in multiple directions beneath several villages [11].

The broader doctrinal framework draws on what analysts call the "Dahiya doctrine," named after Israel's 2006 bombardment of Beirut's Dahiya neighborhood. Formulated by former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot, the doctrine calls for "disproportionate force" against areas from which Israel is attacked, with the aim of pressuring civilian populations to turn against militant groups [12]. Eizenkot stated in 2008: "What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on" [12].

Israel frames the current demolitions as a necessary response to Hezbollah's strategy of embedding military infrastructure within civilian communities — a strategy that, Israel argues, makes those communities legitimate military targets.

The Legal Debate: Military Necessity vs. Collective Punishment

International humanitarian law permits destruction of civilian property only when required by "imperative military necessity" [12]. The question of whether Israel's campaign meets that standard is fiercely contested.

Amnesty International, after analyzing 77 verified videos and photographs, satellite imagery, and 11 interviews with residents, concluded that "extensive destruction of civilian property in order to prevent an opposing party from launching attacks in the future does not meet the imperative military necessity standard" [3]. The organization noted that much of the destruction was carried out with "manually laid explosives and bulldozers" while Israeli forces controlled the areas — meaning it occurred outside active combat [3]. Amnesty called for the demolitions to be investigated as war crimes [3].

The International Commission of Jurists stated that Israel's mass displacement orders were "unlawful" and called for an immediate halt [12]. Human Rights Watch characterized the stated Israeli policies as raising concerns about forcible displacement, wanton destruction of civilian property, and deliberate targeting of civilians [6].

Legal scholars who are critical of Hezbollah's own practices — including its documented strategy of embedding military assets in civilian areas — nonetheless distinguish between tactical operations against specific military targets and the wholesale leveling of villages. The proportionality test under Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions requires that anticipated military advantage be weighed against expected civilian harm. Critics argue that destroying 70% of a village's structures, including mosques, cemeteries, and playgrounds, fails that test even where some military infrastructure exists [2][3].

Israel's defenders counter that the tunnel networks and weapons caches discovered beneath residential structures demonstrate that Hezbollah deliberately weaponized civilian areas, making comprehensive demolition the only effective countermeasure. They point to the scale of Hezbollah's underground infrastructure — kilometers of tunnels with embedded launch positions — as evidence that selective operations would be insufficient to neutralize the threat [10][11].

The ICC Gap

A significant procedural barrier limits international legal accountability. Unlike in the Gaza context, the ICC currently lacks jurisdiction over the Israel-Lebanon conflict because neither Israel nor Lebanon is a party to the Rome Statute [13]. In early 2024, Lebanon's caretaker cabinet voted to authorize the ICC to investigate alleged war crimes on Lebanese territory, but Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib never filed the necessary declaration. The cabinet later amended its decision to omit mention of the ICC, opting instead to file complaints with the United Nations [13].

Multiple UN Special Rapporteurs have, however, conducted investigations. Morris Tidball-Binz, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, visited Lebanon from September 29 to October 10, 2025, and is scheduled to present a full report to the UN Human Rights Council in June 2026 [14]. He condemned Israel's strikes as "part of a disturbing pattern of lethal strikes in populated areas" [14]. Three Special Rapporteurs have called for an international independent investigation into Israel's killing of journalists in Lebanon [14].

The $11 Billion Reconstruction Bill

The World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, released in March 2025 covering the period through December 2024, estimated Lebanon's total reconstruction and recovery needs at $11 billion [15]. Physical damage accounted for $6.8 billion, while economic losses — reduced productivity, foregone revenues, and increased operating costs — added another $7.2 billion, bringing the total economic cost to $14 billion [15].

Source: World Bank RDNA 2025

Data as of Mar 7, 2025CSV

Housing was the hardest-hit sector at $4.6 billion in damages, followed by commerce, industry, and tourism at $3.4 billion [15]. The Nabatiyeh and South governorates sustained the greatest damage [15]. Lebanon's real GDP contracted by 7.1% in 2024, compared to a projected 0.9% growth without the conflict — compounding a cumulative GDP decline of approximately 40% since 2019 [15].

Of the $11 billion needed, the World Bank estimated that $3 to $5 billion would require public financing and $6 to $8 billion would need private investment [15]. The World Bank approved an initial $250 million contribution in June 2025 as part of a $1 billion scalable framework [16]. But these figures predate the March 2026 escalation. With 62,000 additional homes damaged or destroyed since March alone [1], the final bill will be substantially higher.

The comparison to 2006 is instructive. After that war, damage estimates ranged from $3.6 billion to $5.3 billion, with reconstruction costs estimated at up to $8 billion [17]. International donors pledged approximately $2.3 billion in the war's immediate aftermath, including $1.2 billion from Western countries and $1.1 billion in grants from Arab states [17]. The Paris III conference in January 2007 generated pledges exceeding $7.6 billion in loans and grants [17]. Yet much of that funding was slow to materialize or came with conditions that limited its impact, and reconstruction took years longer than projected.

The current bill — already at least three times the 2006 figure and climbing — faces even steeper obstacles. Lebanon's economy has been in freefall since 2019, its banking sector collapsed, and its government has limited institutional capacity. No major donor conference has been convened for the post-March 2026 destruction.

The Pattern of Destruction

Analysis of which villages have been destroyed reveals a pattern. The most heavily demolished communities share several characteristics: they are located close to the Israeli border, they are majority-Shia, and Israel has identified them as areas of Hezbollah activity [2][9]. Villages in the immediate border zone — Yarine, Dhayra, Boustane, Kfar Kila, Odeisseh — sustained the highest destruction rates [2].

The pattern expanded in April 2026. Lebanon's National News Agency reported attacks in the Jabal Amel region south of the Litani, including in Arzoun, Jouya, Hadatha, Jmeijmeh, Dbeibine, and Haris [9]. Reports also emerged of Israel destroying power and water infrastructure in a Christian-majority town, complicating a purely sectarian reading of the targeting pattern [9].

Defense Minister Katz's explicit references to the "Beit Hanoun and Rafah models" — both sites of extensive demolition in Gaza — suggest an operational template being applied across theaters [6]. The sequence is consistent: airstrikes, ground incursion, controlled demolitions with bulldozers and explosives, followed by declarations that residents cannot return.

What Comes Next

The April 2026 ceasefire has paused active hostilities, but Israeli forces remain in southern Lebanon. Israel has indicated willingness to maintain its occupation for months or years [1]. UNIFIL continues to document violations but lacks enforcement capacity. The Lebanese Armed Forces have not been able to deploy into areas Israel was supposed to vacate under the November 2024 agreement [8].

For the residents of southern Lebanon, the situation is defined by absence. Zainab Mahdi, a 50-year-old woman from Naqoura — now occupied by Israeli troops — described what it means to be barred from home: "I'm angry, and I'm sad. Just smelling our own soil is enough" [1].

The legal, humanitarian, and geopolitical questions raised by the campaign remain open. Whether the demolitions constitute legitimate military operations against embedded threats or collective punishment against a civilian population may ultimately be judged by international courts — if they can establish jurisdiction. In the meantime, the villages of southern Lebanon are being systematically erased, and the people who lived in them have no timeline for return.