Israel Outlines Its Requirements for Accepting Any US-Iran Peace Agreement

On May 6, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convened his security cabinet and declared that "the most important objective is the removal of the enriched material from Iran — all the enriched material — and the dismantling of Iran's enrichment capabilities" [1]. The statement came as the US and Iran edged toward a nuclear framework under a fragile two-week ceasefire announced on April 7, following months of open warfare [2]. Israel's demands, delivered both publicly and through private diplomatic channels, amount to a list of conditions more sweeping than any arms control agreement in modern history — and the gap between what Jerusalem wants and what Tehran will accept may determine whether diplomacy survives.

The Four Pillars: What Israel Demands in Writing

Netanyahu has articulated four core requirements. First, all enriched uranium must leave Iranian territory. Second, Iran must not merely halt enrichment but physically dismantle the centrifuges and infrastructure that make enrichment possible [1]. Third, Iran's ballistic missile program must be subjected to range and quantity limits with enforcement mechanisms [3]. Fourth, Iran must accept intrusive, no-notice inspections with no sunset clauses — what Netanyahu called "real inspection, substantive inspections, no lead-time inspections" [1].

These demands have been echoed across the Israeli political spectrum. Opposition Leader Yair Lapid announced five principles largely identical to Netanyahu's: zero uranium enrichment, removal of all enriched material, demolition of centrifuges, dismantlement of the ballistic missile program, and unrestricted verification [3]. The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Israel's most influential defense think tank, published a March 2026 policy paper formally recommending the "closure and destruction of all underground enrichment sites, including Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan, and the new Pickaxe Mountain complex," plus a complete prohibition on advanced centrifuges [4].

US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff adopted much of this framing, stating in May 2025: "We have one very, very clear red line, and that is enrichment. We cannot allow even 1% of an enrichment capability" [5]. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi flatly rejected the demand, calling it "unrealistic" and stating that "enrichment in Iran is not something that can be stopped" [5].

How Israel's Demands Compare to the 2015 JCPOA

Israel opposed the JCPOA — the 2015 deal between Iran and six world powers — but the current demands go far beyond what that agreement required. Under the JCPOA, Iran reduced its low-enriched uranium stockpile by 97%, from approximately 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and limited enrichment to 3.67% U-235, sufficient for civilian power but far below weapons grade [6]. Iran was permitted to operate roughly 5,060 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz, and the Fordow facility was converted to a research center with no enrichment [6].

The JCPOA's verification regime required Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, granting the IAEA expanded access to information and facilities. However, critics — including Israel — pointed out that the inspection regime "proved deficient in terms of short-notice challenge inspections of undeclared sites and the questioning of related personnel" [6]. Most enrichment restrictions had sunset clauses expiring after 10 to 15 years [6].

Israel now demands zero enrichment (versus 3.67%), zero centrifuges (versus 5,060), removal of all enriched material (versus a 300 kg cap), and inspections without any time limits (versus sunsets). In effect, Israel is asking for an agreement far more restrictive than the deal it lobbied against in 2015.

What Iran Would Actually Have to Give Up

The scale of dismantlement Israel requires becomes concrete when measured against Iran's current capabilities. As of June 2025, Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile stood at 9,875 kg — more than 30 times the JCPOA's 300 kg limit [7]. Of that, 441 kg was enriched to 60% U-235, just a short technical step from the 90% required for a weapon [7]. Iran is the only Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon state to have produced uranium at this level [7].

Source: IAEA Quarterly Reports

Data as of Jun 13, 2025CSV

Iran operates over 20,000 centrifuges across its declared enrichment facilities, including 1,419 advanced IR-6 machines at the Fordow facility — each capable of enriching uranium roughly ten times faster than the first-generation IR-1 models permitted under the JCPOA [7]. The IAEA has been unable to verify Iran's full centrifuge inventory since February 2021, when Tehran revoked access to manufacturing and assembly workshops [7]. By February 2026, Iran had provided access to only four of six remaining unaffected facilities [8].

For context, Iran's pre-JCPOA baseline in 2013 included approximately 19,000 centrifuges (mostly IR-1s) and about 7,154 kg of low-enriched uranium. "Zero enrichment" would require Iran to dismantle not just the machines that exceed the JCPOA's limits but all enrichment capacity — a demand no nuclear-capable state has voluntarily accepted outside of regime collapse scenarios like post-apartheid South Africa or post-reunification Ukraine.

The Missile Question: Asymmetry and Double Standards

Iran's ballistic missile arsenal has become co-equal with enrichment in Israel's hierarchy of concerns. A senior Israeli defense official told the Jerusalem Post that "America giving in on the Iran ballistic missiles issue is a redline for Israel" [3]. Israel wants Iran held to specific caps on missile quantities and range, with enforcement mechanisms.

Source: IISS / FDD / Iran Watch

Data as of Feb 1, 2026CSV

By February 2026, IDF estimates placed Iran's ballistic missile arsenal at approximately 2,500 missiles, rebuilt from a low of around 1,500 following the June 2025 war and exchanges of fire in 2024 [9]. Iran's arsenal spans short-range systems like the Fateh-110 (300 km) to medium-range missiles like the Shahab-3 and Emad (up to 2,000 km) and the Khorramshahr-4, with a reported range of 3,000 km and a payload capacity of 1,500–1,800 kg [9]. In March 2026, Iran attempted a strike on Diego Garcia at approximately 4,000 km, though both missiles failed [9].

Tehran argues that missile restrictions amount to an asymmetric double standard. The United States, Russia, and China are not party to any treaty limiting their ballistic missile arsenals. The now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between the US and Russia addressed a specific class of land-based missiles but had no equivalents for the broader arsenals Israel wants Iran to constrain. Iran's Foreign Minister has stated that Iran "deliberately limits the range of its missiles to 2,000 km" and regards them as conventional defensive weapons [9]. From Tehran's perspective, no country with hostile neighbors and no nuclear weapons has ever been asked to accept the kind of missile limits Israel proposes.

The Debate Inside Israel

Despite the appearance of wall-to-wall consensus, fractures exist. The Stimson Center observed in a 2026 analysis that the "strength of that agreement may now be obscuring important questions about the limits of military power and the risks of escalation" [10]. Six months after Israel declared that its war operations had "significantly degraded the Iranian threat," Tehran was already rebuilding its nuclear and missile programs, with the Stimson analysts noting that "deterrence appears temporary rather than transformative" [10].

The INSS paper, while recommending maximalist demands, acknowledged that "the regime in Tehran, if it survives the war, may adopt a national security doctrine that relies on nuclear weapons as its sole existential deterrent capability" — implicitly recognizing that excessive pressure could accelerate the very outcome Israel fears [4]. The Stimson Center noted that "the prevailing consensus reduces incentives for strategic innovation, even as the cycle of confrontation persists," and that "limited depth of public debate in Israel regarding the nature of the Iranian threat has constrained the development of alternative strategic thinking" [10].

Former senior Israeli defense intelligence officials have argued that "the post-war reality no longer allows discussion of a model of 'limited enrichment' under supervision due to loss of political trust" [4]. But some voices from the Quincy Institute and arms control community counter that "zero enrichment" has "for 25 years, proven both futile and counterproductive," giving "Iran more time to advance its nuclear program while stalling the realistic, verification-based deals that could actually constrain it" [11].

Israel's Leverage Over Washington

Israel's ability to shape US negotiating positions rests on several mechanisms. AIPAC, which spent an estimated $20–40 million opposing the JCPOA in 2015, remains a formidable lobbying force, using campaign contributions and vote studies to influence members of key congressional committees [12]. In 2015, Congress voted against the JCPOA in both chambers — 269–162 in the House and 56–42 in the Senate — but the Obama administration sustained a veto, and the deal proceeded [12].

The precedent matters: the JCPOA is the only case in which a US administration concluded a nuclear agreement over Israel's explicit and active objection. The political cost was enormous, and no subsequent administration has attempted to repeat it. The Atlantic Council noted in 2026 that "nothing threatens Israel more at present than such an agreement, even one that would significantly reduce Tehran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb, because it would deal a severe blow to the Israeli desire to see the Iranian regime fall" [13].

The current dynamics are different from 2015 in one critical respect. The Trump administration launched strikes alongside Israel on February 28, 2026 [13], creating a degree of military entanglement that gives Jerusalem substantial informal veto power. A US administration that has gone to war with Iran alongside Israel faces severe political constraints in then accepting a deal Israel publicly rejects.

Iran's Proxies: Degraded but Not Defeated

Israel has argued that any nuclear deal must address Iran's proxy network — Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias — on the grounds that sanctions relief would fund their rearmament. The evidence from the JCPOA era is mixed: between 2015 and 2018, JCPOA sanctions relief did not demonstrably reduce proxy activity, with Iran continuing to fund and arm regional allies [14].

Since October 7, 2023, however, Iran's proxy infrastructure has suffered severe damage. Israel killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in a September 2024 airstrike and eliminated much of the group's senior command structure [14]. The Assad regime's fall in Syria in December 2024 severed Iran's land bridge to the eastern Mediterranean [14]. The US conducted Operation Rough Rider in 2025, a 52-day air campaign with approximately 1,100 airstrikes targeting Houthi leadership and military assets in Yemen [14].

Yet the picture is not one of permanent degradation. By July 2025, reports indicated Iran had "intensified its support for proxy groups, supplying advanced weaponry to both the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon" [14]. The Houthis have begun manufacturing arms domestically, reducing their dependence on Iranian supply lines [15]. Israel's demand that a nuclear deal also restrain proxy funding reflects a legitimate concern — but also expands the scope of negotiations in ways that make agreement harder.

Gulf Arab States: Aligned but Not Identical

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain have aligned with Israel in demanding that any deal go beyond the nuclear file. Gulf states have told Washington that any agreement "must permanently curb Iran's missile and drone capabilities and ensure global energy supplies are never again weaponised" [16]. The UAE ambassador to the US stated that "a simple cease-fire isn't enough" [16].

But the alignment has limits. Saudi Arabia is simultaneously negotiating its own nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, one that arms control experts warn could include uranium enrichment rights for Riyadh [17]. If Saudi Arabia secures enrichment capacity while Iran is denied it entirely, the asymmetry would be diplomatically explosive and would hand Tehran a powerful argument about discriminatory treatment.

Gulf states also diverge from Israel on regime change. While some in the Israeli government view the current military campaign as an opportunity to topple the Iranian regime [13], Gulf states have historically preferred a contained, weakened Iran over the instability that regime collapse would produce. The Carnegie Endowment observed that the war "uncovered weaknesses in US-Gulf ties," with Arab Gulf states pressing for security guarantees that go beyond Iran's nuclear program to encompass their own defense posture [18].

The Military Option: What Happens If Diplomacy Fails

If the US accepts a deal that falls short of Israel's requirements, Jerusalem has signaled it would consider independent military action. The 2025–2026 conflict demonstrated that the Israeli Air Force can sustain operations deep inside Iran — conducting over 540 strike waves in central and western Iran and achieving air superiority across Iranian airspace [19].

However, the hardest targets remain out of reach. Fordow, buried deep within a mountain, is "considered nearly impervious to conventional airstrikes," and analysts assess that Israel "doesn't have bunker busters that are good enough" to destroy it [19]. Even with US-supplied GBU-28 and GBU-72 earth-penetrating munitions, Israel's demonstrated capability is limited against Iran's most deeply hardened nuclear facilities [19].

The broader strategic question is whether strikes produce lasting results. The Stimson Center's assessment — that six months after Israel's war operations, "Tehran is rebuilding its nuclear and missile programs" — suggests that military action buys time rather than resolution [10]. The Carnegie Endowment warned in May 2026 that "Tehran may conclude that its ability to disrupt the global economy via the Strait of Hormuz provides enough deterrence to begin quietly rebuilding its nuclear program" [20].

The Negotiating Trap

Israel's demands create a negotiating dynamic that some analysts describe as deliberately circular. The conditions are set high enough that Iran is unlikely to accept them, which means either the US pressures Iran into an unprecedented capitulation or negotiations fail — and in either case, Israel's preferred outcome of maximum pressure or military confrontation is preserved.

The Arms Control Association noted in April 2026 that "US negotiators were ill-prepared for serious nuclear talks with Iran" [21], suggesting that the gap between stated demands and diplomatic capacity is wide. The Responsible Statecraft publication argued that the zero enrichment demand "gives Iran more time to advance its nuclear program while stalling the realistic, verification-based deals that could actually constrain it" [11].

The counterargument, articulated by the INSS and Israeli defense establishment, is that the post-2023 strategic environment has fundamentally changed. With Hezbollah degraded, Syria's regime fallen, and Iran's air defenses exposed as inadequate, this may be the moment of maximum leverage to demand terms that would have been unthinkable five years ago [4]. Whether that leverage produces a deal or a deadlock remains the central question of the negotiations ahead.