Iran Submits Formal Proposal for Negotiations with US to End Conflict

On April 27, 2026, Iran transmitted a revised proposal to Washington through Pakistani mediators, offering to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and end the war that has raged since late February [1]. President Donald Trump responded the next day that he was "not satisfied" with the terms, and by May 1 suggested the United States "might need" to resume military operations [2]. The exchange crystallizes a central paradox: both sides say they want to end the conflict, but neither has moved far enough from its starting position to make that possible.

The Road to War — and Back to Talks

The current crisis did not begin with bombs. It began with diplomacy that failed.

In April 2025, US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held indirect talks in Muscat, Oman, with messages relayed through Omani mediators [3]. A second round followed in Rome on April 19, 2025 [3]. Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar worked behind the scenes to sustain the channel, with Iran specifically requesting Oman as a neutral venue [3]. Iran proposed a three-step framework: temporarily lower enrichment to 3.67%, gain access to frozen assets, and resume oil exports [3].

Those talks collapsed. By February 2026, a final round of Oman-mediated indirect discussions produced what Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi called a "constructive" atmosphere, but no breakthrough [4]. Iran declared its missile program "non-negotiable" [5]. On February 28, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure [6].

The Israeli Air Force conducted decapitation strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior officials [6]. Natanz was 75% damaged, with over 6,000 centrifuges destroyed. The Fordow deep bunker sustained only 30% damage, leaving its core facility potentially intact [7]. Iran retaliated with strikes on Gulf Arab states hosting US military facilities, deepening its regional isolation [8].

On March 6, Trump posted that "There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!" [6]. By early April, Pakistan — which shares a border with Iran and had stayed out of the military conflict — stepped in as mediator.

The 10-Point Plan and the April Ceasefire

On April 5, Pakistan proposed a 45-day two-phased ceasefire framework. Iran rejected it and countered with its own 10-point plan [9]. The full list of demands:

1. US commitment to no further acts of aggression
2. Continued Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz
3. Acceptance of Iran's nuclear enrichment rights
4. Lifting of all primary sanctions
5. Lifting of all secondary sanctions
6. Termination of all UN Security Council resolutions against Iran
7. Termination of all IAEA Board of Governors resolutions against Iran
8. Payment of war damages to Iran
9. Withdrawal of US combat forces from the region
10. Cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon [9]

On April 8, the two sides agreed to a two-week ceasefire [10]. The Islamabad Talks followed on April 11-12 but ended without agreement or memorandum of understanding [11]. Iran refused to reopen Hormuz, citing ongoing Israeli strikes in Lebanon. Trump responded by announcing a naval blockade of Iran on April 13 [6].

The Latest Proposal: Hormuz First, Nukes Later

Iran's April 27 revised proposal shifted strategy. Rather than demanding all 10 points simultaneously, Tehran offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to all commercial traffic as a trust-building measure, conditional on the US lifting its naval blockade of Iranian ports — while deferring the far more contentious nuclear discussions to a subsequent phase [1].

Analyst Abas Aslani described this as an acknowledgment that the old model of "making compromises on its nuclear programme in exchange for economic sanctions relief" is "no longer a viable path" [1]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio conceded the offer was "better than what we thought they were going to submit" but said any agreement must "definitively prevent them from sprinting towards a nuclear weapon" [1]. An unnamed US official told Reuters that Trump was unhappy because the proposal contained no provisions for Iran's nuclear program [1].

By May 1, Trump reiterated he was "not sure we're going to get to a deal" [2].

How the Terms Compare to the JCPOA

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) capped enrichment at 3.67% uranium-235 for 15 years, required Iran to dismantle over 13,000 centrifuges, ship out 98% of its low-enriched uranium stockpile, and accept intrusive IAEA monitoring including access to suspicious sites within 24 hours [12]. In exchange, Iran received relief from nuclear-related sanctions and access to over $100 billion in frozen assets [12]. The deal explicitly excluded ballistic missiles and regional proxy activities.

Iran's current 10-point plan goes far beyond the JCPOA framework in its demands — calling for removal of all sanctions (not just nuclear-related ones), war reparations, US military withdrawal from the region, and recognition of enrichment rights with no specified limits [9]. It also omits any commitments on proxy militias or missile programs. The JCPOA was itself criticized for these omissions; Iran's 2026 proposal does not address them either.

Iran's Nuclear Program: What Is Known — and What Isn't

Before the February strikes, Iran held 440.9 kg of 60%-enriched uranium, according to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi's April 23 assessment — enough for approximately 10 nuclear weapons if further enriched to 90% weapons-grade [7]. The Institute for Science and International Security estimated Iran could convert its 60% stockpile into 233 kg of weapons-grade uranium in three weeks at Fordow [7].

Source: IAEA Reports / Arms Control Association

Data as of Apr 23, 2026CSV

But the current picture is opaque. Iran terminated all IAEA access on February 28, 2026 — the day of the strikes [7]. Cameras have been disabled, seals removed. As Grossi told the IAEA board on March 2: "We have now not had access to Iran's previously declared inventories of low-enriched uranium and high-enriched uranium (over 20%) for more than eight months" [7]. The destruction of Natanz may have set back Iran's program, but the survival of Fordow's core facility means a pathway to breakout remains. Without inspectors on the ground, neither side can verify the other's claims about the program's current status.

The Economic Toll: Sanctions, War, and Poverty

The human cost of the conflict compounds years of economic deterioration. The World Bank estimates GDP contracted by 2.7% in the Iranian fiscal year ending March 2026, reflecting sanctions, protests, and intensified hostilities [13]. The IMF forecasts inflation will reach 69% in 2026 [13]. The Iranian rial has collapsed from approximately 42,000 to over 1.1 million against the US dollar [13].

Source: World Bank / UNDP estimates

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

An estimated 35-40% of Iranians now live below the poverty line, up from roughly 12% in 2015 [13][14]. UN Food and Agriculture Organization data show 41% of Iranians suffer from moderate or severe food insecurity, and 36 million people cannot afford a healthy diet [13]. Meat has become a luxury item, and an estimated 7 million Iranians go hungry [13].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

Independent economists attribute this deterioration to a combination of US sanctions and domestic mismanagement. The IRGC's control of large portions of the Iranian economy — from construction to telecommunications — has drawn particular scrutiny. A January 2026 Euronews analysis found that Revolutionary Guard-controlled entities distort markets and siphon resources, compounding the damage from external sanctions [15]. The UNDP's April 2026 report documented how military escalation has further devastated an economy already under severe strain [14].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The depth of this crisis gives Iran powerful incentives to reach a deal that restores oil exports and unfreezes assets. But it also means Tehran's negotiators face pressure to secure maximum concessions in return for any agreement — an economy this damaged cannot absorb a deal perceived as surrender.

The Oil Price Dimension

The Strait of Hormuz closure and the broader conflict have pushed oil prices sharply higher. WTI crude reached $114.58 per barrel in April 2026, up nearly 58% year-over-year [16]. The global economic spillover gives Washington its own incentive to resolve the crisis, but also provides leverage: reopening Hormuz without a nuclear deal, as Iran proposes, would relieve energy markets and reduce pressure on Tehran to make further concessions.

Source: FRED / EIA

Data as of Apr 27, 2026CSV

Congressional Red Lines and the Durability Problem

Any agreement faces a structural obstacle in Washington: durability. The JCPOA was an executive agreement, not a treaty, which allowed Trump to withdraw unilaterally in 2018. The same vulnerability would apply to any new deal.

Senate Republicans have drawn firm lines. Senators Lindsey Graham and Tom Cotton have said approval would require full dismantlement of Iran's enrichment capabilities plus resolution of missile and terrorism concerns [17]. In May 2026, 52 senators and 177 representatives wrote to Trump urging rejection of any deal that allows continued enrichment [17]. The Senate has also blocked six consecutive War Powers Resolutions aimed at constraining military operations, most recently on April 30 [18][19].

This creates a paradox: an executive-only deal is faster to reach but can be reversed by the next president, as happened in 2018. A treaty that survives administrations would require Senate approval that, based on publicly stated positions, appears out of reach without terms Iran is unlikely to accept.

Regional Actors: Who Gains, Who Loses

The conflict has reshuffled regional dynamics.

Saudi Arabia and Israel conducted a "weeks-long lobbying effort" that helped move Trump toward military action, according to the Washington Post [20]. Both governments framed Iran's nuclear program as an existential threat. But the war's aftermath has complicated Saudi calculations: Iran's retaliatory strikes hit Gulf states hosting US bases, raising the cost of openly backing Washington [8]. Saudi Arabia has since called for talks that "address all issues" contributing to regional instability [8].

Israel participated directly in the February strikes and has maintained its position that negotiations should proceed without a ceasefire [8]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the strikes as removing an "existential threat" [8].

Iraq and Lebanon remain caught in the crossfire. Iran's 10-point plan demands cessation of hostilities "on all fronts, including Lebanon" [9], linking the bilateral US-Iran conflict to the broader regional proxy war.

Pakistan has emerged as the most consequential mediator, a role that reflects both its geographic proximity to Iran and its desire to maintain neutrality between Washington and Tehran [11].

The Hardliner Rift Inside Iran

Perhaps the most consequential obstacle to a deal lies within Iran itself. The death of Khamenei in the February strikes created a power vacuum that has become a factional battleground.

According to a Washington Times report citing the Institute for the Study of War, Major General Ahmad Vahidi, an IRGC commander, has emerged as Iran's "current decision maker" [21]. The power struggle pits two camps against each other:

Ghalibaf's pragmatists: Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf led Iran's delegation to the Islamabad Talks and supports continued negotiations. On April 28, 261 out of 290 MPs issued a statement backing Ghalibaf and the negotiating team [22].

Jalili's ultra-hardliners: Former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili has escalated tensions by calling on Mojtaba Khamenei (the late Supreme Leader's son) to clarify whether the talks reflect official directives, warning of "sedition of officials" if they do not [22]. MP Mahmoud Nabavian, who attended the Islamabad Talks, declared that "negotiations are now pure damage" and called the inclusion of nuclear issues a "strategic mistake" [22].

The dispute spilled into media when Raja News and the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency clashed publicly — with accusations that one outlet was "seeking to complete Trump's project in Iran" [22]. Tasnim argued that Iran's demands for total sanctions relief amounted to unrealistic expectations "like a magic beanstalk" [22].

The IRGC's institutional interests are directly threatened by normalization: sanctions relief could weaken their economic monopolies, and a deal that constrains proxy networks would undermine their regional influence. Whether the IRGC can formally veto a deal is ambiguous, but their capacity to undermine one — through proxy actions, non-compliance, or political sabotage — is well-established.

The Case Against Engagement

Serious analysts have argued that engaging Iran now rewards coercive behavior and sets dangerous precedents.

The core argument: Iran enriched uranium to near-weapons-grade levels, threatened global oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and maintained proxy networks across the Middle East — and is now being offered negotiations rather than facing sustained consequences. Critics contend this teaches other nuclear-threshold states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea under future scenarios) that the path to diplomatic recognition runs through proliferation [23].

Historical precedents are cited frequently. North Korea signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, received economic benefits, and secretly pursued nuclear weapons anyway — eventually testing its first device in 2006. Libya's Muammar Gaddafi agreed to dismantle his weapons program in 2003 and was overthrown with Western military support in 2011, an outcome that Iran's leadership has explicitly cited as a reason never to surrender its nuclear capabilities [23].

Proponents of maximum pressure argue that the February strikes damaged Iran's nuclear infrastructure significantly and that sustained economic and military pressure could force more comprehensive concessions than negotiation alone [23]. The counterargument — advanced by analysts at RAND and the Modern Diplomacy Institute — is that "pressure has an upper bound" and that rewriting a rival's security strategy through coercion alone "would likely require sustained military escalation and a fractured regional coalition, neither of which appears politically or strategically sustainable" [24].

What Comes Next

The deadline for Iran's revised proposal was anticipated for May 2, 2026, after Trump rejected the April 27 version [2]. Trump's public statements have oscillated between skepticism and conditional openness, making it difficult to assess whether Washington is negotiating or running out the clock.

The fundamental gap remains: Iran wants to decouple the war from the nuclear issue and address each sequentially. The United States insists on linking them, viewing the Hormuz closure and the nuclear program as two halves of the same leverage equation. Neither side has proposed a framework that bridges that gap.

Meanwhile, the war continues, oil prices remain elevated, and the Iranian population bears the heaviest cost. The question is not whether a deal is desirable — both sides have signaled it is — but whether the internal politics of Tehran and Washington leave any space for one that both can accept and neither can easily reverse.