House Democrat Who Led Trump Impeachment Efforts Loses Texas Primary

Rep. Al Green, the Houston Democrat who became a household name for his relentless attempts to impeach Donald Trump, lost his seat on May 26, 2026, falling to freshman Rep. Christian Menefee in a Democratic primary runoff for Texas's redrawn 18th Congressional District [1][2]. Green, 78, had served in Congress since 2005. Menefee, 38, was sworn in barely four months ago after winning a special election to replace the late Rep. Sylvester Turner [2].

The defeat ends the congressional career of one of Trump's most persistent antagonists — a lawmaker ejected from the House chamber during back-to-back State of the Union addresses and who forced floor votes on impeachment even when his own party's leadership opposed the effort [3][4].

The Numbers: A Race That Was Close, Then Wasn't

In the March 3 primary, Menefee narrowly outpolled Green, taking 46.0% to Green's 44.2%, with roughly 9.8% going to other candidates — not enough for either to clear the 50% threshold and avoid a runoff [5].

Source: Texas Secretary of State / NBC News

Data as of Mar 4, 2026CSV

By mid-May, a University of Houston Hobby School poll showed Menefee had opened a 7-point lead, 50% to 43%, with 7% undecided [6]. The poll found Menefee winning white and Latino voters decisively, while the two candidates split the Black vote roughly evenly [6]. Menefee led in Harris County, which accounts for about 75% of district voters, while Green held an advantage only in Fort Bend County [6]. Supporters of third-place March finisher Amanda Edwards broke for Menefee over Green at a 2-to-1 ratio [6].

Green ran unopposed in the 2024 general election in his old 9th District, so there is no recent competitive primary comparison. The shift from a comfortable incumbent to a runoff loser in a matter of months tracks directly to the redistricting that upended his political geography.

Six Impeachment Attempts — And What They Achieved

Green's national profile was built almost entirely on his willingness to force the impeachment question when few colleagues would join him. His efforts spanned both of Trump's terms:

First Term (2017–2018): Green introduced his first privileged impeachment resolution in 2017 following Trump's comments about the Charlottesville rally. He forced a floor vote in December 2017, which was tabled. He brought it back in January 2018, where the motion was defeated 355–66, with 121 Democrats joining all 234 Republicans in voting against [7]. House Democratic leaders Nancy Pelosi and Steny Hoyer publicly said it was "not the time" [7].

Second Term (2025–2026): Green filed articles of impeachment in May 2025, accusing Trump of "devolving American democracy into authoritarianism" [8]. In June 2025, he introduced another article charging Trump with violating the War Powers Clause by ordering strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities without Congressional authorization [9]. In December 2025, he forced a vote on articles accusing Trump of inciting violence against lawmakers and federal judges — specifically citing Trump's suggestion that certain members of Congress could be put to death. The House voted 237–140 to table the resolution, with Democratic leadership voting "present" rather than backing Green's effort [10][11].

None of these efforts advanced past the initial floor vote. The furthest any resolution got was a recorded roll-call vote, each time failing by wide margins. Green's impeachment pushes were opposed not only by Republicans but frequently by his own party's leadership, who viewed the efforts as strategically counterproductive.

Follow the Money: $5 Million From Crypto and the Campaign Finance Debate

The TX-18 runoff became the most expensive House primary runoff in Texas, driven overwhelmingly by outside spending on Menefee's behalf [12].

Source: Federal Election Commission / Texas Tribune

Data as of May 22, 2026CSV

Protect Progress, a super PAC aligned with the cryptocurrency industry, spent $1.5 million boosting Menefee ahead of the March primary and more than doubled that amount for the runoff, pouring in over $4 million total — bringing the PAC's combined spending to more than $5 million [12][13]. The spending paid for advertising that promoted Menefee's candidacy.

Menefee's campaign itself raised $3.46 million in total receipts through May 2026, with donors including Houston billionaire philanthropist John Arnold, trial lawyer and megadonor Amber Mostyn, former Houston Metro chair Carrin Patman, and HillCo lobbying firm cofounder Bill Miller [12]. Menefee said he took no corporate PAC money, though he accepted contributions from PACs representing United Airlines, beer wholesalers, credit unions, and realtors [12].

Green seized on the crypto spending as a central argument, introducing himself on the House floor as "an unbought, liberated, unafraid Democrat, unbought by crypto cash" and accusing Menefee of making "a deal with the devil" by aligning with "Trump crypto cronies" [12]. Menefee countered that he supported banning super PACs and changing campaign finance law but would not unilaterally disarm [12].

No evidence emerged of Republican-aligned or Trump-linked money flowing directly into the race. The crypto industry's involvement, while enormous relative to the race, reflects a broader pattern of Protect Progress and its parent organization Fairshake spending in Democratic primaries nationwide to support candidates perceived as friendly to digital asset regulation [13].

Redistricting: The Structural Force Behind the Matchup

The proximate cause of Green's defeat was not impeachment but mapmaking. In August 2025, the Texas Legislature — controlled by Republicans — redrew congressional boundaries, and Governor Greg Abbott signed the new map into law on August 29 [14]. The U.S. Supreme Court allowed the map to be used for the 2026 elections in a December 2025 ruling [14].

Green's old 9th District was redrawn to tilt heavily Republican, making it unwinnable for a Democrat. Green chose to run in the 18th District instead — a deep-blue seat, but one that already had an incumbent: Menefee, who had just won a special election there [2][14].

Source: Houston Defender Network

Data as of Feb 10, 2026CSV

The demographic transformation was stark. Green's old district had a 39% Black voting-age population; under the new map, that same geography (now labeled the 9th) dropped to just 11% Black [15]. The new 18th District consolidated Black communities with a 50.8% Black voting-age population, but it was unfamiliar territory for Green — he was running in someone else's district [15].

The redistricting also removed significant Black population centers from the district's previous configuration, including downtown Houston, Texas Southern University, and the historically Black Third Ward, pushing them into neighboring districts [15]. Voting rights activists described the Republican strategy as "packing" — concentrating Black voters into fewer districts to dilute their statewide influence [15].

The Generational Argument

Beyond redistricting and money, the race turned on a generational contrast. Menefee, a former Harris County attorney, framed himself as a "fresh voice, fresh fight" and ran on Medicare for All, a higher minimum wage, and directing more federal money to Houston households [16]. He pointed to lawsuits his office had filed against the Trump administration as evidence he could oppose Trump through institutional channels, not just protest [2].

Green ran on his record. "I'm running on a record. I'm not running on promises," he said [16]. He touted his work on flood control, small business support, infrastructure, and federal judicial nominations. He criticized Menefee's missed votes in Congress — though Menefee had been in office only since February [17].

Menefee's sharpest line cut to the core of the seniority argument: "Seniority matters when it delivers" [16]. The implication — that Green's two decades in Congress had not translated into sufficient tangible results for the district — resonated with voters in a district that had gone months without consistent representation after Turner's death in 2025 and a prolonged special election process [18].

Green was twice ejected from the House chamber during Trump's State of the Union addresses — first in 2025, when he stood shaking his cane toward Trump, and again in February 2026, when he held a sign reading "BLACK PEOPLE AREN'T APES" to protest a Trump social media post depicting Barack and Michelle Obama as primates [3][4]. These confrontations cemented Green's national brand but may have reinforced local perceptions that his focus had drifted from constituent service to national political theater.

The Impeachment Curse: What Happened to Others Who Led the Charge

Green's defeat follows a pattern. Of the 10 House Republicans who voted to impeach Trump after January 6, 2021, four lost their primaries in 2022, four retired or chose not to run, and only two survived their primaries [19].

Source: CBS News

Data as of Nov 8, 2022CSV

Liz Cheney, who co-chaired the January 6 committee, lost her Wyoming primary by 37 points — one of the worst defeats for a sitting House member in modern history [20]. Adam Kinzinger retired after redistricting put him in the same district as a fellow Republican, a parallel to Green's own situation [19]. Among Democrats, the impeachment managers from Trump's first and second Senate trials have largely fared better, though none pursued the cause as relentlessly or as unilaterally as Green did.

The comparison is imperfect: Republican impeachment voters defied their own party's base on a single high-profile vote, while Green was a Democrat pursuing impeachment against an opposition president — a stance broadly popular with his party's primary voters. The difference is that Green's impeachment efforts were repeatedly opposed by his own leadership and never attracted significant co-sponsor support, leaving him exposed as a lone operator rather than a party standard-bearer.

The Steelman Case: Was This Democratic Accountability?

A case can be made that Green's loss reflects ordinary democratic turnover rather than backlash. He was 78 years old, seeking a 12th term, running in a district where he had never been on the ballot before, against a younger opponent with a recent mandate from a special election. The district had endured months without representation after Turner's death, and voters may have simply wanted the representative who was already in the seat.

Green's attendance record in Congress was not notably poor — he missed 2.0% of roll-call votes over his career, roughly the median for sitting members [17]. But the perception gap between his national profile and his local deliverables created an opening. When Menefee argued that seniority should be measured by results, he was channeling a specific frustration: Green was famous in Washington but had not translated that fame into outsized federal investment in a flood-prone, economically struggling district.

The crypto PAC spending complicates any clean narrative about voter preferences. More than $5 million in outside money is a formidable advantage in a low-turnout runoff, and it is reasonable to ask whether the result would have been the same without it. Green's supporters argued — with some justification — that the race was bought rather than won.

What This Means for Vulnerable Democrats

The DCCC named 26 House Democrats to its Frontline program for 2026, including all 13 who represent districts Trump carried in November 2024 [21]. The committee has also identified 44 Republican-held seats as targets, reflecting confidence that the midterm environment favors Democrats [22].

Green's district was never a Frontline seat — TX-18 is rated solidly Democratic by the Cook Political Report, and Menefee is expected to win the general election easily [2]. But the race carries a warning for Democrats in competitive districts: a national profile built on confrontation with Trump is not, by itself, a substitute for local credibility and constituent engagement.

Party strategists have already adjusted their messaging guidance for 2026, emphasizing pocketbook issues — healthcare costs, housing, wages — over impeachment or resistance branding [21]. The lesson from TX-18, filtered through the caveat that redistricting and outside money were the dominant forces, is that voters in even the bluest districts want representatives focused on their problems, not Washington spectacles.

A District's Legacy, Reshaped

Texas's 18th Congressional District has been represented by Black Democrats since Barbara Jordan first walked into Congress in 1973 as the first Black woman elected from the South [18]. Mickey Leland, Craig Washington, Sheila Jackson Lee, and Sylvester Turner followed — each a figure of national significance [18]. Menefee, who is also Black, continues that tradition, though the district's boundaries and demographics have been substantially altered by Republican mapmakers.

Green's defeat closes a specific chapter in Democratic politics: the era of the one-person impeachment crusade. Whether his approach was principled or quixotic — and reasonable people can disagree — it is now a spent political strategy. The voters of TX-18, offered a choice between a national provocateur and a local pragmatist, chose the pragmatist.