Germany Calls US Troop Withdrawal 'Foreseeable' as NATO Seeks Clarification

On May 1, 2026, the Pentagon confirmed that approximately 5,000 US active-duty troops will leave Germany within the next six to twelve months [1]. The announcement followed days of public sparring between President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over Washington's conduct of its war with Iran — a conflict launched without notifying most NATO allies [2]. Germany's Defense Minister Boris Pistorius responded by calling the withdrawal "foreseeable," adding that Europeans "must take greater responsibility for their own security" [1]. NATO said it was "working with the US to understand the details of their decision on force posture in Germany" [1].

The drawdown is the latest, and most concrete, rupture in a transatlantic relationship already strained by tariffs on EU automobiles, disputes over energy policy, and fundamental disagreements about the purpose and direction of the Western alliance [3].

The Trigger: Trump, Merz, and the Iran War

The immediate cause is personal and political. Speaking in Marsberg on April 28, Merz criticized Washington's approach to Iran, saying the US was "being humiliated by the Iranian leadership" and that "the Americans obviously have no strategy" [4]. He added: "We are suffering considerably in Germany and in Europe from the consequences of, for example, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz" — the critical waterway through which roughly 20% of global oil supply had flowed before hostilities [4].

Trump fired back, accusing Merz of thinking "it's OK for Iran to have a Nuclear Weapon" and telling the chancellor to stop "interfering" and focus on Germany's economy [2]. Within 48 hours, the Pentagon issued the withdrawal order [3].

The speed of the decision alarmed lawmakers in both parties. Republican Senators Roger Wicker and Representative Mike Rogers, chairs of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, issued a joint statement warning that "prematurely reducing America's forward presence in Europe before those capabilities are fully realised risks undermining deterrence and sending the wrong signal to Vladimir Putin" [5]. Democrats echoed the concern, arguing the move benefits Moscow [5].

What's Actually on the Ground

As of December 2025, 36,436 US active-duty military personnel were stationed across Germany — the largest American contingent in Europe — spread across roughly 20 to 40 installations depending on how "base" is defined [6]. The withdrawal of 5,000 would still leave more than 30,000 troops in country, but the reduction carries operational weight disproportionate to the raw numbers.

Source: DMDC / Stars and Stripes

Data as of May 1, 2026CSV

Germany hosts some of the US military's most consequential infrastructure in the world. Ramstein Air Base is headquarters for US Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa and NATO's Allied Air Command, operating an Air Operations Center described as "the centerpiece of EUCOM and African Command's Command and Control" and home to the European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense system [7]. Stuttgart houses the headquarters of both US European Command (EUCOM) and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) [6]. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment, a rapid-deployment unit based in Vilseck, provides the US military's fastest ground-response option on the continent [8].

Jason Gresh, a Wilson Center fellow, called the withdrawal "the most drastic change concerning our forces based in Europe since the early 1990s," warning that removing units like the 2nd Cavalry Regiment "reduces reaction time and damages multinational relationships built over a decade" [8].

Beyond conventional forces, Germany remains part of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement. Büchel Air Base, operated by the German Air Force, stores an estimated twenty US B61 nuclear bombs under the classified bilateral agreement codenamed "Toolchest" [9]. The US retains custody and launch authority, but German Tornado aircraft (being replaced by F-35s) are designated to deliver the weapons in a conflict. The current withdrawal order does not appear to affect the nuclear mission, but any broader drawdown would inevitably raise questions about the future of these arrangements [9].

The Bill: Cost-Sharing and Who Pays

The annual cost of maintaining the US military presence in Germany runs to approximately $30 billion when salaries, equipment, training, and facilities are included — though that figure reflects what the US would spend on those forces regardless of location [10]. The marginal cost of basing troops in Germany rather than stateside is considerably smaller: the US spends $3–4 billion annually on infrastructure, schools, and transportation at German installations [10].

Germany contributes roughly $1 billion per year toward hosting costs, a figure that has drawn persistent criticism from Washington [11]. Under NATO's direct-funding arrangements renegotiated in 2019, the US contribution was reduced from approximately 22% to 16% — the same share as Germany — for the 2021–2024 cycle [10].

Trump has long framed the relationship as one-sided. But defenders of the current arrangement point out that Germany's hosting of EUCOM and AFRICOM headquarters provides the US with command-and-control capabilities that would cost far more to replicate elsewhere, and that the geographic position in central Europe gives American forces unmatched logistical access to both the eastern NATO flank and the African theater [8].

Germany's Defense Spending: From Laggard to Leader?

For years, Germany's defense spending was a byword for allied free-riding. As recently as 2015, Berlin spent just 1.1% of GDP on defense — well below the NATO-agreed 2% benchmark [12]. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered what then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz called the "Zeitenwende" (turning point), launching a €100 billion special fund for military modernization [13].

Source: World Bank Open Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2024CSV

The trajectory since then has been steep. Germany reached the 2% threshold in 2024 for the first time, spending 1.89% of GDP according to World Bank data [12]. The 2026 defense budget allocates €82.7 billion in regular spending plus €25.5 billion from the Zeitenwende fund, bringing total military expenditure to roughly €108 billion — a 24% year-over-year increase — and pushing the ratio to approximately 2.8% of GDP [13][14].

Source: NATO

Data as of Mar 1, 2026CSV

At NATO's 2025 summit, allies agreed to a new benchmark of 2.8% of GDP for 2026 and 5% by 2035 [13]. Germany's projected spending trajectory aims to reach 3.5% of GDP (over €152 billion) by 2029 [14]. Poland already spends 3.5%, and Greece leads the alliance at 3.9% [15].

The question is whether money alone translates into capability. Germany's Bundeswehr faces chronic procurement delays, personnel shortages, and readiness gaps that spending pledges have not yet resolved. The Heritage Foundation and other analysts have argued that Germany's defense transformation requires not just funding but institutional reform [13].

Local Economies: What Happens When the Bases Shrink

The economic footprint of US bases in Germany extends far beyond the military. Around Ramstein alone, Americans spend approximately €1.4 billion annually in the local economy, according to regional chamber of commerce data [16]. The US Army in Bavaria contributes nearly $1 billion per year to surrounding communities [16].

Nearly 12,000 German civilians work directly at US installations — a figure significant enough that the German government agreed to cover their salaries during the 2025 US government shutdown [17]. The indirect employment multiplier is larger still. Andreas Hausmann, owner of the Hotel America near Ramstein, told Fortune: "Every craftsman, every plumber, every painting company, every small business, even bakeries, taxi companies — everyone is indirectly dependent" [16].

Germany has been through this before. After the Cold War ended, the US cut its Germany-based forces from 227,000 in 1990 to 94,000 by 1995 — removing roughly half of all military and civilian personnel in some communities within five years [18]. Research by the RWI economic institute found that the closures had "noticeable effects" but were "(1) not as severe as predicted, (2) fairly localized, and (3) partially offset by other economic factors" [18]. Some former bases were successfully converted: Mannheim's Benjamin Franklin Village became a residential development for young professionals, and several installations were repurposed as industrial parks [18].

Still, the adjustment was painful for smaller communities. One documented case showed that the departure of 3,000 soldiers, 3,700 dependents, and 325 civilian employees cost a single community approximately $30 million in annual purchasing power [18].

Legal Guardrails: What Congress Can Do

The president has broad authority over military deployments, but Congress has erected procedural barriers. The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits reducing US forces in Europe below 76,000 without first certifying to Congress that NATO allies have been consulted and providing independent assessments of the impact on national security, alliance readiness, and Russian deterrence [19]. The NDAA also mandates that the EUCOM commander remain as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) — a provision designed to prevent the administration from downgrading the European command structure [19].

With approximately 85,000 US troops currently stationed across Europe, a withdrawal of 5,000 from Germany would bring the continental total to roughly 80,000 — still above the 76,000 floor [19]. This means the current drawdown may proceed without triggering the NDAA's certification requirements, though further reductions would hit the statutory tripwire.

The NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 1951 and its 1993 supplementary agreement govern the legal status of US forces in Germany but do not compel a specific force level [20]. No treaty obligation requires the US to maintain a set number of troops in Germany, giving the executive branch significant latitude.

The Strategic Autonomy Argument

Not everyone views the withdrawal as a crisis. A strand of European strategic thinking holds that prolonged US military dominance has allowed Germany and other allies to defer hard decisions about their own defense.

Igor Zevelev, also at the Wilson Center, predicted that the drawdown will "accelerate European strategic autonomy and defense cooperation projects independent of US guarantees" [8]. The European Policy Centre has framed the emerging dynamic as the "Europeanization of NATO" — a process in which European members "strengthen their strategic autonomy, defense capabilities, and leadership roles within the Alliance — not to decouple from the US, but to de-risk overdependence on it" [21].

Germany's own trajectory supports this reading. The Zeitenwende has evolved from an emergency response into what analysts at the Atlas Institute call "a structural transformation backed by cross-party consensus, industrial reform, and institutional adjustments" [14]. The Bundeswehr's planned expansion, including a new Lithuanian brigade and contributions to NATO's enhanced forward presence, suggests Berlin is preparing for a world with fewer American troops on German soil.

But skeptics raise serious objections. A 2020 study in International Security by MIT Press argued that European efforts toward strategic autonomy are hampered by "profound defense capacity shortfalls" and "strategic cacophony" — deep divergences across the continent in threat perceptions, defense priorities, and willingness to use force [22]. Europe has no equivalent to the US military's integrated logistics network, its intelligence capabilities, or its strategic airlift capacity. Replacing those assets within five years is, by most estimates, unrealistic.

Moscow's Calculus

Russia's response has been measured but attentive. Jeffrey Edmonds, a former NSC director for Russia, noted at the Wilson Center that Russian leadership will "certainly see their position with regard to NATO improve" from the weakening of the US-Germany relationship, though the Kremlin already perceives "deeply anti-Russian sentiment in Washington" regardless of troop movements [8].

Katarina Kertysova, also writing for the Wilson Center, warned that the withdrawal "exposes divisions among key NATO allies and fueling anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments in Germany that Russia might seek to amplify" [8]. Moscow has long used information operations to exploit transatlantic disagreements, and a public US-German rift over Iran provides material.

Russian military planners will also be tracking the operational implications. The standing up of a new US corps headquarters in Poland and the redeployment of some Germany-based forces eastward may partially offset the drawdown from a deterrence standpoint [8]. But Peter Zwack, a retired brigadier general and former US defense attaché to Russia, cautioned against discounting the "75-year value of these relationships" embedded in German infrastructure — institutional knowledge and allied interoperability that cannot be replicated by moving units to Poland [8].

Article 5 and the Nuclear Question

Formally, nothing about NATO's Article 5 mutual-defense commitment changes because of a troop withdrawal. Article 5 is a political pledge, not a force-posture requirement: it obliges each ally to take "such action as it deems necessary" in response to an armed attack on another member, without specifying troop levels or forward deployment [23].

In practice, credibility matters as much as legal text. The presence of American soldiers on European soil has long served as a "tripwire" — a guarantee that any attack on NATO territory would immediately involve US casualties and therefore trigger a full American response. Reducing that tripwire, even modestly, changes the deterrence calculus.

The nuclear dimension adds complexity. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements at Büchel are unaffected by the current withdrawal, but they depend on continued US commitment to the broader alliance framework [9]. If the political relationship between Washington and Berlin continues to deteriorate, questions about the reliability of US nuclear guarantees will inevitably follow — regardless of how many B61 bombs remain in underground vaults in the Eifel region.

What Comes Next

The 5,000-troop withdrawal is significant but not irreversible. Previous administrations have adjusted force levels in Germany — Trump's first term saw a planned 12,000-troop reduction that was partially reversed by the Biden administration. The current drawdown falls well short of the NDAA's 76,000-troop European floor, meaning further cuts would require congressional certification [19].

The deeper question is whether this marks a temporary expression of presidential displeasure or a structural shift in American grand strategy. The bipartisan consensus in Washington on China as the primary strategic challenge, combined with the Iran war's drain on US military resources, creates pressures that will outlast any single diplomatic feud. More American troops could be sent closer to China, which Washington views as a greater threat than Russia [6].

For Germany and Europe, the message is clear regardless: the era of automatic American primacy in European defense is ending. Whether that produces a stronger, more self-reliant Europe or a weaker, more fractured one depends on decisions that Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, and their allies will make in the months and years ahead.