Former Congo President Joseph Kabila Becomes Fugitive After 18 Years in Power

On September 30, 2025, a high military court in Kinshasa convicted former President Joseph Kabila of treason, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and insurrection — then sentenced him to death [1]. Kabila was not in the courtroom. He had no lawyer. His whereabouts remain unknown, his last confirmed public appearance in May 2025 in the M23-held city of Goma [2]. The court also ordered him to pay $29 billion in damages to the Congolese state and $4 billion to the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu [3].

The verdict marked the most dramatic turn yet in one of Africa's most consequential political rivalries: the contest between Kabila, who governed the Democratic Republic of the Congo from January 2001 to January 2019, and his successor Félix Tshisekedi, who has spent six years steadily dismantling the Kabila political machine. Whether this amounts to accountability or authoritarianism depends on whom you ask — and the answer carries consequences for 100 million Congolese citizens and for a conflict that has displaced more people than any other on the continent.

The Charges and the Trial

The prosecution of Kabila followed a specific sequence. In April 2025, the DRC's Interior Ministry suspended Kabila's People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), citing its "ambiguous attitude" toward M23's occupation of eastern Congolese territory [4]. In May, the DRC Senate voted 88 to 5 to strip Kabila of presidential immunity, a protection previously guaranteed to former heads of state [5]. The Justice Minister then instructed military prosecutors to initiate proceedings against Kabila "for their direct participation in the aggression conducted by Rwanda through the terrorist group CRA/M23" [6].

The trial began in July 2025 before a military tribunal — military jurisdiction was claimed on the basis that Kabila held the rank of major-general and that the charges involved alleged collaboration with an armed force [7]. Prosecutors sought the death penalty in August [8]. The conviction came in September.

The specific charges included treason for allegedly meeting with M23 leadership, war crimes including intentional murder, rape, and torture, and organizing an insurrection in collaboration with the Rwanda-backed rebel group [1][3]. The prosecution tied some charges to acts during Kabila's presidency — particularly atrocities committed during the Second Congo War (1998–2003) — and others to his post-presidential conduct, specifically his May 2025 visit to Goma while it was under M23 control [7][9].

Fair Trial Questions

The trial's procedural deficiencies are not disputed, even by those who believe Kabila should face prosecution. Human Rights Watch titled its response "Vendetta in Democratic Republic of Congo" and identified two fundamental violations: Kabila was tried in absentia and without defense counsel [10]. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights holds that military courts "should not, in any circumstances whatsoever, have jurisdiction over civilians" — a principle that applies even to former military officers facing political charges [10].

Lewis Mudge, HRW's Director for Central Africa, described the prosecution as looking "less like a quest for justice than a calculated strategy to eliminate a political rival" [10]. HRW acknowledged that Kabila's government had been responsible for serious human rights abuses but argued that "denying a former president basic due process sends a chilling message that other political opponents can face similar treatment" [10].

The DRC's Catholic bishops also objected, recalling that the country's constitution "safeguards the sanctity of human life" and opposing the death penalty on principle [11].

PPRD Deputy Secretary-General Ferdinand Kambere called the entire proceeding "pure theatre" designed to distract from the government's own failures on the eastern conflict [4]. Kabila himself, before his disappearance from public view, denounced Tshisekedi as "drunk on power" [12].

The Money Trail

Whatever the procedural problems of the 2025 trial, the financial record against the Kabila network is extensive and independently documented.

The "Congo Hold-Up" investigation, published in November 2021 by a consortium of 19 media outlets and five NGOs across 18 countries, analyzed 3.5 million leaked documents from Groupe BGFIBank SA, a private bank that opened a Kinshasa subsidiary in 2010 [13]. The bank gave Kabila's sister, Gloria Mteyu, a 40% stake in the subsidiary; his brother, Francis Selemani Mtwale, was appointed to run it [13].

The leaked records showed that Congo's central bank sent $94.5 million to entities connected to the Kabila family, with tens of millions more arriving from state-owned enterprises including $20 million from the mining company Gécamines [13]. Total documented diversions reached at least $138 million between 2013 and 2018 [14].

Separately, a 2017 report by NYU's Congo Research Group found that the Kabila family partially or wholly owned more than 80 companies across farming, mining, banking, real estate, telecommunications, and airlines [15]. Kabila personally held more than 71,000 hectares of farmland. Two family companies controlled diamond permits stretching over 450 miles along the Angolan border. His sister Jaynet Kabila received more mining permits than the country's mining code allows [15][16].

The Sentry, an investigative organization co-founded by George Clooney, documented how Selemani purchased luxury properties in the United States and South Africa using funds diverted from the Congolese government [17]. A criminal complaint was filed in Switzerland over dubious transactions involving the Kabila network and UBS [18].

The military court's order that Kabila pay $29 billion in damages — a figure exceeding the DRC's entire annual GDP — is widely viewed as symbolic rather than enforceable [3].

The Political Calculus

The prosecution cannot be understood outside the political rivalry between Tshisekedi and Kabila.

Tshisekedi took office in January 2019 through what was widely described as a backroom deal: Kabila's coalition allowed Tshisekedi's inauguration in exchange for retaining parliamentary control [7]. That arrangement collapsed in December 2020 when Tshisekedi began purging Kabila allies from government. By 2023, Kabila had gone into self-imposed exile, reportedly to South Africa [2].

Analysts at The Conversation noted that the trial's timing served Tshisekedi's domestic political needs. A June 2025 peace agreement with Rwanda over the M23 conflict created political risk for Tshisekedi, who had built his brand on confronting Rwandan aggression. Prosecuting Kabila allowed him to "demonstrate toughness on M23 while managing fallout from the controversial peace deal" [7].

A central question — raised by HRW and others — is whether Tshisekedi allies with comparable records face any scrutiny. The available evidence suggests they do not. HRW has separately documented a surge in enforced disappearances in Kinshasa under Tshisekedi's watch [19], and the organization's broader reporting describes restrictions on political space that mirror tactics used by Kabila's own government [10]. No senior Tshisekedi ally has been charged with corruption or human rights violations despite ongoing concerns about governance.

Kabila, M23, and the Eastern Crisis

The government's core accusation — that Kabila actively collaborated with M23 — rests on his May 2025 visit to Goma, where he reportedly held talks with rebel leaders while the city was under M23 control [9]. Kabila returned to DRC territory for the first time since his exile specifically to visit this rebel-held zone, a move that the government characterized as direct evidence of treasonous coordination [2][9].

M23, the March 23 Movement, is a predominantly Tutsi armed group that first seized territory in eastern Congo in 2012, was defeated in 2013, and re-emerged in late 2021 with renewed Rwandan military backing [20]. The group captured Goma, the capital of North Kivu province, in January 2025, displacing hundreds of thousands [21].

The relationship between Kabila's political network and armed groups in the east predates M23's resurgence. During Kabila's presidency, his government armed and supported various militia groups as counterweights to Rwandan-backed forces, a strategy that contributed to cycles of violence and civilian suffering [20]. The specific allegation that Kabila personally directed M23 operations, however, rests primarily on his Goma visit and on intelligence claims that the government has not made public in detail.

The humanitarian cost of the eastern conflict is staggering regardless of who bears responsibility. As of September 2025, 8.2 million people were internally displaced in the DRC, up from 4.5 million in 2018 [22]. North and South Kivu alone host more than 4.6 million displaced people [22]. The DRC is the seventh-largest source of refugees globally, with over 1.1 million Congolese refugees abroad [23].

Source: UNHCR

Data as of Sep 1, 2025CSV

More than 500,000 people were newly displaced in eastern DRC in just the first seven weeks of 2025 [22]. UNHCR requires $226 million for its DRC operations in 2025 but has received less than 10% of that amount [22].

Source: UNHCR Population Data

Data as of Dec 31, 2025CSV

Where Is Kabila?

Kabila's location is unknown. He was last seen publicly in May 2025 in Goma [2][9]. Before that, he had been in self-imposed exile since December 2023, reportedly in South Africa [2].

The DRC's ability to compel his return is limited. The military court ordered his immediate arrest [1], but the country's justice system has a near-zero conviction rate for senior officials, and enforcement of the order depends on knowing where Kabila is and on the cooperation of whatever country harbors him. The DRC has extradition treaties with some neighboring states, but enforcement of such agreements across central and southern Africa is inconsistent.

If Kabila is in a country sympathetic to his cause — or simply indifferent to Kinshasa's demands — the death sentence will remain symbolic. The DRC has maintained a de facto moratorium on executions for decades, though the death penalty remains on the books [11].

Comparisons: Bashir, Gbagbo, and the Pattern

Kabila's case joins a growing list of former African leaders facing prosecution after leaving power, each with a different trajectory.

Omar al-Bashir of Sudan was indicted by the International Criminal Court in 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. He remained in power until 2019, when a popular uprising and military coup removed him. Despite the ICC warrant, Bashir was never surrendered to The Hague, and his case remains unresolved amid Sudan's ongoing civil war [24].

Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d'Ivoire was arrested in 2011, transferred to the ICC, and tried for crimes against humanity. He was acquitted in 2019 and returned home in 2021 — an outcome that demonstrated both the difficulty of prosecuting heads of state and the possibility of acquittal when due process is observed [24].

Charles Taylor of Liberia was convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2012 for aiding war crimes and is serving a 50-year sentence in a British prison — the only recent case of a former African head of state completing a full trial and receiving an enforced sentence [24].

The key variable in each case was institutional legitimacy. Taylor's conviction came through an international tribunal with established procedures. Gbagbo's acquittal came through the ICC's standard evidentiary requirements. Bashir's non-prosecution reflects the limits of international enforcement. Kabila's conviction came through a domestic military court that did not meet basic fair trial standards — a distinction that will determine whether the international community treats the verdict as legitimate.

International Complicity and Response

International actors maintained relationships with Kabila throughout his 18-year presidency despite documented human rights abuses. The United States, Belgium (the former colonial power), China, and the United Nations all engaged with Kabila's government.

China's involvement is particularly well-documented. The $6.2 billion minerals-for-infrastructure deal between Chinese state-owned firms and the DRC — the so-called "Deal of the Century" — was shown by The Sentry to have concealed a "multimillion-dollar embezzlement and bribery operation," with funds meant for roads, hospitals, and schools ending up with Kabila's inner circle [25].

The Trump administration's response to Kabila's conviction has been shaped by its interest in DRC's mineral wealth — the country holds significant reserves of cobalt, coltan, and other critical minerals. Kabila's conviction complicates Washington's efforts to broker peace between Kinshasa, M23, and Rwanda as the U.S. seeks access to the region's mining sector [11].

No major Western government or international institution has publicly acknowledged its role in sustaining Kabila's rule or adjusted policy in direct response to his fall. The UN, which maintained a peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) in the DRC throughout Kabila's presidency, has called for "conditions for internal dialogue" without specifically addressing the trial's procedural failures [11].

What Remains of Kabila's Network

The PPRD's suspension does not erase Kabila's political infrastructure. His network retains parliamentary seats, provincial governorships, and appointments across state enterprises, though the exact numbers have shifted as Tshisekedi has worked to co-opt or remove Kabila loyalists since 2020 [4][7].

The risk of destabilization is real. Kabila's base is concentrated in Katanga (his home region in the southeast) and among communities in the east who depended on PPRD-aligned patronage networks. Dismantling those networks without providing alternatives could push marginalized groups toward armed factions — a pattern that has repeated itself throughout Congo's post-independence history [7][20].

Kabila launched a new political movement even after the death sentence, signaling that he intends to remain a factor in Congolese politics from wherever he is [26]. Whether that movement can function under the current repressive conditions is uncertain.

The Central Contradiction

The Kabila case crystallizes a tension that recurs across post-conflict states: the gap between the demand for accountability and the capacity of existing institutions to deliver it fairly.

The financial evidence against the Kabila network is substantial, documented by independent investigators across multiple continents. The humanitarian record of his presidency — particularly the militias that operated under state protection in the east — warrants serious judicial examination. Millions of Congolese suffered under his governance, and millions more continue to suffer from conflicts that his policies fueled.

But a death sentence issued by a military court, in absentia, without defense counsel, against a political rival of the sitting president, does not constitute accountability. It constitutes its opposite: the use of judicial form to achieve political ends, a pattern that entrenches impunity rather than ending it. If Kabila can be condemned without due process, so can anyone.

The DRC's 100 million citizens — many of whom voted for Kabila, and many of whom suffered under him — deserve both accountability and due process. The September 2025 verdict delivered neither reliably.