Elon Musk and Tim Cook Confirmed to Attend Trump-Xi Summit

When President Donald Trump boards Air Force One for Beijing this week, he will not be traveling alone. Alongside the usual entourage of diplomats and national security advisers, the White House has confirmed that 16 chief executives of major American corporations — including Tesla's Elon Musk and Apple's Tim Cook — will join the president for his May 14–15 summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping [1][2].

The delegation reads like a roster of companies with the most to gain — or lose — from Beijing's regulatory apparatus: Blackstone's Stephen Schwarzman, Goldman Sachs's David Solomon, Citigroup's Jane Fraser, Qualcomm's Cristiano Amon, Mastercard's Michael Miebach, Visa's Ryan McInerney, Micron Technology's Sanjay Mehrotra, and others [1][3]. One name conspicuously absent: Jensen Huang, chief executive of Nvidia, the world's most valuable company and dominant supplier of the AI chips that sit at the center of U.S.-China technology tensions [4].

The inclusion of Musk and Cook — two executives whose companies derive enormous revenue from China and whose operations depend on the continued goodwill of the Chinese Communist Party — has drawn scrutiny from ethics watchdogs, opposition lawmakers, and trade policy analysts. The central question is straightforward: Do these executives serve the national interest by being in the room, or do their commercial entanglements compromise the American negotiating position?

The Stakes on the Table

The summit's agenda is sweeping. U.S. and Chinese negotiators are expected to address tariffs, artificial intelligence export controls, semiconductor policy, rare earth supply chains, Taiwan, and the ongoing Iran war [5][6]. As of May 2026, the overall U.S. tariff rate on Chinese goods stands at roughly 31%, following a partial reduction earlier this year, while China has cut its tariffs on U.S. products to 10% [7]. Both sides agreed to a tentative one-year suspension of measures regarding rare earth export controls, with China postponing planned restrictions on five additional rare earths until late 2026 [7].

On semiconductors, the picture remains fractured. The Trump administration partially eased export restrictions on advanced chips in December 2025, shifting from a "presumption of denial" to a "case-by-case review" for certain processors, while maintaining a 25% tariff [5]. Additional tariffs on Chinese semiconductor imports, currently set at 50%, are scheduled to increase further in June 2027 [8]. Analysts at CSIS described the relationship as one of "managed competition, in which rivalry persists but is increasingly constrained by the need to avoid systemic disruption" [6].

Few major breakthroughs are expected. But agreements on aerospace (Boeing aircraft purchases), agriculture (soybean imports), energy, and a possible new bilateral "trade board" are all reported to be in the mix [3][5].

Apple's China Dependency: $25.5 Billion and Counting

Tim Cook's presence in the delegation is inseparable from Apple's deep financial and operational ties to China. In its fiscal first quarter of 2026 (ending December 2025), Apple reported $25.5 billion in Greater China revenue — a 38% year-over-year surge that Cook called "the best iPhone quarter in history in Greater China" [9][10]. The performance was fueled in part by Apple's decision to price the iPhone 17 at 5,999 RMB, qualifying it for Beijing's $43 billion electronics subsidy program [10].

Source: Apple Earnings Reports

Data as of Feb 1, 2026CSV

China is not just a market for Apple — it is the backbone of its supply chain. Foxconn's Zhengzhou facility, the world's largest iPhone factory, operates more than 90 production lines with over 300,000 workers [11]. While Apple has begun diversifying production toward India and Vietnam, the majority of its manufacturing remains in China, and Foxconn is set to serve as the exclusive assembler for Apple's forthcoming foldable iPhone, with mass production planned for late 2026 [11][12].

This dual dependency — as both seller and manufacturer — gives Beijing substantial leverage. Xi's government has previously encouraged nationalist "Buy China" campaigns that push consumers away from foreign brands like the iPhone [13]. Customs delays, tax audits, and regulatory scrutiny are tools that Chinese authorities have shown willingness to deploy against U.S. companies during trade disputes [13].

Tesla's Shanghai Lifeline

Musk's business exposure to China is, if anything, even more concentrated. Tesla's Shanghai Gigafactory delivered more than 97,100 vehicles in December 2025 alone, setting a monthly record, and accounted for more than half of Tesla's total global deliveries in 2025 [14]. In Q1 2026, the facility achieved wholesale deliveries of 213,398 vehicles, up 23.5% year over year [15].

Source: Tesla IR / CPCA Data

Data as of Apr 1, 2026CSV

The Shanghai plant is not merely a production site — it is the centerpiece of Tesla's global strategy. The company has maxed out a $5.8 billion Chinese bank debt facility [16], and in February 2026, Tesla opened a Shanghai Megafactory for energy-storage products, its first such plant outside the United States [14]. Tesla executives have publicly described the Shanghai factory as "the key to unlocking robot mass production," with Gen 3 Optimus humanoid robot volume production planned there before the end of 2026 [17].

Tesla is also waiting on Chinese regulatory approval for its Full Self-Driving technology — a decision that could unlock a major new revenue stream in the world's largest auto market [3]. In April 2026, Musk met personally with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, the same official who fast-tracked the original Gigafactory construction when he was Shanghai's Communist Party secretary [3].

Meanwhile, Musk's other major venture — SpaceX's Starlink satellite internet service — remains completely banned in China. Chinese law prohibits foreign companies from offering satellite-based connectivity, and in December 2025, authorities penalized a foreign vessel for using Starlink while docked at Ningbo port [18]. Tesla has publicly stated it will not use Starlink in China and keeps all vehicle data on Chinese servers [19].

The Conflict-of-Interest Question

The presence of executives with billions of dollars at stake in ongoing regulatory decisions raises questions that extend beyond optics. Both Musk and Cook hold what amount to informal advisory roles with the Trump administration — Musk through his leadership of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and his close personal relationship with the president, Cook through years of cultivated access across administrations.

Democratic Representative Rosa DeLauro has publicly argued that Musk's involvement in government funding decisions "protects his Chinese investments" [20]. The Center for American Progress has catalogued Trump's own conflicts of interest in China, noting that Trump's Cabinet and White House appointees constitute "the wealthiest administration in history — including more than a dozen reported billionaires — with an abnormally long list of potential conflicts of interest" [21][22].

The legal framework around these arrangements is murky. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits payments or benefits to foreign officials for corrupt purposes, with broad definitions of both "payment" and "foreign official" [23]. But CEOs traveling as part of a presidential delegation occupy an ambiguous space — they are not government employees subject to federal conflict-of-interest statutes, yet they participate in discussions where sovereign decisions affecting their shareholders will be made.

Trump has broken with the precedent set by every president since John F. Kennedy by not requiring political appointees to sign an additional ethics pledge [22]. Whether the executives in the delegation have signed any disclosure or recusal agreements regarding matters discussed at the summit has not been publicly reported.

Historical Precedent: CEOs and Presidential Diplomacy

Bringing business leaders on diplomatic trips is not new. During Trump's first state visit to China in November 2017, nearly 30 business leaders accompanied him, and the two sides announced $250 billion in business agreements [24]. President Obama included CEOs in trade-focused events like the Summit of the Americas [25]. Previous administrations have long argued that commercial diplomacy advances the national interest by opening markets and creating American jobs.

The 2026 delegation is smaller — 16 executives compared with roughly 30 in 2017 — reflecting what analysts describe as the structural deterioration of U.S.-China commercial relations since the onset of the trade war [24]. The composition also signals priorities: the White House excluded Nvidia's Huang, reportedly to keep the focus on agriculture, aviation, and manufacturing rather than the most contentious AI chip export issues [4].

Defenders of the practice argue that executives bring irreplaceable ground-level knowledge of how Chinese markets actually operate. "No diplomat understands supply chain logistics in Zhengzhou the way Tim Cook does," one trade policy analyst told Semafor [26]. During Trump's 2017 visit, CEO participation helped close specific deals in energy, agriculture, and aviation that might not have materialized through government-to-government channels alone.

The Steelman Case — and Its Limits

The strongest argument for including Musk and Cook is pragmatic: these executives run companies that collectively employ hundreds of thousands of American workers, and the trade and technology policies on the summit agenda will directly affect those jobs. Apple's U.S. operations support an estimated 2.7 million jobs across its supply chain and app ecosystem. Tesla employs roughly 140,000 people globally, with major U.S. manufacturing operations in Texas, California, and Nevada.

Sectors facing the most immediate consequences from summit outcomes include semiconductors (where Qualcomm and Micron, also in the delegation, have major China exposure), electric vehicles (subject to both tariffs and regulatory requirements), rare earth minerals (critical for electronics and defense), and consumer electronics (where Apple dominates) [5][7].

Having executives who understand these supply chains in the room could, in theory, help U.S. negotiators identify which concessions matter most and which Chinese proposals contain hidden traps. The establishment of a bilateral "trade board" — one of the reported outcomes under discussion — would benefit from private-sector input on implementation [5].

Beijing's Leverage

The counterargument centers on asymmetry. Xi Jinping holds specific, actionable leverage over both Apple and Tesla that could shape what the U.S. side is willing to offer.

For Apple: Beijing controls the regulatory environment for Foxconn's factories, can encourage or discourage consumer boycotts of foreign products, and administers the electronics subsidy program that drove Apple's record Q1 2026 performance [10][13]. In advance of the summit, Chinese officials previewed an expanded "blocking statute" regime — a legal framework designed to counter the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions and export controls [27]. The implicit message: companies that cooperate with U.S. restrictions on China could face legal consequences for doing so.

For Tesla: the Chinese government controls factory operating permits, bank lending relationships (Tesla has $5.8 billion in Chinese bank debt), Full Self-Driving regulatory approval, and the competitive landscape in which Tesla competes against heavily subsidized domestic rivals like BYD [16][28]. Tesla China posted a 36% sales rise in early 2026, but local competitors are closing the gap with aggressive new model launches [28].

This leverage creates a dynamic where Musk and Cook may be reluctant to press hard on issues — human rights, Taiwan, technology transfer — that could provoke regulatory retaliation against their companies. As one Foreign Affairs analysis put it, the arrangement risks becoming a "China trap" in which commercial dependencies constrain diplomatic ambitions [29].

Who Was Not Invited — and Why It Matters

The exclusion of Jensen Huang carries its own significance. Nvidia's AI chips represent the sharpest point of U.S.-China technology competition, and the company has been caught between Washington's export controls and Beijing's demand for access to advanced processors. An analyst quoted by the Seoul Economic Daily observed: "Without Huang's presence, the industry reads this as a signal that chip export issues remain a sticking point" [4][30].

The absence suggests the White House is deliberately keeping the most contentious technology issues off the formal summit table — or at least out of the CEO photo opportunity. Whether that represents diplomatic prudence or an unwillingness to confront the hardest questions about technology competition is a matter of interpretation.

The Workers and Shareholders in the Balance

Beyond the executives and heads of state, the summit's outcomes will ripple through the American economy. Apple's Greater China segment alone generated $25.5 billion in its most recent quarter [9]. Tesla's Shanghai Gigafactory produces more than half the company's global vehicle output [14]. Qualcomm derives approximately 62% of its revenue from China. Micron has faced Chinese regulatory actions that temporarily banned its products from critical infrastructure projects.

The sectors most exposed — semiconductors, EVs, rare earths, consumer electronics — employ millions of American workers across manufacturing, design, sales, and support roles. Tariff rates, export controls, and market access decisions made at or around the summit will affect component costs, supply chain routing, and ultimately consumer prices.

For shareholders, the stakes are equally concrete. Apple's stock price has historically moved on China revenue figures, and any signal from the summit about tariff relief or market access restrictions would be immediately priced in. Tesla's valuation is closely tied to its China growth trajectory and the pending FSD approval [16].

What to Watch

The summit itself will produce communiqués, handshake photos, and carefully managed announcements. The more consequential developments will unfold in the weeks and months afterward: whether Tesla receives FSD approval, whether Apple's subsidy access continues, whether rare earth export controls remain suspended, and whether the proposed trade board takes shape with real authority or becomes another forum for managed disagreement.

The presence of Musk, Cook, and their fellow CEOs in Beijing raises a question that transcends this particular summit: In an era when the world's largest companies have financial interests that rival the GDP of mid-sized nations, can the line between commercial diplomacy and corporate capture of foreign policy be meaningfully maintained? The answer may depend less on the legal frameworks — which remain ambiguous — than on whether the public can see clearly enough what is being negotiated, by whom, and for whose benefit.