Eleven Confirmed Dead in Washington State Chemical Accident After All Bodies Recovered

At 7:15 a.m. on Tuesday, May 26, 2026, a storage tank at the Nippon Dynawave Packaging Company in Longview, Washington, failed. Within moments, an estimated 550,000 to 570,000 gallons of white liquor — a strongly alkaline solution of sodium hydroxide and sodium sulfide used to dissolve wood into pulp — surged through work areas of the paper mill [1][2]. Nine workers died at the scene. Two more were pulled from the wreckage alive and transported to hospitals, where they later succumbed to their injuries [3]. By Saturday, May 31, recovery crews had located and identified the remains of all eleven victims [4].

Washington Governor Bob Ferguson called it "the deadliest industrial tragedy in modern Washington state history" [5].

The Chemical: What White Liquor Does to the Body

White liquor is not a single substance but a solution composed primarily of sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) and sodium sulfide, with disodium carbonate also present [3]. It is classified as highly corrosive. In pulp and paper manufacturing, it serves the essential function of breaking down lignin — the organic polymer that holds wood fibers together — during the Kraft pulping process [6].

Sodium hydroxide, the dominant component, carries an OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 2 milligrams per cubic meter as a ceiling value, meaning workers should never be exposed above this concentration at any point during a shift [7]. In liquid form at the concentrations used in paper milling, direct skin contact causes rapid chemical burns. Inhalation of aerosolized droplets or vapor damages airway tissue. Sodium sulfide adds a secondary hazard: it can release hydrogen sulfide gas, which is toxic at concentrations above 20 parts per million and can cause rapid loss of consciousness and death at concentrations above 100 ppm [7].

The timeline of the Longview disaster — nine deaths at the scene, two more in hospital — indicates that the workers closest to the tank were overwhelmed by the volume and velocity of the liquid release, not by gradual inhalation. This pattern is consistent with a catastrophic structural failure rather than a slow leak, distinguishing it from incidents where workers are exposed to airborne chemical concentrations over hours [6].

Who Died

Cowlitz County Coroner Dana Tucker identified the eleven victims on May 31: Gilberto Bernal, 52; Tyler Covington, 29; Bradley Covington, 27; Robert Wilson, 48; Dale Miller, 54; Jared Ammons, 35; Braydon Finkas, 38; Clinton Doran, 26; John Forsberg, 51; Norman Barlow, 58; and Dillon Miller [4][8].

Tyler and Bradley Covington were brothers [9]. Brad Covington had worked as an electrical and instrumentation technician at Nippon since 2021. Braydon Finkas, an electrician, had been with the company since 2016. Gilberto Bernal, also an electrician, was a 15-year veteran of the facility. Dale Miller, a journeyman millwright, had joined only in December 2025 — less than six months before his death [9][10].

The range of tenure among the dead — from less than six months to more than 15 years — cuts against any simple explanation that inexperience or unfamiliarity with the facility was a primary factor. Several victims held skilled trade positions (electricians, instrumentation technicians, millwrights), suggesting they were working in or near the tank area during what CBS News described as a shift change [3][9].

In addition to the eleven dead, eight people sustained injuries, including seven mill workers and one firefighter. Injuries ranged from severe chemical burns to eye and skin irritation. Some patients were transported to the Legacy Oregon Burn Center in Portland. By May 27, five of the injured had been discharged from hospitals [11][12].

Five Days of Recovery

The Longview Fire Department received reports of "an implosion or explosion of a tank with three burned and one missing" at approximately 7:00 a.m. [12]. Crews arrived at 7:18 a.m. About 40 firefighters and paramedics responded alongside a regional hazmat team [12]. The Washington National Guard later provided decontamination support to recovery teams [5].

Recovery operations proved slow. The site remained structurally unstable, with exposed electrical wiring and collapsed infrastructure [3]. Corrosive white liquor coated surfaces throughout the affected work areas, requiring crews to undergo decontamination after each rotation [5]. At one point, recovery was suspended entirely because of the chemical hazard [6].

By Thursday, May 28, six of the nine missing workers had been found in a gathering area near the tank, suggesting they may have been assembling at the start of a shift when the rupture occurred [3]. The seventh body was recovered Friday. The final two were found Saturday, May 31, after crews moved heavy debris and conducted drone surveys of the perimeter [4].

Six of the nine bodies recovered on-site were found in the same area — a detail that may prove significant to investigators examining whether workers had adequate warning time or escape routes.

A Thin Regulatory Paper Trail

The Washington Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) inspected the Nippon Dynawave facility three times in the five years before the disaster [13]. The total fines assessed over that period: $3,400 [13][14].

Source: Washington Dept. of Labor & Industries

Data as of May 31, 2026CSV

The specific violations were: a $700 fine in 2021 for a respiratory protection violation; a $700 fine for a platform lacking guardrails at a height greater than four feet; and a $2,700 fine for failing to require face coverings during the COVID-19 pandemic [13]. In 2025, after a worker lost a finger, the company was cited for failing to preserve equipment until a state inspector could investigate, though no fine amount was publicly reported for that citation [13].

None of the documented violations related to chemical storage, tank integrity, or process safety [13].

Two separate safety inspections were already open at the time of the May 26 rupture. One, initiated in March 2026, stemmed from an anonymous complaint about a valve on a tank holding aqua ammonia. The second, opened May 6, 2026, concerned a sinkhole caused by a failed drain [13][14]. Neither had been resolved before the disaster.

Workers Had Raised Concerns

Mackenzie Ammons, widow of Jared Ammons, told KOMO News that her husband had expressed misgivings about conditions at the plant. "He told me things. He and his friends talked, and I heard that things weren't right," she said [15]. Jared Ammons, an electrician, had gone to work early that Tuesday to leave in time for a prenatal appointment — the couple's first ultrasound [15].

Simeon Osborn, the attorney representing the Ammons family, said he had spoken with other workers and families who shared concerns about the facility's operations. "If we think for a second that these investigations are lacking in any way, we stand ready to pursue the truth independently," Osborn said. "If there were safety issues, investigators must transparently produce those facts so that employees of the company and the Longview community get the answers and the accountability they deserve" [15][16].

Environmental Fallout

The ruptured tank had a capacity of 900,000 gallons. Officials estimated it was roughly two-thirds full at the time of the failure, with 550,000 to 570,000 gallons released [2]. Approximately 25,000 gallons remained in the damaged tank afterward, leaking slowly [3].

High-pH contaminated water entered a network of ditches and sloughs near the facility and reached the Columbia River, with a spike in alkalinity detected at the plant's river discharge point around 7:15 a.m. [17][18]. Dead carp were recovered from dikes along the river [18].

The ditch system sits above the aquifer and well field that supplies Longview's drinking water. The EPA and Washington Department of Ecology coordinated to divert contaminated water away from the wellhead area, flushing it through the city's ditch system and diluting it before discharge into the Columbia [17][18]. By Friday, May 30, officials stated there had been no detectable effects on Longview's air quality or water supply and that it remained safe to swim and fish in the Columbia River [17].

Where This Ranks Among U.S. Industrial Disasters

With eleven dead, the Longview implosion is the third-deadliest chemical facility accident in the United States in the 21st century, behind only the BP Texas City Refinery explosion of 2005 (15 dead, 180 injured) and the West Fertilizer Company explosion in West, Texas, in 2013 (15 dead, more than 160 injured) [19][20].

Source: CSB, OSHA, News Reports

Data as of May 31, 2026CSV

Washington State has not historically been among the states with the highest rates of chemical facility incidents — Texas, Louisiana, and the Gulf Coast industrial corridor account for a disproportionate share of major U.S. chemical accidents [19]. The Longview disaster is an outlier for the Pacific Northwest, which helps explain the scale of public shock and political response.

Investigations Launched

The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) opened a formal investigation on May 27, the day after the rupture [21]. Washington's Department of Labor and Industries has investigators on-site, though the formal investigation will not begin until recovery operations are complete — a process L&I said could take up to six months [21].

The cause of the tank failure has not been determined. Fire officials said it was too early to identify why the tank ruptured [6]. Key questions include the age of the tank, its maintenance and inspection history, whether corrosion had weakened the structure, and whether process safety management (PSM) protocols under OSHA applied to this facility [7][22].

That last question is not trivial. OSHA's PSM standard covers facilities that use or store highly hazardous chemicals above threshold quantities. Whether white liquor — a process chemical rather than a finished product — triggers PSM requirements at paper mills was described as "not immediately clear" by reporting from OPB and the Insurance Journal [7][22].

Legal Exposure and Precedent

Nippon Dynawave Packaging is a subsidiary of Nippon Paper Group, a publicly traded Japanese conglomerate [23]. The facility had been undergoing a "turnaround effort" under its foreign owners, according to the Seattle Times [23].

On the civil side, families of the eleven dead and eight injured may pursue wrongful death and personal injury claims. Employees are generally covered by Washington's workers' compensation system through L&I, but attorneys have noted that if the company's conduct is found to have been willful or egregious, claims beyond the standard workers' compensation framework may be available [16][24]. Independent contractors or non-employees, including the injured firefighter, would have direct claims against Nippon [24].

Criminal liability is also in play. Washington state law allows for criminal prosecution under industrial safety statutes when employer conduct amounts to willful violation of safety requirements resulting in death. Federal OSHA penalties — which currently cap at approximately $156,000 per willful violation — are widely regarded as insufficient deterrents for large corporations [19]. In comparable incidents, such as the BP Texas City explosion, civil settlements have reached into the billions of dollars: BP ultimately paid over $2.1 billion in settlements and fines related to that disaster [20].

Multiple law firms have already announced they are investigating claims on behalf of families and survivors [16][24].

The Regulation Debate

The Longview disaster has renewed a familiar argument about industrial safety oversight. Critics of the current regulatory model point to structural problems: Washington's L&I investigates largely based on complaints or post-incident reviews, and the agency faces resource constraints that limit proactive inspections [7]. Three inspections in five years at a facility handling hundreds of thousands of gallons of corrosive chemicals is a ratio that critics call inadequate.

Engineering professor Stephen Kmiotek noted that chemical tanks have a failure rate of approximately 1 per 1 million annually and that "there are a lot of measures in place to keep people safe" [7]. That framing supports the argument that catastrophic failures are rare and that the existing safety infrastructure works for the vast majority of facilities.

But public health expert Stephen Lester identified a gap: "Without these health-based guidelines, you're ending up with some person making the judgment about what's acceptable and what's not" [7]. Workplace exposure standards, he noted, do not account for vulnerable populations — children, elderly residents, or immunocompromised individuals in surrounding communities.

The fact that two open safety complaints existed at the time of the rupture — one involving a valve on a chemical tank — will be scrutinized closely. Whether those complaints, if resolved faster, could have prevented or flagged conditions leading to the implosion is unknown. But the timeline raises questions about whether complaint-driven enforcement can keep pace with the risks at aging industrial facilities.

What Comes Next

Nippon Dynawave has shut down the facility, with only critical infrastructure still operating. The company stated it has made arrangements to continue paying employees who are not working [3][23].

Concrete policy proposals have not yet been announced in response to this specific incident. However, the OPB and Insurance Journal reported that the disaster has already intensified scrutiny of industrial tank safety regulations on the West Coast, coming alongside a separate chemical emergency at a GKN Aerospace facility in Garden Grove, California [7][22]. Whether the federal government moves to clarify PSM applicability to paper mills, or whether Washington State enacts its own facility siting or tank inspection requirements, will depend in part on the findings of the CSB and L&I investigations.

For the families of the eleven dead — a 15-year company veteran and a six-month hire, two brothers, an expectant father who came in early to leave early — the regulatory and legal proceedings will unfold over months or years. The community of Longview, a city of roughly 40,000 where the paper industry has been an economic anchor for generations, is contending with a loss that is both industrial and deeply personal [9][10][15].